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On the eleventh day of the eleventh month at 11 o’clock every year, in the United Kingdom 
and the countries of the Commonwealth, life stands still for two minutes as the country 
commemorates the end of the First World War. In Germany, in certain regions so inclined, at 
the very same moment enthusiastic self-proclaimed jesters hold rambunctious parties to 
declare the carnival season open, while those less enthusiastic about this so-called ‘fifth’ 
season most likely take no note of the day and time. This stark contrast can be ascribed to 
many aspects of the divergent experiences and commemorative practices of British and 
German history over the course of the ‘short’ twentieth century from 1914 to 1991 and its 
violent cataclysms. However, a central one of those aspects is the way the official end of the 
First World War was actually experienced in the two different countries. As Robert Gerwarth 
has put it in the subtitle of his recent book on the “vanquished” land empires of Europe, in 
large parts of the continent the war simply “failed to end.”1 While in victorious Britain one could, 
and can, commemorate the end of the war at a precise date and time, the same is less true 
of Germany, and much less true of Eastern Europe. Notwithstanding the armistice signed in 
November 1918, peace for people in many regions thus remained elusive and violence 
remained ever-present. Indeed, the war unleashed “seismic forces”, revolutionary turmoil, and 
civil wars which “transformed the political landscape of much of the old continent.”2 Speaking 
to the fact that violence as a societal phenomenon can be considered a “modern obsession” 
of the twentieth century, Richard Bessel has investigated how changing mentalities and 
attitudes towards violence in Europe and North America have shaped modern history. In his 
observation, it was only after the end of the Second World War in 1945 that there was “a truly 
broad challenge to the legitimacy of violence per se.”3 For the interwar period, however, he 
finds political violence a common phenomenon across large parts of Europe: a “prominent 
feature of German political life”; an obvious factor in Italy; especially brutal in Eastern Europe; 
but present also in France and indeed in Britain, though to a much lesser extent and gaining 
significantly less traction.4 Nevertheless, it has sometimes been suggested that a comparison 
 
1 Robert Gerwarth, The Vanquished: Why the First World War Failed to End, 1917-1923 (London, 
2016). 
2 Robert Gerwarth and John Horne, “Paramilitarism in Europe after the Great War: An Introduction”, in 
Robert Gerwarth and John Horne (eds.), War in Peace. Paramilitary Violence in Europe after the Great 
War (Oxford, 2012), p. 1. 
3 Richard Bessel, Violence: A Modern Obsession (London, 2015), p. 11, emphasis in original. 
4 Bessel, Violence, pp. 99-132, quotation on p. 101. A similar concern regarding the modern obsession 
with violence is voiced by Joanna Bourke in her recent work Wounding the World: How Military Violence 
and War-Play Invade Our Lives (London, 2014), in which she asks how “the militarization of society 
normalize[s] and morally neutralize[s] the effects of violence”, p. 6. 
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between Britain and Germany regarding interwar political violence would largely be a 
nonsensical exercise, as, in the words of Adrian Gregory, “[t]o write about political violence in 
inter-war Britain, is in any normal terms, to discuss a striking absence.”5 This thesis takes 
issue with this assessment. It seeks to address a lacuna in the research by bringing together 
in a truly comparative perspective analyses of perceptions of political violence in interwar 
Britain and Germany. In this, the thesis hopes to chart the processes which led to the 
establishment and reinforcement, on the one hand, of the image of Britain as a “peaceable 
kingdom” while in Weimar Germany political violence not only failed to be controlled but also 
became increasingly defensible in public language.6 
     When this thesis began to be conceived of, in 2014-2015, it was borne out of an acute 
awareness of the significance of the centenary of the First World War, and its undeniably far-
reaching consequences for virtually all European, as well as many non-European, nations. An 
interest in the effects of four years of industrialised mass killing on postwar societies and, in 
particular, how it shaped attitudes to political violence in its aftermath stood at the beginning 
of this project. In the intervening years much has changed. Our own times have witnessed an 
electoral shift towards more right-wing nationalist parties, a rise in populist politics, and a 
resurgence of political violence in democratic nations throughout the ‘West’, including Britain 
and Germany. The long list of Islamist and Islamophobic attacks, of anti-Semitic, racist, and 
homophobic hate crime and shootings, the elections of right-wing nationalist leaders across 
the world, whether Viktor Orbán in Hungary, Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, or indeed Donald Trump 
in the United States of America, and political assassinations, such as those of Labour MP Jo 
Cox in June 2016 and that of CDU politician Walter Lübcke in June 2019 by right-wing 
radicals,7 have had their undoubted effect on this project’s progress and have influenced the 
research questions and the writing of this thesis. A renewed interest, in the present day, in the 
 
5 Adrian Gregory, “Peculiarities of the English? War, Violence and Politics: 1900-1939”, Journal of 
Modern European History, 1 (2003), p. 54. 
6 Jon Lawrence, “Forging a Peaceable Kingdom: War, Violence, and Fear of Brutalization in post-First 
World War Britain”, The Journal of Modern History, 75/3 (2003), pp. 557-589. The term is discussed 
further below. 
7 A by no means exhaustive list of deadly attacks, hate crimes, and domestic terrorism over the past 
five years might include: the Islamist attacks on French satirical magazine “Charlie Hebdo” in January 
2015; the Islamist attacks in Paris in November of the same year; the shooting at a gay club in Orlando, 
Florida, in June 2016; the Islamist attack on the Berlin Christmas market in December 2016; the Islamist 
attack on Westminster Bridge, London, in March 2017; the anti-Semitic shooting at a synagogue in 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in October 2018; the right-wing extremist attacks in Christchurch, New 
Zealand, in March 2019; the shooting targeting Latinos in El Paso, Texas, in August 2019; the attempted 
attack on a synagogue, and subsequent shooting at a Turkish restaurant, in Halle (Saale), Saxony-
Anhalt, on Yom Kippur in October 2019; the Islamophobic shooting at two shisha bars in Hanau, Hesse, 
in February 2020; on Jo Cox, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/16/jo-cox-obituary; on 
Walter Lübcke, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-48496972 [accessed 29.04.2020]. 
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role and significance of language as a tool for legitimising violence, has served to shift the 
focus of the thesis away from an interest in mainly revisiting the immediate post-1918 period 
one hundred years on, and towards a more acutely felt necessity to investigate the ways in 
which language, especially that which is produced in public forums, was used to discuss, 
explain, excuse, or condemn political violence at this crucial time between the two world wars. 
While right-wing leaders today openly declare it their goal to “push the boundaries of the say-
able,”8 and journalists and commentators lament the increasing amounts of “hate speech” 
online and fear a deterioration and toxification of political discourse,9 it is clear that we still 
grapple with the question of how democratic societies can speak about, stand up to, and react 
appropriately to acts of political violence which threaten their principles and identities. There 
has therefore remained a humble hope, while undertaking this research, of the possibility of 
drawing conclusions from the past for the benefit of facing these challenges in the present. 
 
Political violence in the interwar period is at once a topic which has been written about 
extensively, and not much at all. Specifically, texts on individual countries and their post-First 
World War experiences with political violence are quite numerous, while works taking a 
broader comparative, European or even global view are much rarer and have only recently 
started to emerge. The most comprehensive such work is the edited volume by Robert 
Gerwarth and John Horne, War in Peace (2012).10 As in several earlier articles, the editors 
begin to develop a Europe-wide, and in places transnational, view of the many violent post-
First World War conflicts; the book rightly contains chapters on the very violent regions of 
Eastern Europe, Russia, East-Central Europe, and also the Balkans, the Baltic, and Finland. 
Happily, however, it also includes a chapter on Britain’s culture of paramilitarism in Ireland, as 
well as a comparative approach to Irish and Polish nationalist paramilitary forces and the 
 
8 Alexander Gauland, then leader of Germany’s right-wing Alternative für Deutschland party, cited in 
Astrid Séville, “Vom Sagbaren zum Machbaren? Rechtspopulistische Sprache und Gewalt“, Aus Politik 
und Zeitgeschichte, 49-50/2019, https://www.bpb.de/apuz/301138/vom-sagbaren-zum-machbaren-
rechtspopulistische-sprache-und-gewalt [accessed 02.03.2020]. Unless otherwise stated, all 
translations from German my own. 
9 For example: Julya Rabinowich, “Hass im Netz”, Zeit, 16/2019, https://www.zeit.de/2019/16/sprache-
internet-social-media-hass-anonymitaet/komplettansicht; “Durs Grünbein über die Verrohung der 
Sprache. ‚Das ist sprachliche Aufrüstung, die zu Gewalt führen wird‘”, Interview, Deutschlandfunk, 
05.06.2018, https://www.deutschlandfunkkultur.de/durs-gruenbein-ueber-die-verrohung-der-sprache-
das-ist.1270.de.html?dram:article_id=419600; Archie Bland, “How did the language of politics get so 
toxic?“, Guardian, 31.07.2016, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jul/31/how-did-the-
language-of-politics-get-so-toxic [all accessed 30.04.2020]. 
10 Robert Gerwarth and John Horne (eds.), War in Peace. Paramilitary Violence in Europe after the 
Great War (Oxford, 2012). 
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symbolic meaning of their violence.11 Gerwarth and Horne argue, furthermore, for taking an 
even more global perspective on these conflicts in future, expanding into the colonial theatre 
especially in analysing British and French experiences with political violence, which of course 
continued, and intensified, in the post-Second World War era of decolonisation.12 The present 
thesis undertakes a first step in this direction. 
     Another, more recent volume to bring together views from multiple European countries and 
explore their interwar experiences of political violence is the volume edited by Chris Millington 
and Kevin Passmore (2015).13 The special emphasis in this volume lies on political violence 
taking place in the democracies of Western Europe in this time period. This is a new and 
welcome approach, in that it readily acknowledges that political violence was not exclusively 
a problem of the “shatterzones”14 of Eastern and East-Central Europe, but a phenomenon 
warranting systematic attention, too, in countries often considered relatively free from the 
experience of interwar political violence, and inviting comparison between them. The volume 
pays attention to societies typically associated with political violence, such as Germany and 
Italy, but also less frequently explored countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
Britain. Such a work emphasises that the mere existence of the institution of democracy was 
not a guarantee against political violence. The editors further remind readers, with reference 
to Britain and France, that “Empire cannot be bracketed as an anomaly. On the contrary, the 
possession of colonies blurs the distinction between the democratic West and authoritarian 
East.”15 This observation is, again, significant for the approach taken in this thesis. Birte 
Förster’s recent short investigation of the year 1919 refers to several of the case studies which 
this thesis, too, examines in greater detail. Among them are Freikorps violence in postwar 
German cities, as well as in the Baltic, violent labour conflicts in British cities, such as Glasgow, 
and the Irish War of Independence.  The emergence of this kind of scholarship supports this 
thesis’ comparative approach and confirms it in its ambitions of integrating diverse histories 
into a fuller picture of postwar political violence in Europe, and its colonial spheres.16 
 
11 Anne Dolan, “The British Culture of Paramilitary Violence in the Irish War of Independence”, in 
Gerwarth and Horne (eds.), War in Peace, pp. 200-215; Julia Eichenberg, “Soldiers to Civilians, 
Civilians to Soldiers: Poland and Ireland after the First World War”, in Gerwarth and Horne (eds.), War 
in Peace, pp. 184-199. 
12 Gerwarth and Horne, “Paramilitarism in Europe”, p. 18. 
13 Chris Millington and Kevin Passmore (eds.), Political Violence and Democracy in Western Europe, 
1918-1940 (Basingstoke, 2015). 
14 The term “shatterzone” in this context was coined by Donald Bloxham to describe the areas of the 
disintegrated Habsburg, Romanov and Ottoman empires following the end of the First World War; see 
Donald Bloxham, The Final Solution. A Genocide (Oxford, 2009), pp. 81, 112, 171. 
15 Kevin Passmore, “Introduction: Political Violence and Democracy in Western Europe, 1918-1940”, in 
Millington and Passmore (eds.), Political Violence, p. 11. 
16 Birte Förster, 1919. Ein Kontinent erfindet sich neu (Ditzingen, 2018). 
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     An influential notion in trying to explain the high levels of violence experienced by some 
post-First World War societies has been the concept of ‘brutalisation’ developed by George 
Mosse in 1990. In his seminal work, Mosse asserted a ‘brutalising’ effect which the war had 
on the politics of the postwar period in the countries which had lost the war, and especially in 
Germany. In his analysis, the victorious nations, Britain and France, managed to transition 
from war to peace relatively seamlessly and thus kept the process of brutalisation of politics 
under control. Germany, on the other hand, saw a new “ruthlessness” taking shape in its 
politics, fuelled by the continued high visibility and respectability of the military in everyday life 
and by a mind-set numbed by war to accept war-like situations and violence as a means of 
politics.17 The theory argues that specifically the men who fought in the First World War 
became ‘brutalised’ by their experiences of extreme violence at the front and, carrying some 
of those violent experiences back home, were unable, to differing degrees, to leave their war 
experience behind and return to a peaceful civilian existence once the armistice was signed. 
Neither could society, especially in the defeated countries, demobilise culturally, so that, in 
order to “draw the sting from death in war and emphasize the meaningfulness of the fighting 
and sacrifice”, a powerful “Myth of the War Experience” had to be constructed.18 By virtue of 
this persistent myth, “[t]he continuation of wartime attitudes into peace” was perpetuated; 
something which showed itself particularly in the apparent devaluation of human life in 
general.19 Mosse considers the Freikorps a potent symbol of this continuation of “wartime 
camaraderie in peacetime.”20 
     Besides being largely German-centric, Mosse’s theory has, however, since come under 
criticism particularly for the role it ascribes to veterans in perpetuating violent attitudes. As 
Schumann has highlighted, more veterans actually joined pacifist organisations, or no 
organisations at all, than were interested in continuing a violent, quasi-wartime existence into 
peacetime.21 Benjamin Ziemann has analysed the specifically republican veterans’ 
organisations in the Weimar Republic, such as the Reichsbanner Schwarz-Rot-Gold which at 
its high point in between the world wars numbered around one million members. Ángel 
Alcalde, in his recent book on the transnational histories of veterans and Fascism, has sought 
to move the debate over veterans’ roles on by transcending the previously drawn lines 
 
17 George L. Mosse, Gefallen für das Vaterland. Nationales Heldentum und namenloses Sterben 
(Stuttgart, 1993), p. 195. 
18 George L. Mosse, Fallen Soldiers. Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars (Oxford, 1990), pp. 6-
7. 
19 Ibid., p. 159. 
20 Ibid., p. 168. The Freikorps are explored more in Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis. 
21 Dirk Schumann, “Europa, der Erste Weltkrieg und die Nachkriegszeit: Eine Kontinuität der Gewalt?”, 
Journal of Modern European History, 1 (2003), p. 31. 
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between adherents of Mosse’s brutalisation theory and those emphasising the prevalence of 
republican veterans’ organisations.22 Furthermore, the brutalisation thesis was clearly crafted 
within a research context which aimed to explain the emergence of National Socialism, and 
sought its roots in the brutalisation of people and societies during the First World War.23 The 
argument, however, does not quite stand up to scrutiny, as the violence perpetrated by 
potentially brutalised veterans of the First World War took place in the immediate, or short 
term, aftermath of the war’s end, while the violence towards the end of the interwar period was 
in fact perpetrated by men too young to have personally fought in the war, thus making the 
brutalisation theory “untenable.”24 The fact that Britain and France, countries whose soldiers 
shared much the same experiences during the war, did not witness the above-cited 
“continuation of wartime attitudes into peace” further casts doubt on the theory. Though other 
scholars, most recently Jörn Leonhard, have sought the reason for the collapse of democracy 
in interwar Germany in the impossibly high expectations on the peace treaty of Versailles, 
which could but fail, Gerwarth and Horne point out that there has been no real alternative 
theory proposed yet specifically for the persistence, and even escalation, of violence in the 
immediate postwar period.25 An approach as generalising as Mosse’s brutalisation theory may 
not be suitable, but it has witnessed somewhat of a renaissance more recently, for example 
in the work of Mark Jones, who argues for its validity, at least to a certain extent. By using 
thick description in order to focus close attention on the extremes which violence and brutality 
during the German Revolution took, Jones explicitly wants his thesis to be read as “a rebuttal 
to recent criticisms of George Mosse’s ‘brutalization thesis’.”26  
     The present thesis is sympathetic to Jones’ argument that the taboo-breaking violence of 
the immediate postwar years had more of a ‘brutalising’ effect on subsequent Weimar political 
culture than did soldiers’ experiences of trench warfare.27 It is, however, also worth noting that 
while Schumann and Ziemann are correct in highlighting the shortcomings of the brutalisation 
theory, based on the numbers of veterans who actually preferred to take on apolitical, left-
 
22 Benjamin Ziemann, Contested Commemorations. Republican War Veterans and Weimar Political 
Culture (Cambridge, 2013), p. 3; Ángel Alcalde, War Veterans and Fascism in Interwar Europe 
(Cambridge, 2017). 
23 Benjamin Ziemann, “Germany after the First World War – A Violent Society? Results and Implications 
of recent Research on Weimar Germany”, Journal of Modern European History, 1 (2003), p. 82. 
24 Schumann, “Kontinuität?”, pp. 31-32. 
25 Jörn Leonhard, Der überforderte Frieden: Versailles und die Welt1918-1923 (München, 2018); 
Gerwarth and Horne, “ Paramilitarism in Europe”, pp. 2-3. 
26 Mark Jones, Violence and Politics in the German Revolution 1918-1919, PhD thesis, European 
University Institute, Florence, 2011, pp. 4-5. This claim is somewhat toned down in Jones’ resulting 
monograph, which merely suggests to “carefully reassess the brutalization thesis”, see Mark Jones, 
Founding Weimar. Violence and the German Revolution of 1918-1919 (Cambridge, 2016), p. 22. 
27 Jones, Founding Weimar, p. 22. 
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wing, or pacifist identities after the war, Mosse’s analysis was correct for a significant minority 
of men who returned to Germany from the war brutalised and, crucially, disappointed and 
disillusioned to such a degree as to refuse to accept the outcome of the war, the new republic 
and to want to continue fighting, in the belief that only this could give meaning to the sacrifice 
and suffering experienced by those on the losing side of the war. While the experiences on 
the battlefield were similar for British and German soldiers, the British narrative of victory and 
redemption was absent in Germany, which caused the veterans’ violent resentment to fall on 
fertile ground there. In this sense, though Mosse’s theory may not amount to a brutalisation of 
German postwar culture as a whole, it applied to a significant enough minority of men who 
established right-wing extremism in interwar Germany and eventually helped pave the way to 
the republic’s demise. The literature on the rise of National Socialism, naturally, is vast and 
cannot possibly be covered here, even though the thesis is related to this field of research. In 
its fourth chapter, in particular, the thesis examines more closely Fascist violence in Britain 
and Germany in the early/mid-1930s. Sven Reichardt’s work on the German Sturmabteilung 
(SA) and the Italian Squadristi is not only an instructive example of a successful comparative 
piece of work, but provides much groundwork in understanding the Fascist relationship with 
violence and the importance of perpetrating violence for Fascist movements and identities.28 
Daniel Siemens’ in-depth analysis of the SA covers the entirety of the organisation’s history 
through the interwar period and, significantly, its continued role during the Third Reich; it 
provides further valuable understanding of the SA’s structures and the fundamental 
importance of violence in the Nazi struggle for, and maintenance of, power and identity.29 
     The brutalisation thesis being a case in point, Germany and Britain are often considered 
almost polar opposites with regards to the presence and intensity of political violence in the 
interwar period, and comparisons are therefore not often undertaken. Mosse argues that in 
the victorious nations the transition from war to peace was “relatively smooth” and therefore 
the process of brutalisation was largely kept under control.30 However, while actual 
brutalisation of people and politics, if such a concept is to be believed in, was apparently less 
pronounced in postwar Britain than in postwar Germany, Jon Lawrence significantly points out 
that the fear of brutalisation was nevertheless present, and a very real force, in interwar British 
society. In fact, Lawrence argues that it was this fear of a postwar brutalisation of British 
society and political culture which contributed to “strengthen[ing] mythic views of Britain as a 
 
28 Sven Reichardt, Faschistische Kampfbünde. Gewalt und Gemeinschaft im italienischen Squadrismus 
und in der deutschen SA (Köln, 2002). 
29 Daniel Siemens, Stormtroopers. A New History of Hitler’s Brownshirts (New Haven and London, 
2017). 
30 Mosse, Soldiers, p. 159. 
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uniquely peaceable kingdom.”31 The construction of and efforts at upholding this mythic view 
play a central role in this thesis’ argumentation, as speakers discussing political violence in 
public forums in Britain sought constantly to reinforce this image. Lawrence’s 
acknowledgement of the existence of postwar political violence in Britain, and in its colonial 
peripheries, is highly welcome and he lays important groundwork for analysing the effect of 
the fear of brutalisation on British postwar public life. Literature on British post- and interwar 
experiences of and attitudes towards political violence now generally recognises and asserts 
that the claim of ‘peaceableness’ must be “heavily qualified by the observation, ‘except in 
Ireland’”, and gives at least a token ‘nod’ to colonial violence, most often the massacre 
perpetrated at Amritsar in April 1919.32 However, such rather crude caveats should not be 
accepted as sufficient engagement with the topic. And indeed, Gregory’s subsequent 
coverage not only of paramilitary violence in Ireland, but also of labour unrest, demobilisation 
riots, and the British Union of Fascists, makes his assertion, cited above, that political violence 
in interwar Britain constituted a “striking absence” somewhat contradictory. 
     One thesis which may help explain why political violence was less prevalent on the island 
of Great Britain itself is the Sozialimperialismusthese, or ‘social imperialism’ thesis, proposed 
most famously by Hans-Ulrich Wehler. It conceives of imperial spaces as “spaces of evasion” 
(Ausweichräume). In the nineteenth century colonies were increasingly regarded as a 
necessity by European imperialists, as the conquered space would either offer opportunities 
to ‘export’ unwanted elements, for example criminals or religious ‘deviants’, from European 
societies, or provide potential for starting new lives for Europe’s masses of poor and 
unemployed. Furthermore, the racial solidarity experienced by European settlers, even poor 
working-class ones, vis-à-vis the native populations was to provide an integrating force and 
mitigate the on-going class struggle in industrialised European societies, instead directing 
attention towards a racial struggle. In this way, colonial spaces were perceived as necessary 
‘valves’ through which social pressures could be alleviated.33 Expanding this ‘valve’ theory to 
the practice of violence, it has been suggested that following the First World War and its 
brutalising effects, personal violent potentials had to be discharged somewhere, and thus, in 
the absence of colonies, postwar Germany saw high levels of internal violence while Britain 
was spared this experience because violence could be displaced into the colonies.34 The 
 
31 Lawrence, “Peaceable Kingdom”, p. 558. 
32 Gregory, “Peculiarities”, p. 53. 
33 Dirk van Laak, Über alles in der Welt: deutscher Imperialismus im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (München, 
2005), pp. 33-34. 
34 See Schumann, “Kontinuität der Gewalt?”, p. 41. The theory is posited as an open area of 
investigation by Schumann and has been questioned by Gerwarth and Horne (see Gerwarth and Horne, 
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expansion of the analyses of perceptions of political violence in this thesis to include the 
colonial sphere is therefore fundamental, in order to critically examine the narrative of Britain 
as a ‘peaceable kingdom’ in which political violence constituted a ‘striking absence’. 
Translated onto the level of language, this thesis explores whether or how the relative lack of 
political violence on the main island of Britain allowed public discourse to identify violence, for 
the most part, with colonial contexts and draw on the language of colonialism (language 
related to civilisation, race, and ‘the other’) in casting violence as ‘un-British’. Such a 
displacement of discourse about violence into colonial contexts was not possible in Germany. 
In some cases, though, similar language was used in the linguistic creation of internal others 
in Germany, in order to more easily commit and justify acts of violence against them. 
     The fact that “on the whole Britain came out well from the First World War” appears to often 
enough be taken as sufficient explanation for both: the divergent paths taken by Germany and 
Britain in the interwar years, as well as the apparent ‘non-necessity’ of comparing both 
countries’ interwar experiences with political violence.35 However, as the ‘nods’ to colonial 
violence and acknowledgements of ‘exceptions’ referred to above make clear, political 
violence was a factor in post-/interwar British public life, as it was in other European countries. 
It could be said to warrant comparative study for this reason alone. Of course the differences 
especially in scale and intensity, as well as location, of the violence cannot be denied; 
however, it is precisely the process of examining two very different experiences in a new 
comparative light, which allows a reiteration of how and why violence came to be an accepted 
and ‘successful’ tool of politics in Germany while it became increasingly delegitimised in British 
public discourse. It thus only makes sense to integrate experiences of political violence, 
including in the colonial sphere, into the wider characterisation of interwar Britain. In doing so, 
the thesis not only challenges the myth of a “peaceable kingdom” further, but it also contributes 
to both a more integrated treatment of strictly ‘British’ and ‘imperial’ histories, as well as to a 
much-needed Europeanization of traditionally exceptionalist views of British history. 
     Of course, some comparative works examining Germany and Britain during the First World 
War and in the interwar period do exist. Comparative studies of British and German military 
experiences and strategies during the war itself are of little direct relevance to this study, 
though they can help understand both countries’ position at the end of the war.36 Aribert 
 
“Paramilitarism in Europe”, p. 3). Chapter 3 of the thesis will touch more on the related debates 
surrounding a continuity theory which charts a more or less direct line from colonial violence to National 
Socialism. 
35 Gregory, “Peculiarities”, p. 57. 
36 See for example Jan Rüger, The Great Naval Game: Britain and Germany in the Age of Empire 
(Cambridge, 2007); Nicolas Wolz, Das lange Warten. Kriegserfahrungen deutscher und britischer 
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Reimann’s discourse analysis of English and German soldiers’ letters from the front, and of 
wartime press, is an interesting contribution particularly in its capacity as a study of language. 
Through the combination and juxtaposition of the history of everyday life (Alltagsgeschichte) 
gleaned from the personal letters, and the more elite interpretations of history offered in the 
press, Reimann shows how the official political, social and cultural interpretation of the war 
found its way into the vocabulary of private wartime correspondence. In Germany, the 
outcome of the war failed to confirm wartime patterns of interpretation, making the post-war 
discursive creation of meaning much more difficult than in England, where the flow of history, 
moral norms and values, and the socio-economic order appeared to have been confirmed by 
the outcome of the war.37 
     Sonja Levsen’s comparative work on German and British university students in the era of 
the First World War focusses on their ideals of masculinity. It shows how the war, and in 
particular its social and political consequences, led to a gradual demilitarisation of male British 
student identities, while the need to assign meaning to the mass death brought on by the war 
led German students to hold on ever stronger to ideals of sacrifice and military masculinity.38 
The cultural legacy of the war and British and German commemoration of it is also the subject 
of Stefan Goebel’s monograph. It is an important contribution, not least for demonstrating that 
a successful, truly comparative study of interwar Britain and Germany is possible. It 
establishes the cultural and commemorative environment in which the interwar political 
violence analysed for the present study took place, and which conditioned the context into 
which the violence was received.39 In his comparison of the post-war demobilisation 
experience in the cities of Munich and Manchester, Adam Seipp investigates how the wartime 
societal consensus which united whole nations behind the war effort could collapse so quickly 
at the end of the war. He argues for a “crisis of reciprocity” which meant that in Britain 
demobilisation proved actually very difficult because victory led to the – ultimately 
disappointed – expectation that the government ought to deliver on the wartime promises it 
had made. On the losing side, the German army essentially self-demobilised by walking out, 
but the challenges of transitioning from war to peace proved especially difficult to overcome 
due to the limited political and economic options the defeated country faced at the end of the 
 
Seeoffiziere 1914 bis 1918 (Paderborn, 2008); Alexander Watson, Enduring the Great War: Combat, 
Morale and Collapse in the German and British Armies, 1914-1918 (Cambridge, 2008). 
37 Aribert Reimann, Der große Krieg der Sprachen. Untersuchungen zur historischen Semantik in 
Deutschland und England zur Zeit des Ersten Weltkrieges (Essen, 2000), p. 284. 
38 Sonja Levsen, “Constructing Elite Identities: University Students, Military Masculinity and the 
Consequences of the Great War in Britain and Germany”, Past & Present, 198 (2008), pp. 147-183. 
39 Stefan Goebel, The Great War and Medieval Memory: War, Remembrance and Medievalism in 
Britain and Germany, 1914-1940 (Cambridge, 2006). 
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war.40 Seipp’s conclusion that the difficulties of demobilisation increasingly blurred the 
boundaries between wartime and peacetime in the post-First World War context is clearly one 
of the assumptions underlying the present project which is interested in how supposedly 
demobilised societies approached and received political violence taking place after the official 
end of the war. The problem of soldiers unable to demobilise psychologically and societies not 
demobilising culturally is one of the central themes particularly of Chapter 2 of the thesis, in 
which postwar paramilitary formations which were often largely made up of war veterans are 
discussed.41 
     Finally, the observations made by Dirk Schumann in his chapter contribution regarding the 
acceptance of violence among the German bourgeoisie and the British middle classes lay 
valuable groundwork for this project, though the author intends the selective comparison only 
as a way of “accentuating the German peculiarities.”42 Schumann points out that, in the climate 
of collapsing or untrustworthy state power, political violence was seen as a legitimate measure 
of “self-help” by the German bourgeoisie against an aggressive opponent on the Left. This 
was simply not the case in postwar Britain, where neither the stability of party political 
structures was in danger, nor was the legitimacy of the state called into question.43 These 
assertions are of central importance to the present thesis which does not use the British 
counter-example only as a template against which to emphasise German particularities, but 
undertakes a more comprehensive comparison in which both sides inform each other. Making 
use of source materials from both countries, in both languages, this thesis’ comparative 
perspective helps to discern the specificities of both objects of comparison. Charles Maier has 
cautioned that “not every comparison is valid; successful comparison must continue to focus 
on the specific differences as well as the common elements, and it must refer to real historical 
phenomena, not merely arbitrary definitions.”44 Political violence was indeed a real historical 
phenomenon in both countries (and/or their colonial spheres). The fact that this thesis’ 
 
40 Adam R. Seipp, The Ordeal of Peace. Demobilization and the Urban Experience in Britain and 
Germany, 1917-1921 (Farnham and Burlington, VT, 2009), p. 265. 
41 See also John Horne, “Kulturelle Demobilmachung 1919-1939. Ein sinnvoller historischer Begriff?”, 
Geschichte und Gesellschaft. Sonderheft, 21 (2005), pp. 129-150. 
42 Dirk Schumann, “Einheitssehnsucht und Gewaltakzeptanz. Politische Grundpositionen des 
deutschen Bürgertums nach 1918 (mit vergleichenden Überlegungen zu den britischen middle 
classes)“, in Hans Mommsen (ed.), Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Europäische Nachkriegsordnung: 
Sozialer Wandel und Formveränderung in der Politik (Köln, 2000), p. 89. 
43 Ibid., p. 103. 
44 Charles S. Maier, Recasting Bourgeois Europe. Stabilization in France, Germany, and Italy in the 
Decade after World War I (Princeton, 1988), p. IX, quoted in Bernd Weisbrod, “Die Politik der 
Repräsentation. Das Erbe des Ersten Weltkrieges und der Formwandel der Politik in Europa”, in Hans 
Mommsen (ed.), Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Europäische Nachkriegsordung: Sozialer Wandel und 
Formveränderung in der Politik (Köln, 2000), p. 15. 
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comparison highlights significant differences, in societal contexts, but also in the images and 
language used, while also identifying some similar aspects of the discourses on political 
violence in Germany and Britain, does nothing to invalidate the approach but instead 
constitutes a central finding of the thesis. 
     Richard Bessel impressionistically charts the development of attitudes towards violence 
(not solely political violence) over the course of the twentieth century, mainly in Western 
Europe and North America, and shows that over the course of the century enormous social, 
cultural and political changes brought about great changes in attitudes towards violence. 
However, he also takes care to remind readers that this is “not necessarily a story of progress, 
of an irreversible process of the triumph of enlightenment values led by the West into peaceful 
uplands where the rest of the world someday may follow”, but rather that “the protective shell 
that ‘civilization’ provides is less solid than many would like to think.”45 The consideration that 
the process of civilisation has not, and does not, necessarily continuously lead away from 
violence, and that twentieth-century attitudes towards violence have shifted within societies 
and between societies in a perhaps unprecedented way, are necessary foundations for this 
project and they inform its very conception. As Bessel observes, “the systematic study of 
violence as an analytical category has been undertaken by historians and social scientists 
only in the past few decades.”46 It can be said to have begun in earnest only roughly in the 
late 1960s.47 In particular, it is still most often the domain of sociologists and social or political 
scientists, rather than historians. However, the fundamental questions underpinning efforts to 
understand contemporary violence are the same as have to be asked in historical 
examinations of violence, as are the struggles to categorise and understand a phenomenon 
which exists in an ambiguous state between the destruction and the foundation of order.48  
     In his extended essay Traktat über die Gewalt (1996) the sociologist Wolfgang Sofsky 
considered different forms of violent behaviours, analysing the profound human roots of 
violence and its cultural emergence and role in societies. He suggests that “society is a 
precautionary measure of mutual protection” against violence.49 This claim begs the questions 
of a) how a society fulfils this role, and b) what happens if a society fails to do so. Sofsky’s 
own answer to the first of these questions is very clear: “Authority [Herrschaft, also 
 
45 Bessel, Violence, p. 280. 
46 Ibid., p. 17. 
47 Peter Imbusch, “Der Gewaltbegriff”, in Wilhelm Heitmeyer and John Hagan (eds.), Internationales 
Handbuch der Gewaltforschung (Wiesbaden, 2002), p. 26. 
48 Ibid. The significance of order, and the centrality of government efforts to maintain it, are highlighted 
in Chapter 1. 
49 Wolfgang Sofsky, Traktat über die Gewalt (Frankfurt/M, 1996), p. 10. 
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‘rule’/’sovereignty’, A.K.] requires […] violence, inwards and outwards. […] Authority only is 
authority if it commands violence. It acquires recognition and legitimacy to the same degree 
to which it is able to guarantee order.”50 This, thus, makes the second part of the question all 
the more poignant. What happens when a society appears to be losing legitimacy due to an 
apparent inability to adequately contain violence? As the literary scholar and political writer 
Jan Philipp Reemtsma has suggested with reference to the recent upsurge in violent acts in 
Western societies, it is not so much the ‘why?’ behind apparently senseless acts of violence 
which should be scrutinised, but rather the question of how societies decide to react and show 
themselves capable of responding to violent outbursts in their midst and/or violent attacks 
upon their sovereignty.51 This is one of the main interest of the present thesis, as looking 
towards past eras of heightened political violence might prove instructive for the present day, 
too. 
     As this thesis is concerned with the discursive treatment of political violence, a definition of 
this key term is necessary. This thesis agrees with the simple definition followed by Weinhauer 
et al. that political violence describes “all, mostly collectively enacted forms of physical 
violence which were aimed at political enemies (groups, the state etc.) and/or which were in 
a process of communication labeled as being political.”52 Bloxham and Gerwarth have 
proposed a similarly broad concept of political violence, which, beyond only applying to 
political actors or explicitly political causes, also “encompasses atrocities committed by the 
state in the form of genocide, but also of torture and extra-legal warfare; and atrocities 
committed by non-state actors, be they ‘terrorists’ or paramilitary forces vying for political 
influence or territorial control.” Bloxham and Gerwarth include in this definition “violence in 
revolutionary and counter-revolutionary situations, violence within and outside conventional 
warfare, and violence committed in the name of ideological causes, both religious and 
secular.” Their definition of political violence as “all forms of violence enacted pursuant to aims 
of decisive socio-political control or change” is thus not contradictory to, but complements the 
above-cited one by Weinhauer et al.53 
 
50 Ibid., p. 14. 
51 Andreas Lebert and Katrin Zeug, “Jan Philipp Reemtsma: ‘Ich bin sehr für Rache, sie darf nur nicht 
sein’”, ZEIT ONLINE, 07/06/2016, http://www.zeit.de/zeit-wissen/2016/03/jan-philipp-reemtsma-
gewalt-menschen-grenzen-waffen-krieg/komplettansicht [accessed 08.06.2016]. 
52 Klaus Weinhauer, Anthony McElligott, Kirsten Heinsohn, “Introduction“, in Klaus Weinhauer, Anthony 
McElligott, Kirsten Heinsohn (eds.), Germany 1916-23. A Revolution in Context (Bielefeld, 2015), p. 22. 
53 Donald Bloxham and Robert Gerwarth, “Introduction”, in Donald Bloxham and Robert Gerwarth 
(eds.), Political Violence in Twentieth Century Europe (Cambridge, 2011), pp. 1-2. The characterization 
of paramilitary forces as “non-state actors” is questionable, as Gerwarth and Horne have in fact defined 
paramilitary violence as “practices that either expanded or replaced the activities of conventional military 
formations,” which could occur “in the vacuum left by collapsing states,” could be “deployed against the 
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This thesis’ declared interest is in the above-mentioned process of pushing the boundaries of 
the “say-able” in interwar Britain and Germany. Therefore, its main research questions are 
why and how violence became an accepted, even attractive, option for conducting politics in 
interwar Germany, while in Britain, notwithstanding the violent reality of British colonial rule 
overseas, it became increasingly less defensible in public discourse and consciousness. The 
thesis’ diachronic structure also allows an examination of how this changed over the course 
of the interwar period. More concretely, the thesis asks how language, specifically language 
produced in public forums, contributed to this process. 
 
The research rests on the hypothesis that this process took place to a larger, and more 
impactful extent in Germany than it did in Britain where the discursive boundaries of defensible 
political violence were perhaps more bound up with geographical boundaries (see below on 
thesis structure, and see above on literature suggesting a displacement of violence into the 
colonial sphere) and where, thus, certain limitations regarding violence perpetrated within the 
British domestic sphere remained more intact than they did in Germany. The divisions in public 
discourse in Germany will be proved to have been much more accentuated and powerful than 
in British public discourse, forming a significant contributing factor to both countries’ 
subsequent divergent histories of violence. This process will be investigated by focusing on a 
number of case studies, occurring at watershed moments during the early and the later 
interwar period. In order to answer its questions, this thesis lays its focus not so much on 
reconstructing precisely what happened at the selected moments of political violence, but on 
their reception and perception. As Paul Readman has pointed out, the traditional Rankean 
definition of history as “how things really were” led to a focus on “what statesmen did – in 
terms of legislation, diplomatic initiatives and so on – at the expense of what they said, 
especially in public.”54 This thesis, by contrast, is interested precisely in what was said. While 
the reconstruction of reality is a crucial aspect of historical research, the ‘linguistic turn’ in 
historical scholarship since about the 1970s has highlighted the significance and potential of 
reconstructing perceptions of reality.55 Analysing what was said about events can reveal much 
 
state,” or could, as the state-sponsored agents of violence examined in this thesis (Chapter 2), serve 
“as an adjunct to state power,” see Gerwarth and Horne, “Paramilitarism in Europe”, p. 1. 
54 Paul Readman, “Speeches”, in Miriam Dobson and Benjamin Ziemann (eds.), Reading Primary 
Sources. The Interpretation of Texts from Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century History (London and New 
York, 2009), p. 210, emphasis in original. 
55 See Christoph Reinfandt, “Reading texts after the linguistic turn. Approaches from literary studies 
and their implications”, in Dobson and Ziemann (eds.), Reading Primary Sources, pp. 37-54. 
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about the power of certain narratives, even if they were factually untrue. This is considered 
especially relevant by the present author in so far as from such perception-based narratives 
there eventually derives action. This thesis therefore seeks to analyse certain discourses, 
particularly ones taking place in public, which expose those perceptions. Utilising a 
poststructuralist understanding of discourse as a “constitutive [mode] of power that constructs 
reality in unequal ways”,56 a (loosely defined and applied) historical discourse analysis is 
particularly useful for this thesis in order to highlight how the languages chosen for analysis 
here were employed by their speakers in order to construct identity, and thus power relations. 
This thesis’ approach differs from classic discourse analysis by not being a systematic and/or 
quantitative examination of specific, pre-determined key words (concepts, Begriffe), which can 
often lead to a bias in what words/concepts are considered important for the intended 
analysis.57 Instead of focusing solely on a particular set of abstract key concepts and studying 
their semantic change over time, as Begriffsgeschichte has traditionally done,58 this thesis 
takes into account whole sentences, texts, and the arguments developed therein. Thus, the 
thesis engages in empirical examination of speech in the press and in parliament and from 
there identifies which words and ideas were used, by whom, again and again to make what 
kinds of arguments and reinforce what kinds of notions about political violence. Crucially, the 
thesis is most interested in drawing conclusions from these findings about what the choice of 
words, and the arguments employed, reveal about the speaker’s/writer’s attitudes and the 
narratives they held and/or sought to propagate about themselves and others.  
     Mergel has stated that “discourse analysis asks about the production of societal […] 
realities through ways of speaking. Discourses denote that which is talked about in a society, 
that which is problematised and negotiated as a theme, and which contributes to the collective 
production of meaning.”59 This can of course include many different kinds of forums, mediums, 
and speakers. Foucault defined discourse as “institutionalised modes of speaking/writing.”60 
Therefore, this thesis has chosen to analyse discourse from two mediums, or forums, which 
are not only institutionalised but inherently public in nature – the press and parliament – in 
order to access what, in this thesis, is conceived of as ‘public language’. Indian writer and 
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activist Arundhati Roy, in her 2018 W.G. Sebald lecture on literary translation, has reflected 
eloquently on how a “country’s public language”, in her case that of India, represents “its public 
imagination of itself.”61 This thesis’ approach, accepting Anderson’s view of the nation as an 
“imagined political community,”62 takes inspiration from the same idea and is informed by the 
premise that it is through public language that societies construct an image of themselves, as 
much for their own people, as well as to project to the outside world. The analytical term of 
“public language” (or “public speech”, which is used interchangeably) is here also inspired by 
its use in Richard Toye and Martin Thomas’ recent Rhetorics of Empire.63 The authors use 
this notion to refer to “public forms of communication with a persuasive or symbolic purpose,” 
and analyse a variety of public speech materials, supplemented by private sources, to 
examine how empire was sustained or brought down through language.64 Applying phrasing 
developed for studies of (post-) colonial societies to analyses of European history can prove 
useful here, as it helps highlight the conscious process of constructing national identities 
through language, which is perhaps more readily accepted in the contexts of only recently 
independent postcolonial societies, but may be less readily conceded for European contexts. 
Despite the Foucauldian/Saidian approach which argues that discourse thus constructs social 
reality, which this thesis does partly rest on, it is important to remember at the same time, as 
Thomas and Toye point out, “that, although language certainly influences reality, it does not 
determine it.”65 Not every violent act has its roots in discourse, and the capacity of discourse 
to create reality does not remove the responsibility for violent action from the individuals taking 
it. This is why analysing perceptions and reconstructing discourses is not only interesting, but 
highly relevant, as it shows which aspects of the narratives constructed on their basis proved 
especially powerful, carried over into action, and thus in turn shaped reality. 
     Benedict Anderson identified the newspaper, along with the novel, as the “technical means 
for ‘re-presenting’ the kind of imagined community that is the nation.”66 Though it may appear 
obvious, it is worth stating that newspapers can be an enormously useful source for historians, 
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as their critical reading can offer “significant insight into how societies or cultures came to 
understand themselves and the world around them.”67 They not only did, and do, this by 
reporting and reflecting the world and events which have happened in it, but crucially they also 
actively shape their readers’ understanding of and outlook on issues. Through editorial 
choices as to what to report on, how to do so, and by adding commentary, newspapers have 
the “power to shape opinions”, thus influencing society in ways which, as discussed above, 
can eventually transcend the realm of discourse and inform and lead to action.68 Schumann 
has argued, with reference to the representation of political violence in the early Weimar press, 
that the high levels of violence in the immediate postwar years resulted in a reporting style 
marked by (over-)dramatization and extreme adherence to party-political lines, which, over 
time, came to corrupt the Weimar public and political sphere beyond repair.69 The process of 
“filter[ing], fram[ing] and report[ing] news and analysis”, as Vella has pointed out, is “more 
complex and subtle in nominally democratic societies than in despotic regimes.”70 This is a 
reason, among others, why the analysis in the present thesis ends in/before 1933 in the 
German case; with the end of democracy in Germany, no freedom of press could be assumed 
any longer, and an analysis as conducted for this study, especially in its comparative capacity, 
would be rendered senseless. 
     Due to the practical concerns of time and accessibility, this thesis cannot undertake a full 
systematic study of the presses of both countries; it instead has sought to access a reasonable 
cross-section of newspapers, covering the major political leanings in both countries and 
drawing on, particularly for the UK, both the ‘quality press’ as well as the ‘popular press’.71 
Most are national publications, though occasionally local papers complement the analysis, 
where useful and available. In the appendix, the thesis contains a glossary of all the German 
and British newspapers from which articles are cited in the thesis (except where they are 
quoted from a work of secondary literature). The glossary gives information on place of 
publication, circulation figures (as far as available and for points in time as relevant as could 
be identified), and political leanings. A bias towards press based in London and Berlin is 
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71 On historians’ relatively recently found appreciation of the value of the popular press, see Adrian 
Bingham, “Reading Newspapers: Cultural Histories of the Popular Press in Modern Britain”, History 
Compass, 10/2 (1012), pp. 140-150. 
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almost unavoidable, if practical concerns of access are considered, as much less of the 
provincial press has been digitised in either country to date.72 However, the thesis hopes to 
somewhat counteract this imbalance with a relatively consistent use of at least one Scottish 
and a Frankfurt-based newspaper throughout, and the occasional reference to more local 
papers. The circulation figures give an indication of each paper’s reach, though it is worth 
remembering that each copy sold could have been read by multiple people, for example on 
buses, trains, or in pubs, making its actual reach and circulation much larger. The 1920s have 
been identified by Bernhard Fulda as “the decade of the press.” For Germany, he estimates 
that daily Germany newspaper circulation in the early 1930s amounted to over 20 million 
copies.73 Interwar Britain saw the age of the press barons, when Lord Northcliffe, and after his 
death in 1922, his brother Lord Rothermere, Lord Beaverbrook, and the Berry brothers (later 
Lords Camrose and Kemsley) owned half of all national and provincial daily newspapers in 
the UK by the end of the 1930s, which amounted to a circulation of 13 million.74 Bingham 
summarises that in the interwar period the circulation of daily newspapers in Britain doubled 
and that circa two-thirds of the population regularly read a paper by 1939.75 
     It is imperative that newspapers’ political leanings or affiliations be scrutinized and taken 
into account in an analysis of language used in/by the press to discuss political violence. 
These, of course, can be the source of strong biases in the papers’ reporting and certainly in 
their commentary on events. Interwar Britain in fact experienced some anxiety over the 
closeness between the ‘press barons’ and government, and their resulting power in the 
political realm.76 While political partisanship would constitute a grave problem if newspapers 
were consulted in order to try and reconstruct how events ‘actually happened’, the biases are 
less of a problem, and in fact a crucial facet of analysis for the current project and its interest 
in attitudes towards political violence. It should be noted that terms used in the glossary to 
describe newspapers’ political leaning, such as ‘liberal’, ‘conservative’, ‘democratic’, 
‘nationalist’, etc. are not intended to denote an explicit party affiliation or ownership unless the 
party is explicitly noted. Despite, or perhaps also because of, the disparate political stances 
of the press, it is accurate and important to recognize that newspapers play “a crucial role in 
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fostering a sense of belonging to a national political community.”77 They provide insight into 
public opinion and the current conversation, though, given the biases discussed above, it 
should always be avoided to conflate published opinion with public opinion. Nevertheless, 
newspapers no doubt constitute an ideal, if complex, source base for a study interested in 
analysing the perception of political violence in public language and what this meant for, and 
said about, the respective ‘imagined community’. 
     The second main source base of inherently public language used for this thesis is 
parliamentary discourse, by which are meant the speeches made by elected representatives 
in the British parliament (mainly the House of Commons, though occasionally speeches made 
in the House of Lords are also referenced), and the German Reichstag (which, prior to the 
ratification of the Weimar constitution, was called Nationalversammlung (‘national assembly’)). 
As Readman has pointed out, historians influenced by the post-structuralist approaches of 
Foucault and Derrida have often tended to focus heavily on written texts, while paying much 
less attention to spoken texts.78 Of course the sources studied for this thesis were actually 
consulted in written, and indeed digitised, form, in Hansard and Reichstagsprotokolle, which 
brings with it its own challenges and distortions. Not only is there a potential for inaccuracies 
in the record, but parliamentary discourse was also highly performative and consulting merely 
its written record risks losing such aspects as body language, tone, overlapping speech, etc.79 
Nevertheless parliamentary debate is a particularly interesting and important type of language 
for this thesis’ research interests because, as Steinmetz has asserted, “within the realm of 
politics, what can be done (das Machbare) is to large extent dependent on what can be said 
(das Sagbare).” For his own research, he therefore concludes that analysing shifting speech 
patterns and concepts in parliamentary debates was crucial to understanding how political 
change came about.80 This thesis is less focused on explaining tangible political change, but, 
as stated above, considers analysing public speech essential for understanding the notions 
and narratives contained therein. So while the high degree of performativity and, of course, 
the overt political agendas contained in parliamentary speech need to be remembered and 
acknowledged, the source is still highly valuable for this thesis’ interest in attitudes. 
     Parliamentary discourse also stood in constant inter-textual relation with the forum of the 
press. Contemporaries were well aware that the “overwhelming majority of a nation knows of 
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parliament only that which the newspaper reports.”81 Large excerpts of parliamentary 
proceedings were regularly published in national newspapers, in Britain as well as in Germany 
and, as Mergel points out, newspapers’ reporting of parliamentary proceedings not only 
constituted the “main source for public discourse on parliament and parliamentarianism”, but 
also provided the public with important contextual information such as the “non-linguistic acts 
surrounding parliamentary speaking.”82 On the other hand, MPs, or Abgeordnete, were acutely 
aware of their public position, exposing them to intense public scrutiny, but also giving them 
the opportunity to use the spotlight in their favour. As Readman rightly points out, “public 
utterances can be committing.” It is the medium through which ideas are publicly 
communicated, to both political friends and foes.83 With full knowledge of the wide press 
coverage of parliamentary proceedings, parliamentarians would thus, through bold 
statements, harsh accusations, sharp questions, impassioned speeches, or purposefully 
prosaic insistence on facts, find ways to not only represent their party’s stance on an issue 
and to shore up electoral support, but to raise their personal profile, draw attention to their 
constituency’s issues, or use their speaking time to take a more general swipe at the 
opposition or the government.84 While it is relatively straightforward for historians to analyse 
the contents of speeches, their effect on the audience and their reception in society are much 
harder to assess.85 For the present thesis, this does not pose a major problem, in so far as 
the main interest lies on the very fact that certain things were considered appropriate to say 
in public, certain acts of political violence considered possible to defend in public while others 
were not. Nevertheless, an analysis of public speech, in both parliament and in the press, 
must always consider it in its wider contexts and interdependencies. Readman further points 
out that the focus on only discourse sometimes leads to a lack in “proper evaluation of these 
discourses’ significance.”86 It is hoped that this can be counteracted in this thesis by 
juxtaposing, where necessary, the analysed discourses to what historical scholarship has 
succeeded in establishing about the ‘actual’ events. 
     More conventional archival sources, such as personal papers of politicians or key 
journalists, could have been consulted in addition to the chosen source base for this thesis. 
Such kinds of sources would have added a different layer, a counterpoint and perhaps often 
a juxtaposition, to the fundamentally public sources consulted. This would no doubt have been 
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an interesting and worthwhile layer to add. However, it has been largely excluded for this 
thesis for a number of reasons. Firstly, ‘public’, for the purposes of this thesis, is understood 
as the opposite of language which is produced behind closed doors, in private and/or with the 
express purpose of being secret; ‘public’, in this sense, is that language which is produced in 
forums which are publicly accessible and open to scrutiny by the general public, while, 
importantly, offering the speakers/writers opportunities for using language in consciously 
performative ways in the knowledge that it is being heard or printed in an open, public manner. 
Thus, including (to a significant extent) the valuable information to be found in private papers 
would have confused this approach and contradicted its explicit research interest. However, it 
may well remain for a future study, or addition to the present one, to explore this path further. 
Secondly, constraints of time, access, and capacity have come into play. While increasing 
digitisation, especially of newspapers (especially in Britain, though German archives and 
databases are thankfully also developing in this direction), allows faster and easier access to 
these materials than ever before, it also explodes the volume of possible material to use for a 
project like this. Hence, boundaries had to be drawn and the conscious choice was made to 
focus on two main types of sources in the press and parliamentary debates. Lastly, it is worth 
noting that the thesis, at various points of interest, includes auto-biographical material in order 
to provide added layers of contemporary perception and, especially keeping time of 
publication in mind, in order to shed more light on the arguments made in the thesis about 
identity construction through language and how certain narratives rested on what individuals 
considered permissible or not to say about political violence. 
     It must be noted, as Thomas and Toye do, that public speech is more often than not the 
“preserve of the socially and politically privileged.”87 In numerous ways, the language analysed 
in this thesis consists of privileged discourses. As far as a class perspective in concerned, at 
the point of speaking in parliament, even the utterances of working-class Communist 
parliamentarians or early National Socialists, were, by virtue of being uttered in a privileged 
forum, privileged over the utterances made by their fellow party members, or any other 
ordinary citizens, not in the spotlight of a parliamentary chamber. Similarly, though newspaper 
reading in the interwar period became a “normal feature of working-class life,”88 those writing 
in newspapers, especially broadsheets, were part of an educated, often bourgeois, class. It 
must furthermore be recognised that the vast majority of the speakers and writers analysed in 
this thesis are male. This, again, is a result of the thesis approach which is interested in public 
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perceptions and in public language. The participants in public discourse at this point in time, 
in the chosen forums, were mostly men. Women’s experiences and perceptions, on the other 
hand, were oftentimes recorded in different kinds of source materials, such as private sources 
or publications dedicated specifically to women’s movements. The perpetrators of the political 
violence examined in this thesis were also quasi exclusively male. The impact of the First 
World War on the men who fought in it and on images of masculinity resulting from this 
experience played a central role in the abovementioned theory of the ‘brutalising’ effect of the 
war. Despite the chivalrous ideals of “heroic masculinity” which the soldiers of the First World 
War supposedly embodied, men were physically and psychologically broken by the war, and 
emasculated upon their return by disability, unemployment, and in the German case especially 
by the defeat itself, leading some (though, as critics of the brutalisation theory have pointed 
out, not all) of them to react the only way they had been trained in for the past four years, with 
violence. Female Communist fighters, in particular, became a target of reactionary hatred.89 
The postwar expansion of the zone of conflict to include civilians, including women and 
children, as legitimate targets was a crucial development within the postwar conduct of 
violence. It will be a common thread throughout the thesis. 
     The thesis covers a variety of geographies, including the colonial sphere. Edward Said’s 
notion of the ‘Orient’ (the Middle East) as racially and civilisationally constructed as a an exotic 
Other in the imaginaries of the ‘Occident’ plays a significant role, especially in Chapter 3.90 
The use of languages and hierarchies informed by experiences in the colonial sphere to 
furthermore construct certain groups of people as the Other will not only be shown to have 
been at play in the colonial sphere, but also in domestic contexts and spheres on the periphery 
between the domestic and the colonial. David Cannadine, on the other hand, has proposed 
that an ‘ornamentalist’ obsession with rank and class-based hierarchical thinking in fact 
governed the British Empire to a greater extent than Orientalist views did, and thus even 
served to dissolve racial differences in certain imperial contexts.91 Either way, this thesis’ 
shortcomings in the above ways are readily conceded. Even though the public discourse 
source base will occasionally be enriched by (auto-) biographical materials, which draw out 
more of the experiential dimensions of certain events, it cannot be denied that, given the socio-
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cultural-political contexts, the sources and methods used supply an almost exclusively male, 
white, and privileged perspective. Subalterns did not speak in the same forums as the elites 
at this point in time. Women were only beginning to break into these forums. However, this 
approach and the interest in these elite discourses are driven by the underlying assumption 
that speakers in inherently public forums have a particular responsibility for the public 
discourse, participating knowingly and consciously in the construction of national, social, and 
political identities by way of telling themselves, each other, the nation, and the international 
community certain stories about their ‘imagined communities’. It is precisely because of the 
privileged nature of these discourses that attempts, as referred to above, to “push the 
boundaries” of what is acceptable to say and what behaviour is defensible in public forums, 
make a worthwhile object of research. 
     The thesis is divided into four chapters. Their basic structure can be described as following 
the idea of concentric geographic circles, which, across Chapters 1 to 3, move continuously 
outward, from the domestic sphere, via a more peripheral, to the colonial sphere, before, in 
Chapter 4, returning to the domestic sphere. While Chapters 1 to 3 cover events taking place 
in the early interwar period around 1919-1922, Chapter 4 moves forward some ten years to 
the early/mid-1930s, allowing the thesis to assess changes in the discourse over time. As 
much as violence as a phenomenon transcended these geographic circles, the thesis will 
show that language did, too. Similar themes, references, and words appeared and reappeared 
in reference to multiple different case studies across contexts and geographies, often cross-
referencing each other. As Haupt and Kocka have pointed out, comparison necessarily 
“assumes to some degree a selection, abstraction, and detachment from context.” However, 
a comparative study should strive for “as much abstraction as necessary, as much concretion 
and contextuality as possible.”92 It is hoped that the approach via a number of case studies 
offers this balance between abstraction and concretion. 
     The thesis begins at the innermost of the concentric circles, examining reactions to political 
violence taking place in the domestic spheres of Britain and Germany, respectively. Two 
distinct types of political violence will be examined; on the one hand, violence taking place in 
the streets of a major city, Glasgow and Munich in 1919 respectively; and on the other hand, 
two high-profile political assassinations, namely those of MP and former head of the British 
Army, Sir Henry Wilson, and of German Foreign Minister Walther Rathenau, both in June 
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1922. The scale of both types of violence differed enormously between Britain and Germany. 
With regards to street violence, numerous different examples could have been chosen as a 
German case study, from the crushing of the Spartacus uprising in Berlin in January 1919, 
which saw the murders of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, to the March fighting taking 
place there the same year, to the violent fights between militant workers’ movements and 
government troops in the Ruhr area in 1920, to even the later Blutmai (‘blood May’) of 1929 
when Berlin police shot 33 civilians in the context of banned Labour Day demonstrations. The 
crushing of the Munich Councils’ Republic was chosen here as a slightly less frequently 
examined episode than the violence in Berlin is; secondly, with an eye to the relative 
comparability of Munich and Glasgow as both countries’ ‘second city’ with strong regional 
identities; and thirdly, as taking place after key taboo-breaking violence had already taken 
place during the previous fighting in Berlin, making it all the more interesting to examine how 
a certain use of government troops against left-wing movements was already becoming 
normalised as a means to defend the young republic’s monopoly on power. As mentioned 
above, Jones has even argued that the republic’s birth in violence characterised its whole 
existence and its eventual failure. The assassinations of multiple political leaders taking place 
over the following years, of which Rathenau’s was the most prominent one, can thus be read 
as another sign of a state steeped in violence and unable to rein it in. Cities functioning as 
incubators of radical politics sparked a fear, in both countries, of the ‘lumpenproletariat’ and 
its revolutionary potential, which in German cities proved much more real than it ever did in 
British cities, where the ‘Battle of George Square’ in Glasgow, with no deaths and 53 injured 
people proved a potent enough event to cause severe debate. While hundreds, and even 
thousands of civilians were killed in German urban contexts,93 Britain had no comparable 
numbers. However, even much fewer dead or injured bodies could spark a much greater 
reaction in a British domestic context, while in Weimar Germany the ‘threshold’ for what 
violence was considered defensible or necessary to found the state’s authority grew higher 
right from its conception in the revolutionary period of 1918-1919. On the other hand, the 
examination of the assassinations of Wilson and Rathenau also demonstrates the reactions 
to violence done to just one particular body, which was representative of state power. 
     Chapter 2 will move into a sphere that is here understood as ‘peripheral’. It examines 
reactions in Britain and Germany to political violence taking place in Ireland, during the Irish 
War of Independence, and during the German Freikorps’ campaign in the Baltic following the 
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end of the First World War. Work has been undertaken comparing violent nationalist 
movements in Poland to the IRA in Ireland, as well as examining violence and identity among 
communities in Ulster and Silesia in the postwar period.94 However, a comparison of attitudes 
towards paramilitary violence perpetrated in the name of the German and the British states, 
respectively, is lacking. Chapter 2 therefore examines how the violence unleashed by state-
sponsored paramilitaries threatened both British and German efforts at constructing certain 
self-images. As the British government increasingly lost control over the ‘Black and Tans’, 
their reprisals and violent behaviours threatened to delegitimise the British government’s claim 
over Ireland as well as its wider self-image and identity as a beacon of justice and civilisation 
in the world. Ireland’s position on the periphery of the domestic sphere, but not quite as a 
colonial space like India or the Middle East, is key as a steppingstone between the geographic 
circles of this thesis, demonstrating how themes and language transcended these circles. The 
Freikorps’ refusal to return from their anti-Bolshevik campaign in the Baltic not only risked the 
health and wellbeing of the entire German population, as a renewed blockade was threatened 
by the Allies, but dissociating itself from the rogue paramilitaries was a priority for the young 
German state in order to demonstrate its role as a reliable partner in the postwar world, who 
shared the values of civilised conduct. 
     The third chapter moves into the outermost circle, the colonial sphere, while also turning 
inwards to focus on the interplay of race and violence in Britain and Germany in the early 
interwar period. It firstly examines the policy of aerial bombing in Mandatory Iraq in the early 
1920s. The Middle East has been chosen here as an example of the colonial sphere rather 
than the perhaps more frequently discussed example of India, even though their administrative 
status was not the same; however, this particular type of violence, inflicted from the air, allows 
for particular analyses of the significance of spatial removedness between victim and 
perpetrator, as well as the geographic distance between the perpetration of violence and the 
public sphere where it was discussed back in the metropolis. As Germany no longer held any 
actual colonies following the Versailles Treaty, German discourses on colonial revisionism will 
be analysed alongside. In a second part, the chapter will examine violence through the prism 
of race in contexts in which colonial sailors and soldiers found themselves in the heart of the 
metropolis; on the one hand, examining violence against colonial sailors and soldiers in British 
port cities, and on the other hand, violence perpetrated by French colonial troops of occupation 
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in the Rhineland. In both cases, the ‘darkness’ which now appeared at the centre of British 
and German society met with a threatened white identity. Fears of miscegenation, in particular, 
guided the hostility against the men of colour, with the nation’s women discursively standing 
in for the threatened national body as a whole, and European ‘civilisation’ more widely. While 
similar themes occurred in both national discourses, the intensity of the hostility differed, and 
the extremely racialised language used to vilify French colonial soldiers undeniably fed into 
later National Socialist imagery and policy. The chapter thus explores how, on the one hand, 
geographic removedness allowed certain kinds of violence to be perpetrated in the ‘Orient’, 
which would not have been defensible in the domestic sphere, and which were heavily 
debated in the peripheral sphere; and, on the other hand, how racial thinking governed the 
reception of political violence in the domestic sphere when colonial, racial ‘others’ were 
confronted by a collective ‘white’ racial anxiety and fear of ‘darkness’. 
     In the fourth and final chapter the thesis examines receptions of Fascist violence in Britain 
and Germany in the early/mid-1930s, respectively. By extending its view in this way, the thesis 
can chart the development over the course of the interwar period of how political violence was 
received in public discourse in both countries. For the Weimar Republic, specifically, the 
middle years of circa 1924 to 1929 are often considered a period of calm, when the state had 
established its monopoly on power and levels of political violence were lower.95 While this 
might be accurate if those years are examined in isolation, the fact that the state quickly lost 
its monopoly on power again at the end of the 1920s and in the early 1930s makes this thesis’ 
diachronic approach no less justified. Chapter 4 will demonstrate how narratives established 
in the early interwar period had solidified by this later point in time. While, again, some similar 
themes were present, the discourses, the scale and intensity of the actual violence as well as 
the divisiveness within the discourses was highly divergent between Britain and Germany. 
This points towards the way in which public discourse itself had continued to drift apart and 
become more fragmented and more extreme in Germany, while in the UK more consensus 
remained intact, crucially including a majority of conservative voices, which condemned 
political violence as ‘un-British’ and held steadfastly on to an identity which was constructed 
around notions of ‘peaceableness’, justice, law, and order. This was increasingly less the case 
in Germany, where elites began to actively support and/or excuse the SA’s violent power 
propaganda, lending it decisive credibility and shifting the boundaries of permissible violence. 
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Anti-Semitism, which reappears as a theme throughout several of the, especially German, 
case studies, will play an unsurprisingly important role in this chapter, highlighting the ways in 
which Jewish identity was discursively marked out as ‘other’, thus facilitating the perpetration 
of violence against those perceived or constructed as Jewish. The Fascist challenge in Britain 
led to open and heated debate over the principles and limits of free speech, demonstrating 
that the established mechanisms of democratic debate remained intact in Britain to an extent 
that no longer existed in Germany’s divided public discourse.
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CHAPTER 1 
THE ENEMY WITHIN. STREET VIOLENCE AND POLITICAL ASSASSINATIONS. 
This chapter examines political violence taking place within the inner circle, or domestic 
sphere, of Britain and Germany respectively. Two distinct types of violent act have been 
chosen: on the one hand, the chapter will analyse public discourses on violence happening in 
the streets of major cities, Glasgow and Munich in 1919, respectively; and, on the other hand, 
it will examine the reactions to two prominent political assassinations, those of Henry Wilson 
and of Walther Rathenau, in June 1922, respectively. Though disparate in nature, both kinds 
of case study have been included in this first chapter, as they both took place in a domestic 
urban setting. In a peculiar sense of symmetry, the street violence occurred in both countries’ 
‘second city’, both with a strong regional identity, where troops from ‘outside’ were sent to 
quell the unrest; while the assassinations took place in both nations’ capitals, at the heart of 
political power, committed by forces hostile to the state. By beginning this thesis with a lens 
focussed on the inner geographic circle, this chapter will establish the narratives, which 
emerged in public discourse when speaking about these instances of political violence, and 
which were consciously employed in order to construct certain national (self-) images and 
identities. In the case of discussing street violence in Glasgow and in Munich, the primary 
theme of the discourse was that of maintaining law and order. When strike protests in Glasgow 
turned riotous in January 1919, the police enforced law and order with the help of the baton, 
and troops were sent to the city subsequently to maintain lawful and orderly conduct. In 
Munich, where a radical left-wing Councils’ republic had been in power for several weeks in 
April 1919, the Weimar government eventually used troops to reconquer the city and return it 
to what it considered to be s state of law and order. In both cases, the ability of the state to 
appear able and willing to enforce its power and control those transgressing against the rules 
of civilised conduct was paramount in order to portray the country, both domestically and 
internationally, as part of a civilised international community.  
     When both countries experienced high-profile assassinations, almost simultaneously in 
June 1922, similar narratives needed to be reinforced in public discourse, condemning the 
assassins as not part of the national community which prided itself on justice and democracy. 
Crucially, however, the threat which these acts of violence posed to both nations and their 
discursively constructed self-images, was of a significantly different power in both countries. 
Neither the Glasgow strikers’ demands nor the state’s overt performance of power in response 
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seriously upset the emerging British self-identification as a “peaceable kingdom.”1 The 
assassination of Henry Wilson did not pose an existential threat to the British state either; it 
was received as a singular and shocking crime which only served to unite public discourse in 
the condemnation of the violent act. In Germany, however, the attempt to create an alternative 
state and government, in the shape of a Councils’ republic, in the Bavarian capital clearly 
posed an overt challenge to the existing regime; its use of violence appeared necessary but, 
as will be demonstrated, the breaking of taboos over the course of the German Revolution 
had devastating consequences for the republic’s subsequent relationship between violence 
and politics. Walther Rathenau’s assassination was essentially a symptom thereof, as it stood 
in a series of similar such acts of political violence committed in the early years of the Weimar 
Republic, which consistently failed to effectively tackle the threat posed by its numerous 
enemies operating clandestinely to bring about the democratic regime’s downfall.  
     Anti-Semitism appears as an important theme in this early chapter. The leaders of the 
movements which were, more or less, violently crushed by state forces in Glasgow and in 
Munich in 1919 were consciously marked out as Jewish and as supposedly foreign enemies 
of the nation, conspiring to foster Bolshevism. Walther Rathenau, too, was specifically 
targeted by his enemies on the extreme Right as a wealthy Jewish industrialist and ‘enemy’ 
of the German nation. It was in precisely this ideological environment, and in Munich 
specifically, where the Nazi movement originated during the early interwar years, and where 
anti-Semitism became the main language of the Right.2 In this sense, anti-Semitism can be 
considered to bookend the thesis as a whole, as Chapter 4 will return to this theme to examine 









1 See Lawrence, “Peaceable Kingdom”. 
2 See Michael Brenner, Der lange Schatten der Revolution. Juden und Antisemiten in Hitlers München 
1918 bis 1923 (Berlin, 2019) 
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1.1 MAINTAINING LAW AND ORDER: GLASGOW AND MUNICH 1919. 
The two incidents of street violence which this chapter will examine are, on the one hand, the 
crushing of the short-lived Bavarian Councils’ Republic in Munich by government troops and 
government-affiliated Freikorps (‘free corps’), at the beginning of May 1919; and, on the other 
hand, what has hyperbolically become known as the ‘Battle of George Square’, a riot between 
striking workers and protestors, and the police, which took place in Glasgow on 31 January 
1919. Though the absolute scale of violence taking place in Munich and Glasgow is not at the 
centre of this comparison, an analysis of the reactions which the violence elicited produces 
some shared themes, as well as highlighting fundamental differences. The most central theme 
is the importance which both the British and the German state placed on maintaining law and 
order in these two respective situations. This, it will be argued, was motivated fundamentally 
by wartime and early postwar experiences of unrest and (potentially) revolutionary upheaval, 
which, significantly, took on transnational dimensions. British fears of left-wing radicalism 
spreading to the UK and of workers ‘stabbing the country in the back’ were informed by 
experiences and narratives developed on the continent, from Russia to revolutionary 
Germany. Regarding the thesis’ two main source bases, it so happens that parliamentary 
debates yield very little relevant material for these two case studies, as both the German 
Nationalversammlung and the British House of Commons were not in session at the time of 
the two events. Therefore, the section will rely heavily on the analysis of a cross-section of the 
national press in both countries, drawing upon other additional material where available and 
relevant. 
     Glasgow, the ‘second city of the Empire’, and in particular the important shipbuilding and 
engineering works by the river Clyde, had been a hotbed of industrial unrest and strike action 
throughout the war years; the strike across multiple Clydeside munitions works in February 
1915, for example, gave “the Clyde its popular image as a centre of militant discontent.” 
Further unrest, especially the rent strikes and struggle over “dilution” between summer 1915 
and March 1916, only cemented this image.3 Conflicts continued after the end of the First 
World War. Exacerbated by demobilisation, unemployment was a major concern and the 
Scottish Trades Union Congress (STUC) and the Clyde Workers’ Committee (CWC) 
demanded the introduction of a 40-hour working week in order to provide more jobs for the 
 
3 Iain McLean, The Legend of Red Clydeside (Edinburgh, 1983), Part I, quotation on p. 16. “Dilution” 
referred to the increasing pressure during the war to admit unskilled workers to jobs of traditionally 
skilled craftsmen, ibid., p. 6. 
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thousands of men returning from the battlefields.4 Their campaign reached its peak at the end 
of January 1919 and strike action by shipbuilding and engineering workers on the Clyde began 
on Monday 27 January. On Friday 31 January, a large demonstration was planned outside 
the City Chambers in Glasgow’s central George Square where strikers, other demonstrators, 
and many onlookers, assembled to await the announcement of the government’s response to 
the strike leaders’ demand for political intervention in the industrial dispute. Contemporary 
reporting estimated the crowd at well over 20,000 people.5 Around midday, the first scuffles 
began to break out from among the assembled workers and some protestors attempted to 
stop and vandalise the trams running along the square. A force of about 140 policemen, plus 
six mounted police, began charging the crowd with their batons in order to disperse it, 
irrespective of whether they were hitting actual demonstrators or onlookers, men or women. 
Contemporary reports in the local press described how “the ground floor of the City Chambers 
became a casualty station. Men and women appeared bearing the marks of injury or 
complaining of having been hurt. Bruised and bleeding figures were carried in, sometimes 
seemingly unconscious.”6 The Sheriff of Lanarkshire, while being pelted with stones and 
bottles, then stepped outside the City Chambers and read out the Riot Act, which made it a 
“felony for [twelve] or more people to riotously assemble and not to disperse within an hour 
after the reading of a proclamation commanding them so to do.”7 However, the situation 
continued to deteriorate, as protestors regrouped and threw more stones and bottles, began 
looting shops, and built barricades on adjacent North Frederick Street. The police continued 
their baton charges. Two of the strike leaders, Emmanuel Shinwell and David Kirkwood, who 
had been inside the City Chambers to consult with the Lord Provost, were allowed to address 
the crowd and encouraged it to clear the square and reassemble in Glasgow Green to discuss 
further actions. The crowd eventually dispersed, and while some minor clashes, looting, and 
vandalising of shops continued throughout the rest of the day and into the night, by the next 
 
4 Jenkinson has raised important points on the intersectionality of class and race in these strikes, 
arguing that postwar harbour rioting and labour conflict ought to be viewed together. While the STUC 
and the CWC demanded more jobs for demobilised soldiers, they explicitly excluded soldiers and 
sailors of colour from their demands, instead demonising them as a threat to the employment prospects 
of white British men. See Jacqueline Jenkinson, “Black Sailors on Red Clydeside: Rioting, Reactionary 
Trade Unionism and Conflicting Notions of ‘Britishness’ Following the First World War”, Twentieth 
Century British History, 19/1 (2008), pp. 29-60. While the race dimension does not play a major part in 
the present section, its interaction with class should be recognised and Chapter 3 of the thesis will take 
up race riots specifically as another case study of postwar political violence. 
5 “Glasgow Disorders”, The Scotsman, 01.02.1919, p. 7; see also Gordon J. Barclay, “’Duties in Aid of 
the Civil Power’: The Deployment of the Army to Glasgow, 31 January to 17 February 1919”, Journal 
of Scottish Historical Studies, 38/2 (2018), p. 276. 
6 “George Square Riots”, Glasgow Herald, 01.02.1919, p. 5. 
7 Jacqueline Jenkinson, Black 1919: riots, racism and resistance in imperial Britain (Liverpool, 2009), 
p. 20. 
 39 
morning calm prevailed in most parts of the city. However, on government orders, from the 
evening of 31 January onwards, and over the next few days, around 10,000 troops from 
various Scottish and English regiments began arriving in Glasgow in full kit and armed with 
machine-guns. In addition, on Monday 3 February, six tanks took up positions at strategic 
points throughout the city. The military, however, did not have to intervene at any point. 
Overall, fifty-three people were injured on ‘Bloody Friday’, of which thirty-four were civilians 
and nineteen police officers. There were no deaths.8 
     The German revolution had been notably non-violent in Bavaria. When the Bavarian free-
state, a socialist republic, was established on 7 November 1918 under the leadership of Kurt 
Eisner, the overthrow produced a “body count of zero.”9 Political violence, however, made its 
spectacular entrance when Ministerpräsident (‘minister-president’, state leader) Eisner was 
assassinated by the young right-wing radical nobleman Count Anton von Arco auf Valley in 
the middle of a Munich street on 21 February 1919. Eisner had been on his way to the Bavarian 
state assembly to announce his resignation following disappointing election results for his 
party, the Independent Social Democrats (USPD), the previous month. Following Eisner’s 
death, Social Democrat Johannes Hoffmann became Bavarian Ministerpräsident, but, 
encouraged by news of the successful establishment of a Councils’ republic in Hungary in 
March, the governing Independent Social Democratic Bavarian Central Council declared a 
Bavarian Councils’ Republic on 7 April. The Hoffmann government fled to Bamberg in northern 
Bavaria, and when an attempted putsch (‘Palm Sunday Putsch’) by Hoffmann loyalists in 
Munich was defeated on 13 April, a second, even further left-wing Councils’ Republic was 
established with the support of the Communist Party under the leadership of Eugen Leviné 
and Max Levien. The Hoffmann government-in-exile finally requested military aid from the 
Reich’s Minister of Defence Gustav Noske, having previously refused the offer, in order to 
regain power in the Bavarian capital. Along with the government troops sent by Noske, the 
Reich and Hoffmann governments recruited volunteer fighters into so-called Volkswehren 
(‘citizens’ militias’) and Freikorps.10 Overall, some 30,000-35,000 troops and volunteers began 
converging on Munich during the final days of April.11 Their advance in and around Munich 
 
8 Brief summary of events: McLean, Red Clydeside, pp. 124-126; casualty numbers were widely 
reported in the press, for example “The Strikes”, Morning Post, 03.02.1919, p. 10; detailed run-downs 
of the day’s events were printed by the local press, for example Glasgow Herald, 01.02.1919, pp. 4-5. 
9 Jones, Founding Weimar, pp. 288, 322 (quotation). 
10 The origin and nature of postwar German Freikorps and their members is explored in more detail in 
Chapter 2 of the thesis, as it is of more relevance to do so there. 
11 Allan Mitchell, Revolution in Bavaria, 1918-1919: the Eisner regime and the Soviet Republic 
(Princeton, 1965), p. 271-272; Wolfram Wette, Gustav Noske. Eine politische Biographie (Düsseldorf, 
1987), p. 438; Jones, Founding Weimar, pp. 288-290. 
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was brutal. The government troops and Freikorps entered Munich on 1 May and the Councils’ 
Republic was toppled after a few days of intense fighting. Munich remained under martial law 
until 1 August 1919.12 An incident which attracted particular attention was the so-called 
Geiselmord, the execution by soldiers of the Councils’ Republic of ten hostages, among them 
well-known members of Munich’s bourgeoisie, mostly members of the conservative Thule 
society, and including one noblewoman, in a school building on 30 April, just one day before 
government troops entered the city. News of this act quickly reached the government troops 
and Freikorps waiting in the suburbs to take Munich, and added to the brutality of the violence 
they unleashed on the city’s population over the following days.13 A week later, on 6 May, a 
second mass murder occurred in the city, when government troops killed twenty-one members 
of a Catholic journeymen’s association whom they had mistaken for Communists. Because of 
their scale and shocking nature, both acts unsurprisingly came to dominate the public 
discourse about violence during the Munich Councils’ Republic and its crushing. 
     This chapter section does not seek to compare the absolute scale of violence witnessed in 
Glasgow and Munich in January and May 1919, respectively. Unlike in Glasgow, on the streets 
of Munich the government troops with their machine-guns and artillery were put into action, 
and the number of fatalities after just three days exceeded 600, most of whom were civilians, 
with many hundreds, if not thousands, more injured.14 As has recently been argued by Jones, 
these few days at the end of April and the beginning of May 1919 marked “the end point of 
the transformation in the relationship between politics and violence during the German 
Revolution of 1918-19.” The revolutionary period thus stands out as a watershed moment in 
the German history of violence, at which previously existing boundaries of violent conduct 
were crossed, including, as elucidated below, the officially sanctioned killing of civilians in a 
domestic urban context.15 The rioting taking place in Glasgow earlier that year cannot be said 
to have had a comparably profound impact on the “relationship between politics and violence” 
 
12 Wette, Noske, p. 442. 
13 See for example Robert G.L. Waite, Vanguard of Nazism: The Free Corps Movement in post-war 
Germany, 1918-1923 (New York, 1952), pp. 88-92; Mitchell, Revolution in Bavaria, pp. 329-331; Hagen 
Schulze, Freikorps und Republik, 1918-1920 (Boppard am Rhein, 1969), pp. 98-99. 
14 Jones, Founding Weimar, p. 287; Eliza Johnson Ablovatski, “Cleansing the red nest”: 
Counterrevolution and White Terror in Munich and Budapest, 1919, PhD thesis, Columbia University, 
2004, p. 48. Gumbel’s more contemporary body count suggests at least 557 victims, including just 38 
government troops killed in action, 93 red guards killed in action, as well as 42 red guards and 144 
civilians summarily executed. He also cites the Münchener Neueste Nachrichten which reported 107 
fallen members of the red guards as well as 184 supporters of the Councils’ Republic who had been 
“killed in an accident” (tödlich verunglückt). Gumbel interprets this as most likely to mean that they had 
fallen victim to political murders. Emil Julius Gumbel, Vier Jahre Politischer Mord (Berlin, 1922), pp. 31-
32. 
15 Jones, Founding Weimar, quote on p. 288. 
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in Britain; but, as will be discussed below, the unrest, the police crack-down on the protestors, 
and the deployment of the military to the city all caused significant discussion within British 
public discourse and warrant inclusion in this comparative perspective examining the 
rhetorical responses these violent acts elicited. 
     A leitmotif emerging in the analysis of the public language exhibited in response to both 
events was an overwhelming anxiety on the part of the authorities to maintain ‘law and order’, 
or its German counterpart, ‘Ruhe und Ordnung’ (‘quiet and order’). With the Councils’ Republic 
in power in Munich during April 1919, especially the more conservative papers in Germany 
ran multiple articles reporting on the alleged “reign of violence” in Munich and the “Spartacist 
reign of blood” which had unleashed a “civil war in Munich.”16 In the national assembly, too, 
Maximilian Pfeiffer of the Catholic Centre Party, emphasised the “chaos” and “anarchy” 
wrought by Bolshevism and juxtaposed it with the need for the German government to restore 
“Ruhe und Ordnung” in the Bavarian capital.17 Some observers who had lived through the 
days of the Councils’ reign in Munich, however, did not quite share this dramatized view of 
conditions in the Bavarian capital. Victor Klemperer, not expecting a bloody outcome, 
considered the main characteristic of the Councils’ Republic to be “ridiculousness” and 
described the whole situation as a “pitiable affair” and a “comedic play”, while Thomas Mann 
was more afraid of the “cultural catastrophe” of Bolshevism than of any bodily harm that might 
be done to him by Communists.18 Once government troops had taken over Munich, Mann 
showed himself much relieved by the counter-revolutionary intervention and admired how 
“well disciplined” the Freikorps were, marching into Munich with their steel helmets. He, too, 
betrayed his yearning for Ruhe und Ordnung, referring to the troops’ marching band when 
asserting that “music is order.”19 Newspapers, whose distribution was once again allowed in 
Munich following the end of the Councils’ Republic, broadly echoed this view. The liberal 
Frankfurter Zeitung, for example, condemned the Communist reign as having enabled a 
“terrible corruption and disintegration of all public conditions”, as well as the “abolition of the 
security of property”, a “creeping culture of denunciation and the persecution of and threat to 
personal freedom.”20 It therefore welcomed the return to “Ruhe und Ordnung” and urged 
 
16 “Die Gewaltherrschaft in München”, NPZ, 24.04.1919, MA, p. 1; “Bürgerkrieg in München. 
Spartakistische Blutherrschaft“, DZ, 19.04.1919, MA, p. 1. 
17 Verhandlungen der Verfassungsgebenden Deutschen Nationalversammlung, 34. Sitzung, 
10.04.1919, p. 922. 
18 Victor Klemperer, Man möchte immer lachen und weinen in einem. Revolutionstagebuch 1919 
(Berlin, 2015), p. 128; Thomas Mann, Tagebücher 1918-1921, ed. Peter de Mendelsohn (Frankfurt, 
2003), p. 222. 
19 Mann, Tagebücher, pp. 219, 222, 228. 
20 “Das Ende der Münchener Räteherrschaft“, FZ, 05.05.1919, MB, p. 1. 
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“peaceful order and sensible reconstruction.”21 More right-wing papers lamented, in particular, 
that the red guards had destroyed the “entire institutions and apparatuses of the police records 
department, files, forms, finger prints and residence registration forms”, as well as “all the 
material of the gipsy surveillance office.”22 The same paper, the Deutsche Tageszeitung, was 
all the more pleased to report on the reestablishment of the police security service, which 
would proceed against “all disruptions of Ruhe und Ordnung” with the “greatest sharpness.”23 
     An anxiety to restore and uphold ‘law and order’ was also evident in the UK after the rioting 
in George Square. The strike itself, and simultaneous ones by engineering and transportation 
workers in, for example, London and Belfast, were called “sporadic, chaotic, unauthorised, 
and stupid” by the right-wing Daily Mail, and were seen as “jeopardising the reconstruction of 
our trade and industry.”24 Moral condemnation of the strike leaders was particularly strong in 
the local press, where the consequences of the strike were most acutely felt. Papers 
characterised the leaders as “men who from the outset flouted law and decency, and 
deliberately set themselves to paralyse the orderly functionings of the community.”25 The 
“methods of hooliganism” employed by “the Clyde strikers running amok in George Square” 
and creating “a scene of lawless disorder”26 were juxtaposed with the military’s “display of 
force”, evidenced by the soldiers and tanks throughout the city, “which [had] had a sobering 
effect” and helped re-establish “a sense of security and confidence.”27 The presence of the 
military in the city was recognised as an effective deterrent against further disorder and as “a 
pledge that the Government was prepared to fulfil its promise that law and order would be 
maintained and public safety guaranteed.”28 Claiming that there was “no public support” for 
the strikers in Glasgow and their riotous behaviour, particularly more right-wing newspapers 
like the Daily Mail  and the Daily Express, evoked a “universal determination that public order 
shall be maintained.”29 Especially the military presence in Glasgow was seen as restoring 
“public confidence […] in the ability of the authorities to deal with any fresh outbreak of 
disorder.”30 But also the conservative, local Glasgow Herald, which still in principle voiced 
support for “peaceful picketing,” reflected on what “the moral of this disgraceful episode” might 
be: “It surely is that the maintenance of law and order in the great community is the primary 
 
21 “Das Ende der Münchener Räteregierung“, FZ, 04.05.1919, ZMB, p. 1. 
22 “ Heftige Straßenkämpfe in München. Spartakistische Bestialitäten“, DTZ, 03.05.1919, MA, p. 2. 
23 “Wie München befreit wurde”, DTZ, 05.05.1919, AA, p. 2. 
24 “Trade Unionism or Anarchy”, Daily Mail, 01.02.1919, p. 4. 
25 “The Strike and its Sequel”, Glasgow Herald, 01.02.1919, p. 4. 
26 “Strike Riots in Glasgow”, The Courier and Argus, 01.02.1919, p. 3. 
27 “Military on Duty”, The Scotsman, 03.02.1919, p. 5. 
28 “The Strike Position”, Glasgow Herald, p. 7. 
29 “Trade Unionism or Anarchy”, Daily Mail, 01.02.1919, p. 4. 
30 “Tanks sent to Glasgow”, Daily Express, 04.02.1919, p. 1. 
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duty of the authorities, and the one which at all costs they must see is vigilantly and adequately 
discharged.”31 
     The reasons for this keenness to demonstrate authority, maintain law and order, and 
especially to be seen to be able to do so, were varied, but fear played a major part. The 
expectation of revolutionary upheaval, in one case, and the experience of it, in the other, 
shaped the responses by the British and the German authorities, respectively. During the 
strike week leading up to ‘Bloody Friday’ in late January 1919, the not yet disbanded British 
War Cabinet clearly exhibited some concern about the potential the strike might hold to foment 
revolutionary action and lead to violent escalation. With the Prime Minister David Lloyd George 
occupied at the Paris Peace Conference, Deputy Prime Minister Andrew Bonar Law chaired 
the meeting on 30 January and insisted that “he thought it vital […] that there was a sufficient 
force in Glasgow to prevent disorder.” He was also convinced that “if the movement in 
Glasgow grew, it would spread all over the country.”32 The next day, 31 January, the War 
Cabinet met at 3 pm, while the riot in George Square was already underway. The Secretary 
for Scotland within Lloyd George’s Coalition government, the Liberal Robert Munro, made a 
point of rather dramatically characterising the events in Glasgow not just as a strike, but “a 
Bolshevist rising.”33 He thus clearly exhibited the exaggerated perception of the strike’s power 
by some in the Cabinet, as well as consciously marking the movement out as foreign, namely 
Russian. However, the looming spectre of Germany, specifically, may well have also played 
at the forefront of British minds, as the month of January had seen the leftist Spartacist uprising 
in Berlin and its violent crushing by government troops. William Gallacher, one of the 
protagonists of the Clydeside labour movement and himself at the centre of the ‘Battle of 
George Square’, made this point in his 1936 memoir, referring to a newspaper article which 
claimed that “’[t]he panic of the civic and national authorities can only be explained thus. They 
actually believed a Spartacus coup was planned to start in Glasgow, and they were prepared 
to suppress it at all costs.’”34 Similarly, the conservative Aberdeen Daily Journal also referred 
to the “Spartacist fomenters of chaos” in Germany, but rather than be scared, it emphasised 
that they had been roundly “discredited, and their leaders disposed of.” The paper considered 
the George Square riot the “first serious outbreak of Bolshevism, which, unfortunately, [was] 
disgracing Scotland,” but it lauded that it had been “met with firmness by the Government, […] 
 
31 “The Strike and its Sequel”, Glasgow Herald, 01.02.1919, p. 4. 
32 War Cabinet [WC] 522 Conclusions, 30 January 1919, TNA (Kew), CAB 23/9/9, p. 3. 
33 War Cabinet [WC] 523 Conclusions, 31 January 1919, TNA (Kew), CAB 23/9/10, p. 2. 
34 [Glasgow?] Herald, 08.02.1919, cited in William Gallacher, Revolt on the Clyde: an autobiography 
(London, 1936), p. 234. McLean also points to the synchronicity of the Spartacist uprising and the 
Clydeside strike, Red Clydeside, p. 137. 
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[leaving] no doubt that, as a people, we are not going to tolerate lawlessness under any guise 
in our midst.”35  
     The fear of what revolutionary potential the striking workers of Clydeside might develop 
extended beyond just the British Isles and included overt worry from the press and politicians 
about the effect on the wider British Empire. The Times reproduced what it claimed was the 
“programme of revolution” of the “rebel strike leaders”, which explicitly included the aim of co-
ordinating “all revolutionary and anarchical movements (with special attention to Ireland and 
India).”36 McLean indeed has suggested that the government’s reaction was in part informed 
by their anticipation of “another Easter rising.”37 Though no tanks had been used in Dublin in 
April 1916,  the British state had ensured a strong military response to suppress the rising, 
including the use of heavy machine-guns, shelling the city centre with artillery, and the 
imposition of martial law. It has been argued that the ongoing First World War “shaped the 
state’s reaction to rebellion” in Ireland, and thus, perhaps, the close temporal proximity of the 
protests in Glasgow accounted for some of the state’s strong reaction informed by the only 
recently concluded war.38 Secretary for War Winston Churchill, appointed only three weeks 
prior, on the other hand, reminded members of the War Cabinet not to take any drastic action 
against the strikers “until some glaring excess had been committed” by them. He thus framed 
and justified any potential violence by the executive in advance as a defensive act only, while 
also expressing a revealing expectation that the protestors were likely to commit excesses.39 
The involvement of the figure of Churchill in this decision-making process brought with it a 
particular significance, as he can be regarded as personified evidence that while 1919 may 
have represented a break in the relationship between violence and politics in Germany, in the 
UK the presence of the Army at urban scenes of rioting represented to an extent a continuation 
of pre-war practices. In 1910, for example, Churchill had been responsible, as Home 
Secretary, for dispatching troops in domestic urban contexts in order to control riots. In the 
Welsh mining town of Tonypandy, troops were sent to re-enforce the police after rioting took 
place on 8 November 1910 during the course of a strike. The use of troops to intimidate the 
striking miners, if not directly suppress them by military force, had made Churchill a particularly 
hated figure among the working class, and his role, now as Secretary for War, within a British 
 
35 ‘Glasgow Terrorism’, Aberdeen Daily Journal, 01.02.1919, p. 4. 
36 “Rebel Strike Leaders. Points in Programme of Revolution”, Times, 01.02.1919, p. 9. 
37 McLean, Red Clydeside, p. 137. 
38 Niall Whelehan, “The Irish Revolution, 1912-1923”, in Alvin Jackson (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Modern Irish History (Oxford, 2014), p. 624. See also Fearghal McGarry, “Violence and the Easter 
Rising”, in David Fitzpatrick (ed.), Terror in Ireland 1916-1923 (Dublin, 2012), pp. 39-57. 
39 War Cabinet [WC] 522 Conclusions, 30 January 1919, TNA (Kew), CAB 23/9/9, p. 5. 
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government which sent troops into Glasgow in January 1919 only served to heighten the 
animosity and enforce Churchill’s negative image among this part of the population.40 
     The fear of the potential of revolution can be interpreted as a symptom of what Jon 
Lawrence has identified as a broader “fear of brutalization” which took hold in postwar Britain. 
Though Britain had been victorious in war and remained relatively politically stable compared 
to its continental European neighbours, the discourse surrounding events like the ‘Battle of 
George Square’ was clearly characterised by a fear that the ‘continental’ unrest of places like 
Germany, Hungary, and of course Russia might migrate across the sea to sweep the United 
Kingdom and its Empire.41 The Lord Provost of Glasgow in fact voiced his concerns about the 
war’s brutalising potential himself, when, speaking at a dinner for recently returned prisoners 
of war, he referred to the rioting in George Square and lamented that the men “should have 
returned just in time to experience something of the aftermath of war at home.”42 However, in 
order to uphold its self-image, as described by Lawrence, of the UK as a “peaceable kingdom”, 
it was crucially necessary to demonstrate, domestically and internationally, the state’s ability 
to maintain law and order. The Lord Provost therefore assured his audience, and the citizenry 
more generally, that the city authorities would not “shirk their duty” and that “the resources of 
civilization were not yet exhausted.”43  
     Though some, like Churchill, warned against exaggerating the danger posed by the striking 
workers in Glasgow, it is important to note that the scale of the rioting, as well as the firm 
reaction of the police force did appear to come as a shock to the British press, even those 
publications generally unsympathetic to the strikers.44 The Glasgow Herald gave voice to the 
shock by describing the day’s events as “unparalleled in the civic history of the city”, producing 
“unprecedented scenes of violence and bloodshed.”45 Some journalistic observers classed the 
repeated police baton charges, as well as the immediate deployment of battle-ready troops 
and tanks to the city, as a clear overreaction. The Manchester Guardian, for example, found 
“such lavish and pretentious display of force […] altogether disproportionate and a trifle 
ludicrous.”46 Others, notably the conservative Morning Post, betrayed their fear of what the 
protest might have been and lauded the “firm action of the authorities” which had “saved 
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Glasgow from a very disastrous Bolshevik riot.”47 Whether viewed as an overreaction or not, 
however, in the days following ‘Bloody Friday’, there was a notable emphasis on normalcy 
quickly returning to the streets of Glasgow. The Scotsman was of the opinion that “the rioting, 
serious as it was, found the authorities prepared”, and that the police had “shown remarkable 
patience” and “displayed for the most part great tact in dealing with the crowds.” The paper 
insisted that “the casualties were not numerous” and that the strikers’ “[m]ethods of terrorism” 
had “completely failed” because the “traffic in the streets skirting the square was carried on 
uninterruptedly, except for about twenty minutes.”48 Two days later the paper reported that the 
“battle-ground at George Square” was already attracting “large crowds of sightseers”, and that 
“[b]usiness was carried on briskly, and the tramway and other traffic proceeded without any 
hindrance during the day, while the football matches had their customary large crowds.”49 
Evidently, it was important to demonstrate just how unperturbed the citizens of Glasgow were 
by the strike, the rioting, and the presence of the military, and just how successful the 
authorities had been at achieving their central aim of maintaining law and order. 
     If, given the general fear of brutalization and of ‘foreign’ revolutionary sentiment spreading 
to the UK, as well as the relative gravity of the violence of ‘Bloody Friday’ in a domestic British 
context, the (over-)reaction of the authorities was perhaps comprehensible, it nevertheless 
played into the hands of the labour movement. The Scottish socialist revolutionary leader John 
Maclean swore that Scottish workers would not let themselves be “dragooned and bludgeoned 
at the behest of the Chief Constable or anybody else.”50 The Manchester Guardian, while 
maintaining that the “military intervention certainly [had] not terrorised either the strikers or any 
other citizen of Glasgow,”51 suggested that the “intervention of the troops [had] probably done 
more for the revolutionary agitator than two or three years’ propaganda.”52 This view was not 
entirely wrong, as the riot gave the would-be revolutionaries a “romantic history” to recount;53 
the day has since become mythologised, especially in pro-independence popular history, as 
a battle in which ordinary, unarmed Scottish workers fought against the overwhelming might 
of the British state and its military which, as the popular, and wholly non-factual, myth goes, 
had been sent in by the hated figure of Winston Churchill himself to crush the strike. A 
particular aspect of the myth focuses on the nationality of the troops sent to Glasgow. In the 
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majority, they were in fact drawn from various Scottish regiments, and contemporary reports 
in the papers confirmed as much; subsequently, however, they have come to be painted as 
‘foreign’, namely English, invading forces, giving the ‘Battle’ an additional nationalist, and even 
anti-colonial, significance in the more recent mythologization. The dramatic events of 31 
January 1919 naturally lend themselves to storytelling, and it must be remembered that often 
accounts of the ‘Battle of George Square’ originated in the autobiographical writings of those 
personally involved in the strike movement, such as William Gallacher, leading trade unionist 
and founding member of the Communist Party of Great Britain, or Emanuel Shinwell, one of 
the strike leaders of Red Clydeside and later a Labour politician. These men wrote their 
memoirs many years after the fact (1936 in Gallacher’s case; 1973 for Shinwell, by then a 
member of the House of Lords), and with a mind to portraying the events and their role in them 
to suit their contemporary agendas. Only more recent historiography has taken seriously the 
task of systematically dispelling these myths and providing a more fact-based account of the 
‘Battle of George Square.’54 
     In Germany, the focus on restoring Ruhe und Ordnung can also be analysed as a function 
of fear, only in this case it was not just the expectation of potential revolutionary violence and 
left-wing radicalism, but the actual experience of it which fuelled action. It is important to view 
the crushing of the Bavarian Councils’ Republic in the context of the wider German Revolution, 
the violence which had already occurred in various places throughout Germany, and how 
certain boundaries of what constituted legitimate uses of violence had already shifted since 
December 1918.55 A key taboo-breaking moment occurred during the brutal Märzkämpfe 
(‘March fighting’) between Spartacists and government troops in Berlin, when Defence 
Minister Noske issued the Schießbefehl, or ‘order to shoot’, on 9 March 1919. In the infamous 
order, government soldiers, and associated Freikorps, were instructed to “shoot immediately 
any person who [was] found to be fighting, with weapon in hand, against government troops.” 
Noske justified the order as a “deterrent“ which he had only issued “in the greatest need”, and, 
looking back, reflected that “[a]s harsh as this order was, as swiftly it proved effective.”56 The 
fighting between 3 and 16 March in Berlin cost an estimated 1,200 lives, among them many 
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civilians, including women and children; government troops counted 75 losses.57 It is not 
surprising that this taboo-breaking experience, in which German soldiers had received license 
to kill German civilians in an inner-German urban setting, informed how the situation in and 
around Munich was perceived and handled in late April and early May. As described above, 
the overwhelming perception, bolstered by conservative propaganda, was of the Communist 
reign in Munich as anarchic, lawless, and brutal; it therefore had to be brought to an end as 
quickly and decisively as possible. Notwithstanding the bourgeois experiences of men like 
Mann and Klemperer, for whom the Councils’ Republic was a laughable affair, as described 
above, which brought certain inconveniences, such as rising food prices, closed banks, and 
interrupted tram lines and postal services,58 Klemperer observed that many in Munich wished 
for a “Pater Noske, who may as well be called Epp,” to liberate the city from Communist rule.59 
Noske himself, re-emphasising the focus on Ruhe und Ordnung, noted in his autobiography, 
“[f]or the time being, there were no Bavarian troops available to put Munich in order.”60 
Therefore, troops and volunteer Freikorps from elsewhere in the Reich were brought into 
Bavaria. An order, vaguely reminiscent of Noske’s order to shoot from March, was passed by 
the commanders of the government troops and Freikorps, von Oven and Möhl, and signed by 
a representative of the Hoffmann government, which placed Munich under martial law and 
proclaimed that “whoever confronts government troops with weapon in hand will be punished 
by death.”61 Ruhe und Ordnung were thus to be established in Munich with just as much 
ruthlessness as it had been in Berlin two months prior. Only the Communist Rote Fahne 
newspaper, unsurprisingly, condemned what it considered the “orgies of order”, and indeed 
the “terror” wrought on Munich by the “Noskes” and his “Ordnungstruppen” (‘order troops’).62 
Though Klemperer bitterly regretted the fact that Munich, five or six times smaller than Greater 
Berlin, had had to experience just as much bloodshed,63 his personal experiences of late April 
and early May 1919 were dominated by the above-cited practical inconveniences, which 
contrast starkly with the experiences of those actively involved in the fighting, who were 
traumatised by the brutality of the government troops’ advance into the city, and who 
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recounted either witnessing, or experiencing first-hand, fear, chaos, imprisonment, torture, 
summary justice, and executions.64 
     Nadine Rossol’s work on the Prussian police and the German revolution, while dealing 
mainly with the specific challenges posed by the revolution to the police service, further 
supports the view that maintaining order was a main priority for state authorities in early 
postwar Germany. As the revolution had brought about a “crumbling of the state’s monopoly 
on violence”, a domestic “power vacuum” needed to be filled by whoever proved best capable 
of forcefully demonstrating their ability to restore and maintain law and order.65 As many of the 
troops and volunteers who were recruited to aid the Bavarian government to crush the 
Councils’ Republic were not of Bavarian origin, but were drawn from various places throughout 
the Reich, there was some concern that Bavarians’ age-old animosity against ‘Prussians’ 
would create tensions between locals and the government troops and Freikorps. Rumours 
sprang up that the troops were living off of the already sparse resources available to Munich’s 
citizenry, and commander-in-chief of the Reich troops, General Major Möhl felt compelled to 
issue an official statement, dispelling the rumours and reminding the general population of 
Munich that they “owed the northern German troops thanks.”66 This can be viewed as an active 
effort on the part of the authorities to counteract inner-German divisions based on regional 
identity, and instead to foster more national cohesion at a point when the country needed to 
recover from these violent excesses.67 Klemperer observed this uneasy coexistence, including 
the linguistic clash, not without some bemusement: “For the first and only time in my life […] I 
saw a joyful Bavarian-Prussian fraternisation.”68 
     The ultimate end to which Ruhe und Ordnung needed to be restored was, however, not 
only domestic. It carried international significance as well. Social Democrat Philipp 
Scheidemann had expressed these international ramifications bluntly during an April 1919 
sitting of the National Assembly, while the Peace Conference was ongoing in Paris and the 
first Councils’ Republic was simultaneously working to enforce its authority in Munich. After 
four years of “murder and destruction”, he implored his fellow deputies, Germany needed 
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nothing more urgently than to prove its “honesty”, “willingness to peace” and “renunciation of 
violent politics.” Scheidemann therefore admonished those Germans, calling them 
“adventurers and phantasists,” who were continuing to wage war on their fellow countrymen 
as well as on the “peoples with whom we intend to sit at the negotiating table tomorrow.”69 He 
thus gave voice to the German government’s pressing need to present the new state as a 
reliable democratic partner in the postwar order of civilised nations; an aim which crucially 
required the defeat of any alternative forms of government, especially of the extreme Left, as 
set up in the Bavarian capital, which might threaten this projected image. However, whether 
the manner in which “the government chose to demonstrate its will to rule with unrestrained 
acts of performance violence” successfully served this aim or proved in fact detrimental to it, 
turned out to be one of the cruxes for the eventual failure of the Weimar Republic.70 
     The linguistic dehumanisation of the ‘inner enemy’, though not a new development, was a 
main rhetorical device to support the state’s position of authority and undermine the power of 
those the state was battling domestically. The dehumanisation was achieved primarily through 
emphasis on foreignness and through animalistic descriptions. The process was particularly 
prevalent in the reception of the Bavarian Councils’ Republic, its leaders, and its violent 
crushing by government troops and Freikorps.71 The murder of the ten hostages by 
Communists, unsurprisingly, took a central place in the reporting of the end of Munich’s 
Councils’ Republic. The act, both before and after being officially confirmed, was universally 
described with horror and condemnation, though not without some voyeuristic interest in the 
gruesome details of the murders. Several papers reported on the alleged mutilations, bashed-
in faces, spilled guts, missing heads or limbs, and the difficulty these circumstances caused 
in identifying the victims.72 The murder of the hostages itself was consistently described as 
“bestialisch” or “viehisch” (‘beastly’, or ‘bestial’), while the perpetrators were called “vertiert” 
(‘brutish’); furthermore, as the government troops advanced, they were said to be “cleansing” 
(“säubern”) the “nests” of Communists along the way. Such an animalistic, unhuman enemy 
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evidently made the deployment of violence an easier option.73 The government troops and the 
associated Freikorps, on the other hand, were portrayed as liberators, received 
enthusiastically by the joyous population of Munich. Their advancement into the city was 
accompanied by an emphasis on their low casualty numbers and their employment of the 
means of modern warfare, such as machine-guns, armoured vehicles, flamethrowers, and 
mortars.74 The ‘savage’ Communists, as described above, however, were prone to running 
away, opportunistically swapping their red armbands for white ones, sniping at government 
troops, or ambushing them under cover of the night in a cowardly fashion.75 At the same time, 
however, Communists were repeatedly reported to have used gas ammunition and Dum-Dum 
bullets.76 These were also quintessentially modern arms; however, crucially, they were 
internationally outlawed and, especially after the experiences on the frontlines of the recent 
war, marked out as particularly vicious. The Communists’ and Bolshevism’s foreignness, more 
generally, were also emphasised in an effort to ‘other’ the enemy of the German government 
troops. During April, Maximilian Pfeiffer (Catholic Centre Party) had spoken of the situation in 
Bavaria as brought about by “aliens” (“Fremdlinge”) who had no trace of the Bavarian 
“character” (“Wesen”).77 This view of Bolshevism was repeated later, for example in a 
proclamation by the Bavarian government to the Bavarian people, which declared it 
everybody’s duty to fight the “character alien to German-ness” (“das deutschfremde Wesen”) 
of Russian Bolshevism.78 The circumstance that the leaders of the Councils’ Republic, Eugen 
Leviné and Max Levien, were Russian-born offered yet another opportunity to brand the 
Communist experiment in Munich as foreign, the liberal Frankfurter Zeitung for example 
blaming the “days of horror” on “the Russian Bolshevists Dr. Levien and Leviné-Nissen.”79 
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Furthermore, Jewishness was consciously associated with the Councils’ Republic in order to 
heighten its foreignness. Many prominent figures within the Councils’ reign, and in Eisner’s 
government before then, were in fact Jewish, like Eisner himself, Eugen Leviné, Gustav 
Landauer, or Ernst Toller. Though Max Levien was not actually Jewish, both him and Leviné 
were purposely denounced as foreign, Russian Jews, and agents of Bolshevism. Over the 
course of the year 1919, Brenner has shown how parts of the local and right-wing press 
increasingly focused on the, real or alleged, Jewishness of left-wing leaders and of the 
Councils’ Republic in particular, becoming increasingly aggressively and outspokenly anti-
Semitic.80 Victor Klemperer’s diary, too, holds clues to this changing mood in Munich, when 
he recounts a visit to his colleague Jochimsen’s house where Mrs Jochimsen “hysterically” 
defends Count Arco, the right-wing extremist who had murdered Eisner in February of 1919, 
as a German martyr.81 
     The fear of ‘Russian conditions’, aided by ‘foreign’ agents, was prominent in Germany, 
especially against the backdrop of the already experienced violence of revolutionary and 
counter-revolutionary upheaval and the quite real presence and activities of, first, the 
Spartacus League and then the Communist Party in Berlin and Munich.82 However, even 
though the labour conflicts in postwar Britain, with their classic socialist demands surrounding 
working conditions and hours, never took on the scale and violence of the much more radical 
civil war-like situation in postwar Germany, the fear of ‘Russian conditions’ was also applicable 
to the UK. As has already been mentioned, the strike movement in Glasgow was consciously 
associated with Bolshevist activity, painting it as an outside influence foreign to Britain and 
explicitly ‘un-British’. Particularly the conservative Morning Post characterised Bolshevism as 
something “alien”, leading astray working men’s “good loyal English instincts.”83 The paper 
also engaged liberally in anti-Irish and anti-Scottish racism, as well as anti-Semitism, blaming 
the “big Sinn Fein element among the Irish workers” in Glasgow, the “wild Scots”, and the 
“Russian Jews” for the disturbances, which they exaggerated into a potentially “very 
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disastrous Bolshevik riot.”84 Echoing the anti-Semitism and anti-Bolshevism of the German 
‘stab-in-the-back’ myth, and rehashing stereotypes about Jews as foreign conspirators, strike 
leader Emanuel Shinwell in particular was singled out by the Morning Post as a “Polish Jew”85 
who was representative of “your professional Hebrew revolutionary” who preyed on “a 
discontented people.” The paper expressed surprise, or perhaps frustration that “the British 
workman should allow those aliens to lead him by the nose.”86 To prevent this ‘foreign’, 
specifically ‘continental’, chaos and revolutionary sentiment from spreading to either Britain or 
the Empire, the British state needed to be seen to be able to maintain law and order. An 
important aspect of maintaining law and order, and related not least linguistically, was the 
state’s ability to rely on its executive; the Morning Post therefore expressed complete 
confidence that, if called upon, “soldiers will obey orders.”87  The characterisation of this 
executive more generally was similar to that of the government troops in Munich. Emphasis 
was placed on the police and the military as orderly, efficient, and possessing all means of 
modern, “scientific warfare”, including “shrapnel-helmet[s], […] rifles and fixed bayonets, with 
many rounds of live ammunition.”88 The professionalism and efficiency of the state executive 
was again juxtaposed with the demonstrators, who were frequently described as “young 
roughs” and “boys” who used “disgusting language”, got drunk on looted beer, and later “ran 
away like rabbits” when the police charged them with their batons.89  
     Just as the experience of Munich’s bourgeois citizenry contrasted starkly with the 
experiences of those involved in the fighting itself, there was also an apparent discrepancy 
between, on the one hand, the violence meted out by police in George Square on 31 January 
1919 which newspapers reported as unprecedented and shocking, and, on the other hand, 
some of the more mundane aspects of the rioting on that day, which, as indicated above, 
involved some young men breaking into businesses, looting beer and jewellery, and throwing 
nothing more dangerous than stones and bottles of sparkling water.90 While commentators 
thus cast aspersions on the bravery and the virility of the male protestors, the treatment of 
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women presented an interesting gendered reading of the public discourse around the acts of 
political violence in both Glasgow and Munich. It constituted another category of classing 
people as either the ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ kind to be involved in such conflicts. There were both 
men and women among the assembled protestors in Glasgow’s George Square, and as the 
police began charging the rioting crowds, they reportedly used their batons to “[hit] out at 
everybody who came in their way.”91  Some women who were reported to have “innocently 
turned out to watch the procession” had children with them and “got mixed up in the melee.”92 
Women were thus characterised as passive and innocent victims of the police charges; the 
possibility of them being actively involved in the political demonstration taking place was not 
entertained. Once injured, they were described as “hysterical.”93 On the one hand, this long-
standing trope painted the women as too weak to withstand the consequences of getting 
involved, or even just showing up, at the scene of political protest. On the other hand, it also 
helped in driving home the indiscriminate force of the police violence used against all those 
assembled in George Square, many of whom, men and women, were considered ‘innocent’ 
passers-by, thus undermining the authority of the police’s actions. 
     In the reporting on the violent end of Munich’s Councils’ Republic the characterisation of 
women was twofold. As in Glasgow, they were occasionally presented as innocent victims; 
but the press also emphasised the fact that there were women among the Communist fighters. 
Given the high number of civilian victims of the fighting in Munich, it is reasonable to assume 
that among the civilian victims there were a number of women. However, as has been 
discussed above, the murder of the hostages drew the most attention in the press. Among the 
victims shot in the school yard was Hella Countess von Westarp, a noblewoman and the only 
female victim of the hostage murder. Westarp became the epitome of the ‘innocent woman’ 
killed, not by the ‘white terror’ of the government troops, but by the ruthless, animalistic 
Communists. Being the only woman among the victims, she was by definition an atypical 
victim, but her fate was especially picked up by newspapers who presented it as 
representative more generally of the innocent victims which Communist rule in Munich had 
allegedly demanded. Reports on the hostage murder made sure to mention that one woman 
was among the victims, and, speaking of “marks of a particular ordeal,” intimated that she had 
been sexually abused.94 Though Jones has noted that these rumours proved to be untrue, the 
idea dominated the discourse and added to the characterisation of the Communists as 
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predatory.95 Westarp’s status as a noblewoman made her an attractive victim to use in order 
to highlight Communist violence against supposedly innocent individuals; the many working 
class women killed over the course of the fighting in Munich remained nameless and their 
deaths were not constructed as a public scandal and crime. On the other hand, women who 
were active in fighting on the side of the Councils’ Republic also themselves became part of 
the negative characterisation of the Communists. Bourgeois newspapers described them as 
“fanatical womenfolk” (“fanatische Weiber”), and noted with some disgust that “even hateful 
[“verhetzte”] armed women [took] part in the fighting.”96 The dichotomy in the reception of 
women as either innocent victims or fanatical Communists echoes the theory developed by 
Klaus Theweleit in his influential, if unusual, psychoanalytical study of German Freikorps 
fighters. In it, Theweleit made the case that, based on their fragile masculinity, the Freikorps 
men could only perceive women as one of two distinct archetypes. One was the blood-red 
Communist Flintenweib (literally ‘gun woman’, somewhat akin to ‘battle-axe’), who was an out-
of-control Amazonian murderer, sexual predator, and fair game for the Freikorps fighter. The 
other was the white and saintly, virginal German woman, who was generally a mother, sister, 
nurse, or wife to the Freikorps men and had to be liberated by them from the Bolshevist yoke.97 
The fact that language in the press echoed these characterisations, even if only moderately, 
should be noted as an important aspect in the use of public language in negotiating the 
legitimacy or illegitimacy of certain acts of political violence at this early stage of the interwar 
period. 
     This linguistic dehumanisation of the ‘inner enemy’, including the linguistic treatment of 
women, formed an important accompanying element of the authorities’ efforts to present and 
uphold a certain self-image, both domestically and internationally, in both Germany and the 
United Kingdom. Language, in the words of Alessandro Portelli, allows access to the “horizon 
of shared possibilities, real or imagined.”98 This horizon may be individual or, if public language 
is examined, it can illuminate what expectations a society had in certain circumstances, based 
on certain experiences, and how it chose to respond. What this exploration of public language 
around political violence in Munich and Glasgow in 1919 has demonstrated is how 
experiences and expectations of revolution reverberated and took effect inter-, as well as 
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trans-nationally in postwar Europe. Projecting and upholding their preferred self-image was of 
central importance to both the German and the British states, and maintaining law and order, 
or Ruhe und Ordnung, was a central way of doing so. In the newly founded Weimar Republic, 
the experience of war and then of revolutionary upheaval and violence, primarily in Berlin in 
December 1918, in January 1919 and again in March 1919, shaped the authorities’ response 
to the challenge of the Councils’ Republic in Munich in April and May 1919. The fear of 
Bolshevism taking hold in a major German city pushed the authorities to act swiftly and 
decisively, while the precedent set by the taboo-breaking ‘order to shoot’ and the linguistic 
dehumanisation of the Communist enemy helped drive up the number of victims. 
Domestically, as well as internationally, presenting the young German republic as a stable, 
reliable and democratic member of the community of civilised nations was paramount. Britain 
had not experienced a revolutionary overthrow following the end of the First World War, but 
the Russian, and German, spectre of upheaval and violence unleashed on the continent 
sparked fear in the British authorities, too, of the strike movement on the Clyde developing a 
power which, in reality, it never did, and of Bolshevism spreading to Britain and its Empire.99 
Riots, especially in port cities like Glasgow, which had already been a hotbed of labour unrest 
during the war, often involved returned servicemen and fuelled wider concerns about the 
‘brutalising’ effect of the war on British society. This fear helps explain the (over-) reaction in 
Glasgow, as the image of Britain having emerged from the horrors of the war as a ‘peaceable 
kingdom’ needed to be enforced, ironically by the use of the police baton if necessary. The 
discrepancies, especially along class lines, between the lived experiences of those involved 
in violent events, those living adjacent to them, and those reporting or recording them are 
obvious. Political violence, thus, was a postwar phenomenon frequent in many parts of 
Europe, and though it manifested itself on vastly different scales, the responses to it indicate 
the inter- and transnational potential of the European postwar culture of protest, upheaval, 
and social and political change, which the governments in power perceived as enough of a 
threat to respond with significant force. 
 
1.2 JUNE 1922. SUMMER OF ASSASSINATIONS. 
In June 1922 high-profile assassinations shook both the German and the British capitals. First, 
two men associated with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) assassinated former Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff and serving Member of Parliament, Sir Henry Wilson, on the doorstep 
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of his London home on 22 June. Just two days later, on 24 June, two men associated with the 
right-wing underground group Organisation Consul assassinated the German Foreign 
Minister, Walther Rathenau, near his Grunewald home as he was making his way to work in 
an open-top car. Shocking acts of domestic terrorism such as these assassinations confronted 
both the British and German states with the question of how a democratic society can and 
should react to them. This section, therefore, will examine the public language exhibited in 
parliament and in the press in response to these two assassinations. Initially, what these 
responses reveal is unsurprising. Both crimes shocked the British and German publics, 
respectively, and were strongly condemned by those writing or speaking in the press and in 
parliament. However, the section will then examine the ways in which the two murders soon 
began to be used politically, by different sides, and it will argue that these discourses 
contributed to the further solidification of certain constructions of national identity and the 
consolidation of particular self-images. For the still young Weimar Republic, profoundly 
affected by political violence throughout its early years, the violent death of the Foreign 
Minister posed a serious challenge and intensified the need to reassert its democratic, 
republican values and identity in the face of such a counter-revolutionary attack, both to a 
domestic and an international audience. In this situation, the figure of the murdered Rathenau 
lent itself particularly well to being stylised as a martyr for the republic. Within a domestic 
British context, the assassination of a high-profile military leader and politician stood out as a 
shocking and unique exception to the otherwise non-physical carrying out of political conflicts 
in British politics, in which the commentators analysed here took great pride. Though it did not 
pose a real threat to the integrity of the British state, public discourse in Britain was 
nevertheless compelled to emphasise the act’s ‘un-British’ nature and to ensure the 
perpetrators’ categorical condemnation and their rhetorical exclusion from civilised society. 
     The secondary literature dedicated exclusively to these two assassinations is relatively 
sparse. The still most widely cited monograph on the murder of Walther Rathenau is Martin 
Sabrow’s Die verdrängte Verschwörung (‘The [psychologically] suppressed conspiracy’).100 In 
it, the author reconstructs in great detail and based on careful source work, the events of the 
assassination and its aftermath, including the public reaction to it, the hunt for the perpetrators, 
their trial, and their highly probable affiliation to the right-wing underground Organisation 
Consul, providing an invaluable source for understanding the event and its wider 
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consequences and context. Two perceptive book chapters by Manuela Achilles explore the 
murder and its aftermath in the context of nationalist violence and republican identities in 
Weimar Germany more generally. She firstly analyses the deliberate construction of Rathenau 
as a martyr for the republic, in life as well as in death, and as a lieu de mémoire used to aid 
the relatively young German state in its identity construction. In a second contribution, she 
analyses the official commemoration of Rathenau’s death in detail and identifies it as a crucial 
“moment of democratic invention” for the young Weimar Republic.101 Henry Wilson’s murder 
is, leaving aside several non-academic biographies written by Wilson’s contemporaries, the 
subject of only two publications: firstly, the final chapter of Keith Jeffery’s biography of Wilson; 
and secondly, a journal article by Peter Hart, focusing in particular on the possibility of a direct 
link between the Irish revolutionary leader and politician, Michael Collins, and Wilson’s 
assassins.102  
     For a study interested in the rhetorical treatment of political violence, looking at the public 
language exhibited in response to these targeted assassinations in some further detail helps 
reveal another side to the topic of enquiry. It illuminates what language was used, and 
considered appropriate, when the perpetrators of a violent act were clearly identifiable as 
enemies of the state. Several other case studies considered for this thesis focus on violent 
acts perpetrated by (currently or formerly) state-directed or state-sponsored agents, for 
example paramilitaries. Their violent actions often necessitated a difficult balance to be struck 
within public discourse, as to how to judge them when their actions were perceived to have 
overstepped the lines of what was publicly defensible. Both the assassins of Henry Wilson 
and those of Walther Rathenau had been members of formerly state-sponsored bodies of 
violence who subsequently lost their state-sponsorship and then joined violent underground 
organisations. Reginald Dunne and Joseph O’Sullivan both served in the British Army before 
joining the Irish nationalist cause; while the members of the right-wing underground 
Organisation Consul had previously been members of the Reich’s armed forces and/or of 
certain Freikorps which the German government had relied on in its early months to 
consolidate its power against left-wing radicals, such as in the example of Munich discussed 
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above.103 This background notwithstanding, these perpetrators of violence were easy to 
identify and condemn as  enemy outsiders, as they were considered to operate outside of 
societal norms by having attacked individuals who were representatives of the state. Strong 
and outright condemnation of the assassins’ acts was therefore acceptable and expected. 
This section will examine what other discursive treatment of the perpetrators and their actions 
was considered acceptable under the circumstances, but also what lines could still not be 
crossed or may have been contested, for example through reference to universal moral codes, 
certain self-images based around justice and dignity, and the need to reaffirm membership of 
the ‘civilised’ world. 
 
Henry Wilson, born into a Protestant family in County Longford in Ireland, was a British Army 
officer, eventually reaching the rank of Field Marshall, who served as Sub Chief of Staff of the 
British Expeditionary Force on the Western Front, then as Corps commander, later as head 
of Eastern Command, and finally as the British Military Representative on the Supreme War 
Council during the First World War. He became Chief of the Imperial General Staff (head of 
the Army) in 1918 and held the position throughout the period of the Irish War of Independence 
from 1919-1921 (which is explored more in Chapter 2 of the thesis). It was this role of his, 
overseeing the British (para-)military campaign in Ireland, which made him profoundly 
unpopular with, and a conceivable target of, Irish nationalists. In February 1922 he was 
furthermore elected Unionist MP for the Northern Irish constituency of North Down. In the 
afternoon of 22 June 1922, when returning from the unveiling of a war memorial for fallen 
railway men at Liverpool Street Station earlier in the day, Wilson was shot multiple times and 
died on his own doorstep on Eaton Place in London. The two gunmen, Reginald Dunne and 
Joseph O’Sullivan, both 24 years old, London-born Catholics and former members of the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA), were apprehended after a brief chase in which two policemen and a 
civilian were wounded. As the news of the murder spread through London and the country 
more widely, Jeffery asserts that “condemnation was complete.”104 This was unsurprising, 
given the cold-blooded nature of the crime, committed in broad daylight in London’s affluent 
Belgravia district, and given the great esteem in which the victim was held by his peers, 
especially for his role as a military leader in the First World War. Accordingly, words like 
“shocking”, “horror”, and “dastardly” abounded in the newspapers as well as in the 
parliamentary chambers. When word of Wilson’s murder reached the House of Commons that 
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afternoon, members were visibly shaken. Speaking with palpable emotion, Leader of the 
Opposition, H.H. Asquith, inquired whether the news he had just received was indeed true 
and after the Conservative leader Austen Chamberlain confirmed the fact of the assassination, 
the House agreed to adjourn out of respect for the murder victim.105 Similarly, the House of 
Lords immediately agreed a Motion expressing its “detestation of the horrible crime” which 
passed unanimously, as the circumstances were perceived to be “altogether without 
precedent.”106 This was of course not strictly true, neither was the exaggerated assertion made 
in some of the press that there had been no such assassination “for centuries.”107 The last 
time a sitting Member of Parliament had been assassinated had been in 1812 when Prime 
Minister Spencer Perceval was shot in the lobby of the House of Commons.108 What these 
horrified affirmations gave voice to, however, was the wide-spread and profound sense that 
this act was upsettingly un-British and uncharacteristic of British history, society, and politics. 
Political murders, “these hideous crimes”, were recognised as something that was happening 
on the disturbed European continent; however, as the then Colonial Secretary Winston 
Churchill claimed, there were “few things of which this country could be more proud” than the 
fact that there had been “hardly any political assassinations” in Britain. This was, continued 
Churchill, due to “very deep causes in the national character.”109 This theme was picked up, 
for example by the left-liberal newsmagazine The Nation, which repeated it in its assertion 
that “[t]he peculiarly British horror of political assassination, which would make the ordinary 
Englishman shudder equally at the murder of a Die-Hard leader or a Communist leader, is […] 
one of the soundest instincts in our nature.”110 This striking, almost oxymoronic, affirmation 
that the British people were opposed to all political assassination, no matter the victim’s actual 
politics, raises the question of how much meaningful content the phrase ‘political 
assassination’ actually held in the British public, as opposed to ‘ordinary’ murder. Reiterating 
the distinct British way of dealing with an incident such as Wilson’s murder, and drawing 
attention to the international reverberations of the crime, Prime Minister David Lloyd George 
urged the preservation of the “calm which has always characterised Britain”, and warned 
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members to be more aware of how Britain was viewed abroad, where there was – according 
to him – a sense that if ‘England’ were to succumb to panic now, then “England is just like any 
other country,” rather than, as always, displaying “calm composure, judgment, [and] firmness 
in moments when others would have been swept away by passion.”111 
     Along with outright shock and outrage, further layers soon emerged within the public 
language used to discuss the crime. The notion of ‘civilisation’ was once again central, in two 
notable facets. On the one hand, the crime contradicted basic values of civilisation; while on 
the other hand, the murder also presented an opportunity for Britain to demonstrate and 
reinforce precisely those civilizational values in its reaction to the assassination and in its 
treatment of the assassins. Opinion was largely unanimous in declaring that the crime had 
“horrified the whole civilized world” and “shocked humanity and disgraced civilisation.”112 In 
particular, the identification of the assassins, as former IRA members, with the cause of Irish 
independence and the continuing violence of the nascent Irish Civil War caused some 
commentators in the press and in parliament to associate the recently independent south of 
Ireland with the ‘uncivilised’ act of brute force committed in London. The Pall Mall Gazette 
expressed hope that the “Free State” would one day “evolve into a community that will 
eventually rise to the ranks of civilisation.”113 Not being one to mince his words, the Scottish 
Unionist MP John Jameson declared that if  
 
Ireland – that is to say, Green Ireland – […] [had] determined not to let Ulster lead a 
decent life, free from murder, arson and crime, and if it [had] determined not to let 
Great Britain live a decent life either, but to send murderers and gunmen to commit 
outrages in the very heart of the Empire here in London, Ireland will have to be dealt 
with very drastically. It is the old problem of barbarism and civilisation existing side by 
side. […] If civilisation does not conquer barbarism, barbarism will over-run civilisation. 
[…] That will have to cease, or the independence, what is called self-determination, of 
the 26 counties, will have to cease, and they will have to be re-conquered.114 
 
This drastic appraisal contained as much evidence of Jameson’s condemnation of 
assassinations, as it allowed insight into Jameson’s understanding of the civilizational values 
propagated by him. While the civilisation which, in Jameson’s eyes, was epitomised in the 
British Empire had granted Ireland self-determination, the MP clearly betrayed his continued 
perception of Ireland as a colonial sphere and reserved the right of the Empire to “re-conquer” 
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the 26 southern counties if the Free State’s inability to contain terrorism and civil war should 
render it unworthy of independence in the eyes of the former imperial rulers. Éamon de Valera, 
then Teachta Dála (TD, ‘Deputy to the Dáil’, the Irish parliament) for County Clare, however, 
lost no time in turning such accusations on their head. From his position as a member of the 
Irish parliament, he criticised “our hypocritical civilisation” which, according to him, only called 
for expressions of horror and condemnation when the victim of a killing was “placed in the 
seats of the mighty and his name known in every corner of the earth” and not when the victim 
was “the humble worker or peasant unknown outside his immediate neighbourhood.”115 During 
the trial of the two defendants Dunne and O’Sullivan, the judge further established that their 
crime had transgressed certain universal mores. He refused Dunne the right to read out a 
prepared statement in his defence, arguing that the statement was nothing more than a 
“manifesto asserting a belief in the right to kill” and thus impermissible to have read out publicly 
in court.116 Seemingly underlining the fact that the entire ‘civilized’ world shared the horror of 
this assassination, newspapers faithfully reported the many letters of sympathy from 
international dignitaries which reached the British government, for example from France, 
Canada, and even the traditionally pro-Irish United States.117 
     The indignation at, and overwhelming condemnation of, the assassination of Wilson was 
not surprising. Where this reaction might lead, however, was a more open question. The 
Manchester Guardian’s evidently quite level-headed London Correspondent analysed as early 
as Thursday evening that though many expected Wilson’s assassination to cause a seismic 
shift in the government, making perhaps even a general election necessary, he did not expect 
the murder to change the government’s Irish policy in favour of Ulster Unionism, or indeed 
have any “serious political consequences” at all.118 Though he was right in predicting that the 
shock of the assassination did not lead to a change in government behaviour towards the 
British-recognised Provisional Government of Ireland or a sudden explicitly pro-Ulster Unionist 
shift of policy, Wilson’s murder was soon instrumentalised by forces on either side of the 
political spectrum to further exacerbate their divisions. As one editorial observed, “[both] in the 
press and outside emotions have been allowed to get out of hand, and attacks of great 
violence and acrimony have been made on the Premier, on Mr. Chamberlain, and especially 
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on [the Home Secretary, A.K.] Mr. Shortt. Attacks were of course expected. It is their extreme 
bitterness which surprises.”119  
     The connection of Wilson’s death with ‘Irish affairs’ was immediately obvious to all 
contemporaries, even if it remained unclear for a long time whether or not a conspiracy to 
have Wilson killed had actually existed within the IRA, and whether Dunne and O’Sullivan had 
been acting on direct orders from Michael Collins or had hatched their plan alone. Despite the 
existence of earlier IRA plans to target Wilson, Hart has presented the most conclusive 
evidence to date that by June 1922 no such action was officially sanctioned, and Dunne and 
O’Sullivan must be considered to have made the decision to assassinate Wilson on their own 
and without orders from the IRA.120 Nevertheless, the explicitly political nature of this murder 
further exacerbated the on-going conflict over how Great Britain, following the Anglo-Irish 
Treaty of December 1921, ought to behave towards the Provisional Government in the south 
and the six counties to the north of the island, as the Irish Civil War began to break out in the 
summer of 1922. Amid the bitter debates on the future of British policy in Ireland, Wilson, the 
recently elected MP for North Down, was quickly turned, by some of his former colleagues in 
the Commons, into a martyr for the fate of Southern Unionists and Ulster Protestants. As one 
Conservative MP insisted, “[the] late Field-Marshal died for the freedom of his people, for the 
freedom of conscience, for the freedom of free expression.”121 
     Other MPs took it upon themselves to speak on behalf of the recently deceased and used 
Wilson’s memory to attack the government, proclaiming, for example, that “[in] Ireland these 
things have been going on every day. If Sir Henry Wilson were alive now he would say that 
he would be very glad to give his life in order that those deeds might be stopped. Yet it is only 
when a man is murdered here that the Government come down and tell us what action – as 
to that I am extremely doubtful – they are going to take.”122 In Jeffery’s analysis, Wilson’s death 
quickly achieved a “mythic quality.”123 The ultra-conservative Morning Post spoke with 
admiration of the way that “the martyrdom of one man, a famous soldier” had drawn thousands 
to line the streets of London for Wilson’s funeral procession to pay their respects.124 His 
‘martyrdom’ was heightened further by the heroisation of his leadership in the First World War. 
Thus, The Times commented upon the “special poignancy” of the circumstance that when he 
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was murdered, Wilson had just returned from a commemoration of men who had fallen in the 
war. “Few”, the paper eulogised, “had done more to achieve the victory for which they had 
died.”125 However, as Jeffery points out, critical voices existed too, which also tied Wilson’s 
death to Ireland, but, hyperbolising his support for Ulster Unionist politics, blamed him for 
having provoked his own death through an alleged “fanatical Orangeism” and “spirit of ruthless 
and stupid retaliation.”126 
      Against the background of the volatile climate in Ireland, Wilson’s violent death sparked a 
vigorous political debate. There were those who placed the responsibility for this assassination 
on the Provisional Government and the nation of Ireland, for supposedly having harboured the 
ideological fanaticism which had allowed such an act that was beyond the boundaries of a 
common, human moral code. The Times made this case, for example, writing that  
 
nothing can atone for the crime that has been committed. Whatever measures the 
Government and Parliament may see fit to take, the responsibility for those measures 
must rest solely with the Irish nation. […] Morally she is an outlaw […]. She is past the 
reach of external aid. No amount of good will, good faith, and good intentions on the 
part of Great Britain can be of any avail to her as long as murder is her ultimate political 
argument.127 
  
The Times thus actively positioned the government of the Irish Free State as being outside of 
moral law, by describing it as a moral “outlaw” from the community of civilised nations. 
However, more conciliatory voices conceded that some of the responsibility for the ongoing 
violent conflicts in Ireland, which had in this instance spilled over into the streets of London, 
also lay with the British government’s actions. Reminding readers of the circumstance that 
both assassins had served in the British Army during the First World War, Dunne with the Irish 
Guards and O’Sullivan with the Royal Fusiliers, having even lost a leg in France, The 
Manchester Guardian suggested that “[in] ordinary circumstances these are hardly the kind of 
men who would be likely to be guilty of so black a crime. But it is quite conceivable that they 
may have been led to it by what they regarded as intolerable wrongs committed against the 
section of the people to which they belonged and to the men of their own faith.”128 Fearing 
rising tensions, the same paper made a particularly striking appeal to the patriotic virtue of 
calmness to both British and Irish politicians and ordinary people. It compared Wilson’s 
assassination to that of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in June 1914 and recalled how the 
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“intemperate elements in the two Imperial Powers prevailed”, leading the world into the all-
too-recent horrors of the war. It warned that  
 
even now there are not wanting, among the ‘Die-hards’ of an English party, men who 
would follow the Austrian and German example and visit upon the whole of a weak 
neighbour nation the punishment of a murderous fanatic. Nor are there wanting in 
Ireland ‘Die-hards’ equal in folly and inhumanity to these […]. That is what every 
patriotic Englishman and every patriotic Irishman has to resist.129 
 
     As the two perpetrators were caught very soon after the crime, their trial before the Central 
Criminal Court (known as the Old Bailey) could go ahead swiftly, and given the overwhelming 
evidence, the two defendants pleaded guilty and there was little doubt that they would receive 
the death penalty. It was carried out promptly on 10 August 1922, when Dunne and O’Sullivan 
were hanged in Wandsworth Prison. The trial illuminated another facet in which Wilson’s death 
was instrumentalised politically. The conservative Morning Post accused the Labour and 
Liberal-friendly press of a “whitewashing of the assassins” by continuing to call them “’alleged 
murderers’”, as the Daily Herald had done, and by attempting to shift the blame for the act 
from the murderers to the “’policy of reprisals’” which the British forces had engaged in during 
the Irish War of Independence (see Chapter 2). It used international and historic comparisons 
to express disgust at how the Westminster Gazette readily acknowledged the assassins’ 
political motivations rather than condemning them as ordinary criminals, which, the Post 
remarked bitterly, would be “equally valid as applied to the murderer of Abraham Lincoln or, 
to take the most recent case, to those of Dr. Rathenau.”130 At the other extreme, there were 
those liberal voices which accused the judiciary of having become “entangled in party politics” 
and thus considered the trial a miscarriage of justice altogether. Referring to the judge’s 
(above-mentioned) decision to not allow one of the accused to read out a statement, because 
the judge considered it to be defending the right to kill, George Bernard Shaw argued that the 
running of the trial and the resulting death sentence passed on Dunne and O’Sullivan had 
been a “travesty of judicial procedure.”131 The proper course of justice, even if interpreted in 
diametrically opposed ways, was thus presented in the press as an enormously important 
aspect of the ‘civilisation’ that was to be defended against this murderous attack. 
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     Another point of contention which surfaced in the debates following Wilson’s death was the 
accusation levelled against the government of having failed to provide appropriate protection 
for ministers and other public figures who were considered to be at risk of assassination by 
Irish gunmen for their role as outspoken supporters of Ulster. ‘Die-hard’ Conservative critics 
of the government railed against the decision to have police protection removed from potential 
targets, such as Wilson, taken by the government in consultation with Scotland Yard a few 
weeks prior, and demanded that someone ought to resign over the matter.132 The Home 
Secretary Edward Shortt, however, categorically denied that there had been any concrete 
evidence to suggest that “the Field-Marshal was in danger.”133 In this context, a particularly 
interesting debate arose over the question of whether police should be (or should have been) 
armed. The matter was repeatedly raised by ‘die-hard’ MPs who suggested that under the 
present circumstances, where attempts on certain individuals were apparently imminent, the 
police should be armed to be adequately equipped to handle this danger. The Home Secretary 
again defended the course of action taken by the government, stating the police were unarmed 
“by their own desire” and that they had always had the option to ask for weapons to be 
provided to them from their stations.134 Even the ‘die-hard’ Conservative MP Archer-Shee 
agreed that it was usually not necessary to arm police, expressing proud hope that “it never 
will be [necessary] to arm the police in London, or in England generally”; however, he 
vehemently opposed the policy of expecting policemen to come forward and only arming them 
at their own request. Betraying a typically conservative notion of manliness, Archer-Shee 
argued that asking to be armed while carrying out their duties would make those policemen 
who did so “a laughing stock to others.” Therefore, he continued, that decision ought to be 
taken out of the individual policeman’s hands and made by “the superior authority.”135 This 
particular debate demonstrated how conservative voices could at the same time take pride in 
the fact that the British police did not usually need to be armed, but also categorically argue 
in favour of a strong approach, including arming certain policemen when it was considered 
necessary for the protection and defence of a “distinguished person.”136 
 
Walther Rathenau was a German-Jewish politician and industrialist, born the heir to one of 
the world’s leading electrical companies, AEG (Allgemeine Electricitäts-Gesellschaft). After 
the First World War, the member of the centrist Deutsche Demokratische Partei (DDP, 
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‘German Democratic Party’) became Germany’s Foreign Minister in January 1922. On the 
morning of 24 June 1922 he was on his way from his villa in the wealthy Grunewald 
neighbourhood on the outskirts of Berlin to the Foreign Office in the city centre, when his 
assassins overtook his open-top vehicle, threw a hand-grenade in the car and shot him, before 
driving off. The minister was dead within minutes. News of Rathenau’s death spread fast and 
a nation-wide manhunt for his killers began immediately, with a 1 million Reichsmark reward 
announced for their capture or relevant information leading to their capture. When the two 
young men who had killed the minister, 23 year-old Erwin Kern and 26 year-old Hermann 
Fischer, were eventually cornered inside Burg Saaleck castle in Saxony-Anhalt on 17 July, 
Kern was killed in a shootout with the police after which Fischer took his own life.137 Their 
associates who had been arrested in the meantime and eventually stood trial, could therefore 
only be charged with aiding and abetting, and as accessories to murder. Among them were 
the driver of the car from which Rathenau had been attacked, the 20-year old student Ernst 
Werner Techow, as well as a number of other men involved in the conspiracy to kill the 
minister. As subsequent historical research has established, Kern, Fischer, Techow, the 
owner of Saaleck castle, and several other conspirators were all most likely members of the 
so-called Organisation Consul (O.C.), an anti-democratic illegal underground paramilitary 
group, formed out of the disbanded Freikorps, whose express goal it was to destroy the 
republican form of government and fight “anything anti- and international, Jewry, Social 
Democracy, and radical left-wing parties.”138 
     After Reichstagspräsident (‘president of the parliament’, equivalent roughly to Speaker of 
the House), Paul Löbe, broke the news of Rathenau’s violent death to the assembled 
members of the Reichstag, the tumultuous reactions immediately made it practically 
impossible to continue with the sitting. No adjournment out of respect for the deceased was 
sought, as the House of Commons had done two days previously. Instead, the day’s 
scheduled debate was to be used as a first opportunity for the members of parliament to 
honour the victim. However, it took Löbe numerous appeals to members’ manners and sense 
of mutual respect to allow for anyone to actually speak to the assembled. Among riotous 
behaviour and shouts from the Communists and Independent Social Democrats calling right-
wing members, particularly Karl Helfferich of the Deutschnationale Volkspartei (DNVP, 
‘German National People’s Party’), “murderers” and demanding their immediate arrest, Löbe 
had to remind those assembled that “physical assault” (Tätlichkeiten) had no place in the 
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Reichstag. Even after a break in proceedings, calm could still not be restored as bitter 
accusations continued to fly across the chamber. Members on the extreme Left accused those 
on the Right of having functioned as the intellectual vanguard which had inspired Rathenau’s 
assassins with their consistently reactionary, monarchist, nationalist, and anti-Semitic rhetoric; 
they refused to take their seats while the DNVP was still in attendance, as this would, in their 
view, turn the planned memorial ceremony into a farce.139 
     Much like with Wilson’s death two days previously, the overwhelming reaction from the 
political establishment to Rathenau’s murder was one of indignation and condemnation of the 
act. Löbe spoke of “an act of such monstrous cruelty and brutality [Grausamkeit und Roheit 
[sic!]] as to make the blood in our veins freeze.” He highlighted the unity which resulted from 
the “grief and horror which moves us all, as well as the contempt for those wretched ones who 
committed this deed.”140 There was considerable evidence of this unity in the chamber that 
weekend, as Independent Social Democrat Arthur Crispien conceded that even though 
Rathenau had been a political opponent of the USPD, he had always done what he thought 
best for his country and Crispien’s party held Rathenau in high esteem for it. His murderers, 
on the other hand, were nothing more than “cowardly beasts.”141 Even the political Right was 
compelled to join the “republican litany of mourning.”142 Oskar Hergt, who was given the 
thankless task of speaking for the DNVP during Sunday’s special sitting, announced that “[the] 
German National People’s Party is filled with deepest indignation and disgust at this wicked 
deed”, only to be heckled by speakers on the Left who promptly denounced him as a 
“hypocrite!”143 
     Even though the reactions to Rathenau’s murder were largely characterised by 
condemnation, the divisions between left- and right-wing voices were more marked in 
Germany, and the transformation of Rathenau’s tragic death into a political weapon with which 
to attack opponents was more immediate, and much more aggressive, than in Great Britain. 
Commenting on the riotous Reichstag, the conservative and business-friendly Deutsche 
Allgemeine Zeitung published an exaggerated account of how “members of left-wing parties 
rowdily pounced on the present bourgeois [bürgerlich] members, and, under physical assaults 
and verbal abuse, forced them out of the chamber.”144 Though Löbe made a point of clarifying 
the previous day’s events at Sunday’s sitting, saying that there had been misunderstandings 
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but certainly no physical assaults on anyone, but that the press instead had exaggerated 
events in their reporting, the DAZ still indignantly spoke of “tumultuous and highly undignified 
scenes.”145 There was even some, perhaps justified, fear that the strong emotions aroused by 
the murder might actually have the potential to escalate into a civil war, as contemporary 
observer Victor Klemperer noted in his diary.146 Crispien indeed made a relatively unveiled 
threat of civil war, when he said that if the government continued to prove unable to clamp 
down on the rampant counter-revolutionary violence, then the proletariat would eventually be 
forced to respond in kind.147 
     As with Wilson in Britain, martyrdom emerged as the fate of this victim of assassination, 
too. Martin Sabrow has observed that the murder reverberated deep into bourgeois-
conservative quarters, making the figure of Rathenau especially suited to be turned into a 
martyr for the republic as soon as the minister had succumbed to his injuries.148 This could be 
observed as early as the Reichstag’s Saturday afternoon sitting, where Löbe declared with 
great pathos that following this attack on so prominent and eminent a representative of the 
German state, “what is at stake is the German nation, the German people, the German 
republic!”149 Löbe then went on to make sharp accusations against the right-wing underground 
networks within Germany, set on undermining and destroying the republic, who protected and 
financed the assassins and their accomplices, as well as those who, in public forums such as 
the Reichstag and in the press, incited such acts. Pointing, he declared that “[this] chair would 
not be empty today […] without the unbridled agitation against the men who are at the forefront 
of the government.”150 Löbe’s pithy remarks were greeted by spontaneous eruptions of “Long 
live the republic!”, initiated by Leader of the Social Democrats Otto Wels, while other left-wing 
members shouted “Down with the monarchists!”151 The next day, Wels repeated accusations 
of hypocrisy against the German-völkisch press, as well as accusations against the DNVP for 
not distancing itself clearly enough from völkisch ideologies and movements and inciting 
violence in their speeches.152 Chancellor Wirth appealed to all of the German people and all 
parties to work together to protect the republic, and resolved that the time for leniency had 
passed and that decisive action had to be taken following this latest attack in a series of attacks 
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against the republic.153 By the summer of 1922, the Weimar state had not only suffered one 
attempted coup already, in March 1920, but had also seen numerous political assassinations, 
such as the above-mentioned murder of Bavarian Ministerpräsident Kurt Eisner in February 
1919; that of Finance Minister Matthias Erzberger in August 1921, also by members of the 
O.C.; and, just twenty days prior to the attack on Rathenau, another O.C.-led attempt on the 
life of Social Democratic MP and mayor of the city of Kassel, Philipp Scheidemann, who 
famously had declared the German Republic on 9 November 1918, making him a particularly 
hated target for the reactionary Right. The decisive action advocated by Wirth in the aftermath 
of Rathenau’s death, took the shape of a special decree [Verordnung] for the protection of the 
republic. Special decrees for the protection of the republic had already been passed following 
Matthias Erzberger’s assassination on 26 August 1921. They had given the Interior Minister 
the right to ban certain publications or assemblies if they incited violence against the 
constitution or against representatives of the republican state, as well as limiting the right to 
wear uniforms to members of the Reichswehr.154 A further special decree was agreed as early 
as the evening of Rathenau’s death, which threatened to ban associations and assemblies 
which were illegally combatting the republican form of government, and penalised verbal 
abuse of the republic and its representatives.155 Though the DNVP’s Oskar Hergt denied the 
“outrageous and unproven” accusations against his party and argued against the decrees, 
which he saw as unfairly targeting right-wing organisations, Minister for Justice Gustav 
Radbruch defended the decrees on the basis that, as he saw it, there was currently no reason 
whatsoever to anticipate any radical left-wing excesses.156 The Catholic Centre Party’s 
Wilhelm Marx was of the opinion that passing special measures against the anti-republican 
Right was simply legitimate self-defence [Notwehr] on the part of the state; a view shared by 
the prominent liberal daily Frankfurter Zeitung.157 During the month following Rathenau’s 
assassination, the Reichstag debated combining the various decrees into one law, which was 
eventually voted on by members and passed on 18 July 1922.158 Thus Rathenau’s murder 
significantly precipitated the passing of the “Law for the Protection of the Republic” 
(Republikschutzgesetz), which strove to outlaw right-wing underground organisations such as 
the O.C. 
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     The liberal and left-of-centre national press echoed the calls to rally in support of the 
republic. Naturally, the Social Democratic Party organ, the Vorwärts, was among the most 
vocal. It published an appeal to the working classes of Berlin to assemble in the Lustgarten 
park on Sunday morning to demonstrate their readiness to defend the republic, while exhorting 
attendees to “maintain dignity and discipline!”159 Accompanied by the ubiquitous “Long live the 
republic!”, the paper also called Rathenau a “martyr” and pointedly observed that at the current 
time one had to “feel ashamed in front of the civilised world” for being the “compatriot of certain 
kinds of people”, taking a thinly veiled stab at the anti-republican Right.160 The editor-in-chief 
of the liberal Vossische Zeitung, Georg Bernhard, appealed to all those who still valued 
“decency and reason” in politics, as he echoed the concern that “the republic is in danger.” He 
was under no illusion that this had been a political murder and took the opportunity to give 
voice to his dissatisfaction at the “murderous attitude which currently counts as political in 
Germany.”161 In a lengthy piece entitled “Männer!” [‘men’], the journalist and writer Robert 
Friedlaender made an impassioned appeal for the republic. He argued that Rathenau’s 
assassination had made it abundantly clear that now the fate of the republic and its future, 
indeed liberty itself, were at stake, and a decision regarding what kind of a state, one governed 
either by violence or by intellect, Germany wanted to be was imminent; it was a question of 
“to be or not to be.”162 As long as a majority of the people wanted the republic, Friedlaender 
argued, the state was within its right, had the obligation even, to defend itself against acts 
which threatened it – by any means. He therefore urged readers, and citizens, to become 
politicised and openly assert their support for the republic.163 
     Declarations of support for the republic were, however, often accompanied by lamentations 
of the general deterioration and brutalisation of political discourse in Germany. Crispien, 
anticipating later historiography, argued that it was little wonder that the  
 
old officer caste, who were drilled and educated in murder and pillage, who had all 
regard for humanity and human rights flogged out of them, […] who cannot build lives 
as officers in the republic, which wants to put an end to militarism, these gentlemen 
now look for an alternative scope of activity. As they can no longer indulge in the mass 
murder of other peoples, they rage against their own compatriots [Volksgenossen] with 
their murderous activities.164 
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The presence of hundreds of thousands of men, trained mainly in perpetrating violence, 
traumatised and potentially brutalised by their experiences in the war, who were now facing 
uncertain futures was thus clearly identified by Crispien as posing a problem, if not an explicit 
danger, for a democratic republic which consciously sought to overcome its legacy of 
militarism. Reichs-chancellor Joseph Wirth (SPD) denounced the “atmosphere of murder” in 
Germany, and deplored the “brutalisation of mores” [Verwilderung der Sitten], which had 
recently led to “a state of downright political brutishness” [politische Vertiertheit] in Germany.165 
Seeking to publicly identify and shame the culprits, he famously declared:  
 
There stands the enemy [pointing right] who trickles his poison into the wounds of a 
people. There stands the enemy – and about this there is no doubt: This enemy stands 
on the Right! [Long applause in the centre and on the left, as well as in the stands].166 
 
     During the memorial ceremony held in the Reichstag on the day of Rathenau’s burial, 
Tuesday 27 June, President of the Reich, Friedrich Ebert (SPD) reinforced the notion that the 
attack on Rathenau had been an “attack on the nation” and, reiterating the shared “horror and 
disgust” at this deed, firmly placed the perpetrators “outside the community of the German 
people.”167 Significantly, the victim’s Jewishness was also brought up by those striving to use 
the figure of Rathenau to defend the republic against the right-wing attacks on it. While the 
murderers were placed outside the national community, the Jewish victim was firmly 
constructed as part of it by the voices of the centre and the left-liberal establishment. 
Rathenau’s fellow party member Adolf Korell denounced the “so-called idea of völkisch purity” 
to which the minister had fallen victim, and indignantly asked the assembly: “What have we 
come to […] to judge the other according to which race or faith he belongs to! […] Unless we 
Christians turn our backs on this counter-Christian [widerchristlich] position, the atmosphere 
in Germany will not improve.”168 Wels similarly attacked the “wild agitation from those Christian 
worshippers of violence” [Gewaltanbeter], but he also betrayed a peculiar concept of 
Jewishness when he went on to praise Rathenau essentially as a ‘good’ Jew because he 
actually “was a true Christian, much more so than those can claim who, today, arm and pay 
the murder gangs.”169 On the other hand, Rathenau’s Jewishness was, unsurprisingly, central 
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to the völkisch and early National Socialist discourse on the minister’s assassination. The 
NSDAP’s party organ, the Völkischer Beobachter, initially displayed a notable lack of interest 
in the murder in the days following the attack. Only once the democratic parties’ martyrisation 
of Rathenau in support of the republic had become increasingly apparent did the paper begin 
to propagate its own view of the murder victim with some force. This view centred on 
Rathenau’s position as a rich and successful industrialist “at the helm of the biggest capitalist 
corporation in Germany”, and thus a prime example of the capitalist exploitation of workers, 
while reiterating the familiar alleged connections between Rathenau’s Jewishness, 
“international Jewish high finance”, and “international Jewish Bolshevism”, who together were 
supposedly plotting the ruination and downfall of the German people.170 
     Turning Rathenau into a martyr for the republic was by far the most common manner in 
which his death was exploited for political ends, especially given the circumstance that, unlike 
with Matthias Erzberger’s death in August 1921, Rathenau’s assassination “shook society all 
the way up to the conservative bourgeoisie.”171 However, of the more conservative voices, 
some also found a different way to politically capitalise on Rathenau’s murder. The editor-in-
chief of the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, Paul Lensch, argued that Germany could never 
truly calm down politically and find peace within itself as long as it was subjected to the harsh 
terms of the Treaty of Versailles, in particular the heavy burden of reparations. He thus laid a 
significant portion of the blame for what had happened to Rathenau, and other assassination 
victims before him, at the feet of the Entente.172 In the Reichstag, the right-of-centre German 
People’s Party (Deutsche Volkspartei, DVP) and the Catholic Centre Party (Zentrum) made 
the same accusations and insinuations, and the Centre Party’s Reichs-chancellor Wirth 
repeated this claim explicitly, arguing that in a Germany subdued under the terms of the Treaty 
of Versailles, democracy could not flourish and peace for Europe not be sustained.173 The 
Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung proudly re-printed the entirety of Wirth’s speech as its opener 
the following day, accompanied by Lensch’s editorial denouncing the Entente’s “bloodsucking” 
policies.174 
     Press voices even further to the political Right, however, displayed their own view of the 
minister’s death, which was markedly different from the Centre and left-of-centre positions, 
and were very vocal in publicising it. While all appeared to share in the regret and 
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condemnation of the crime itself, and demanded a swift and thorough investigation, focus was 
immediately drawn away from the political Right’s possible connections to the murder or its 
perpetrators, and cast instead onto the government’s special decrees for the protection of the 
republic. The Right unanimously viewed the decrees as an outrageous and unconstitutional 
[verfassungwidrig] targeted attack against them, their groups, goals, and culture.175 As the 
decrees banned the display of the German imperial colours (black, white, red) and the wearing 
of uniforms outside the Reichswehr, they prompted a curious comparison with the anti-Liberal 
Carlsbad decrees of 1819, in which the papers cast the government and the political Left as 
the new ‘Metternichs’.176 Legislation directed against just one political strand, as they saw it, 
was going to precipitate the end of the rule of law [Rechtsstaat].177 The DNVP and the 
newspapers close to it repeatedly insisted that, though they had opposed Rathenau’s policies, 
they had only ever advocated a political fight by parliamentary means, never violence, and 
explicitly sought to distance themselves from anti-republican underground organisations of 
which the Organisation Consul was the most prominent and powerful one.178 Instead, they 
expressed concerns that the radical Left posed a much greater threat to the state and 
highlighted violent acts against German-nationalist and völkisch groups and individuals which 
had taken place sporadically in the aftermath of Rathenau’s murder to support this claim and 
cast doubt on the assumption that Rathenau’s assassins had anything to do with the political 
Right. The papers cautioned against drawing premature conclusions and reminded readers 
that it was not yet known who had actually committed the crime. Indeed, they argued, the 
murder actually only hurt the Right and the DNVP because of the visible fallout against them, 
in the shape of rhetorical opposition, emergency legislation, and acts of vandalism and 
physical violence. The Right thus quickly and cleverly re-cast itself as the true victim of the 
assassination plot.179 Besides defending themselves in this manner, the voices on the Right 
also immediately went on the offensive, attacking those members of the Reichstag who had 
accused the DNVP of having planted the ideological seeds of this murder. They denounced 
the shouting of “murderer” at Helfferich, and the alleged physical assaults in the chamber, as 
unparliamentary and undignified, and – in direct contrast to what the Frankfurter Zeitung would 
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go on to praise as a “dignified day” in the German parliament – described Löbe’s and Wirth’s 
speeches as “monstrosities.”180 
     What the political instrumentalisation of Rathenau’s murder demonstrates, is that the 
German government in the early interwar period saw a need, and tried hard, to portray itself 
as a legitimate member of the civilised, democratic world, as it strove for full recognition on 
the international stage. This concern was made explicit in the way nearly every eulogy held in 
the Reichstag for Rathenau praised his efforts to re-connect with Germany’s former enemies. 
In Chancellor Wirth’s eyes, the Foreign Minister had “not only fallen for his people,” like a 
soldier in war, but more importantly, “he fell to teach people reconciliation.” Wirth then 
appealed to the assembled to continue Rathenau’s work: “It is also the work of our people’s 
salvation, it is the work of the salvation of all of Europe.”181 While Marx explicitly urged the 
DNVP to think about how their agitation against the government and against the republic would 
be viewed abroad, Crispien raised the general concern that following yet another political 
assassination in Germany, the foreign press was no doubt wondering whether the German 
republic was in fact stable.182 He was not mistaken. An opinion piece in the Observer 
suggested that Rathenau’s murder had made the German government realise that “it cannot 
hope to be listened to abroad unless it commands authority at home.” Incidentally, the same 
opinion piece also expressed the hope that Wilson’s murder might cause the same realisation 
among the Irish Provisional Government. However, the author expressed some hope at the 
fact that following this latest assassination in Germany, “public opinion […] has rallied manfully 
round the republican regime.”183 It was evidently true, then, that the outside world was 
watching closely, and that those speaking publicly in Germany were acutely aware of this 
circumstance. Therefore, the rallying cry to protect the republic was not only of great 
importance domestically, but also internationally. The German press proudly reported the 
many international notes of condolence which the German government received, especially 
from the Entente members Great Britain and France, and which praised the murder victim as 
a “German patriot” and “one of the most able ministers in Europe.”184  
     The effort to be recognised as a member of the democratic and ‘civilised’ postwar world 
order needed to be made in deed as much as in word. This could mean small but significant 
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gestures, such as Reichstagspräsident Löbe’s insistence that in this assembly there was 
“freedom of expression for everybody”, when speakers on the Right were being repeatedly 
heckled and prevented from speaking.185 It could also mean the fact that a month-long 
relentless manhunt for the perpetrators was undertaken nationally and the trial against the 
captured associates of Rathenau’s assassins went ahead swiftly after their arrest. This, 
however, was also where the entire endeavour fell short. The assassins themselves, Kern and 
Fischer, could not be made to face justice and no one suffered the death penalty, as Wilson’s 
murderers had. With the exception of Techow, who had steered the assassins’ car and who 
was therefore accused of murder, the other twelve defendants who stood trial before the 
Staatsgerichtshof, responsible for crimes against the republic, in Leipzig in October 1922 
could only be accused of failing to report a planned crime and of being accessories to the 
murder. Three defendants were acquitted, while the others received prison sentences varying 
from two months to eight years. Techow received fifteen years as an accessory to murder, but 
only served eight of them before being released as part of an amnesty in 1930. The 
defendants’ membership in the conspiratorial anti-republican Organisation Consul, though 
openly, and correctly, assumed as fact by liberal and left-wing contemporaries, was never the 
subject of the trial and the defendants consistently denied any connections to the O.C.. At trial 
it could thus not be proved “that the murderers had committed their crimes on the order or in 
the service of a secret organisation”, and the O.C. therefore evaded direct responsibility for 
Rathenau’s murder.186 This was typical of the judicial handling of political murders during the 
early Weimar Republic and the justice system’s failure to grasp the anti-republican, right-wing 
extremist organisation at its roots. Though the O.C. was banned by the Republikschutzgesetz 
passed in the wake of Rathenau’s murder, the organisation had no difficulty to secretly re-
group as the Bund Wiking to carry on their anti-republican agenda.187 Emil Julius Gumbel’s 
detailed collection of figures regarding political murders and their judicial treatment, 
furthermore, confirmed that the justice system generally showed more leniency towards right-
wing defendants than left-wing ones. Overall, he judged there to have been, in the four years 
preceding publication in 1922, 354 political murders committed by the Right and 22 by the 
Left. Of those, he considered 18 of the Left’s murders to have been fully or partly “punished” 
[gesühnt], while of the Right’s murders he judged 326 to have gone “unpunished.”188 He also 
 
185 Verhandlungen, 236. Sitzung, 25.06.1922, p. 8049. 
186 Quote from Gotthard Jasper, “Aus den Akten der Prozesse gegen die Erzberger-Mörder. 
Vorbemerkung”, Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 10/4 (1962), p. 430. Trial summarised in Sabrow, 
Verdrängte Verschwörung, pp. 133-149. 
187 Howard Stern, “The Organisation Consul”, Journal of Modern History, 35/1 (1963), p. 31. 
188 Gumbel, Vier Jahre Politischer Mord, p. 81. 
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highlighted the much lower sentences given out to right-wing perpetrators, who often were 
acquitted or received only short prison sentences or fines, while left-wing perpetrators 
received harsh prison sentences of often many years. This, in his conclusion, amounted to a 
“complicity of the courts.”189 
     In considering the two virtually contemporaneous acts of political assassination in Britain 
and in Germany side by side, some common themes emerge. One of these was the fact that 
both murders brought forth an explicitly gendered way of remembering the victim. In the 
above-mentioned piece “Männer!” in the Vossische Zeitung, Friedlaender exhorted Rathenau 
for having been exactly what those on the political Right had accused the country of lacking: 
a real man, a truly German man, one “with the courage of his convictions, the courage to 
speak, and the courage to act.” He considered Rathenau a man of both intellect and of action, 
which was rare in Germany, a rare “political citizen.” Friedlaender praised Rathenau for having 
bravely faced all the accusations and threats from “desperadoes” on the anti-republican Right. 
He had displayed “civil courage” [Zivilcourage], a quality which the “Lüttwitzer”, “Pabsts”, and 
“Tillessens” (referring to several well-known Freikorps leaders, and thus implying a connection 
between them and Rathenau’s murderers) lacked completely. Instead, Friedlaender called the 
assassins “cowardly.” This exhortation of Rathenau’s many manly qualities was followed by 
Friedlaender’s ardent appeal for the republic, as referred to above, drawing a connection 
between masculine qualities and the success of the republican state.190 A notable emphasis 
on manliness also surfaced in the reactions to Wilson’s death. The Lord Bishop of Norwich 
was not the only one to praise Wilson as having been “every inch a man and every inch a 
soldier.”191 As is noted by Jeffery, the reporting on the trial against Wilson’s murderers 
developed a peculiar obsession with the question of whether or not there was conclusive 
evidence that the Field Marshal had drawn his sword in an apparently masculine and valiant 
last effort to defend himself against his assassins’ undeniably superior firepower.192 In an 
extension of the image of manliness, Churchill affirmed Britain’s identity as a “manly country” 
which would not be perturbed or changed by assassinations and where murderers would 
always be made to face justice.193 Masculinity and bravery were thus in both cases claimed 
 
189 Ibid., pp. 147-149, quote at p. 147. Though there were flaws in Gumbel’s methods, his overall 
judgement is still considered sound by historians, see Arthur David Brenner, Emil J. Gumbel. Weimar 
German Pacifist and Professor (Boston and Leiden, 2001), p. 73. 
190 VZ, 27.06.1922, MA, pp. 1-2. 
191 HL, 22.07.1922, vol. 50, c. 1095. 
192 Jeffery, Henry Wilson, p. 285-286. 
193 HC, 26.06.1922, vol. 155, c. 1707. 
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for the state, which would defend itself against the cowardly assassins of its representatives 
in a just and manly way. 
     Furthermore, it is hardly surprising to find contemporaries in either country making 
reference to the other murder, respectively. The DAZ’s editor-in-chief Lensch commented that 
“[by] coincidence, political murder found its victims simultaneously in London and in Berlin, 
there General Wilson, here Minister Rathenau.” He acknowledged that “Wilson’s murder was 
not one link in a long chain to the same degree as Rathenau’s is, even though the Irish 
Question, too, has demanded many assassination victims.” However, he highlighted the 
“different demeanours of government and parliaments” in the two countries, admonishing the 
German parliamentarians for their tumultuous behaviour, and urged them to “learn” from those 
who had rallied in support of the republic in a calm and orderly fashion in the Lustgarten the 
previous day.194 In Britain, too, reference was made to Rathenau’s murder, and some 
contemporary commentators proved clear-sighted enough to place Wilson’s murder in a wider, 
European context of political assassinations. Once again giving voice to a certain fear of 
brutalisation as a result of the First World War, the liberal Saturday Review asserted that 
 
The murders of Sir Henry Wilson in London and of Herr Rathenau in Berlin have 
brought the whole of European society, with a shock, face to face with a menace which 
may threaten the stability of our civilization. No thoughtful observer of the means by 
which the necessity of ruthless slaughter was inculcated in youthful minds at our great 
training camps during the war, could fail to be aware that we, and other countries driven 
to employ similar teaching, would have to pay for it somehow when peace came. Few 
of us imagined that it would mean an attempt to substitute for the age-long and 
mitigated way of political controversy in Europe the methods of Mexico.195 
 
Listing the murders of Matthias Erzberger and Walther Rathenau, “shot under circumstances 
of peculiar brutality”, as well as that of the Spanish Prime Minister Eduardo Dato in Madrid just 
over a year previously, the magazine insisted that the “danger is greater in Europe than it is 
here.” Nevertheless, the Review showed itself concerned that “[a]ssassination, dormant since 
the seventeenth century, is again asserting itself as a political weapon, and the revolver makes 
a bid for the rule.” The magazine’s fear was especially palpable that “public conscience” in 
“England” might “slacken” in the same way that it supposedly already had in conflict-ridden 
Ireland. “A few more horrors like the assassination of Sir Henry Wilson and the exasperation 
of the ordinary citizen would take the form of buying a revolver himself and using it without 
 
194 “Die Straße als Muster”, DAZ, 26.06.1922, AA, pp. 1-2. 
195 “The Rule of the Revolver”, The Saturday Review, 01.07.1922, p. 4; further discussion of the fear of 
brutalisation in Britain, see Lawrence, “Peaceable Kingdom”. 
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hesitancy.”196 Hart is therefore correct to place the violent death of Wilson within the “season 
of assassinations all over Europe.” Though its weight as a threat to the existing regime differed 
to that of Rathenau’s murder in Germany, Hart observes that nationalism, Irish in the one 
case, German in the other, was the common motivation behind both attacks.197  
 
Just as the two assassinations shared nationalist motivations in common, the two victims 
shared the fate of their instrumentalisation for political ends, though with somewhat differing 
vehemence. The British parliament, as well as the press across the political spectrum was 
united in the aftermath of Wilson’s death in shock, horror, and, if not everyone shared the 
personal grief, in condemnation of the cold-blooded act. The murder thus served to reinforce 
already existing notions about British identity and its relationship to violence and civilisation. 
Nevertheless, the robust debates over the violence taking place in Ireland, and Britain’s 
responsibility for it, were reinvigorated by the murder. Questions were asked in the forums of 
public debate and accusations were made over who had been responsible for fostering an 
environment in which radical Irish nationalists would commit such a crime, as well as over the 
lack of adequate protection for such individuals as Wilson. However, British debates never 
reached the levels of toxicity and aggression evident in German public discourse following the 
assassination of Walther Rathenau. Notwithstanding the unanimous declarations of 
condemnation of the murder, at least in public, the language displayed in response to 
Rathenau’s death was of a more extreme nature. The political spectrum diverged further than 
in Britain and more virulent attacks were made; on the one hand, attacks by speakers in the 
centre and left of it on the anti-republican forces who were seen to have incited the crime; and 
on the other hand, attacks by those on the Right on the government and its emergency 
legislation. Perhaps as a result of this circumstance, a difference was also visible in the 
manner in which the respective crimes were condemned. While in British public language 
there were relatively frequent references to the crime’s shocking nature to all of humanity and 
all of the ‘civilised’ world, the prime exponent of which Britain considered itself to be, in 
Germany the crime was viewed more in its immediate political context and condemned as 
such. Rathenau’s assassination was the latest, and most prominent, part of an on-going trend, 
an epidemic of political murder that had been haunting the young republic for several years.198 
As such, it was recognised as yet another blow to the state’s integrity. While Wilson’s murder 
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came as a shock to the British public, and constituted a tragic and outrageous incident, it stood 
alone and never presented the very real threat to the existing form of government which 
Rathenau’s assassination did in Germany.199 As has been argued above, in this climate it 
became imperative for the representatives of this German state which was under attack from 
within, to present the republic as a legitimate part of the democratic world, which reliably 
subscribed to the same civilizational values as its European partners. The failure, however, to 
adequately handle this, and previous, murders in court and to confront the extent of anti-
republicanism within Germany head-on, was undoubtedly a symptom of the unchallenged 
strength of counter-revolutionary forces in interwar Germany, the deeply divided political 
landscape, and the comparative impotence of the Weimar state. 
 
This chapter has examined two quite disparate kinds of political violence, which nevertheless 
displayed a particular kind of symmetry, with street violence in 1919 happening in each 
country’s ‘second city’, both strong regional metropolises; and high-profile political 
assassinations happening in each nation’s capital, at the centre of political power, and indeed 
close to the victims’ bourgeois homes. Despite the disparate nature of the different case 
studies, they have been brought together in this chapter as acts of political violence which 
took place in a domestic context, within the inner geographic circle, and which seriously 
exercised, if not outrightly shocked, public discourse in both countries. In the discourse on 
political violence analysed here, one can observe strong narratives aimed at reifying certain 
identities and efforts at constructing, or upholding, self-images, both on a domestic stage as 
well as for an international audience. Most prominently, the maintenance of law and order has 
been shown to have played a major part in both British and German discourse as the 
importance was recognised of overtly performing state power. In the aftermath of the First 
World War for Germany, especially, the necessity to prove itself a reliable democratic partner 
in the international community of civilised nations played a paramount role. British discourse 
strove especially to identify ‘Britishness’ with ‘peaceableness’ and in opposition to any kind of 
political violence. While in 1919 the struggle for law and order stood at the forefront, by 1922, 
when two high-profile assassinations shook both publics, those discursively reified identities 
ought to have been better established, making it especially important to maintain the orderly, 
civilised image, both domestically and internationally, and to not allow these acts of political 
violence to unsettle them. Thus, in British public discourse, Wilson’s assassins were 
 
199 The fear for the fate of the republic was, for example, voiced by Independent Social Democrat Arthur 
Crispien, who urged the government to do everything in their power to prevent the possibility of the 
monarchy ever returning to Germany. Verhandlungen, 236. Sitzung, 25.06.1922, p. 8053. 
 81 
expressly, and paradoxically, constructed as outside of that identity. They were constructed 
as foreign, and even though they were English-born, they represented Irish nationalism, while 
their victim, who was Irish-born, represented the British state. The fact that the Irish-born war-
time leader Wilson was just returning from unveiling a war memorial when he was 
assassinated by British-born Irish nationalists who had been British soldiers, represented the 
ultimate betrayal. 
     Though both case studies of political violence presented in this chapter posed a threat to 
each country’s preferred narrative about national identity, respectively, the severity of the 
threat was markedly different. At the time of Wilson’s death some concern, as cited above, 
was expressed in Britain of the “season of assassinations” making its way from the continent, 
or from Ireland, over onto British soil. However, in the murder’s more medium- and long-term 
aftermath, it became clear that the act would remain unique and did not herald a significant 
destabilisation of the British state. By the time Wilson’s diaries were published in 1927, all 
interest was once again on what they revealed about his role as a war-time leader and his, 
apparently often unkind, private notes on political leaders he disagreed with, especially Lloyd 
George.200 His memorial plaque, unveiled a year after his murder at the site of the Liverpool 
Street Station memorial he himself had unveiled the morning of his death, does not specify 
that Wilson was murdered. It states only that his death “occurred on Thursday 22nd June 1922 
within two hours of his unveiling of the adjoining memorial.” Today it is decorated in the familiar 
poppy wreaths, indicating again his primary memorialisation as a war-time leader.201 The 
Imperial War Museum’s database, however, lists the plaque under ‘Terrorist Acts’ and ‘Ireland 
(1801-1923)’.202 This process, in which Wilson is not primarily remembered for his murder but 
for his achievements as a military leader, confirms this chapter section’s wider argument that 
by being framed as singular, the assassination ultimately reinforced already existing narratives 
about Britain’s inherent ‘peaceableness’ and civilisation, and that the murder did not endanger 
either. Public discourse strove to divide a British ‘us’, defined by an ongoing commitment to 
the values of civilisation and justice where acts such as assassinations did not occur, from 
‘them’, the assassins whose acts were ‘uncivilised’ and shocking but would not destabilise the 
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political status quo. The fact that Britain did not see the introduction of emergency legislature, 
like Germany’s Republikschutzgesetz, only serves to confirm this further. 
     The situation was markedly different with the assassination of Walther Rathenau, one in a 
long line of such attacks, behind which stood a deep underground network of conspirators 
which the Weimar state never succeeded in destroying. Two facets of the Weimar Republic’s 
relationship between politics and violence in the early interwar years proved decisive in its 
downfall: the failure to control and disband extremist right-wing underground organisations, 
on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the shift in boundaries of legitimate violence 
experienced during the revolutionary period, when government troops received license to 
shoot and kill German civilians in an inner-German urban setting. Anti-Semitism represented 
a third forceful aspect which came to play an increasingly prominent role as the Weimar 
Republic came closer to its end. In the early interwar years, there had been numerous Jews, 
most often intellectuals, in positions of political power, such as the Bavarian Ministerpräsident 
Eisner, one the Councils’ Republic’s leaders, Eugen Leviné and several of his Bavarian co-
revolutionaries, and later, Walther Rathenau. All were identified, and attacked, as Jews and 
were constructed as foreign conspirators and agents of Russian Bolshevism by their enemies. 
The prominence of anti-Semitism in, especially, the German case studies examined here, 
foreshadowed later developments under the Nazi regime, but its results were also visibly 
borne out into the post-1945 world. In Britain, Jewish leaders of the interwar years lived to 
appear in postwar political life; Emanuel Shinwell, for example, had a political career with the 
Labour Party, eventually becoming Clement Attlee’s Minister for Defence in 1950. In Germany, 
however, many of the Jewish leaders from the revolutionary period did not survive the pre-
Nazi era, like Eisner and Rathenau, who were murdered by reactionaries in the early interwar 
years. 
 
The next chapter will move into the second geographic circle and analyse paramilitary violence 
in a sphere that is more ‘peripheral’ than the domestic sphere examined here, but not fully 
colonial. The very origins of the animosity towards Wilson will be examined more closely, as 
Chapter 2 is concerned with public discourse on political violence during the Irish War of 
Independence (1919-1921); it will be compared side-by-side with the German state’s efforts 
to control the Freikorps sent towards the Baltic at the end of the war. The chapter will provide 
further opportunity to explore the efforts within both nations’ public discourse to construct 
those self-images and narratives presented here, but it will show how these efforts at identity 
construction were complicated when the agents of violence were sent into those peripheral 
spaces by the states themselves.
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CHAPTER 2 
“DIE ICH RIEF, DIE GEISTER, WERD’ ICH NUN NICHT LOS.”1 PARAMILITARY 
VIOLENCE IN IRELAND AND IN THE BALTIC. 
This chapter moves from addressing political violence experienced at the centre of the 
domestic sphere, to the second of the three concentric circles which structure the thesis. Thus, 
the events analysed here took place in a more peripheral sphere, namely Ireland and the 
Baltic region. The chapter will investigate British and German public discourses in reaction to, 
respectively, the Irish War of Independence, or Anglo-Irish War, 1919-1921, and the Freikorps’ 
Baltic campaign in 1919. It will explore the central theme of violence functioning as a 
demarcator of what was considered civilised conduct or not, negotiating different and layered 
notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’, depending on what violence was publicly justifiable in the 
circumstances explored in this chapter, and what was not. The chapter will support the thesis’ 
overall argument that the language by which political violence was publicly justified or 
condemned transcended the geographical circles around which the thesis is structured. The 
chapter will demonstrate in particular how political violence perpetrated by state-sponsored 
paramilitary bodies, especially when it escalated out of state control, turned into a fundamental 
threat to both countries’ self-perception and identity construction. These concerns became 
especially acute in the wider postwar political context, within which left-liberal parties, in 
particular, struggled to form a coherent political identity and to define their path. This was true 
of both the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) as well as the British Liberal Party, both 
of which had undergone, or underwent, painful internal splits during the war and immediate 
postwar years, resulting in the establishment of the Independent Social Democratic Party 
(USPD) and SPD in Germany, and of an opposition part of the Liberal Party under H.H. 
Asquith which opposed the Coalition Liberals under Prime Minister David Lloyd George.2 The 
splits were fuelled in part by disagreements as to what true liberal values should or could mean 
in the face of wartime and postwar violent conflict. This chapter’s analysis of public discourse 
relies mainly on press and parliamentary materials but also incorporates life-writing by the 
agents of violence themselves. The presence or absence of such life-writing sources reveals 
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the extent of the paramilitaries’ ability, or lack thereof, to construct themselves as legitimate 
representatives of their respective societies, adding a further layer to the chapter’s arguments. 
     As this chapter is situated in what is called here a ‘peripheral’ geographical sphere, it is 
necessary to first say a few words on this choice and what is meant by it. The extent to which 
the Baltic lands (comprising the modern-day countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), and 
the island of Ireland can be considered to have been on the periphery of the German and 
British states, respectively, is and has been highly contested. For the purposes of this thesis, 
both areas are conceived of as lying in between the domestic sphere, where, significantly, 
political power resides, on the one hand, and the sphere of colonial activity on the other. With 
regards to Ireland, in particular, a large and differentiated body of literature exists, which 
exhibits the often controversial debate over Ireland’s position vis-à-vis Great Britain. Whether 
Ireland is considered to have been a British colony proves difficult to answer not only on the 
basis of different interpretations of historical developments and differing definitions of colonial 
rule, but also due to the highly contested nature of the question and its continued political 
implications to the present day.3 Therefore, following trends in recent literature which 
emphasise the need to move beyond the dichotomous question of whether Ireland was a 
colony or not, and instead to focus on “degrees of coloniality,”4 this thesis places Ireland 
conceptually on the periphery of the centre of British state power. This view is supported by 
literature which highlights precisely “Ireland’s ‘hybrid’ position which made it an important 
hinge between debates on domestic politics and those on the future of the Empire.”5 With 
reference to the Easter Rising of April 1916, it has been suggested that the disproportionate 
military response of the British state to the rebellion, which included heavy machine-guns, 
artillery, and martial law, was not only informed by the context of war, but also “suggestive of 
the colonial dimensions of Ireland’s status”, with McGarry asserting that it would be “’difficult 
to envision the same tactics being so readily deployed in a British city’.”6 The themes emerging 
from parliamentary and press discourses on political violence during the Irish War of 
Independence analysed below, will elucidate and strengthen this claim further.  
     It can be argued that both countries experienced a moment of parallel imperial collapse 
after the end of the First World War; while the fight for Irish independence was only the 
beginning of this process for the British Empire, the collapse was absolute for the German 
 
3 Stephen Howe, “Questioning the (bad) question: 'Was Ireland a colony?'”, Irish Historical Studies, 
36/142 (2008), p. 138. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Stephen Howe, “Colonized and Colonizers: Ireland in the British Empire”, in Alvin Jackson (ed.), The 
Oxford Handbook of Modern Irish History (Oxford, 2013), p. 71. 
6 Whelehan, “The Irish Revolution”, p. 624. McGarry quoted therein. 
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empire. Both processes, however, were accompanied by a violent lashing out by the state 
against this threatening collapse. It is in this sense that Ireland and the Baltic are considered 
peripheral spheres in this chapter, emphatically without claiming their status or experience 
were identical. There is less literature, and less heated debate, on the position of the Baltic 
regions in relation to the German state. The area had not been part of the German empire 
before the First World War but had a history of ethnically German settlement and German 
language and culture reaching back several centuries. The area was partly conquered by 
German troops in 1915 and, according to Barth, was governed like an overseas colony by the 
German army which had utopian visions of establishing a colony in the East.7 In choosing to 
view the Baltic region as a periphery of the German lands and German state power in the era 
immediately following the First World War, this thesis takes its cue from Annemarie 
Sammartino’s recent work on the “impossible border” between Germany and the East. She 
highlights the frequent and rapid shifts in national borders between the pre-unification period 
in German history (meaning pre-1871) and their status in around 1920, emphasising that an 
under-defined notion of ‘the East’, which at various points included the Baltic lands, was an 
important part of “utopian dreams and apocalyptic danger for the war and postwar imaginary 
of Germans across the political spectrum.”8 
     Self-styled Freikorps, re-appropriating a term developed in the eighteenth century and 
brought to prominence during the Napoleonic wars to describe the German armed volunteers 
fighting French occupation,9 were paramilitary formations which appeared in the context of the 
collapsing German empire at the end of the First World War in November 1918, as the 
defeated imperial army fell into disarray. With parts of the old army disintegrating on their 
retreat, such as the remnants of the Eighth Army in the Baltic,10 and other parts mutinying and 
re-organizing into workers’ and soldiers’ councils in many places, the newly founded German 
republic found itself without the executive power required to consolidate its position and 
protect itself from what it perceived to be the most imminent threat to its existence, left-wing 
Spartacist revolutionaries. The Freikorps for the most part consisted of demobilised soldiers 
of the imperial army, who were soon joined by other volunteers, particularly students, who 
refused to accept the German defeat, did not surrender their arms and considered themselves 
 
7 Boris Barth, Dolchstoßlegenden und Politische Desintegration: Das Trauma der Deutschen 
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loyal to the idea of the German fatherland, rather than the new German state. Above all, 
however, they were loyal to their Freikorps leaders, and the corps thus often carried the name 
of the leader to whom the men had sworn “personal allegiance.”11 Following a secret 
agreement between the Social Democrat Friedrich Ebert, soon to be Reichs-president, and 
General Wilhelm Groener, the old army’s quartermaster, the new republic thus ‘hired’ the 
Freikorps to fight Communism and Bolshevism, while the army in return promised, at least 
nominally, to support the new state.12 Jones importantly highlights that while ‘Freikorps’ was 
the fighters’ own chosen name, they should more accurately be thought of as government 
soldiers, as they would have appeared to contemporaries.13 One of the places where 
Bolshevism was to be fought, in fact the very forefront of the anti-Communist struggle, was 
the Baltic region, which the Red Army was conquering rapidly in late 1918 and early 1919, 
and so a combination of ex-soldiers still left there after the World War and new volunteers 
from the Reich hired through government and private recruitment campaigns began to fight a 
brutal campaign against the Bolsheviks.  
     It has been noted that not much attention has been paid in the literature specifically to 
these Freikorps, often referred to as Baltikumer, as most literature on German Freikorps is, 
perhaps understandably so, concerned with the groups active in conflicts within the borders 
of the Reich itself, rather than the embattled periphery.14 Other geographically peripheral 
conflicts which the Freikorps engaged in took place in Upper Silesia, East Prussia, and Poland. 
Many other Freikorps were engaged within the borders of the Reich, crushing left-wing activity 
such as the Spartacists’ uprising in Berlin in January 1919, or, as Chapter 1 examined, the 
short-lived Bavarian Councils’ Republic in April and May 1919. Once the German government 
realised that it had in effect given license to brutal private armies which were beyond their 
control, the Freikorps were officially disbanded in 1920 and the ‘Freikorps spirit’ was to be 
explicitly avoided in recruiting the new Reichswehr.15 The Freikorps in the Baltic were ordered 
to return to Germany as early as the summer of 1919; however, they refused and even 
preferred to join the White Russian troops under Count Bermondt-Avalov fighting the 
Bolsheviks. When they were forced to return by complete defeat and material annihilation 
 
11 Sullivan, “Freecorps”, p. 125. Waite, author of one of the earliest post-1945 histories of the Freikorps, 
sees in this a direct precursor to the Führerprinzip (‘leader principle’) of the National Socialists. See 
Waite, Vanguard, pp. 50-51. The validity of drawing such direct lines from the Freikorps to the Nazis, 
however, has since been questioned, see Sauer, “Mythos”, p. 902. 
12 Waite, Vanguard, p. 5. 
13 Jones, Violence and Politics, p. 5. 
14 Sauer, “Mythos”, p. 869. 
15 Matthew N. Bucholtz, Republic of Violence: The German Army and Politics, 1918-1923, PhD thesis, 
University of Calgary, 2015, p. 184. 
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towards the end of the year, many Freikorps fighters chose to ‘go underground’ to fight the 
Weimar state which they hated and which they considered an even more legitimate target now 
that it was perceived to have stabbed the soldiers in the back a second time after 1918 by 
refusing to continue supporting the Baltic Freikorps once they had disobeyed the order to 
retreat.16 
     As noted, the historiography specifically on the phenomenon of the Freikorps is less 
numerous and well-developed than the much vaster historiography on the political culture of 
the Weimar Republic and its endemic problems with political violence more generally, of which 
discussions of the Freikorps are of course often an important part.17 The case made in Waite’s 
early study of the Freikorps, based largely on life-writing, that they were, as the title puts it with 
some pathos, the Vanguard of Nazism, is indeed too direct a line to draw. However, his 
emphasis on the Freikorps fighters’ “brutality of spirit” is not misplaced.18 Theweleit’s study of 
the Freikorps is situated in the field of literary studies rather than history, but equally focuses 
on these fighters’ highly violent behaviours, psychoanalytically identifying its roots deep inside 
their fragile masculinities.19 Hagen Schulze’s earlier (1969) study of the relationship between 
the Freikorps and the young republic, while strong on using both archival sources and life-
writing, takes the somewhat surprising revisionist view that the Freikorps were by no means 
“villains”, but should be credited as being existentially necessary for the early republic to 
consolidate its position.20 Though Schulze acknowledged that the Freikorps did contribute to 
the emergence of National Socialism, he considered their fate ultimately a “tragedy”, choosing 
to end his book on a quote asserting that “’the German people need not be ashamed of 
them’.”21 More recently, the Freikorps activity in the Baltic has been effectively incorporated 
into wider historical examinations of the extremely violently contested Eastern border regions 
 
16 One of the most explicit voices denouncing the state for this second ‘stab in the back’ was the 
commander of all German troops in the Baltic, Rüdiger Graf von der Goltz. See particularly the chapter 
entitled “Der Dolchstoß” in the 1936 edition of his memoirs, Als Politischer General im Osten (Leipzig, 
1936). 
17 To name a few older and more recent examples: Volker Berghahn, Stahlhelm: Bund der 
Frontsoldaten, 1918-1935 (Düsseldorf, 1966); James M. Diehl, Paramilitary Politics in Weimar Germany 
(Bloomington and London, 1977); Bernd Weisbrod, “Gewalt in der Politik. Zur politischen Kultur in 
Deutschland zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen”, Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, 43 (1992), 
pp. 391-404; Richard Bessel, Germany after the First World War (Oxford, 1995); Mergel, 
Parlamentarische; Barth, Dolchstoßlegenden; Ziemann, “Germany after the First World War – A Violent 
Society?”; Schumann, Political; Jones, Violence and Politics; Ziemann, Contested Commemorations; 
Bucholtz, Republic of Violence. 
18 Waite, Vanguard, p. 281. 
19 Theweleit, Männerphantasien. 
20 Schulze, Freikorps und Republik, p. 326. 
21 Michael Freund, quoted in Schulze, Freikorps und Republik, p. 334. 
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of Germany in this period, providing a more holistic and internationally integrated outlook on 
some of this era’s violent events.22 
     The other side of the comparison in the current chapter concerns British reactions to 
paramilitary violence in Ireland in the postwar years. The group of men commonly referred to 
as the ‘Black and Tans’, due to the mismatched police-green and army-khaki uniform they 
were initially issued, actually consisted of two distinct bodies of paramilitary forces recruited 
by the British government during the Irish War of Independence (or Anglo-Irish War) of 1919-
1921, in order to assist in crushing militant Irish nationalism. Home Rule for Ireland had been 
a long-standing and contentious demand in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
before it was put on hold at the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. However, the Easter 
Rising in 1916 and the forceful British suppression of it, as well as the attempt by the British 
government in early 1918 to impose conscription in Ireland caused tensions between Irish 
nationalist movements and the British state to greatly heighten again. Though conscription 
was eventually not enforced, Ireland became increasingly ungovernable.23 Following the 
nationalist party Sinn Féin’s landslide victory in the general election in December 1918, the 
elected MPs refused to take their seats in Westminster and formed their own parliament, the 
revolutionary Dáil Éireann. Finally, with the murder of two Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) men 
in January 1919, a ruthless guerrilla war between the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the 
forces representing the British government broke out.24 According to David Leeson’s blunt 
assessment, “the RIC was not up to the job.”25 To reinforce a basically civilian police force and 
equip it for counter-insurgency, the British government began from late 1919 to recruit ex-
soldiers, only recently demobilised following the end of the First World War, into the body that 
became known as the ‘Black and Tans’. From July 1920, ex-officers were also recruited into 
a special, heavily armed Auxiliary Division RIC (ADRIC). These paramilitary units, functioning 
as adjuncts to the power of the British state in Ireland, quickly gained notoriety for the 
ruthlessness with which they carried out their duties, and in particular for engaging in reprisals 
against the civilian population, such as looting, wanton destruction, the burning of towns and 
cities such as Balbriggan (September 1920) or Cork (December 1920), and shootings. Martial 
law was imposed in parts of Ireland by December 1920, through which the government 
 
22 Sammartino, Impossible Border, pp. 45-70. 
23 Charles Townshend, The British Campaign in Ireland, 1919-1921: The Development of Political and 
Military Policies (Oxford, 1975), pp. 8-10. 
24 Townshend, British Campaign, pp. 14-16. 
25 D.M. Leeson, The Black & Tans: British Police and Auxiliaries in the Irish War of Independence, 1920-
1921 (Oxford, 2011), p. 4. 
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appeared to be sanctioning a policy of ‘official reprisals.’26 The guerrilla-like conflict carried on 
and by July 1921 the British government was forced to agree to a truce. With the signing of a 
peace treaty in December 1921 Ireland was divided into the Irish Free State in the south and 
the six northern counties constituting Northern Ireland, which continued to be part of the United 
Kingdom. 
     The question of how such outbreaks of violence as perpetrated by the Black and Tans and 
Auxiliaries could happen, how such behaviour could have been tolerated for as long as it was, 
and whether the violence was a reflection of the bad character of the British recruits, has been 
a recurring topic of inquiry in the historiography of this conflict. As David Leeson, author of the 
most recent (and only the second) monograph specifically on the ‘Black and Tans’, argues, 
the accusation often levelled against the Black and Tans and Auxiliaries that they were largely 
made up of “jail-birds and down-and-outs” who would easily engage in any sort of ‘outrage’ 
for no particular reason, was not accurate.27 Instead, their image as “the scum of London’s 
underworld” was largely a very effective Irish propaganda construct.28 Diligent work carried 
out by Lowe using the Home Office’s Irish Constabulary records has done a lot to reveal the 
real composition of the force and thus help dispel myths, as well as producing very useful 
statistical information.29 While there is a large body of literature on the War of Independence 
from an Irish perspective,30 British historiography has engaged with the role and behaviour of 
its paramilitary bodies in Ireland to a much lesser extent. Their violence is often simply side-
lined as an exceptional episode in the interwar history of an otherwise largely “peaceable 
kingdom.”31 Though the role this violent ‘episode’ played in British policy-making with regards 
to Ireland, and its effects on British self-perceptions, have been studied to some extent, they 
have certainly not been incorporated into broader, indeed comparative, views of interwar 
discursive negotiations on the legitimacy of political violence.32  
 
26 Townshend, British Campaign, pp. 133ff., 149. 
27 Leeson, Black & Tans, p. 223. 
28 David Leeson, “The ‘scum of London’s underworld’? British Recruits for the Royal Irish Constabulary, 
1920-21”, Contemporary British History, 17/1 (2003), p. 19. 
29 W.J. Lowe, “The War against the R.I.C., 1919-21”, Éire-Ireland, 37/3-4 (2002), pp. 79-117; W.J. Lowe, 
“Who were the Black-and-Tans?”, History Ireland, 12/3 (2004), pp. 47-51; W.J. Lowe, “Irish 
Constabulary Officers, 1837–1922: Profile of a Professional Elite”, Irish Economic and Social History, 
32 (2005), pp. 19-46. 
30 Just two, which focus particularly on the nature of the guerrilla war, of the many works available are: 
Joost Augusteijn, From public defiance to guerrilla warfare. The experience of ordinary volunteers in 
the Irish War of Independence, 1916-1921 (Dublin, 1996); Hart, I.R.A. at War. 
31 See Lawrence, “Peaceable Kingdom”. 
32 David George Boyce, Englishmen and Irish Troubles: British public opinion and the making of Irish 
policy, 1918-1922 (London, 1972); Dolan, “British Culture of Paramilitary Violence”; Ronan Fanning, 
Fatal Path: British Government and Irish revolution 1910-1922 (London, 2013). 
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     An investigation of the press and parliamentary sources makes evident a large imbalance 
in the quantity of material available for the British and German cases, respectively. The actions 
of British paramilitary bodies in Ireland commanded much more attention and took up much 
more space within British public discourse than the Freikorps’ activities in the Baltic did within 
German public discourse, especially in parliament. While this circumstance necessarily skews 
this chapter’s analysis a little more towards the British case study, it is telling in itself and will 
be discussed further below. The circumstance that this imbalance of materials was reversed 
with regards to life-writing sources is equally telling and will also be addressed below. The 
discourses analysed exhibited a remarkable number of layers of arguments, images, 
comparisons, and parallels which were evoked by the speakers, and which to an extent were 
mirrored by those writing in the papers. As a central theme within the sources, violence was 
presented as an aberration from civilisation. Press and parliamentary sources differed, 
however, in how they identified this aberration from an often un- or underdefined standard of 
civilisation. Opposing interpretations were put forward as to who was considered civilised or 
uncivilised for their respective uses of violence, and who was tasked with upholding civilisation 
and civilised values in the interwar world, thereby creating different, but at times intersecting, 
layers of who was considered part of a collective ‘us’ and who was marked out as an other 
‘them’. Violence acted both as a constituting trait of the in-group, meaning that some violence 
was defensible, and even necessary, while more or less subtle lines demarcated the legitimate 
use of violence from the instances when it became illegitimate, and a marker of outsider status. 
In the British parliament, the notion of ‘civilisation’, or ‘civilised government’, was frequently 
invoked by MPs, but it notably meant different things to different speakers, who applied it to 
different, sometimes diametrically opposed, acts and actors. During a notable Commons 
debate on 20 October 1920, the Chief Secretary for Ireland, Hamar Greenwood, denounced 
the violent campaign of the Irish nationalists and defended the government’s resolute policy 
in Ireland, proudly declaring that “[t]o tolerate a campaign of murder is to abdicate the first 
principle of civilised government.” Soon after, in the same debate, the opposition Liberal MP 
for Hull, Lieutenant-Commander Joseph Kenworthy effectively turned the accusation on its 
head, charging the British government with uncivilised conduct, following accusations of 
mistreatment of captured suspects by Crown forces in Ireland. Kenworthy insisted that “you 
do not ill-treat the vilest murderer when you capture him, if you make any sort of claim to 
civilised government.”33 By way of an example, this exchange, occurring well over a year into 
the conflict, serves to exhibit where the discursive battle lines were drawn. However, already 
 
33 HC, 20.10.1920, vol. 133, cc. 953, 956. 
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in the earlier stages of the conflict (and indeed before the British government had begun to 
employ paramilitary forces in Ireland) the rhetorical conflict was characterised by the same 
broad lines, with speakers on one, usually the Conservative or Coalition Liberal, side 
emphasising what they considered the depravity of the IRA’s actions and demanding better 
support for the Crown Forces in Ireland; while opposition speakers, mainly from the Labour 
camp and the Asquithian wing of the Liberal Party, regularly accused the Crown forces of 
antagonising the general population in Ireland and using unduly harsh and violent means 
against them.  
     The notion that violence was an aberration from civilisation was also a familiar theme in 
the German National Assembly (Nationalversammlung). Here, too, speakers differed on what 
they meant, however. Social Democratic Foreign Minister Hermann Müller emphasised in 
October 1919, without going into any specific detail, that the troops in the Baltic could hardly 
be called “guardians of humanity [Menschlichkeit],” implying their conduct was reproachful 
and, possibly, inhumane.34 Later on in the same debate, German Nationalist People’s Party 
(DNVP) member Gottfried Traub, misquoting Müller and misattributing the quote to Minister 
of Defence Gustav Noske, criticised him for having sarcastically referred to the Baltic troops 
as “strange guardians of civilisation.” He then went on to implore the Assembly to remember 
the brutal and inhumane – and thus by implication, uncivilised – conduct which these troops 
had faced from their Bolshevik enemies, and claimed the population of the city of Riga, which 
the German troops had ‘liberated’ in May 1919, were still grateful to them.35 Traub, alongside 
other right-of-centre speakers, thus presented as ‘civilised’, and in need of defence against 
the Eastern depravity of the Bolsheviks, something explicitly German: a 700-year long tradition 
of Deutschtum, or Germandom, and German culture and settlement in the Baltic region as 
well as the ethnic Germans (Baltendeutsche) who still upheld it on this periphery of the 
German empire.36 In the British parliament, similarly, frequent exhortations were made that in 
the fight against militant Irish nationalism something particularly British stood to be defended. 
This applied, in a very concrete sense, and in analogy to the Baltic Germans, to the Loyalist-
Unionist population in Ireland, especially in the island’s north, who would be left defenceless, 
as many argued, if Britain surrendered to the violent campaign of the IRA.37  
 
34 Verhandlungen, 94. Sitzung, 09.10.1919, p. 2960. 
35 Ibid., p. 2972. 
36 A notion repeated by several speakers in different debates: Verhandlungen, 46. Sitzung, 04.071919, 
p. 1298; 67. Sitzung, 26.07.1919, p. 1980; 94. Sitzung, 09.10.1919, p. 2950. 
37 For example: HC, 29.03.1920, vol. 127, cc. 959, 964; HC, 17.02.1921, vol. 138, cc. 241-2; HC, 
31.10.1921, vol. 147, cc. 1369, 1388, 1439, 1451. 
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     In a more abstract sense, however, what was seen to become endangered in the conflict 
in Ireland was an explicitly British set of values, steeped in democratic tradition, and the honour 
derived from them. Naturally, especially members of the opposition made this point very 
strongly. As early as May 1919, Labour MP Vernon Hartshorn expressed concern that 
“wherever there is any democratic opinion throughout the world, whether in our Colonies, on 
the Continent, or in the great free Republic of America, Ireland's wrongs are known and are 
execrated to the damage of the fame of this country and the Mother of Parliaments.”38 It was 
common among MPs to express a fear over the international reputation and good name of 
Britain and its Empire suffering as a result of the undeniable indiscipline of Crown forces, and 
the policy of reprisals being carried out in Ireland. Robert Cecil, a Conservative MP who 
crossed the floor of the House in protest against the government’s policy in Ireland,39 
highlighted that “there are correspondents from French and American papers in Ireland, and 
these charges are being reported all over the world. It is very serious. There is the vast 
importance of our national reputation to be considered.”40 Labour MP John Swan repeated the 
by now familiar theme, that “the policy of the British Government in Ireland […] has brought 
our name into reproach throughout the civilised world.” Joseph Devlin, from the Irish 
Parliamentary Party, reminded specifically the English members of the House that the issue 
of the government’s Irish policy was “mainly […] a question which affects England – its honour 
and good name. It affects the character of your Imperial prestige and pride,” as “their good 
name [was] being besmirched by the disgraceful acts and scandals committed by the 
Government of this country day by day.” In the same debate, Alexander Lyle-Samuel, a 
Coalition Liberal MP, powerfully expressed his opinion that the government were, by their 
failed policy, betraying what British soldiers had fought for in the recent war: 
  
What is at stake in Ireland is the reputation of this country as a country that governs 
by civilised means. What is the foundation of civilisation? It is justice, it is truth, it is 
mercy, it is love. We used these words simply and naturally when we went into the 
War. We went into the War to secure civilisation. We asked great sacrifices that 
civilisation might be preserved. Here today we see the very antithesis, the very 
negation of civilisation in Ireland.41 
 
 
38 HC, 14.05.1919, vol. 115, c. 1692. 
39 Richard Bennett, The Black and Tans (London, 1959), p. 169. 
40 HC, 20.10.1920, vol. 133, c. 975. 
41 HC, 22.02.1921, vol. 138, cc. 843, 846, 853-854. 
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     Indeed, what the Great War had been fought for, and the sacrifices made, were a notion 
often invoked by speakers. Government critics, such as Hartshorn, particularly focused on the 
rights of small nations to self-determination “for which we have just fought successfully through 
the bloodiest war the world has ever seen. We have been fostering aspirations in the Poles, 
the Czecho-Slovaks, and other alien races, yet it is the very aspirations we have fostered in 
other people which we treat with intense hostility when we find them in our Irish brethren.”42 
That this right, for which the country had been “willing to sacrifice 800,000 sons,”43 was being 
denied to the Irish “brethren” but granted to “other alien races” particularly highlighted what its 
critics perceived to be the double standards of the British government. This inconsistency was 
not only noted and remarked upon in Britain, however. It travelled transnationally and was, for 
example, readily used by members of the German National Assembly to accuse Britain of 
hypocrisy. Fulminating against the removal of Germany’s colonial possessions in Africa, Asia 
and the Pacific as a result of the Versailles Peace Treaty, Arthur von Posadowsky-Wehner 
(DNVP) rhetorically asked the assembly: “There is so much talk among our enemies of the 
right to national self-determination. Why does England [sic!] not introduce this right in Ireland? 
Why does it not introduce it in India? But they just juggle as they please.”44 He had a point in 
so far as MPs in Westminster agreed, and warned that the British government would face the 
“charge of hypocrisy” from their “critics abroad.”45 In a rousing speech, the Conservative MP 
Henry Cavendish-Bentinck, who consistently criticised the government for the failure of its 
Irish policy and advocated Dominion status for Ireland, exhorted his audience to “found our 
policy on the glorious tradition of this Empire, namely, on liberty and self-government,” so that 
“the light to which the Australians, Canadians and South Africans” had already turned their 
faces “with admiration and love and reverence” would shine on Ireland, too, and so that Great 
Britain would “shine out once more as the sanctuary of liberty, and not as the oppressor of a 
subject nationality.”46 
     On the other hand, there were also those in parliament and in the press who staunchly 
expressed the view that the British government ought to follow a hard line against the IRA. 
The Daily Telegraph considered the Irish republican fighters to have positioned themselves 
outside of the norms of civilised warfare and, as a consequence, argued that “the officers and 
men of a civilised army cannot always adhere to civilised and legal rules if their opponents 
ignore them.” The paper even explicitly made the point that the IRA’s conduct had removed 
 
42 HC, 14.05.1919, vol. 115, c. 1697. 
43 T.P. O’Connor (Irish Nationalist Party), HC, 20.10.1920, vol. 133, c. 1020. 
44 Verhandlungen, 40. Sitzung, 22.06.1919, p. 1122. 
45 Hartshorn, HC, 14.05.1919, vol. 115, c. 1696. 
46 HC, 20.10.1920, vol.133, c. 1001. 
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their “claim to the privileges and restrictions of the Hague Convention” and argued that while 
“irregular reprisals [were] wrong, […] there [was] much to be said for organized and properly 
controlled punitive measures.” As to what shape such measures might take, the paper 
straightforwardly suggested that an “adaptation of [the] system” used in “some of our Asiatic 
and African Dependencies” may be “feasible in rebel Ireland.”47 Conservative MP Rupert 
Gwynne confidently urged the government to disregard international opinion and declared that 
“our Empire was not built up, and will not be maintained, by thinking, or caring, what other 
countries will think.”48 The violence associated with colonial rule, however, was another aspect 
which German members of the National Assembly could only too easily pick up on to criticise 
Britain and accuse it of hypocrisy. Unsurprisingly, Posadowsky-Wehner’s attack against the 
British Empire also included an explicit reference to “this England, which has subjugated India 
for centuries, which has extracted unbelievable wealth from India”, after which he went on to 
directly associate British colonial rule with that of Belgium, “whose ignominious rule in the 
Congo still is in everyone’s memory”, a clear attempt to further denigrate the reputation of the 
British Empire.49 This was not, however, just the position of one right-wing German Nationalist 
People’s Party representative. The Social Democratic Foreign Minister Müller showed himself 
to be similarly outraged by the forced removal of Germany’s colonies and specifically denied 
the “untenable charge that German failure in the area of colonial civilisation had been plainly 
shown.”50 This utterance is particularly noteworthy as it established the practice of “colonial 
civilisation”, also referred to as the ‘civilising mission’, as a practice, and perhaps even a right, 
common to all European colonial powers. Germany had thus been excluded from the ranks of 
European colonial powers, no longer considered an equal. Conservative German politicians 
protested that “when it comes to the founding of the colonies of the German Reich, we as 
Germans have a clear and good conscience. […] Germany acquired all its colonies in a 
peaceful way in accordance with international law. There is no Fashoda in German colonial 
history.”51  
     Evidently, for these German politicians, the outcome of the war was merely an excuse used 
by the Entente powers to acquire Germany’s former colonies. They forthrightly refused to 
recognise that past violent colonial policies could have anything to do with the removal of the 
 
47 “Restore Order First”, Daily Telegraph, 30.09.1920, p. 10. 
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German colonies. In this light, German Freikorps ambitions to conquer the Baltic regions to 
the East of the Reich could be regarded as all the more significant. By fighting against the 
Bolsheviks there, essentially colonial aspirations and extreme violence could be cloaked in 
the language of anti-Communism. When, in late 1918, the Latvian government and the 
Entente powers requested that the German army remain in the Baltic and send additional 
Freikorps to help fight the Red Army, a promise of future citizenship was made by the Latvian 
government to the prospective Freikorps men. An explicit promise of land for volunteer fighters 
was not made, but citizenship would have brought the right to settle with it. Freikorps 
recruitment posters in Germany nevertheless often proclaimed the promise of land anyway, 
and, as Gustav Noske noted in his memoirs, “What was not promised on the recruitment 
posters, the recruiting officers promised the men verbally.”52 Thus, many men who joined the  
Freikorps, facing uncertainty and unemployment in postwar Germany, did so with the explicit 
expectation of settling on fertile Baltic land to begin new lives as farmers, while defending and 
reinvigorating the region’s Germanic heritage, culture and Volk.53 This was reflected in the 
autobiographical writing of many of the Freikorps, in which the prospect of settlement in the 
region was a recurring theme and, besides the highly ideological motive of defeating 
Bolshevism, a central motivation for the recruits. Ernst von Salomon, whose postwar writing 
on the Freikorps’ campaign became bestsellers in Weimar Germany, stylised the almost 
spiritual connection he claimed some of the men felt towards the land they were fighting on, 
and for: 
 
With every breath a peculiar, tangy smell filled my lungs. Almost painfully spicy, it 
permeated my entire body. This haze of the Courlandish earth gave me a dull sense 
of what this land could offer us. My fingers clawed at the rich earth, which appeared to 
suck me in. We had conquered this land. Now it called on us; suddenly it had become 
a symbol of our obligation.54 
 
 
52 Noske, Kiel bis Kapp, p. 177. 
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The Freikorps’ motivations to set out to the East were put into words by many of the men and 
mainly clustered around such highly ideological motives as “to protect the border,”55 to “serve 
Germany”, to “fight for the liberation of Germany to our last breath,”56 to “save the fatherland 
from chaos,”57 and “to become the saviour of the fatherland out of our national upbringing, out 
of tradition, and duty.”58 The defence of the 700-year long history and tradition of Germandom 
in the Baltic region was, according to the commander of all German troops in the Baltic, 
Rüdiger Graf von der Goltz, a “cultural act” [Kulturtat].59 Goltz even evoked the prevention of 
“the downfall of the Occident [Untergang des Abendlandes]” as the Freikorps’ goal, while 
others viewed the fight against Bolshevism in the Baltic as a fight “for the security of the 
homeland, nay of all of Western Europe” and for “the salvation of Christian-European 
culture.”60 Josef Bischoff, the commander of the Eiserne Division (‘iron division’) which fought 
in the Baltic, was perhaps bluntest with the title of his memoir, Die Letzte Front (‘the last front’) 
in expressing the firm belief that the Baltic campaign fought by the Freikorps was not only a 
‘real war’ but a direct continuation of the First World War, indeed its final stage at which 
Germany’s fate might still have been changed for the better.61 
     The Freikorps’ enemies in the fight for the Germanisation of the Baltic lands were thus both 
the Bolsheviks, as well as Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian nationalist movements, against 
whom the Freikorps willingly perpetrated excessive acts of violence, aided by the linguistic 
dehumanisation of their enemies, who were consciously othered as civilisationally and racially 
subhuman. This was particularly prevalent in the Freikorps’ life-writing. The Bolsheviks, as 
well as the native Latvians, Estonians and Lithuanians, were consistently characterised 
through animalistic language as “beasts”, and a “brutish enemy.”62 Goltz furthermore 
repeatedly emphasised the geographical remoteness of Bolshevism, characterising it as an 
“Asiatic” ideology, which was therefore alien to Germandom and Western civilisation.63 Even 
Biblical allegories were employed, characterising the Freikorps’ mission as the prophesised 
battle against “the animal [which] had come from the Asiatic steppes, and was now devouring 
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man.”64 Once again, the central theme of violence as a demarcator of civilised behaviour can 
thus be identified in these materials, as the Bolsheviks and their acts were described as 
uncivilised and barbarous. When the Baltic Landwehr (‘militia’), which was not a body of 
German troops but did contain German volunteers, captured Riga from the Bolsheviks on 24-
25 May 1919, papers repeatedly stressed the enthusiastic celebrations by the city’s 
population, grateful to the “heroic troops” who had liberated them from the terrible conditions 
which they had allegedly had to suffer under the “Bolshevik reign of terror” (bolschewistische 
Schreckensherrschaft).65 The papers reported for example that at the last minute, before 
giving up the city, the Bolsheviks had shot “nine pastors and twenty women”, concluding that 
after months of Bolshevik rule “terror and famine in Riga exceed[ed] all imagination.”66 Thus, 
the German troops in the Baltic were portrayed, in large parts, as legitimised in their defence 
against the “bestial” Bolshevik, and later Latvian, enemy.67 
     Motivations for men to join the Black and Tans appear to have been altogether more 
material. Douglas Duff, the lone Black and Tan known to have penned an autobiography, 
published in 1934, joined a monastery after fighting in the First World War and signed up to 
the RIC as a Black and Tan on a whim, after deciding monastic life was not his calling after 
all. The title of his memoir directly expressed the fact that he considered himself a mercenary, 
or a “Free-companion”, and he took pride in “the old trade of the Free-companion, […] the 
soldier who sells his blade to, and faithfully serves, the hirer.”68 In describing an attack by “the 
‘Shinner’”, Duff justified the Black and Tans simply ducking for cover by reminding the reader 
that “we were mercenary soldiers fighting for our pay, not patriots willing and anxious to die 
for our country.” In fact, his remarks reflected a deep sense of disillusionment with fighting for 
greater ideals following the perceived lack of gratitude and appreciation from the British 
government and society after the end of the First World War. He bitterly recalled that “most of 
us had been [patriots willing and anxious to die for our country] already, in a far more important 
scrap, and had seen exactly how much that sort of thing was worth or even appreciated by 
the people at home. Our job was to earn our pay by supressing armed rebellion, not to die in 
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some foolish, though maybe heroic and spectacular ‘forlorn hope’.”69 He almost sounded 
envious of the Irish nationalists, for “[t]hey, at least, conceived themselves to be fighting for a 
just cause.”70 
     The consequences for the British Empire of the on-going conflict in Ireland and a feared 
loss of international prestige as a consequence were, as mentioned above, a frequent 
argument brought forward in public discourse. Especially once the government had agreed a 
truce in July 1921 and had entered negotiations with the leaders of the Irish nationalist 
movement, those opposed to the treaty negotiations, and later the Treaty which was signed 
on 6 December 1921, considered the government to be setting a dangerous precedent, as 
they appeared to be “surrender[ing] to crime.”71 In particular, they raised concerns that the 
IRA’s “policy of calculated and brutal arson and murder”, to which the British government were 
appearing to surrender, was being “watched by sinister eyes in Great Britain, in Egypt, in India, 
and throughout the world. Its success would mean the breakup of the Empire and our 
civilisation.”72 At the end of the First World War, the British Empire was indeed facing violent 
nationalist movements, rebellion, and rioting on an endemic scale, from Ireland to Egypt and 
India, as well as in Mesopotamia, on the Afghan frontier, and in several port cities at home.73 
The fear that the success of the Irish rebels in forcing the British Empire to its knees by means 
of a covert guerrilla war would spread and affect especially “our great interests […] in India 
and in Egypt” was thus widespread.74 In fact, for Conservative MP Lieutenant-Colonel Henry 
Croft it was the government’s surrender to “terrorism and assassination” which actually proved 
that “British civilisation ha[d] failed;” while fellow Conservative MP Colonel John Gretton found 
that the government bowing to its fear of the Irish guerrillas constituted an unprecedented 
“humiliation.”75  
     The left-wing Daily Herald, on the other hand, considered the situation as a positive 
opportunity for the British government to extend to Ireland, and eventually India, similar 
freedoms as had recently been negotiated with the protectorate of Egypt. It called for “’a 
recognition of the independence and full sovereign status of Ireland,’ coupled with the 
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immediate withdrawal of the army of occupation.” Demanding speedy action, as “the sands 
[were] running out”, the paper wondered whether, if the British government had trusted Egypt, 
“lying across the spinal cord of our empire”, with these privileges, “can we not extend an equal 
trust to Ireland on our western front?” It called on the government with hopeful urgency to “take 
its courage in its hands and deal with Ireland and India and Mesopotamia as it has dealt with 
Egypt, as South Africa was dealt with.”76 The Daily Mail’s James Dunn wrote on the same 
theme with much more concern, calling Ireland the “keystone of the British Empire.” The author 
was convinced that “the solving of the Irish question [meant] the saving of the British Empire”, 
arguing that the question needed to be solved quickly, as “forces within and without the Empire 
[were] at work seeing the destruction of the glorious edifice of which we are so justly proud.” 
By prolonging the conflict in Ireland, the author worried that the British government would “play 
into the hands of these envious enemies.” However, rather than advocating a full-blown 
military effort on the part of the British forces to regain control over Ireland, the author 
wondered whether it was worth losing “an empire for the sake of an island” and seemed to 
argue that “an independent Ireland”, rather than being “a menace to the Empire,” would be 
preferable to “a conquered Ireland” which would spell “the end of Empire.”77 The Observer 
took a somewhat more positive view of the potential which a peaceful solution of the Irish 
question might hold for the wider Empire. It also recognised that “Ireland [was] the key problem 
for the British Empire”, but, in this sense, it was convinced that “if British statesmanship can 
succeed here it can succeed everywhere” and that “peace in Ireland will be itself a step 
towards the settlement of great Imperial problems.” Reminding readers once again of the 
importance of British actions in Ireland for the country’s international prestige, the paper clearly 
stated that “by its acts in Ireland the British Government acquires its character in the eyes of 
the Dominions and dependencies, of the United States and of foreign countries.” It warned of 
“the alarming effect of the present Irish situation upon, say, Indian, American, or even 
European opinion.” The paper was convinced that “our political credit is lowered throughout 
the world by the news which is telegraphed from Ireland,” and it therefore argued that “when 
our political credit is at stake our existence as an Empire is at stake.” This, the paper 
concluded, should be reason enough for the British government to vigorously seek to achieve 
“peace by agreement” in Ireland.78 
     Another frequently repeated theme in the public discourses analysed here was not only 
what the recent war had been fought for, but how it had been fought, especially by the German 
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enemy. ‘Prussianism’ had become a byword for universally condemned barbarism, wanton 
destruction and cruelty. Opposition Liberal MP Joseph Kenworthy set the tone, asking as early 
as November 1919 whether the number of military and police raids carried out on private 
houses in Ireland was “less than the number of raids made on private houses in Belgium by 
the German Government.”79 Kenworthy further accused the government of following a policy 
of “Prussianism” for allegedly keeping men imprisoned without any charges or evidence in 
April 1920,80 and Labour MP Arthur Henderson, in his opening speech to the October 1920 
debate on reprisals, characterised the government’s current Irish policy as “akin to the policy 
of frightfulness which was associated with the doings of the Germans, and the doings of him 
whom we described as the Hun during the War.”81 In the same speech, Kenworthy appealed 
to his colleagues to not tolerate the government’s defence of its policy of reprisals in the face 
of ambushes, saying that the same excuse had been used by the Germans in Belgium. With 
great pathos, he implored his audience: “If we do not condemn it, we shall be as guilty as the 
German people, and worse. […] then Germany will have won the War. The Prussian spirit will 
have entered into us. […] the 800,000, the flower of our race, who lie buried in a score of 
battle-fronts will really have died in vain.”82 The theme was present in the press, too. The 
radical Daily News published a report on the situation in Ireland by Robert Lynd entitled 
“Prussianism in Ireland”, and in a cartoon (Fig. 1), the same paper depicted a black British 
soldier, on whose uniform can be read the words ‘Our Own Prussianism’, who was 
simultaneously being slapped on the wrist with a feather and being handed a one-way ticket 
to Ireland by the Prime Minister, David Lloyd George. Along with his purposely ineffective 
chastisement of the soldier, Lloyd George tells him “Take that! And that! You bad boy, you, 
for forgetting that British rule does not rest on force. And now – go to Ireland.” All the while, 
the recently produced Amritsar Commission Report was depicted as lying in the dust between 
the two men.83 The cartoon is multi-layered; besides its obvious condemnation as 
‘Prussianism’ of the government’s policy in Ireland and its inability or unwillingness to 
discipline the Crown forces who partook in illegal reprisals, it also contains reference to the 
exploitation, as perceived by the radical Left, by the Empire of colonial soldiers to do its ‘dirty 
work,’ though it should be noted that it is not generally recognised in the literature that colonial 
troops were deployed to Ireland for this purpose. However, with this racialised aspect, as well 
as the overt reference to the Amritsar massacre of April 1919 (discussed further in Chapter 3 
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of the thesis), the cartoon embodies a central argument of this thesis: political violence in 
interwar Britain spanned all the way between the domestic, via the more peripheral, to the 
colonial sphere, and the language used to debate it transcended those circles, being applied 
cross-referentially, as in this cartoon. 
 
Fig. 1: Cartoon from Daily News, 29.05.1920, in TNA (Kew), WO 35/185. 
 
     While the killing of civilians, the burning of houses, and the taking of reprisals was thus 
characterised as a specifically ‘German’ kind of outrage, unworthy of the British forces who 
had defeated the ‘Hun’, there was one last line which Kenworthy was quick to remind the 
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House had not been crossed by the Crown forces. “There has, however, been one bright spot. 
There have been no sexual outrages on women. We have not followed the Germans in that 
respect. Thank God, English, Scottish, and Welsh soldiers have not sunk to that depth.”84 
Kenworthy thereby drew a clear line to demarcate the British forces, though guilty of many 
acts of indiscipline, from the particularly objectionable crime of sexual violence. This theme 
will have to be discussed in more detail further below. Oswald Mosley, then of the 
Conservative Party, however, went even further, suggesting that while the Germans in the war 
had at least acted according to a policy, however abject, which had been set out by their 
military authorities, the British in Ireland acted in a manner “more reminiscent of the pogrom 
of the more barbarous Slav, and it represents a far greater breakdown of law and order and 
justice than did the German method in Belgium.”85 Mosley thereby established a different kind 
of ‘hierarchy of contemptibleness’, interwoven with ideas of race, in which the British had 
tumbled from their elevated position even further down past the hated Germans, and onto the 
same level as the leaderless perpetrators of mob violence in eastern European villages. 
     Those critical of the government’s Irish policy did not deny that the methods employed by 
the IRA in their fight against Crown forces were “breaches of universal moral law;” however, 
as expressed by Cecil after the Anglo-Irish Treaty was signed, the government’s critics thought 
that by “breaking [its] own laws” the government had made things significantly worse and had 
“sanctioned the doctrine that murder is a legitimate political instrument.” Cecil was clear: “I 
believe it to be a dishonour.”86 Referring to the recent Hunter Commission which had been set 
up to investigate the actions of General Dyer at Amritsar in April 1919, questions were asked 
in parliament whether the government would allow a similar commission to visit Ireland and 
undertake an impartial inquiry.87 Such requests for an impartial inquiry into the situation in 
Ireland were made frequently in the House, but the government consistently refused, usually 
citing as an explanation that people in Ireland were too intimidated by Sinn Féin and the IRA 
to give “independent evidence.”88 The shocking events of ‘Bloody Sunday’, 21 November 
1920, when the IRA assassinated nine British intelligence officers in their hotel rooms in the 
morning, and Crown forces opened fire on the crowds at a Gaelic football match at Croke Park 
stadium in Dublin in the afternoon, killing fourteen spectators and injuring dozens more, 
prompted the Labour Party to dispatch its own commission to investigate the situation in 
Ireland. Its report was published in 1921 and found that the “situation in Ireland today is nothing 
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short of a tragedy, whether from the point of view of the Irish people or from the standpoint of 
British honour and prestige.”89 
     The insistence on an inquiry was indicative of a particular part of the ‘British prestige’ which 
was at stake in this conflict, namely the “supremacy of the law”, described as that “British 
possession, handed down for generations.”90 Mosley accused the government of having 
“surrendered to the Sinn Feiners when it emulated their policy of assassination. […] It has 
surrendered the very root principle of British justice.” Irish Nationalist MP for the Scotland 
division of Liverpool, T.P. O’Connor, implored the nation’s representatives to be “faithful to the 
almost unbroken tradition of this great free and constitutional country that law shall be supreme 
and the protection of the law shall follow even those charged with the most heinous crime.”91 
In particular, torture was singled out as a practice utterly unworthy of a country like Britain, 
with its claim to civilisation and the pride it took in its history of the rule of law. Kenworthy, for 
example, claimed that day after day national and international newspapers carried stories 
alleging that captives in Ireland were “treated in a way in which men ought not to be treated 
by civilised captors.” Specifically, men were “being flogged to extort confession.”92 Accounts 
from members of the Crown forces active in Ireland at the time appear to support this 
accusation, if only by second-hand. In his diary, Private J.P. Swindlehurst levelled accusations 
of serious torture against the Black and Tans: 
 
Prisoners were brought in occasionally, [...], covered in blood, minus teeth, and 
numerous other injuries. After a grilling in one of the upper rooms, we could hear 
groans and curses coming down the stairway, a dull thump indicated someone had 
taken a count […] The Black and Tans have their grilling room, they are at it night and 
day, knocking information out of suspects and prisoners alike, and then carting them 
off to Mountjoy [prison, A.K.] more dead than alive.93 
 
     However, not only those attacking the government invoked the notion of the supremacy of 
the law, but also those defending its actions. Leader of the House, Andrew Bonar Law, mocked 
his colleague Robert Cecil for making an “academic speech” on the supremacy of law, as if 
“the conditions which are prevailing in Ireland make no difference.” He asked, rhetorically, 
whether his “Noble Friend really [thought] that while the Civil War was going on, and they were 
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fighting for the ultimate aim of supremacy of the law, they were doing it in the academic way 
of which he spoke?” Instead, he insisted, the “essence of getting, in the long run, and 
permanently, the supremacy of the law is to put down disorder and murder.”94 Similarly, Hamar 
Greenwood condemned the provocation of the Crown forces by the IRA through their breach 
of civilised norms more than he did the reprisals which Crown forces took in response. 
Referring to the ‘sacking’ of Balbriggan on 20 September 1920, when, following the violent 
death of a constable and his brother, a number of ‘Black and Tans’ stationed at a near-by 
barracks broke out, looted several public houses, destroyed a factory and burned close to fifty 
other buildings before summarily executing two alleged Sinn Féiners, Greenwood admitted 
that the men “saw red. I admit it with regret.” However, he also insisted that “I cannot condemn 
in the same way those policemen who lost their heads as I condemn the assassins who 
provoked this outrage.” One particular item of weaponry, which had, according to Greenwood, 
recently “become the common weapon of revolting mutilation in carrying out this policy to 
smash the British Empire” was especially associated with the breach of civilisation, namely 
expanding ‘dum-dum’ bullets.95 They were “condemned by every civilised race” and “contrary 
to the usages of all civilised warfare and the Geneva Convention.”96 In the face of such cold-
blooded murder, which Greenwood refused to recognise as “a political crime,” “British soldiers 
and British police will fire first, in the proper conduct of their difficult duty, in firing at people 
who are trying to ambush them and trying to annihilate them.” He declared he had “the honour 
to support their conduct in the House” and explained that the difference lay simply in the fact 
that the members of the opposition “put all the emphasis on the reprisals in Ireland; I put it on 
the provocation.”97 
     Even after the truce had been agreed in summer 1921 and the government had entered 
negotiations, the Prime Minister himself expressed the aggressive conviction that, if need be, 
Britain would be ready to continue the fight. He stressed that should the treaty in any way 
endanger British economic or security interests, then “Britain, I feel confident, will make the 
necessary sacrifice, and face the necessary risks to avert such evils, and it will soon be found 
that the island which raised 6,000,000 or 7,000,000 men to fight for the liberties of Europe is 
still quite equal to defending its own safety and maintaining its own honour.”98 Others, even 
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more hostile to negotiations, invoked the American Civil War and suggested that Britain ought 
to take inspiration from Abraham Lincoln’s unwavering fight to preserve the Union.99 
Expressing his confidence in the might of the British military, and emphasising British moral 
superiority in this conflict, Conservative MP Samuel Hoare was not alone in asserting that:  
 
No one can deny that had we attempted a military solution the armed forces of the 
Crown would have carried out the task. The Army and the Navy that beat the German 
Empire would certainly have been victorious. […] The British Empire does not 
surrender to anyone. Our power is so strong, our might so unquestioned, that no one 
can say that we surrender to anybody. […] We are making peace with Ireland, not 
because we have to make peace, but because we wish to make peace.100 
 
This view of course conveniently disregarded the fact that the British government had lost the 
support of public opinion as a result of its unsuccessful attempts at quelling revolt in Ireland 
and could therefore simply no longer afford to carry on this messy war which was costing 
British lives.101 
     The nature of the conflict in Ireland presented a constant point of contention, as was 
indicated by the kinds of questions and issues raised repeatedly by MPs in parliament. 
Criticism of the government came not only from the opposition, but also from the government’s 
own backbenches, as well as Ulster Unionist MPs, who regularly challenged government 
politicians on wantonly risking and wasting the lives of British Crown forces in Ireland. They 
were primarily concerned with the government’s failure to provide its forces with adequate 
protection against attacks. For example, the need for more armoured cars was brought up 
repeatedly by John Pennefather, Conservative MP for the Kirkdale division of Liverpool.102 
There were appeals for better-suited materials to conduct an effective campaign, such as 
more powerful firearms, including machine-guns,103 and, early on, the use of trained dogs for 
the protection of police and to trace suspects.104 As early as December 1919, hand grenades 
had been issued to the Royal Irish Constabulary “purely for defensive purposes to safeguard 
the lives of the police when they are attacked, and to provide them with means of dealing with 
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their armed assailants.” The Attorney-General for Ireland, Denis Henry quickly added that 
“there [was] no truth in the statement that the police [had] been instructed to use them against 
unarmed crowds.”105 The provision of an appropriate legal framework, in the shape of martial 
law throughout all of Ireland, bringing with it the reintroduction of the death penalty in certain 
circumstances, was also advocated repeatedly by the more hawkish MPs in order to enable 
the military and police leadership to take whatever measures they saw fit to defeat the guerrilla 
forces of the IRA.106 In particular Henry Wilson, then Chief of the General Imperial Staff, 
advocated for the introduction of martial law in all of Ireland and considered the introduction 
of it in only the most disturbed southern and south-westerly counties of Cork, Kerry, Limerick, 
and Tipperary in December 1920, and in Clare and Waterford in January 1921, a half-hearted 
and counterproductive measure. He condemned the undisciplined taking of unofficial reprisals 
and instead argued for the government to take a more decisive stance, bluntly declaring that 
“if these men [the IRA, A.K.] ought to be murdered then the government ought to murder 
them.”107 Despite the fact that Lloyd George famously insisted that the Irish rebels were 
nothing but criminals and that fighting them was a “policeman’s job”, MPs’ specific and 
insistent questions suggest that there was a significant portion of opinion in support of putting 
the Crown forces on a more solid war-like footing.108 Indeed, following the truce in July 1921, 
and in the middle of the treaty negotiations taking place in London, Henry Croft launched a 
vehement attack on the government and the House, who had, according to him, consistently 
tied the Crown forces’ hands and thereby prevented them from succeeding at their job of 
quelling rebellion in Ireland.109 
     MPs’ acute awareness of having their speeches made public in the papers, as well as their 
often uneasy relationship with the press, was illustrated when Ulster Unionist MP for Mid-
Armagh, Lieutenant-Colonel William Allen, implored his colleagues to stop making accusatory 
speeches against the forces of the Crown in Ireland as they would be published in the press 
and thus only serve to encourage the Irish nationalists.110 The Irish Unionist MP William Jellett, 
when protesting the treaty negotiations between the British government and the Irish 
nationalist leaders in autumn of 1921, even went as far as to accuse the “unscrupulous Press” 
of purposefully misleading the British public, saying “the British public have been 
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chloroformed. The truth has been suppressed.”111 The British press was indeed acutely aware 
of the administration’s difficulties in controlling the situation in Ireland and, as time went on, a 
large swathe of press opinion grew increasingly critical. Throughout the period of the conflict, 
but especially at its height from late 1920 to the summer of 1921, papers carried almost daily 
reports of new “outrages” by the IRA and alleged reprisals by the Crown forces. Conservative 
and traditionally imperialist papers, like the Morning Post, reported more on attacks made 
against the Crown forces in Ireland, while more liberal and especially left-wing papers, like 
The Manchester Guardian, reported more heavily on the violent conduct of the Crown forces 
towards the Irish population, in particular alleged reprisals, especially as the conflict wore 
on.112 Up until the summer of 1920, there was a certain level of understanding for the Crown 
forces’ difficult situation in Ireland. In some quarters there was support for a strong stance 
against the armed independence movement in Ireland. The Daily Chronicle, a pro-Lloyd 
George paper, argued in favour of using the military to subdue the Irish guerrillas, rather than 
leaving the task to underequipped police. The paper therefore heartily endorsed “using the 
mobile military forces which we possess [and] carrying the offensive with unresting energy 
against [the guerrillas, A.K.]. […] It is only by such methods that armed resistance to the State 
should be met.”113 The Manchester Guardian, however, was less convinced that deploying the 
military was an appropriate solution. It wrote sympathetically of the “luckless boys in English 
and Scottish regiments who are afflicted with the joyless labours and risks of police work in 
Ireland” and pointed out that these “boys” were “not trained as policemen” and therefore could 
not be expected to deal with the task before them of maintaining civil order.114  
     According to Bennett’s analysis, by around June 1920 the majority of the British press left 
of The Times had come to oppose the government’s approach to fighting the Irish 
nationalists.115 The Morning Post, on the other hand, remained a notable supporter of the 
Crown forces, even when unauthorised, or later authorised, reprisals were proven to have 
taken place. In multiple articles appearing as late as April 1921, for example, the paper’s 
special correspondent was still primarily occupied with denouncing “Sinn Fein’s Methods” and 
its “Revolting Murders”, while exonerating the Black and Tans and the Auxiliary Division RIC 
as “not the ruthless villains […] that the Sinn Fein propaganda represents,” emphasising that 
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they were, on the contrary, “on reasonably good terms with the peaceful Irish” and “doing 
excellent work.”116 This did not mean the paper was not critical of the government’s policy in 
Ireland, however. On the contrary, it argued that the government’s strategy of trying to 
suppress the IRA with the RIC and paramilitary reinforcements was unsuccessful and 
ineffective and therefore should be abandoned. The paper seemed to suggest the 
government’s strategy was not tough enough, accusing the administration of surrendering to 
Sinn Féin and thereby furthering the cause of an Irish republic.117 Almost a year on, in April 
1921, the Morning Post, while still defending reprisals in the face of provocation, called for 
clearer definitions of police powers (outside the martial law areas) and advocated a policy of 
holding an entire district in which an “outrage” against Crown Forces occurred financially 
responsible for its commission.118 
     The criticism in the press of the Crown forces’ conduct can be divided into two broad 
strands of condemnation. One of them, as discussed above, was condemnation of the Crown 
forces behaviour out of concern for the international reputation of Britain around the world and, 
in particular, how whatever happened in Ireland would affect the stability of the British Empire 
by potentially fuelling nascent independence movements elsewhere. The second strand of 
criticism, voiced most vocally by the moderate and more radical Left, was that of condemnation 
of the Crown forces on broadly moral and civilizational grounds. In the aftermath of the 
‘sacking’ of Balbriggan by Black and Tans on 20 September 1920, The Manchester Guardian 
showed itself appalled at the “gross and scandalous excesses now almost daily committed by 
the agents of the law and forces of the Executive in Ireland”. It likened their methods to a 
series of institutions which it considered synonymous with primitive and despotic rule, such as 
“the Tsar’s Government”, “the Corsican vendetta or […] the Indian [sic!] scalp-hunt.” Though 
the paper seemed convinced that these “crimes and outbreaks [were] certainly not approved 
by the Castle authorities”, it also emphasised that despite the unquestionable provocations 
which the Crown forces were subjected to, “reprisal in kind is not a tolerable form of action on 
the part of any Government calling itself civilised.”119 Reporting regularly from Ireland for The 
Observer, the Irish journalist and moderate nationalist politician Stephen Gwynn explicitly 
queried what “definition of civilisation” a government could possibly be referring to when it 
claimed that the police force had “restored Ireland to civilisation,” when in actual fact, Gwynn 
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claimed, nobody’s life or property had become any safer “since the Black and Tans started.”120 
In a notably entitled editorial, even The Times, not by any means a paper of the radical Left, 
found very clear language in which to condemn the recent spate of “arson and destruction” at 
Mallow, committed by Crown forces following a raid on military barracks on 28 September 
1920. Suggesting that the reprisals were “deliberately organized”, the paper called them “acts 
of war” against the people of Ireland. The paper made a nuanced case as to what, in their 
opinion, would have been within reason to do in response to the raid, which included the 
“arrest on suspicion of complicity [of] any townsfolk against whom a prima facie case could be 
established” and dealing summarily “with any insurgents caught in the possession of arms.” 
The paper emphasised, however, that the soldiers were “not entitled to reduce to ruins the 
chief buildings of the township and to destroy the property of the inhabitants merely as an act 
of terrorism.” Such “savagery”, it continued, was a “national disgrace” and only served to sully 
Britain’s name “throughout the Empire and throughout the world.”121 
     One particular paper provides an interesting juxtaposition to the discourses analysed 
above. The Weekly Summary, a Dublin Castle-issued propaganda paper for the RIC and the 
Black and Tans, issued between August 1920 and the agreement of a truce on 11 July 1921, 
contained in large part curated excerpts from the British and Irish press, as well as 
(anonymous) opinion pieces, letters, and other short pieces. The paper thus offers insight into 
what the British government’s representatives in Ireland considered important and appropriate 
to boost the Crown forces’ morale at the height of the conflict. It did so by assuring new recruits 
that they were needed, wanted, and, as former soldiers, had the right skills for the job, as in 
one piece which emphasised that “They were wanted badly and the R.I.C. welcomes them. 
[…] They know what Danger is. They know what Fighting is. They have looked Death in the 
eyes before and did not flinch. They will not flinch now.”122 The publication praised the recruits’ 
courage,123 and roundly placed the blame for reprisals, which it recognised were “wrong,” on 
IRA provocation: “Police murder produces reprisals. Stop murdering policemen.”124 It also 
published long lists of attacks on the police in a recurring section entitled “Persecution of the 
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R.I.C.”125 and highlighted in particular acts of IRA violence against women,126 children,127 old 
men,128 and animals,129 all of whom represented the most vulnerable elements of society and 
thus painted the IRA as particularly inhuman and cruel. Even in spring 1921, when the general 
opinion in the British press had decidedly turned against the government’s handling of the 
conflict in Ireland, and especially against the use of paramilitaries and reprisals, the Weekly 
Summary insisted that the “’Black and Tans’ [were] Increasingly Popular”, and espoused the 
“Chivalry of the Crown Forces.”130  
     As unsurprising as the above positions were for an outright propaganda publication, the 
discourses analysed here did reflect the divisions within the wider political context of the time, 
most notably the ongoing split of the Liberal Party, and the accompanying soul-searching over 
what ‘Liberalism’ meant, when part of the Liberal Party had gone into coalition with the 
Conservatives and a Liberal Prime Minister could appear to spearhead the increasingly 
escalating violence of Crown forces in Ireland. In an editorial, The Manchester Guardian 
reminded readers of instances in the past when the Liberal Party had taken a principled stand, 
under William Gladstone, against “[British] support of the inhuman tyranny of the Turk”, and, 
under Henry Campbell-Bannerman, to oppose the “’methods of barbarism’ in South Africa” 
during the Boer War. Now, continued the editorial, it was again up to the Liberal Party, not 
under Lloyd George but the Asquithian opposition wing of it, to distinguish itself “as the leader 
of the fight against still worse methods of barbarism than those of South Africa – methods 
employed nearer home, not against an enemy, but against fellow-subjects, and relying not on 
organised operations of war but on licensed arson and murder by a lawless police force.”131 
Reinforcing his opposition to the Coalition Liberal Party under Lloyd George, Asquith, in a 
speech to supporters at the National Liberal Club in November 1920, two days before ‘Bloody 
Sunday’, described the escalating violence in Ireland as “civil war” and emphasised that all 
“killing is murder, whether the victim be a constable, or a soldier, or a woman nursing her baby 
by the wayside.” He strongly condemned the practice of reprisals and expressed his opinion 
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that the government was dealing “a blow at the very foundation on which civilized society rests 
when the Executive is permitted, or rather permits itself, to confound the innocent with the 
guilty and to strike out wildly and blindly in a frenzy of retaliation.” His condemnation was 
received with cheers. Asquith went on to cite several recent cases of reprisals and, in 
particular, the destruction of creameries in towns like Tubbercurry and elsewhere and accused 
the Prime Minister of wilfully misguiding the public in his speech in the Commons where he 
denied the evidence for these events. Asquith then addressed “the English people” directly 
and, holding up Britain as a bulwark of liberal values, accused the current government of an 
unconscionable incitement to violence: 
 
Are we going to content ourselves with protesting (loud cries of “No”) against the 
misdoings of other people, while we ourselves – the pioneers of liberty, […] laying 
down the principles of freedom and justice for the rest of the world – are here in Ireland 
doing things by the authority and with the incitement of the Executive which would take 
a fitting place in the blackest annals of the lowest despotisms of the European world? 
 
Asquith ended by vowing he would continue to work to make information about the real 
circumstances in Ireland publicly available and opening the British people’s eyes to “the 
dishonour that is being done in their name.”132  
     While Asquith’s speech was received with cheers by his supports at the National Liberal 
Club, several papers reporting it vehemently disagreed with its contents, illustrating that the 
Independent Liberals’ strong condemnation of the government’s continued support of the 
Crown forces was by no means representative. Commenting on the speech, the more 
conservative Observer did urge the government to “awaken thoroughly to the fact that 
undisciplined and promiscuous reprisals are hateful to the plain mass of the British people.” 
But the paper strongly condemned Asquith’s speech as unnecessarily divisive party-political 
rhetoric which would only result in the loss of united Ireland.133 An editorial in the Unionist 
Scotsman, calling Asquith’s speech “frenzied” and “one of the least creditable incidents in his 
political career”, considered his point of view “deplorable”, “vicious”, and an “outrageous 
example of perverted judgement.” The piece alleged that there was no evidence to Asquith’s 
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claim that the owners of destroyed Irish creameries were unconnected to Sinn Fein or the IRA. 
Instead, the paper suggested that Asquith and his supporters all too readily chose to believe 
“Sinn Fein inventions.” The paper specifically condemned Asquith for “blackening the name 
of Great Britain, without a single shred of justification.” While it is thus obvious that the strong 
condemnation of Crown force conduct, as articulated by the Opposition Liberals, was not 
necessarily representative of wider opinion in the British press, the Scotsman’s incensed 
editorial does give proof of the argument made in this chapter that preserving British prestige 
and upholding its self-image, domestically and internationally, was of foremost importance 
amid the violence taking place in Ireland.134 
     One case which threw the issue of excessive use of force in Ireland into sharp relief in the 
summer of 1920 was the so-called Listowel ‘mutiny’ in June, which raised the question of when 
Crown forces were officially allowed, or expected, to fire on civilians. In this ‘mutiny’ a number 
of RIC constables resigned from their posts at Listowel police station in Kerry in protest after 
receiving new orders to shoot on sight any suspicious person who, when challenged, refused 
to remove their hands from their pockets immediately.135 The content of this drastic order was 
substantially vouched for by a report produced by Colonel Gerald Smyth, who conveyed the 
order to the Listowel police, himself.136 Allegedly, however, the order was accompanied by 
callous remarks from Smyth that “the more you shoot the better I will like you” and an 
assurance that “no policeman will get into trouble for shooting any man.”137 Smyth 
categorically denied using any such words in a report he authored and which was submitted 
to parliament in July 1920 after Smyth had been assassinated by the IRA in Cork on 17 July 
1920.138 Nevertheless, the incident, and the order which prompted the ‘mutiny’, drew 
significant public attention. The left-wing press used it to forcefully condemn the government’s 
policy in Ireland as a “new form of Dyerism”, again in reference to the April 1919 Amritsar 
massacre.139 The conservative Spectator, on the other hand,  focused its attention on Smyth’s 
assassination, not mentioning the ‘mutiny’ and calling the allegation that Smyth had incited 
 
134 “[Editorial article], Scotsman, 20.11.1920, p. 8. 
135 The exact number of constables who resigned is difficult to ascertain. Accounts vary between five 
(Bennett, Black and Tans, p.57) to all fourteen (Thomas Fennell, with Rosemary Fennell (ed.), The 
Royal Irish Constabulary: a history and personal memoir (Dublin, 2003), p.109). 
136 HC, 29.07.1920, vol. 132, cc. 1606-1609; see also “Col. Smyth on his speech”, Times, 30.07.1920, 
p. 14. 
137 Statement of Jeremiah Mee, Bureau of Military History, Dublin, 1950, p. 10, digitised: 
http://www.militaryarchives.ie/collections/online-collections/bureau-of-military-history-1913-
1921/reels/bmh/BMH.WS0379.pdf [accessed 30.05.2020]. 
138 HC, 29.07.1920, vol. 132, cc. 1606-1609; see also “Col. Smyth on his speech”, Times, 30.07.1920, 
p. 14. 
139 “Dyerism in Ireland”, Daily News, 12.07.1920, TNA (Kew), WO 35/185. 
 113 
policemen to take reprisals “without any truth.” Instead, the paper asked “how long British 
people [were] going to allow the horrors of the Sinn Fein conspiracy to go on without any 
serious attempt to protect their own friends, to punish those who are guilty of murder, and to 
maintain the ordinary standard of civilization in the South of Ireland?”140 What the controversy 
over the ‘mutiny’ highlighted, was the confusion in large parts of Ireland over who was in 
charge of the law and what the law actually allowed for. The incident also highlighted the limits 
of what the British administration could successfully ask its Irish policemen to do to aid the 
fight against the IRA; shooting members of their own communities on very little suspicion was 
evidently not something the policemen, at least at Listowel, were prepared to do.  
     The similarities between this order and the Schießbefehl pronounced by German Minister 
of Defence Gustav Noske in the 1919 Berlin March Uprising, which ordered that anyone who 
was encountered carrying a weapon fighting government soldiers was to be shot on the spot, 
are noticeable.141 Both were considered, by some, a departure from previously publicly 
espoused values. When the Listowel incident was raised in the Commons by T.P. O’Connor 
in July 1920, the House was disinclined to discuss the matter in any great detail, despite the 
insistence of Irish Parliamentary Party MP Joseph Devlin that, due to the “intense passions” 
that Smyth’s alleged statements had aroused throughout the country, it should be debated in 
the House in order to enable “the nation […] to form its own judgement.”142 The German 
National Assembly had in fact spent even less time discussing Noske’s order to shoot, despite 
independent Social Democrat Hugo Haase explicitly putting a question down regarding the 
“illegality of the Defence Minister’s order of 9 March 1919 for Berlin.” The Chief of Staff briefly 
replied that the directive had been lifted once order had been restored in the city; he then 
deflected any follow-up questions, demonstrating a great unwillingness to have the 
controversial order discussed at all.143 The practice at the centre of the controversial order 
given to the police at Listowel, however, was defended, in principle, by Oswald Mosley, whose 
remarks appeared characterised by both fear and aggression amid extraordinary 
circumstances. Condemning deliberate reprisals, he nevertheless insisted that “in the present 
state of Ireland one certainly cannot deny the right to shoot a man who, when challenged, 
refuses to hold up his hands. Anything of that sort is perfectly legitimate. Men who are 
suspected of being about to attack or who are engaged in actual combat may be shot perfectly 
fairly and legitimately under the conditions which exist now in Ireland.”144 
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     It is noticeable that in the German National Assembly debates, the violence perpetrated by 
Freikorps and other German volunteer bodies in the Baltic areas was scarcely mentioned at 
all. Unlike their British counterparts, even opposition MPs did not frequently spend a lot of time 
illustrating the violent acts committed by the state-authorised forces in the East. When their 
actions were brought up at all, it was done using consistently vague language. Noske, in 
particular, was given to speaking of “Ungehörigkeiten”, or ‘improprieties.’145 Some of the only 
instances when explicit descriptions of violent acts were uttered in the National Assembly were 
when the actions of the Bolshevik forces were mentioned. The most noteworthy instance of 
graphic violent language being heard in the chamber in this context was the recitation by 
German Nationalist Gottfried Traub of an open letter written by Major Josef Bischoff, the 
commander of the Eiserne Division. Bischoff was most staunchly opposed to Germany having 
signed the Versailles Peace Treaty, in which it surrendered the Baltic areas, and his division 
refused to return to Germany throughout the year 1919.146 In his letter, Bischoff wrote: “In our 
ears we hear the screams of raped women, of slain children; before our eyes we see the 
images of bestially mutilated corpses. We could never believe that in the face of such atrocities 
no flame of indignation had caught the entire world.” He thus justified the violent (re-)actions 
of his men and warned his compatriots back home to be vigilant against left-wing agitation.147 
The fact that the only voice to explicitly describe acts of extreme violence (though they were 
his enemies’) was one of the Baltikumer himself, chimed with the literature produced by the 
Baltic fighters themselves after their return to Germany. Their life-writing abounded with 
graphic details of the fighting and oscillated between comparatively ‘harmless’ adrenaline-
fuelled adventure stories and viscerally hate-filled manifestos of right-wing extremism.148 While 
the German troops’ and volunteers’ “improprieties” were loosely condemned by the 
government, from July 1919 a much larger proportion of speaking time in parliament was 
devoted to condemning the troops for not following the government’s orders to return home. 
This was seen as a much more morally bankrupt act, as it would endanger the wellbeing of 
German civilians at home, who would suffer immensely if the Entente powers were to go 
through on their threat to re-impose a blockade on Germany if the troops continued to refuse 
to cooperate. As Foreign Minister Müller put it in October, when he was expressing his hope 
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that the troops would now finally follow the orders to return, “I cannot imagine that the troops 
would make themselves complicit in the murder of German seniors, invalids and children.”149 
     This sentiment was also echoed to an extent in the national press. From the very beginning 
of the Freikorps’ Baltic campaign, there had been consistent, if not overly much coverage of 
developments in the Baltic region in the press, mostly in the shape of brief reports on troops 
movements, battles, or territory gained or lost. At times of especially notable developments in 
the conflict, such as when Freikorps captured Riga from the Bolsheviks on 24-25 May 1919, 
significantly more attention was directed towards the area and more reporting emerged in the 
press. Overall, however, few editorials or opinion pieces were published, which discussed the 
campaign or specifically the violence accompanying it, in a substantial way. This was certainly 
in contrast to the British press’ outspokenness and lively culture of debate with regards to the 
conflict in Ireland. Occasionally German papers published supposed exclusive eyewitness 
accounts from the region, often anonymous but always aligned with the paper’s political 
leaning.150 Right-wing papers, such as the Deutsche Zeitung or the Deutsche Tageszeitung 
reported more on the Baltic campaign than did more liberal or left-leaning papers, such as the 
Vossische Zeitung or the SPD’s Vorwärts. The fact that liberal, republican publications showed 
less interest in covering events in the Baltic may have been a result of their political 
acceptance of the postwar borders of Germany and their recognition that the Baltic areas were 
not, and were not going to be, part of Germany, nor was it their conviction that a war should 
be fought to reconquer them. More nationalist, pan-German papers, on the other hand, 
refused to accept the postwar order and supported the quasi-colonial desire to conquer and 
(re-)germanise the Baltic lands, which may thus have been borne out in their heightened 
coverage of the conflict. 
     During the earlier stages of the Freikorps’ Baltic campaign, during February, March, and 
April 1919, especially the more conservative papers often carried recruitment advertisements, 
urging men to join one of the numerous Freikorps being set up. They presented the Freikorps 
as an attractive, exciting and worthy option of carrying on the fight against Bolshevism, and to 
gain personal opportunities for building a new life in the Baltic. One advertisement by the 
Anwerbestelle Baltenland (‘recruitment office Baltic lands’) specified that it was especially 
keen to recruit “farmers, agricultural officers and labourers,” as well as “orderly, faithful 
soldiers,” offering in return “favourable settlement opportunities and good, permanent living-
conditions.”151 Another recruitment advertisement, on the other hand, appealed to the “front 
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soldiers” to take up arms again and support the “Balts” in their “undaunted” fight  against the 
“superior number of Russian hordes of murderers and incendiaries” (“Ueberzahl russischer 
Mordbrennerhorden”). It was characterised as a patriotic German duty to participate in this 
“decisive battle” for “Germany.” The Baltic was regarded as the Eastern bulwark against the 
advance of Bolshevism, with the recruitment notice ominously warning that once the “Balts 
are run over, then woe betide the homeland!”152 The press approach to the violent Freikorps 
campaign in the Baltic broadly followed the same lines, never discussing, positively or 
negatively, the actual violence unleashed by the German fighters, while consciously 
dehumanising and othering the Bolshevik enemy in crude and often animalistic terms, as 
mentioned further above. 
     The dehumanising language was also, and indeed especially, applied to the women who 
participated in the conflict in the Baltic. As noted in Chapter 1, according to Klaus Theweleit’s 
analysis of their life-writing, the Freikorps men only recognised two main types of women. The 
blood-red and Communist-red Flintenweib on the one hand, a quickly popularised vulgar term 
for female Communist fighters and commissars, characterising them as out-of-control 
Amazonian murderers, sexual predators, and thus fair game for the Freikorps men; and, on 
the other hand, the white and saintly, virginal German woman, who could only be a mother, 
sister, nurse, or wife.153 The latter were the women the Freikorps considered themselves to 
be liberating from the Bolshevist yoke in the Baltic. The Flintenweiber were characterised by 
the Freikorps as among the most violent fighters; they were seen as “beasts in human shape, 
who only wanted to see blood, who got into a blood frenzy” and killed innocent people “with a 
grin on their face.”154 Though “satanic” and a “monster”, who had ordered everyone caught 
fleeing from the Bolshevists to be beaten almost to death, one Freikorps man could not help 
but be slightly dazzled when the “Beast of Bausk, the female commissar, high on her steed, 
fled right through our midst.”155 This language also partly made its way into the press, where 
reports by the German journalist Erich Köhrer were published, characterising Communist 
women as “female beasts” who had led the “terrible regime of horror” as “militia women” 
(Miliziantinnen).156 Furthermore, a certain sexual pleasure was also often mixed in with the 
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frenzy of the fight. Salomon, for example, chose to describe the pleasure he derived from 
shooting a machine gun in quasi-sexual terms: “I press the lever. The gun trembled between 
my knees like an animal. […] Was it not that I could feel, though the jerking of the gun’s metal 
pieces, how the fire smashed into warm, living human bodies? Satanic lust, am I not one with 
the gun? Am I not machine – cold metal? In, into the jumbled crowd…”157 
     The role of women also occasionally took a particular place in the discourse on the conflict 
in Ireland, however in a way which suggested that violence perpetrated against women 
constituted a particularly contemptible act. Accusations of having been guilty of perpetrating 
such contemptible violence were made both against the Irish guerrillas as well as against the 
government’s paramilitaries. The conservative Morning Post focused on what it called the 
“Sinn Fein War on Women”, recounting how the IRA considered any woman observed walking 
out with a soldier or other member of the Crown forces a traitor who would face the death 
penalty. Recounting one particular case, the paper alleged that a woman named Nellie Carey 
had been shot near Fermoy by IRA men after they had shot her soldier companion and she 
had knelt by his side to pray. The detail that she was allegedly shot with “a soft-nosed [bullet]”, 
meaning an expanding bullet, only added to the brutality and illegality of the act. Furthermore, 
hair-cutting was mentioned as one of the measures the IRA employed against women who 
they regarded as traitors.158 The left-wing Daily Herald, on the other hand, alleged that among 
the “Barbarities in Ireland” committed by the Crown forces there were stories of “expectant 
mothers driven in their night attire into the street, young girls outraged, school children 
terrorised.” It based its reporting on the materials collected by the Irish Women’s delegation 
and “prepared under the authority of the Irish White Cross”, who had made documentary 
evidence of the alleged crimes available to British and Dominion politicians. The paper 
stressed that it did not think that the “majority of our fellow-countrymen [were] guilty,” but 
emphasised that “for the honour of our race it is necessary these charges should be 
investigated and the guilty brought to trial.” The report claimed that “the conventions of the 
Red Cross and its protections […] [were] not recognised by the Crown forces in Ireland” and 
listed several concrete cases of violence against women including rape, attempted rape, 
robbing and kicking a woman to death, turning a heavily pregnant woman out of her house in 
the middle of the night, and mistreatment of female prisoners.159 
     In the House of Commons, Joseph Devlin pointedly asked the government whether this 
was “a war against women and children” after Hamar Greenwood had had to admit that twelve-
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year old Annie O’Neill had accidentally been killed, and another five-year old girl named 
Teresa Kavanagh injured, when Crown forces opened fire on a group of six young men who, 
despite being ordered to stop, were running away from the forces’ vehicle. The loss of this 
“young innocent life” was “deplorable” according to Greenwood, but he refused to attach any 
responsibility for it to the Crown forces as long as they remained under threat of assassination 
from the IRA.160 The common practice of cutting women’s hair, familiar from the recent First 
World War when particularly French and Belgian women accused of associating with enemy 
soldiers were severely stigmatised and punished as traitors by having their heads shaved, 
was also levered as an accusation against the forces of the Crown.161 Irish Nationalist MP 
Jeremiah MacVeagh confronted the government with a long list of detailed allegations of Black 
and Tans cutting off the hair of at least eight Irish women as punishment, in addition to setting 
houses on fire, turning women out of their houses, and beating and shooting several other 
women and girls. Greenwood promised to make inquiries as to the details of these cases, but 
nevertheless vehemently rejected the “monstrous allegation that the forces of the Crown are 
making war on women and children in Ireland.”162 Nevertheless, the Daily Herald’s decisive 
assessment of the situation of women in the conflict was accurate. The paper criticised that 
while women in Ireland were “subjected to all the horrors of war, they [were] given none of the 
immunity or protection afforded to non-combatants.”163 This meant that the traditional lines of 
conflict and warfare, especially as they had most recently been experienced by millions on the 
Western Front, were quickly dissolving and becoming heavily blurred with each act of violence 
against civilians, including women and children, in Ireland. 
     This dissolution of lines of conflict and the resultant extreme violence was also borne out 
in life-writing documents. Especially within the Freikorps’ writings, the men did not hesitate to 
describe the violent acts they engaged in, especially once they had been ordered, but refused, 
to return and had thus lost the official support of the German government, leaving the men on 
the backfoot militarily, desperate, and full of bitter resentment. Published in 1930, perhaps 
with the prospect of a new regime already looming, Salomon’s bestselling narration of his 
Freikorps’ ‘last hurrah’ as it tried to recapture the city of Mitau was particularly striking in its 
unabashed brutality. Bitterly disappointed by the lack of support from the German government, 
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full of hatred for the (winning) Bolshevik enemies and their Latvian and Estonian allies, and 
aggravated by the oncoming wintery conditions, Salomon described the troops snapping and 
falling into a frenzy of wanton destructiveness:  
 
We fired into surprised crowds and rampaged and shot and beat and chased. We 
drove the Latvians like hares across the fields and set fire to every house […]. We 
threw the bodies into the wells and threw hand grenades in after them. We beat to 
death whoever fell into our hands, we burned whatever was flammable. We saw red, 
we had no human feelings left in our hearts. […] there burned our hopes, our desires, 
there burned the civic [bürgerlichen] tablets, the laws and values of the civilised 
world.164 
 
     The stress and tension under which the fighting took place, and which resulted in such 
excessive acts of lashing out against a civilian population, was exacerbated by the presence 
of a quasi-invisible enemy in both conflicts. In a guerrilla war, such as the one fought by the 
IRA, which was heavily dependent on ambushes, this was of course a defining feature. Irish 
women, though not necessarily active fighters, were often also involved in the clandestine 
operations, working as messengers, hiding weapons, or sheltering IRA men on the run, thus 
further blurring the lines between combatants and non-combatants.165 Two Black and Tans 
whose experiences were recorded in a volume of oral history, John Fails and Joseph 
Thompson, spoke of the uncertainty of identifying who or where the enemy was, especially 
due to the fact that the IRA were not in uniform and could easily blend into the civilian 
population.166 It was “quite natural”, according to Thompson, that the Black and Tans thus 
ambushed, began replying in kind.167 This led to some of the Crown forces viewing all Irish 
civilians as the potential “hidden plain clothes enemy.”168 Bernard Montgomery, later of 
Alamein, revealed a rather stark attitude as, once he had begun regarding “all civilians as 
‘Shinners’,” “it never bothered [him] a bit how many houses were burnt.”169 Lieutenant General 
Arthur Percival who served in Ireland during the conflict stressed, in a lecture he gave on 
guerrilla warfare, that “[e]very civilian should be looked upon as a potential enemy.”170 In fact, 
the extraordinarily stressful situation of being under constant threat of ambushes from a 
hidden enemy is one of the central arguments Leeson has presented as to why violence in 
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the Irish War of Independence could escalate to the degree that it did. The fact that the British 
government, anxious to uphold the pretence of a ‘policeman’s job’, often overlooked the Crown 
forces’ violent excesses only exacerbated the “climate of lawlessness which seems to have 
encouraged both political and non-political crimes.”171 Heavy drinking among the Crown forces 
often added to violent behaviour, too, and for Douglas Wimberley, stationed in Queenstown 
(now Cobh) with his Cameron Highlanders, this “was no wonder, for when off duty there was 
so little for them to do, cooped up as we were in a small camp surrounded by sentries and 
barbed wire.”172  
     In the Baltic, too, the enemy was, though not a guerrilla, often hidden and operated through 
ambushes. In Stenbock-Fermor’s first encounter with the Bolsheviks he recalled taking aim, 
“but on what? One can’t see a single person, just the flashes of the shots.” However, he denied 
being scared of the hidden enemy, but instead concerned that he would not be able to tell if 
his first shot had been on target or not. Once he had begun shooting, however, he described 
getting into a “proper shooting mood” and the formerly threatening circumstances became 
practically enjoyable. “Everyone is having loads of fun. We are lying comfortably in the snow 
behind trees and rocks and are firing on the invisible enemy.” As the enemy retreated, 
Stenbock-Fermor was triumphant: “That was damned easy […] What a lovely war! […] 
Everyone is boasting about their heroic deeds.”173 Shortly afterwards, however, as he was 
confronted with the first casualties, fear resurfaced and he described his main source of 
comfort in this situation as “only the gun,” which “calms me down, only the gun. Only the hard 
rifle butt against the cheek gives comfort. Every one of my own shots chases away the fear.”174 
Leeson’s analysis, in its general sense, of the significance of stress and constant danger from 
an invisible enemy as sources of violent excesses is thus likely applicable to both conflicts. 
     As has been mentioned before, from summer 1919 onwards, the coverage of the Baltic 
campaign increasingly shifted towards discussions of the troops refusing to return to Germany 
despite orders from Berlin and from the Entente. Like the parliamentarians, the press were 
largely occupied with discussing whether the troops had a right to refuse to return to Germany, 
given the promises of citizenship and settlement opportunities which they had been given by 
the Latvian government (a position espoused especially in more right-wing organs, but also 
recognised in more left/liberal publications); or whether they were – particularly morally – in 
the wrong, as their behaviour endangered the general population of Germany, given that the 
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Entente threatened to renew the blockade against Germany should its troops continue to 
remain in the Baltic. In trying to force the Freikorps to comply with their orders, the German 
government had made it clear that any German troops remaining in the Baltic against orders 
would lose any right to benefits back home and by November it even declared those men who 
remained to be deserters.175 Thus, through their refusal to obey orders, the Freikorps, who 
had started out serving on the margins of the German lands, positioned themselves outside 
of the imagined German community. While the right-wing press remained pro-Freikorps, the 
left/liberal press eventually came to condemn the troops for disobeying orders and not 
returning to Germany. By potentially provoking the Entente into renewing its blockade against 
Germany, the Freikorps became a threat to the body politic, putting Germans within Germany 
in danger of starvation. For the SPD’s Vorwärts, in particular, criticising the blockade of the 
Baltic Sea, and those who might cause its renewal through their obstinacy, made sense 
politically, as the government had a paramount need to appear to have the general 
population’s best interests at heart, rather than pandering to the demands of a small rogue 
minority of troops who were endangering the whole body politic. To belittle and minimise the 
Baltikumers’ campaign further, the Vorwärts disparagingly called it Radauheldentum (‘racket 
heroism’) and Baltikumabenteuer (‘Baltic adventure’), implying that it was not a serious 
endeavour, but rather a boyish adventure, foolishly undertaken at great risk to the general 
population.176 
     Towards the very end of the campaign, more explicit mention and condemnation of the 
Freikorps’ specific actions could be observed. The Independent Social Democrat Luise Zietz 
was one of the voices who described the Freikorps’ campaign as characterised by robbing, 
plundering, arson, and shooting. She disparagingly called the troops a Soldateska (a 
pejorative term for a disorderly band of soldiers), claimed that people in East and West 
Prussia, areas through which the Freikorps would need to pass on their retreat, were already 
shaking from fear, and, with much foresight, warned of the consequences of incorporating the 
returning reactionary troops into the republic’s Reichswehr.177 However, it is noteworthy that 
the Vorwärts was most vocal in condemning the Eiserne Division after their eventual retreat 
from the Baltic, in reference to violence perpetrated on actual German (namely East Prussian) 
soil, again suggesting that violence as employed by the Freikorps only became relevant and 
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condemnable in public discourse once it was directed against Germans, rather than against 
the dehumanised Bolshevik enemy.178 
     The comparatively little coverage of events in the Baltic might suggest something about 
their relative importance in the unstable and violent immediate postwar context in Germany. 
The fighting in the Baltic was geographically far away from the centre of German society and 
state power, thus posing less of an immediate risk of the violence unleashed at the periphery 
finding its way back to that centre. In Ireland, where British citizens were perpetrating violence 
against other British citizens, this circumstance can reasonably be assumed to have made the 
violence much more immediate, giving rise to much more scrutiny and discussion within British 
public discourse. What the nevertheless consistent coverage of the Freikorps’ Baltic campaign 
proves, however, is that the events were not unknown, considered entirely irrelevant, or 
purposely ignored. Instead, the men and their campaign only began to be perceived as a 
problem at the centre of power once they had disobeyed the order to return to Germany. Their 
insubordination endangered not only Germans within Germany, who stood to suffer famine if 
the Entente re-blockaded the country, but also the new German republic’s nascent efforts at 
re-establishing its international reputation as a member of the civilised nations of the world; 
thus the Freikorps, operating at the periphery, became both a literal and a conceptual danger 
to the body politic. As German politicians, unlike their British counterparts with regards to 
Ireland, did not discuss the acts of the Baltikumer to a meaningful degree in the public forum 
of parliament, it was left up to the perpetrators of violence themselves to take control of the 
narrative and publicise their own version of events, recounting their experiences and 
explaining their behaviour and motivations, which they duly did in their numerous, and 
bestselling, autobiographies. With their claims of upholding old codes of honour and defending 
Germandom, the Freikorps’ “Baltic endeavour” became central to right-wing imagination in 
interwar Germany. As Barth has argued, no other episode of the German revolutionary period 
was cloaked in as many myths, constructed from the protagonists’ life-writing, which enjoyed 
significant popularity in the 1920s and 1930s.179 
     Time of publication is a factor worthy of particular attention when considering these 
examples of life-writing, or ‘ego-documents’. Broadly, egodocuments can be said to cover “all 
texts in which an author wrote about his or her own feelings, thoughts and actions”, covering, 
in the words of the inventor of the term ‘egodocument’, Jacques Presser, “those documents 
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in which an ego intentionally or unintentionally discloses, or hides itself.”180 Michael Masuch 
has further emphasised that autobiographical writing, as a cultural practice, should really be 
considered a “public show of self-identity,” as it encompasses not simply the re-construction 
of a life story, but the conscious and deliberate construction of personal identities with all their 
“flexible, shifting and chameleonic character.”181 Thus it is paramount in the use and analysis 
of egodocuments to reflect on factors such as motives for writing, time of writing, and intended 
audiences.182 With this in mind, the radical shifts in the nature of the German state and society 
between the end of the First World War and the era of the Cold War can be shown to have 
necessitated quite different approaches to the attempt of writing the story of one’s life as a 
Freikorps fighter. A substantial amount of Freikorps memoirs was published during the time 
of the Weimar Republic. These texts in particular exhibited a vicious anger towards the 
Weimar state and government, which the Freikorps felt had ‘stabbed’ them, and the German 
nation, in the back, and cheated them out of land, honour, and their future.183 After the arduous 
and humiliating defeat of the Freikorps in the Baltic, they retreated back into the borders of 
Germany, confident that they had “fought a just fight.”184 While Meyer was an exception in 
urging the Freikorps men to now help, peacefully, to rebuild Germany,185 bitterness mixed with 
defiant pride were more characteristic. After their return, the men felt that “this government 
[did] nothing for [them]”, resulting in frustration and vague threats that if “nothing is to be done, 
we will unfasten the cannons.”186 Rudolf Mann, who had fought with Captain Ehrhardt’s 
Freikorps in various German cities and in Upper Silesia, assured himself, as much as the 
readers, in a hopeful tone that “there will be war again, when the time is ripe. […] There will 
be war again, even if it is just against Poland.” He vowed to keep his uniform, the symbol of 
his honourable, if not yet successfully completed, fight: “It has splashes of blood on it, but no 
stains.”187 
     An important function of the Freikorps writing at this time was the active effort to promptly 
pen the history of these events according to the Freikorps’ own interpretation, and thus 
monopolise the historicisation process. This was made particularly explicit in a letter from 
military author Ernst von Eisenhart-Rothe, suggesting that Franz von Epp, involved, as 
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Chapter 1 explored, in the crushing of the Munich Councils’ Republic, write a history of the 
German Freikorps, to be published by the Deutscher National-Verlag (‘German Nationalist 
Publishers’). Such a work, emphasised Eisenhart-Rothe, “would have to deliver a glorification 
of these last remnants of the old Army.”188 Epp evidently accepted the request. His letter to 
Eisenhart-Rothe, accompanying his finished treatise on the Freikorps, is especially revealing, 
as in it Epp cautioned that any writing on this topic was currently a “delicate” matter, “because 
it cannot be extricated from being interlocked with the political conditions which are in force 
still.” Therefore he had striven to, in his own words, “fashion the examination as little 
aggressively as possible, without abusing the historical truth, as I view it.”189 The multiple 
editions of many of the Freikorps memoirs, published throughout the interwar period, and print 
runs in the thousands speak to their popularity and wide readership, as evidently large parts 
of the reading public shared, or were happy to accept, the Freikorps’ interpretations of the 
“historical truth.” 
     A different picture emerged looking at the, also very numerous, Freikorps memoirs 
published during the era of the National Socialist dictatorship. To contemporary readers 
between 1933 and 1945, it could not but appear that the Freikorps had been the vanguard of 
the new regime. This circumstance allowed for an overwhelming language of glorification, 
triumphalism, and self-righteousness to fill the pages of the memoirs. The 1936 second edition 
of Rüdiger von der Goltz’ memoir, now emphasising his role as a “political general” in the title, 
serves as a prime example of the shifting emphases set in relation to time and context of 
publication. It was considerably shorter, giving less military and political detail, in order to give 
a more comprehensive “clear picture of the former time.”190 With added chapters on 
“Romanticism and Leadership”, and on “The Stab in the Back”, the new edition presented itself 
fully in line with the new regime and Goltz explicitly bestowed the title of “Pioneers 
[Vorkämpfer] of the Third Reich” on the Freikorps.191 He even insisted that, as of 30 January 
1933, the front soldiers of the First World War had achieved their victory after all, and ended 
the book by imploring readers to heed the call of the national anthem, “Deutschland über 
alles.”192 Goltz added that a large part of the book was consciously “political”, and that now, 
“after the Machtergreifung by Adolf Hitler”, he could openly say what he previously could not.193 
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Noticeably, if unsurprisingly, the memoirs published during the Nazi era exhibited more, and 
more explicit, anti-Semitism. Where Goltz, in 1920, identified the Freikorps’ enemy as 
“Bolshevism, led by international capital,” this changed in the 1936 edition to “Bolshevism, led 
by international Jewry.”194 Easily recognisable Nazi jargon was used frequently, making 
reference to “sub-humans” and “Jewish-Bolshevist commissars” with “bulging negro lips and 
devilish eyes.”195 Whether relevant to the events or not, the real or assumed Jewishness of 
the enemy was compulsively highlighted, and Jews characterised as “dirty”, while the Yiddish 
language was rendered in mocking pseudo-phonetic script.196 
     The memoirs of Gerhard Rossbach, too, contained anti-Semitic prejudice, such as the 
following instance: as a collective punishment, the population of a Baltic village was made to 
whip cream for the entire 1,500 troops, and Rossbach, congratulating himself on his humorous 
approach to martial law, described how the Jewish population of the village whipped the cream 
particularly assiduously, because, as opposed to fines, this punishment saved them money. 
“We were particularly amused by the foamy vestiges left in their beards and on their caftans,” 
Rossbach mockingly assessed the scene.197 What is remarkable about this episode, however, 
is that Rossbach’s memoirs were published in 1950, thus highlighting the deep 
embeddedness of anti-Semitism within the psyche of the author. Writing Freikorps memoirs 
after the collapse of the ‘Third Reich’, when the association with the genocidal, totalitarian 
Hitler regime was no longer respectable or acceptable, posed new challenges. As a result 
(though partly also as a result of the natural passing of time), vastly fewer publications of this 
kind exist. Rossbach’s memoirs, sub-headed “Memories and Avowals”, were a transparent 
effort at redeeming himself and at writing against the judgement he could sense society 
passing on him. He presented himself as a reformed man and appealed to contemporary 
youth, in particular, to be wary of the dangers of their “own passions” and disavow “parochial 
nationalism and the worn phrases of class hatred”198 Waldemar Pabst, leader of a notorious 
Berlin-based Freikorps in the early interwar period, on the other hand, presented himself much 
more confidently in an interview he gave to the news magazine Der Spiegel in 1962. He 
defiantly stood by his decision to arrest Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht in January 1919 
but refused to discuss whether he had ordered their summary execution. Instead, he 
emphasised that what really mattered about the whole affair was the necessity to stop their 
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activities. He was even confident enough to jokingly reassure the interviewer, “you know, I 
wasn’t quite as bloodthirsty as you think.”199 However, advice given to Pabst by a lawyer prior 
to the interview also stressed the importance of insisting on the “contemporary 
circumstances,” such as the lack of a functioning police service and judicature, and the general 
“confusion of those times” in an effort to deflect blame.200 
     The British case presents the opposite. Very few life-writing or oral history sources exist 
from members of the Crown forces engaged in fighting in Ireland between 1919 and 1921, 
and virtually none were left behind by members of the paramilitary ‘Black and Tans’ or Auxiliary 
Division.201 This is perhaps unsurprising. Although both bodies of fighters, the Baltikumer and 
the Crown forces in Ireland, were on the ‘losing side’, meaning they were forced to retreat 
from the disputed areas without securing them for their respective causes, the public spheres 
into which the men returned had established very different kinds of discourses about the two 
conflicts during this time. As illustrated above, the Freikorps’ extreme violence in the Baltic 
areas was hardly ever a topic of conversation in parliament, and when violence was spoken 
of in the context of the ongoing conflict in the East, it was most often done to condemn 
Bolsheviks and various different Eastern European nationalists of ‘uncivilised’ acts of violence. 
The Crown forces’ behaviour in Ireland, on the other hand, was a constant topic of scrutiny 
and contention in the British press and parliament. From around early 1920, almost daily 
questions were put in the Commons about the conduct of British forces in Ireland, often 
accompanied by harrowing accounts of the acts which the soldiers, paramilitaries, or 
policemen were being accused of. As Bennett has noted, by 1921 debates in the House of 
Commons had “fallen into a stereotyped pattern, with the recital of atrocities committed by the 
Crown Forces, particularly by Black and Tans and the Auxiliaries, on one side, and 
denunciation of the ‘murder gang’ [the IRA, A.K.] on the other.”202 The country’s press, as 
shown above, was equally vocal about the conflict, and, the longer it carried on, a significant 
portion of press opinion became increasingly hostile towards the actions of government forces. 
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Following the end of the conflict and the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in December 1921, 
it was thus neither possible, nor desirable, for the men who had fought and lost this war to 
defend their actions in their own, alternative accounts of events, putting themselves at risk of 
condemnation within a public discourse which, if not explicitly hostile, had constructed the 
men’s conduct as a shameful blot on the British record. While in postwar Germany there 
existed a large enough audience eager to read the Freikorps’ ‘exciting’ and violent accounts 
which appeared to be carrying on the unjustly lost world war, in Britain the Great War had 
indeed ended in November 1918, and ended in victory, producing an aversion to publicly 
discuss British violence and instead an emphasis on the importance of maintaining ‘law and 
order’, justice, and civilisation. 
     Thus, the outbreaks of violence on the Irish and Baltic periphery, respectively, carried with 
them a threat to the domestic political sphere. Members of the German Freikorps, upon their 
return and having been officially disbanded in the summer of 1920, often went underground 
and continued to fight the republic they hated as terrorists, assassinating high-profile 
politicians like Walther Rathenau (see Chapter 1) and attempting coups, thus quite literally 
endangering the very state which had sponsored their existence in the first place. In Britain, 
the threat which the existence of the paramilitary bodies posed to the state was less of a direct 
physical one, but a conceptual one, as the government increasingly lost control over their 
forces in Ireland. T.P. O’Connor, who as a Liverpool MP represented a large Irish constituency, 
vividly gave voice to this dynamic, when he accused the government of having raised a 
“Frankenstein” in its Irish policy.203 Kenworthy, however, also raised the spectre of the direct 
threat. Acknowledging that there was a “residue in every army after a war which is not really 
suitable for civilian life”, the fear he expressed was specifically in regard to “your White Guard 
in Ireland”, who were “allowed to exercise lynch law in Ireland.” He voiced his concern when 
asking, “if they are allowed to shoot men out of hand on suspicion […] what will they do in 
England to-morrow?”204 The perpetration of ‘uncivilised’ acts of violence by Crown forces so 
near the centre of British power thus intensely threatened British efforts at constructing the 
country as an honourable, civilised, and “peaceable kingdom”, an image which, according to 
Lawrence, had begun to emerge forcefully after the mass experience of extreme violence 
during the First World War.205  
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What this chapter on British and German reactions to violent paramilitary conflicts in the 
peripheral regions of Ireland and the Baltic has shown, is that in both cases violence itself was 
considered, by those involved in public discourse in parliament and the press, an aberration 
from a civilisationary standard. This standard, as well as whose violence was considered an 
aberration, however, varied according to the individual speakers’ perceptions of in-groups and 
out-groups. The practice of violence demarcated the different groups and could therefore 
constitute both a feature of a political, cultural, social, geographical, or racial ‘us’, or it could 
be the very behaviour that was deemed deviant in the ‘other’. German Defence Minister 
Gustav Noske’s rare admission that “unfortunately improprieties by German soldiers cannot 
be denied” and “yes, if German soldiers are looting – with all allegiance to German blood and 
German flesh abroad, – improprieties and pillaging will not be covered up by the government,” 
was rather out of character.206 More often than not, the notion of civilisation was invoked to 
denounce Germany’s enemies. Traub, for example, picked out French president Georges 
Clemenceau’s notorious comment that there were “20 million too many Germans” and called 
it a great dishonour that a “man of a civilised nation” would dare say such a thing.207 Most 
glaringly, of course, Bolshevik violence was marked out as an uncivilised “fight of annihilation 
against the last remains of Baltic Germandom.” The General Commissioner for the Baltic 
Lands (Generalbevollmächtigter), August Winnig, bluntly stated that “if I am going to mourn 
the loss of human life there, I am first and foremost going to mourn the lives of our slain 
compatriots [Volksgenossen].”208 Violence by German paramilitaries therefore attracted 
comparatively little attention in public discourse, while Bolshevik violence was determinedly 
constructed as uncivilised.  
     While in Britain, too, the violence perpetrated by the state’s enemy, the IRA, “who operate 
by means which would disgrace the Hottentot of the Bush,” was demarcated as savage and 
aberrant from civilisation, there was a much stronger case made by political representatives 
and commentators in the national press that the British state was undermining its own claim 
to be the prime representative of civilisation in the world by stooping to the same low level as 
its enemies.209 This argument was made mostly from within the opposition, offering especially 
the Asquithian wing of opposition Liberals a daily opportunity to attack Lloyd George’s 
government, but importantly it also came from within the governing parties themselves, 
indicating that the marker of national identity which was at stake here transcended party 
 
206 Verhandlungen, 93. Sitzung, 08.10.1919, p. 2919. 
207 Verhandlungen, 94. Sitzung, 09.10.1919, p. 2973. 
208 Verhandlungen, 46. Sitzung, 04.07.1919, p. 1298. 
209 George Curzon, Earl Curzon of Kedlestone, HL, 02.11.1920, vol. 42, c. 165. 
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political considerations. It is thus no surprise that the ‘Black and Tans’ subsequently morphed 
into a byword in parliament for indiscipline and wanton destruction, as well as for failed 
government policies of attempted pacification. As has been noted by Dolan, in 1933 one MP 
used it to insult an opponent in a debate on housing, accusing him of having been associated 
with the Black and Tans and therefore knowing more about “burning down houses than [about] 
constructing them.”210 The term was also used in reference to foreign conflicts involving British 
forces, where the Black and Tans were invoked as a deterring lesson in how not to carry out 
counterinsurgency, for example in post-1945 Germany, Palestine, Cyprus, Congo, and 
Northern Ireland.211 
     More, and more consistent, coverage of events in Ireland in British public discourse as 
compared to coverage within Germany of the Freikorps’ campaign in the Baltic indicates that 
Ireland was more present in public discourse, and therefore, perhaps, in the public 
consciousness of Great Britain, than events in the Baltic seem to have been in Germany. 
Where German papers, much like the parliamentary discourse, lacked any actual debate of 
the specific violence and means employed by the Freikorps fighters at the time of the 
campaign, the national discourse instead became retroactively dominated by the actors 
themselves and their life-writing accounts. In the British context, however, there was more 
news coverage and indeed more explicit and contentious debate and eventual condemnation 
of the government’s means of fighting the Irish insurrection at the time of the conflict in Ireland 
itself. British public discourse notably contained strong critical voices, which explicitly 
articulated concerns about the consequences, both domestically and internationally, of the 
violence thus unleashed. There was, however, virtually no retrospective life-writing by the 
perpetrators of the violence. It appears that the verdict on their actions had already been 
spoken in public discourse within the press and parliament, removing from the agents of this 
violence the opportunity to come into this discourse retroactively to explain or to redeem 
themselves.  
     Both paramilitary bodies’ violence endangered their countries’ self-image in different ways. 
They highlighted the complicated relationship between violence and civilisation, which 
continuously posed the question within the public discourses of both nations as to when the 
use of violence could become a danger to a nation’s desire to define itself as civilised and thus 
 
210 HC, 28.02.1933, vol. 275, c. 273. See also Anne Dolan, “British Culture of Paramilitary Violence”, p. 
201. 
211 See HC,18.07.1944, vol. 402, c. 136; HC, 31.07.1946, vol. 426, c. 1017; HC, 15.07.1957, vol. 573, 
c. 824; HL, 12.11.1958, vol. 212, c. 412; HC, 07.02.1963, vol. 671, c. 682; HC, 08.06.1971, vol. 818, c. 
876. 
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what level of violence was acceptable in the defence of this civilisation. This raised questions 
about how representative of the nation, meaning the ‘imagined community’ which adheres to 
certain norms, these (for the most part) officially condoned agents of violence were.212 In the 
immediate postwar context, the Social Democratic government of the young German republic 
had to actively try to struggle its way back into the circle of civilised European nations, in order 
to rebuild the country’s international reputation and be recognised again as a partner in the 
international community. Not much attention was therefore paid to the peripheral conflict in 
the Baltic beyond the international effort to contain Bolshevism in which the Freikorps were 
initially asked to become involved. Later, as the men disobeyed orders to return to Germany, 
they became a substantial threat to the German body politic by potentially provoking a 
renewed blockade. However, while the government condemned the troops’ disobedience, the 
Freikorps themselves managed to maintain and particularly to resurrect their positive image 
in a new context, after the triumph of Nazism in 1933, painting themselves as its vanguard 
and representative of the movement’s ideals. However, even before 1933, the highly divided 
nature of the Weimar political scene had allowed them to continue to present their activities in 
the Baltic in a positive manner and find enough of a willing audience for their accounts.  
     Notably, postwar Britain and Germany offered very different audiences for the discourses 
analysed here. The need to publicly justify political decisions was novel in the newly 
democratised Weimar Republic, which lacked significant public support and whose political 
sphere was and remained bitterly divided. Britain, on the other hand, had a long-established 
tradition of a critical public sphere in which political decisions regularly were subjected to 
controversial debate. In this context, the Black and Tans had been perceived to undermine 
British values and ideals of fairness and justice, and thus endanger a national self-image of 
Britain as the highest example of civilisation and a fundamentally ‘peaceable kingdom’. The 
notable lack of life-writing by former Black and Tans indicates that they were largely 
considered to have exceeded the boundaries of violence acceptable by state-sponsored 
agents and were thus no longer considered representative of the accepted norms of society. 
As a result, it appears that the men chose to largely remain silent on their experiences. 
     However, through an analysis of the available life-writing sources, this chapter has also 
been able to reveal differences in the motivations for joining paramilitary bodies, with 
economic factors being primarily important for the Black and Tans, while the Freikorps were 
driven by a more complex mixture of pay, the promise of land, idealistic-spiritual love of the 
 
212 Of course, in the case of the Freikorps, even this notion changed over the course of the Baltic 
campaign; they begun the campaign as a state-sponsored body, but after disobeying the order to retreat 
they were no longer state-endorsed agents of violence. 
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fatherland, and post-war disorientation.213 The levels of violence depicted in the life-writing 
displayed some strong discrepancies, as did the explicitness of the violence and its effects. 
While the British Crown forces in Ireland most often only related violence as something they 
were aware of but not actively involved in perpetrating themselves, the Freikorps frequently 
appeared to relish the frenzy of the fight, the adrenaline rush, the adventure, and witnessing 
the demise of the enemy. An aspect common to both the Anglo-Irish War and the Freikorps’ 
Baltic campaign, was their spatial removedness on the periphery of the metropole. In both 
conflicts, more or less overt colonial aspects played into the way they were carried out and 
indeed the language used to discuss them. In the British case, there was an explicit fear of 
surrendering Ireland to the independence fighters, as it had the potential to become the first 
domino in a chain of global imperial collapse for the British Empire. The Baltic played a 
prominent part in the colonial imagination of Germans whose former overseas empire had just 
been dismantled and who could now only attempt to lean on areas to the East which had a 
long history of Germandom as potential colonial space for settlement and cultural influence. 
The relative spatial remove of these areas has been shown here to have been significant in 
facilitating the ‘othering’ of victims as not only geographically, but also culturally and racially 
removed from the perpetrators, allowing for excesses of violence much less imaginable at the 
centre of the metropole. This theme in particular will be explored further in Chapter 3. 
 
213 While Duff’s autobiography is the only known text of its kind, available oral history interviews, as 
cited above, as well as an analysis of recruitment materials for the RIC point towards the same 
conclusions regarding motivations for joining. See for example Brewer, Royal Irish Constabulary; Lowe, 




THE HEART OF DARKNESS. VIOLENCE AND RACE IN THE COLONIAL SPHERE AND 
IN THE METROPOLE. 
In Joseph Conrad’s 1899 novel The Heart of Darkness, the European protagonist finds himself 
on the river Congo venturing deeper and deeper into what was considered the ‘heart of 
darkness’, areas in central Africa that had been little explored by Europeans seeking to exploit 
the land’s riches. In Conrad’s novel, the people native to the Congo riverbanks form a 
mysteriously omnipresent yet invisible adversary to the intruding Europeans. Nature itself 
appears impenetrable and hostile, and danger lurks, unseen yet constantly watching, along 
the river route, ready to ambush the Europeans, exposed on their boat, at any moment.1 This 
nameless, disembodied enemy, working from the cover of the jungle, therefore seems to justify 
the use of extraordinary brutality against him, outside of the laws of warfare applicable to 
conflicts between ‘civilised’, European enemies. Conrad describes and alludes to at least 
some of the brutality employed in the ivory trade to extract labour out of the abused local 
population.2 The greed and inhumanity brought to the Congo in the European pursuit of ivory 
of course ultimately drives the fabled ivory trader Kurtz to madness, and he finally dies 
spluttering his famous last words, “The horror! The horror!”3 Tied up in this short novel are 
many of the themes which this chapter will also be addressing and working with. In particular, 
the notion of an unseen, yet highly ‘orientalised’4 and de-humanised enemy plays a significant 
role; as does the state of seeing or not-seeing more generally. In the heart of the Congo jungle, 
the danger lay in not being able to see the enemy, while he could see and ambush those 
exposed on the riverboat; whereas in administering Mandatory Iraq, the British used the 
practically ‘all-seeing’ capacity of aeroplanes to their advantage, soaring high above their 
mostly defenceless enemies on the ground. This chapter, however, also takes Conrad’s title 
more liberally; it is concerned more generally with interactions of race and violence, both in 
the third, outermost circle, the colonial periphery (the ‘heart of darkness’, as it were), as well 
as examining the implications and reactions when ‘darkness’, in the shape of colonial soldiers 
or sailors, appeared in the heart of the metropole, namely during the French occupation of the 
Rhineland between 1919-1923, and during the so-called ‘race riots’ in numerous British port 
cities in 1919. 
 
1 Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness and the complete Congo Diaries (London, 2009), first published 
1899, p. 46. 
2 Ibid., pp. 18, 51, 61. 
3 Ibid., p. 76. 
4 Cf. Said, Orientalism, as discussed in Introduction. 
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     Connected to the theme of seeing and not seeing, the imaginary plays a significant role 
throughout the chapter. The British imaginary of what signified ‘Arabia’ informed their actions 
there; the lost, but unceasingly imagined, German colonial possessions, mainly in East and 
South-West Africa and the South Pacific, shaped interwar German discourses about its past 
conduct and its future role, as well as attitudes towards the Allies; connected was also the 
non-existent but imagined German air force which took up much space in German public 
discourse and consciousness, and was in fact pursued clandestinely in the interwar era; 
imagined acts of brutal violence perpetrated by French colonial soldiers in the Rhineland made 
up a significant portion of the viciously racist propaganda campaign directed against the 
occupation. Besides the imaginary, another recurring theme of this chapter will be the victims 
of different kinds of violence, and considerations about who the victims were, who was talked 
about, and who was named and given an identity in any given circumstance. In this context, 
the instrumentalisation for political ends of human beings, be they the victims of aerial bombing 
or colonial soldiers or sailors who found themselves in the midst of European societies, 
constitutes another common theme. Finally, the connections and interactions between race 
and gender, and especially between race and sex, manifesting themselves in a profound fear 
of miscegenation, make up another very significant shared theme. 
     A series of case studies have been chosen for this chapter. Firstly, the chapter will be 
concerned with debates over the appropriate level and kind of violence to be used by British 
forces in their administration of Iraq (called ‘Mesopotamia’ until 1921)5 following the end of the 
First World War; aerial bombing will be a particular focus. From there, the chapter will move 
on to German discourses over the colonial possessions which Germany had been stripped of 
under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. The former colonies and the insistence on 
Germany’s status as a colonial power played an important and powerful role in German 
interwar society and public discourse. In its second section, the chapter will examine the 
interaction of race and violence in the domestic sphere. It will focus on the French occupation 
of the Rhineland after the First World War, which included French colonial soldiers among the 
occupying forces, and on the so-called ‘race riots’ which took place across several British port 





5 The region, historically known as Mesopotamia, became known as Mandatory Iraq in 1921. In common 
parlance, the term ‘Mesopotamia’ continued to be in widespread use. Here, the modern-day name ‘Iraq’ 
will be used, unless citing primary material. 
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3.1 LOST COLONIES, NEW MANDATES. 
3.1.1 The British Mandate in Iraq. 
“It’s an amazingly relentless and terrible thing, war from the air.”6 
- Gertrude Bell 
 
Douglas Duff, the Black and Tan introduced in Chapter 2, was one of many former Black and 
Tans and Auxiliaries who, upon finding himself out of a job as a result of the signing of the 
Anglo-Irish treaty in December 1921, chose to embark on yet another paramilitary assignment. 
After serious rioting had broken out in Jaffa in May 1921, and elsewhere in Mandatory 
Palestine, the then Secretary of State for the Colonies, Winston Churchill, was driven to 
reconsider the idea of a “quasi-military defence force” for the region. Conveniently, General 
Tudor, who had previously created the Auxiliary Division of the RIC in Ireland, suggested to 
Churchill to make use of the Black and Tans and Auxiliaries who, by the end of 1921, were no 
longer needed in Ireland, to help police Palestine. Thus, members of the Black and Tans and 
of the Auxiliaries were actively recruited for service in Palestine and General Tudor became 
the commander of the new gendarmerie.7 In this way, the government made use of the relative 
abundance, in the immediate aftermath of the war, of men with military training who were 
willing, given the precarious economic situation and employment prospects at home, to 
continue their careers of violence in the postwar period. The majority of Duff’s “saga of a 
modern free-companion” is dedicated to relating his time spent with the British gendarmerie 
in Palestine. Recognising the strategic importance of the Middle East, Duff framed his reasons 
for joining the British gendarmerie in Palestine as the need to maintain “our Imperial prestige” 
and to protect Egypt and India from spreading unrest.8 Early on, Duff met several fellow 
recruits and a commander he recognised from Ireland.9 Their reputation, Duff noted, had 
preceded them, and it had in fact been spread deliberately: “the Arabs had heard about us 
and knew what manner of men we were; there had been a great deal of judicious propaganda 
from District Officers, telling them what our reputation had been in Ireland.”10 
     Expanding its analysis of perceptions of political violence to this third, outermost circle, the 
colonial sphere, is particularly important for this thesis, as it is in this geographic realm that 
the inclusion of Britain, or the Empire, in this comparison truly becomes justified against the 
 
6 Quoted in Jafna L. Cox, “A splendid training ground: The importance to the Royal Air Force of its role 
in Iraq, 1919-32”, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 13/2 (1985), p. 168. 
7 Jeffery, British Army and the Crisis of Empire, pp. 128-129. 
8 Duff, Sword for Hire, p. 138. 
9 Ibid., pp. 94-95. 
10 Ibid., pp. 111-112. 
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historiographic trends of excluding British experiences from histories of European post-1918 
political violence. Most of the violence pertaining to interwar Britain took place within the 
peripheral and colonial spheres, and while the scene of violence may not have been 
‘European’, the perpetrators and the public discourses into which it was received, were, 
making their inclusion in this study imperative. It has been estimated that at the height of 
nineteenth-century British imperialism, between 1837 and 1901, “at least 228 known armed 
conflicts took place across the British Empire.” Some were accompanied by extraordinary 
levels of violence, such as the suppression of the so-called ‘Indian mutiny’ of 1857, which may 
have caused up to 100,000 deaths.11 By the post-First World War period, the use of violence 
to quell uprisings and maintain power in colonial spaces had thus been a long-standing feature 
of British colonial rule, whether in India in 1857, or in Jamaica in 1865. In 1867, Frederic 
Harrison, one of the members of the Jamaica Committee, which condemned the brutal 
reprisals, resulting in the deaths of over 400 Jamaicans, taken by Governor Eyre against the 
1865 uprising at Morant Bay, presciently voiced his concern that “[w]hat is done in a colony 
today may be done in Ireland tomorrow, and in England hereafter.”12 This remark makes the 
connections between different geographic theatres of violence explicit. The recruitment of 
many paramilitaries previously engaged in Ireland into the British Gendarmerie in Palestine in 
order to assist in policing yet another hostile population for the Empire, thus embodies a mirror-
inverted version of Harrison’s warning and reflects the structure which this thesis also takes, 
moving from the domestic sphere (Chapter 1), through the peripheral (Chapter 2), to the 
colonial (Chapter 3). 
     This case study will focus on yet another example of the use of violence within the 
outermost circle, the colonial periphery, namely the use of air power in Mandatory Iraq. First, 
however, a brief excursion may help explain why this example of the use of violent action in a 
mandated area has been chosen. Perhaps the single most prominent and controversial case 
of colonial violence in the interwar era was the massacre of unarmed Indian civilians at 
Jallianwala Bagh in Amritsar on 13 April 1919. Brigadier-General Reginald Dyer ordered his 
troops to open fire on a large crowd of over 20,000 people, who had gathered in a large open 
park area surrounded by walls. After about ten minutes of firing, at least 379 people were dead 
 
11 Philip Dwyer and Amanda Nettelbeck (eds.), Violence, Colonialism and Empire in the Modern World 
(Cham, 2018), pp. 5, 8. 
12 Quoted in J. Joseph Miller, “Chairing the Jamaica Committee: J.S. Mill and the Limits of Colonial 
Authority”, in Bart Schultz and Georgios Varouxakis (eds.), Utilitarianism and Empire (Lanham, MD, 
2005), pp. 155-178, here p. 160. 
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and many hundreds more were injured.13 The massacre sparked a strong reaction and gained 
notoriety in both India and Britain, with contemporaries divided between those who 
condemned General Dyer for what he had done and those who defended him and his actions. 
Dyer’s defenders agreed with his own line of defence that shooting into the crowd of people 
had been “[his] duty – [his] horrible, dirty duty.”14 Those condemning him did so variously for 
tarnishing the reputation and good name of the British and their Empire in front of the entire 
world,15 or chose to single him and the massacre out as, in the well-known words of War 
Secretary Winston Churchill, “an extraordinary event, a monstrous event, an event which 
stands in singular and sinister isolation.”16 Recent scholarship, however, has argued that the 
massacre ought to be viewed no longer as standing in “sinister isolation”, but rather as 
symptomatic of British colonial rule in India, which, in Kim Wagner’s severe yet convincing 
analysis, had rested on “the spectacle of colonial violence” at least since the uprising of 1857.17 
By characterising the events at Amritsar as standing in “singular and sinister isolation”, the 
massacre could too easily be ‘explained away’ by laying all the blame on one aberrant 
individual and consciously constructing the action as an exception to the otherwise civilised 
and benevolent practice of British colonial rule in India.  
     The use of air power in Iraq, however, was quite different. Rather than standing in “singular 
and sinister isolation”, as Dyer’s actions at Amritsar were constructed to have been, air control 
was on its way to becoming official policy by about 1921, when the Cairo Conference approved 
a proposed air control scheme to administer Mandatory Iraq with the help of aircraft.18 
Arguments can certainly be made about the qualitative differences between shooting unarmed 
civilians at point blank, as happened in Amritsar;19 and bombing them, their villages and 
livestock from the air, as in Iraq. However, it should prove interesting to investigate how 
bombing from the air was framed and became legitimised as official policy, as Iraq was one of 
 
13 Mark Doyle, “Massacre by the Book: Amritsar and the Rules of Public-Order Policing in Britain and 
India”, Britain and the World, 4/2 (2011), p. 247. Indian estimates of deaths have always been much 
higher, up to 1,500. A number of between 500-600 deaths appears to be plausible. See Helen Fein, 
Imperial Crime and Punishment. The Massacre at Jallianwala Bagh and British Judgment, 1919-1920 
(Honolulu, 1977), p. 20. 
14 Dyer cited in the Daily Mail, 04.05.1920, quoted in Derek Sayer, “British Reaction to the Amritsar 
Massacre 1919-1920”, Past & Present, 131 (1991), p. 134. 
15 Colonel Wedgewood, HC, 22.12.1919, vol. 123, cc. 1230-1233. 
16 HC, 08.07.1920, vol. 131, c. 1725. 
17 Kim A. Wagner, “’Calculated to strike terror’: The Amritsar Massacre and the Spectacle of Colonial 
Violence”, Past & Present, 233 (2016), pp. 185-225. See also most recently Kim A. Wagner, Amritsar 
1919. An Empire of Fear & the Making of a Massacre (New Haven and London, 2019). 
18 David E. Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force, 1919–1939 (Manchester, 
1990), pp.25-26. 
19 Note that in the aftermath of the massacre, under martial law, aerial bombing was also used against 
rioters in some areas of the Punjab. See HC, 28.05.1919, vol. 116, cc. 1183-1184. 
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the first places where air power was used consistently, and – from a British perspective – 
successfully to quell revolt in 1920, establishing a precedent for its further use. Following the 
1920 revolt, Iraq thus became the testing ground for employing air policing and air control 
more widely as a means to control a large area, peripheral to the Empire, at a reduced cost to 
the British taxpayer.20 
     At the end of the First World War, in November 1918, British troops were deployed in 
France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, the Ottoman Empire, and Russia, as well 
as to the British Imperial garrisons. In 1920, in addition, British troops were also part of the 
Army of the Rhine, were deployed to the Polish Plebiscite Area and Danzig, to France and 
Flanders, and to the Army of the Black Sea. Additionally, as the last chapter has illustrated, 
British troops were needed in Ireland, and, as chapter one has shown, they were also 
deployed to settle industrial unrest within Britain.21 Though the British Empire had thus 
reached its “apogee,” the War Office’s priorities, operating under the immediate impression of 
the most costly war in history, in human as well as in economic terms, were retrenchment, 
demobilisation, and decreasing the running cost of its military commitments across the world.22 
The use of air power, by means of the nascent Royal Air Force, was one of the central ways 
which its proponents, most famously Winston Churchill, advocated as a new and economical 
form of controlling peripheral space in the colonies and newly acquired League of Nations 
Mandates, such as Palestine and Iraq.  
     Along the Lower Euphrates, a revolt against the British administration, protesting British 
taxation of the locals and the occupiers’ heavy-handed approach, broke out in early July 1920. 
The rebellion quickly grew, spreading towards the Upper Euphrates and the area around 
Baghdad, and comprising up to 131,000 armed Arab rebels and tribesmen, which the British 
army struggled until February 1921 to control.23 Trying to put down the rebellion came at a 
large price to the British taxpayer, and cost the lives of British (and Indian) troops, both of 
which made the continued engagement of British and Empire forces in Iraq highly unpopular 
in Britain.24 The press, across most of the political spectrum, brought up time and again the 
 
20 Omissi defines ‘air policing’ as “the use of aircraft to uphold the internal security of a state”, and ‘air 
control’ as the Air Ministry assuming “responsibility for the defence of any particular regions of the 
Empire”, as occurred in Palestine, Iraq, Transjordan, and Aden. ‘Air power’ covers both terms. See 
Omissi, Air Power, p. XV. 
21 Keith Jeffery, “Sir Henry Wilson and the defence of the British Empire, 1918-22”, The Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History, 5/3 (1977), p. 271. 
22 Jeffery, British Army and the Crisis of Empire, p. 1, 11-12. 
23 Toby Dodge, Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation-Building and a History Denied (New York, 2003), 
pp. x, 8-9. 
24 Ibid., p. x. 
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issue of the financial burden of holding and administering Iraq with British forces, often 
questioning whether the undertaking was worth the cost and effort. The Times showed little 
enthusiasm or optimism, complaining that “[w]e shall never be able to hold Mesopotamia with 
smaller forces than are now concentrated. We shall never escape an annual toll of 
£50,000,000 for the cost of garrisoning Mesopotamia so long as the present madness prevails. 
Is it worth while [sic!] to make such sacrifices for three million Arabs, who do not want us and 
who desire to be entrusted with the control of their own affairs?”25 Before the Iraqi revolt broke 
out in July, the cost of maintaining British control of Iraq had already been a much debated 
topic in the House of Commons, and the possibility of using air power for “looking after that 
country” was concretely put to the Air Ministry for consideration.26 In the House of Lords, the 
Foreign Secretary voiced similar hopes that the Royal Air Force could be used to bring down 
the number of Iraqi garrisons and the associated costs.27 With the revolt showing no signs of 
abating, many papers joined the chorus deploring the government’s misguided spending 
priorities in Iraq, and suggesting instead that the money ought to be spent at home. The Daily 
Express lamented that while fighting the rebellion in Iraq cost the British state ”fifty millions a 
year”, “hospitals [in Britain] are bankrupt, and railway fares are to be increased to 2d. a mile.”28 
Similarly, the Daily Mail also railed against the £50,000,000 being spent annually on 
maintaining “Persia” and “Mesopotamia”, emphatically arguing that “the money is wanted 
here.” It appeared to advocate leaving Iraq to its own devices, dismissing arguments that the 
region was integral to the safety of British India and emphasising the futility of “trying to force 
our ideas of progress upon people who do not want to know anything about such ideas.” 
Instead, the paper warned, the overspending in the Middle East would lead to a “financial 
collapse” in the UK and bring about unemployment and social and political unrest.29  
     On the other hand, there were those voices that urged the British government to fully 
embrace its engagement in Iraq. As National Party (later Conservative) MP, and former World 
War soldier, Henry Page Croft reminded readers of the Morning Post, “the British Empire [had] 
been offered, and [had] accepted, a mandate for this territory.” Thus, he argued, the 
government should live up to its responsibility to administer the area appropriately.30 However, 
ulterior motives also soon emerged in the debate. Page Croft was quick to point out that 
holding Iraq was not solely an act of moral responsibility in accordance with the mandate, but 
 
25 “The War in Mesopotamia”, Times, 21.08.1920, p. 11. 
26 John Davidson, HC, 22.03.1920, vol. 127, c. 93. 
27 Earl Curzon of Kedleston, HL, 25.06.1920, vol. 40, c. 884. 
28 “Policy or Drift?”, Daily Express, 19.07.1920, p. 4. 
29 “The Money is Wanted here”, Daily Mail, 03.08.1920, p. 4. 
30 “Great Britain and Mesopotamia”, Morning Post, 28.08.1920, p. 3. 
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also held significant economic potential for Britain. Cotton, corn, and, above all, oil were the 
two main factors which drew the British, along with the French (who administered their Syrian 
Mandate) and the Americans into the area. Page Croft was completely open about the 
financial and commercial attractiveness of Iraq for the British economy. He was convinced that 
Middle Eastern oil, which was then believed to be “capable of supplying the total needs of the 
British Empire”, was worth even the “staggering” cost of maintaining Iraq with British troops: 
“in oil alone, if the estimates are correct, Mesopotamia should pay its way.”31 Oil also featured 
prominently in many other assessments of the situation in Iraq and Britain’s interests in the 
region. The Scotsman focussed on the American government’s eagerness to secure “their oil 
supply […] before the entire known oil fields of the world are apportioned among the nations”, 
implying the need for Britain to take part in this apportioning game so as to not miss out.32 The 
Times, questioning again Britain’s Middle Eastern policy, insinuated that the true reason 
behind the government’s continued commitment of troops and money to the area was “the 
influence of oil.”33 On the other hand, the Guardian, once again condemning the high 
expenditure in Iraq, questioned whether even the amount of oil which Britain stood to gain 
from the area could ever be worth the money spent there.34 The Times voiced the same 
concern, arguing that “[a]ll the oil in Asia could not compensate us for the sacrifice we have 
made, the thousands of lives destroyed, and the hundreds of millions of pounds poured into 
that repellent region.”35 
     In the face of this sustained, vehement criticism of the British government’s policy in the 
Middle East and the considerable associated costs, the RAF’s contribution to the successful 
quelling of the revolt late in 1920, was highly significant, as it indicated a new way forward 
towards administering the area at a reduced cost. Even though The Times complained in 
August 1920 that aircraft and armoured-cars were proving “entirely unable to cope with the 
hostile populace”, the use of aeroplanes was mentioned regularly and approvingly in 
newspaper reporting of developments in Iraq.36 Major C.C. Turner reminded readers of the 
recent great success of the Royal Air Force against the leader of the Somali anti-colonial 
dervish movement, disparagingly nicknamed ‘Mad Mullah’ by the British, in Somaliland in 
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1920, which he thought “foreshadow[ed] an aspect of future warfare.”37 Britain later also 
successfully used air power in the defence of Aden in 1922.38 In Iraq in 1920, aeroplanes were 
used consistently for reconnaissance, providing supplies, as well as for active fighting. The 
official War Office communiqués, reprinted by many major papers, spoke of planes dropping 
“food” and “medical supplies and money”39; they lauded planes inflicting “serious losses” on 
the enemy, by “effectively bomb[ing] and machine-gunn[ing] the Arabs” and “punish[ing] 
tribesmen,”40 as well as performing “aerial reconnaissance,”41 and undertaking rescue 
operations.42 
     Quelling the 1920 Iraqi revolt can thus be described as a litmus test. Given the need, 
following the First World War, to reduce the running costs of Britain’s military commitments, 
the newly created RAF (formed only in 1918)43 had to prove it was a useful branch of the 
armed forces worth British taxpayers’ money or otherwise face the real threat of 
disbandment.44 By proving itself “capable of playing a cheap and efficient peacekeeping role 
in Iraq,” the RAF managed to do just that and secure its place, alongside the Army and the 
Navy, as a viable future branch of the armed forces.45 Following the end of the 1920 revolt, 
therefore, Winston Churchill’s priority (as War and Air Secretary until February 1921, then as 
Colonial Secretary) was “the replacement of costly imperial troops” with the RAF’s new 
capacities, in order to enable Britain to maintain order in the Middle East, thus fulfilling its 
Mandate responsibilities, while keeping the costs lower than before.46 By March 1922, 
Churchill could proudly declare that “we have been able to reduce the Estimate for future years 
by £1,000,000.”47 From October 1922, when air power’s economy and utility had become 
increasingly apparent, the RAF took over the responsibility of enforcing order in Iraq.48 
Between 1922 and 1926, it had a presence of eight squadrons in Iraq, with the addition of four 
squadrons of armoured cars which were also manned by the RAF.49 Air power, or the “doctrine 
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of ‘control without occupation’” thus became a preferred method for controlling the mandated 
space until the end of the Mandate in 1932.50 
     The intense focus on the financial advantages of air power not only worked towards ‘selling’ 
the RAF at home; it also undeniably had the effect of displacing and obscuring from the public 
discourse the victims of air power among the civilian Arab population. Rapid technical 
developments in the area of weaponry in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century had 
the effect of producing vastly differing numbers of casualties on the side of the ‘native’ enemies 
as compared with Western, in this case British, colonial forces. The most striking example is 
no doubt the use of expanding Mark IV bullets, developed from the notorious Dum-Dum bullet, 
at the Battle of Omdurman in Sudan in 1898, where famously British casualties numbered 28 
killed and 148 wounded, while an estimated 11,000 Dervishes were killed and 16,000 
wounded.51 Aeroplanes constituted another area of rapid new technological development, 
following the Wright brothers’ first aeroplane flight in 1903. Moves towards equipping planes 
with machine-guns and using them to bomb into submission rebellious native populations 
further worked to skew casualty numbers and soon developed into a pan-European technique. 
Italian aeroplanes used it in Libya as early as 1911-12.52 During the First World War, air 
warfare and bombing form the air first appeared in a European theatre; however, compared 
to the staggering casualty numbers of the trenches, aerial bombardment did not yet have as 
large an impact in 1914-18 as it would come to have in subsequent conflicts.53 Nevertheless, 
as Sven Lindqvist notes, with regards to bombing from the air while largely disregarding civilian 
deaths, the “principle of what was going to happen in Dresden and Tokyo at the end of the 
Second World War was already formulated at the beginning of the First.”54  
     After the end of the First World War, bombing from the air, as employed by the RAF in the 
Middle East, British India, and Africa in the years after 1918, was in fact presented as a 
particularly ‘humane’ new form of warfare, besides being cheaper and quicker than the Army. 
Two arguments in particular were put forward to support this claim: the low risk to the lives of 
the British pilots flying the aeroplanes, as those on the ground had no way to retaliate against 
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the planes overhead; and the purported ‘surgical precision’ of airstrikes, aimed primarily at 
material targets, which would keep collateral damage among the civilian population on the 
ground low.55 In any case, the “air force apologists”, as Omissi has called them, argued, air 
power’s results did not rest on inflicting heavy casualties but on so-called “moral effect”, which 
was aimed at demoralising the rebellious villagers.56 The mere sight of aeroplanes flying 
overhead would be enough to achieve this effect among the native population, cowing them 
into immediate submission and making the use of any actual force mostly unnecessary.57 
‘Moral effect’, however, could only be achieved if those on the ground had learned to fear 
aeroplanes and their destructive power. Actual displays of violence were therefore 
occasionally necessary.58 Especially from 1924 onwards, ‘moral effect’ was linked above all 
to the goal of causing the “indefinite disruption of everyday life” for the villagers and 
tribespeople on the ground.59 After the RAF’s takeover of duties in Iraq in 1922, a typical 
punitive air strike against villages where rebels were suspected, or which were refusing to pay 
taxes, was initiated by dropping warning leaflets onto the villagers, who were then expected 
to flee their villages with the little they were able to carry and while their villages were bombed, 
to hold out in caves or dug-outs until their supplies were depleted and they would be forced to 
surrender.60 Air Ministry records suggest that during “a single two-day operation, a squadron 
might drop several dozen tons of bombs and thousands of incendiaries and fire thousands of 
rounds of small arms ammunition.”61 Tribes’ livelihoods, their livestock, houses, water supply, 
grain and fuel stocks thus became the chief targets of air action.62 The RAF tacitly accepted 
that this form of exemplary violence, in essence a blockade by air, constituted a policy of 
‘frightfulness’, which was considered necessary both for subduing rebellion in the area as well 
as for establishing the future supremacy of air power. An Air Staff memorandum from late 
1922 contained a whole list of possible intended uses of aircraft in order to undermine “morale 
by ‘making life a burden’” for those on the ground. The list ran from such forms of airborne 
weaponry as 
  
delayed-action bombs, essential if villagers were to be kept out of their settlements by 
night, since the RAF had no night bombing capacity, through phosphorus bombs […]; 
crows feet, by which ‘great numbers of cattle would be lamed and great numbers of 
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people incommoded’ […]; aerial darts with whistling holes to magnify their 
psychological effect; ‘throwdowns’, or fireworks, which should ‘keep the tribesmen on 
the jump and give them the impression that our bombing capacity is very large’; to 
crude oil, which could poison water supplies. Some of the methods, such as ‘liquid 
fire’, the ancestor of napalm, were abandoned as impracticable in the present state of 
technology.63 
 
The fact that this policy of ‘frightfulness’, which can rightly be called terror, was thought to 
force villagers into submission quicker than traditional ground warfare could, caused its 
proponents to argue again for the policy’s ‘humaneness’, as it would shorten the overall length 
of conflicts.64 Finally, the recognition and frequent reiteration of aeroplanes’ other positive 
uses, for supply or rescue as mentioned above, as well as for carrying mail and passengers, 
enabling British political officers to be in quicker and more direct contact with the tribesmen 
they were supposedly administering, as well as significantly improving imperial 
communications, further worked to offset the potential human cost among the Arab population 
to the British public.65  
     If Europeans were the ones piloting the planes and doing the bombing and machine-
gunning from the relative safety of the air, then who the victims were, and the manifest 
inequality in their recognition and treatment in public discourse, was crucial. After initial 
reporting of high, indeed shockingly high, numbers of British Army casualties at the beginning 
of the Iraqi revolt in July 1920, in the following weeks and months, the War Office ensured, in 
its official communiqués, to continuously emphasise the low numbers of British casualties.66 
The final tally, presented to the public in October 1920, listed “416 killed or died; 1,119 
wounded; 159 prisoners in Arab hands (1 of whom died in captivity); and 473 missing. The 
Arab losses have been considerably heavier than ours.”67 The number of deaths among the 
Iraqi population, unreported at the time,  has since been estimated at around 8,450.68 Those 
British soldiers and officers who were killed or wounded, on the other hand, were carefully 
counted; often individuals were named in the papers and thus given identities which the Arab 
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victims were denied.69 The fate of the British women and children who had joined their 
husbands and fathers in Mesopotamia was afforded special attention. The case of Mrs 
Buchanan, the widow of a British officer killed in the uprising, made for a classic human-
interest story and became somewhat of a cause célèbre. The Daily Mail called her a “most 
British woman”, lauding her “courage worthy of her breed”, who had gone “out” to 
Mesopotamia to “relieve her husband’s loneliness.”70 When he and several other men were 
killed in their outpost at Shahraban, Mrs Buchanan, who was reported to have been the sole 
survivor of the attack, was abducted by the tribesmen.71 Her 18-month old child was initially 
thought to have been abducted too, but was later found to be safely in England with his 
grandparents.72 Mrs Buchanan’s “terrible agony” and the “unknown terrors of [her] captivity in 
the desert” were cause of much concern and speculation.73 Though she was eventually 
liberated, by this time all British women and children in the Kirkuk, Hit, and Ana areas along 
the Euphrates had been evacuated as a “safety precaution.”74 
     The significance of who was named and counted in Iraq takes on more importance 
particularly when considering the subtle yet markedly different, side-by-side reporting of the 
unrest taking place at the same time in Ireland (see Chapter 2). While the Daily Mirror, for 
example, reported that “[o]ur aeroplanes inflicted over eighty casualties on a hostile 
concentration near Bakuba” in Iraq, on the same page it provided much more in-depth 
reporting on the situation in Belfast, detailing that “[o]ne man was killed and scores of people 
received injuries, fifty being admitted to hospital.”75 The victims of rioting in Belfast were 
identifiably human: “one man” and “scores of people”; while Iraqis were unidentified 
“casualties” and part of an unhuman-appearing “hostile concentration.” The comparable lack 
of detail in the reporting on the Iraqi revolt was certainly partly due to the slower, more difficult 
access to information from the area; furthermore, Belfast was a major city within the United 
Kingdom, its inhabitants being British citizens and subjects of the monarch, and unrest of this 
scale so close to the British centre of power was understandably more immediately relevant, 
disconcerting, and newsworthy than events in a faraway region which Britain only 
administered under a League of Nations mandate. Nevertheless, in particular the differing 
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treatment of the human casualties of those conflicts is but one symptom of the way in which, 
in Satia’s analysis, the “British idea of Arabia” allowed the administrators to overcome their 
ethical scruples and reconcile them with the “actual violence of imperial policing in the British 
Middle East.”76 European cultural imaginations of ‘Arabia’, or the ‘Orient’, characterised it as 
a “land of mirage, myth, and imprecise borders” about which “nothing could ever really be 
known.”77 The lands between Euphrates and Tigris were, in the administrators’ estimation, “a 
biblical place” whose inhabitants, distinguished as they were presumed to be by their own 
brand of “fatalism”, simply viewed bombardment from the air as “yet another kind of 
visitation.”78 Douglas Duff, the ‘free-companion’ shipped over to Palestine from Ireland, also 
reproduced some of these common stereotypes. He characterised the Arab population he 
encountered in Palestine as “the wily Oriental”, by whom he shamefully admitted to having 
been “hoodwinked” during his first few weeks in the Mandate.79 He also played on the theme 
of religion, framing himself and his fellow recruits in terms of modern-day crusaders, “men 
used to fighting, with arms in our hands, [approaching] Terra Santa [‘the Holy Land’, A.K.] to 
maintain Peace and Security.”80 He also claimed his Arab opponents still fought using chain 
mail and sword hilts from the period of the crusades, which he called “relics” and revelled in 
taking from the defeated enemy.81 At the same time as harking back to the Middle Ages, 
however, Duff juxtaposed his implied religious crusading heritage with the actual and 
overwhelming superiority of the modern means of warfare used by the British gendarmerie 
and army in Palestine against the revolting Arabs. These means included “the bitter blast of 
machine-guns and rifles” and “Rolls-Royce armoured cars.” The RAF’s planes were another 
essential part of Britain’s modern war machinery, and Duff comments on how his unit, fighting 
alongside the local Emir Abdullah, was assisted by air power in repelling Wahhabi invaders 
into Transjordan between 1922 and 1924.82 The effect of such overwhelming force on the 
rebels was evident and devastating: “In ten minutes hundreds had fallen.”83 
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     In this Orientalist evaluation of Arab society, however, life itself was thought to be of little 
value to those who stood to lose theirs by the bomb. As late as 1930, in his maiden speech to 
the House of Lords, the long-serving Chief of the Air Staff and ‘Father of the RAF’, Hugh 
Trenchard, claimed that the “natives of a lot of these tribes love fighting for fighting’s sake.” 
“They have no objection to being killed”, he asserted, “if they can kill you and take your rifle.” 
Here, again, lay the great advantage of the RAF, in Trenchard’s analysis: that the “natives” 
were unable to retaliate against aeroplanes. Whether or not this actually meant that, following 
his own reasoning, the “natives” would now have objections to being killed, if the option of 
retaliation was taken from them, Trenchard left unanswered.84 The notion of different 
standards of civilization and the low value of life, was furthermore bound up with ideas of 
gender. There was no point denying that women and children were occasionally the victims of 
bombs dropped from aeroplanes onto Iraqi villages. However, the justifications given by British 
officials in response to these instances are revealing. Repeatedly, they put forward the alleged 
low status or even insignificance of women in Arabic society in order to illustrate this society’s 
backwardness and relativize the effects of aerial bombardment on the villagers. The era’s 
perhaps best-known expert on the Middle East, Colonel T.E. Lawrence (‘Lawrence of Arabia’), 
commented that “[Sheiks] … do not seem to resent … that women and children are 
accidentally killed by bombs.” Indeed, he asserted that women and children were considered 
“negligible” casualties, dismissing this astounding attitude as “too oriental a mood for us to 
feel very clearly.”85 Philip Game, the Air Officer Commanding (AOC) India, made the point that 
in frontier societies more generally women were regarded as “a piece of property somewhere 
between a rifle and a cow,” meaning their deaths were not comparable to the deaths of 
European non-combatants. The fact that tribal women were sometimes also actively involved 
in the fighting further helped the Air Command to blur the lines of who constituted a legitimate 
target.86 Although the interservice rivalry, with the RAF having to prove itself and justify its 
existence as a legitimate branch of the armed forces, was one prominent source of the Army’s 
attacks, especially, on the dubious ethics of air power, as Satia points out, British 
understanding of  the “moral world of Arabia as distinct from their own” cannot be 
underestimated. Indeed, the notion of Arabia as “a place somehow exempt from the this-
worldliness that constrained human activity elsewhere” combined with contemporary racist 
worldviews to guide ideas about what use of force was appropriate in this ‘other-worldly’ 
sphere.87 Importantly, the postwar world, and in particular the League of Nations’ system of 
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Mandates, had produced, in Dodge’s words, a “new category of the world’s population, that of 
the ‘semi-civilized’”, who were “involved in a process of evolution” which would be furthered 
by the discipline dispensed by the British from the air.88 Henry Page Croft, in the Morning Post, 
asserted forthrightly that the Arabs lacked even the most “elementary ideas of civilization” and 
needed to be educated on them by their British administrators.89 As a result, bombing, 
“permissible only in wartime in advanced countries”, “turned out to be always permissible in 
Iraq” as a policing technique for one of the “’semicivilised’ areas of the world.”90 
     If the British understanding of Arabia itself was imaginary, to take Satia’s argument further, 
so were the victims of British aerial bombardment in the area. They were not seen, often not 
properly counted (or even countable, from the air), nor were they named or given identities, 
as discussed above. A largely unseen “phantom enemy”, producing imaginary victims, was 
thus easier to bomb than one who was visible and knowable. The “bliss of wilful ignorance” at 
the outcome on the ground therefore made air power overall more acceptable.91 The distance 
between the scene of the conflict itself and the metropole only added to this dynamic. In 
February 1923, the RAF Staff Officer Lionel Charlton came face to face with victims of a British 
air raid in a local hospital in Diwaniya, Iraq, and, having observed the injuries and suffering 
inflicted, subsequently requested to be relieved of his post “on grounds of conscience.”92 This, 
however, remained the only reported case in which a member of the RAF drew such drastic 
conclusions as a result of the technological distance, and with it the emotional distance, 
between pilot and victim having been broken down, which had heretofore ‘protected’ the pilot 
from facing up to the consequences of his actions.93 
     The employment of a new technology so “amazingly relentless and terrible,”94 in the words 
of traveller, archaeologist, and administrator in the Middle East, Gertrude Bell, sparked a 
significant amount of controversy within British public discourse. Members of the Opposition, 
in particular, used their platform in the House of Commons to sharply question and criticise 
the government’s use of air power and its policy of ‘frightfulness’ in Iraq. George Lansbury, 
future Leader of the Labour Party and decidedly on the left of his party, was one of the most 
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outspoken critics and explicitly raised the issue of the policy’s victims, denouncing what he 
framed as racist double standards. When the Germans had bombed London during the First 
World War, he argued, they were decried as “Huns” for adopting such barbaric methods. If the 
British government now condoned the bombing of Iraqi villages with civilians in them, the Air 
Ministry had become a “Department of Huns”, for no one could “stand up and say that the 
people in those villages are of less value than the people in the East End of London.” Lansbury 
did not mince his words as he explicitly condemned those who felt “that a coloured person is 
of less value than a white person”, and called those responsible for the bombing policy “baby 
killers […], whether you kill a black baby or a white baby.”95 The argument that the race of the 
potential victims of aerial bombing factored into considerations of its use can be further 
supported when looking at debates about its application in Ireland. While the Commander-in-
Chief for Ireland, Neville Macready, advocated for air attacks when airmen could “clearly 
distinguish” between rebels and civilians, the Chief of the Air Staff, Hugh Trenchard, showed 
more caution and opposed the use of air power in Ireland as he did not think aircrews could 
reliably distinguish hostile from peaceful elements on the ground.96 Thus, what was tacitly 
accepted in Iraq and inflicted on ‘semi-civilized’ Muslim Arabs, did not apply to an area 
inhabited by white Christian citizens of the United Kingdom, even if they, too, were in a state 
of rebellion. 
     T.E. Lawrence, the “blond bedouin” whose status and popularity as a practically legendary 
hero of “British imperial masculinity”97 made him a prominent voice in the public discourse, 
also bitterly condemned the British methods for subduing rebellion in Iraq in 1920, including 
the use of bombs and aeroplanes. Writing with strong cynicism, he suggested the additional 
use of poison gas, as it would be even more effective at “getting the women and children” than 
simply bombing their villages and allow the British to “neatly” wipe out “the whole population 
of offending districts.” He considered his suggestion “no more immoral” than what the British 
administration was already engaged in.98 Poison gas was in fact considered at various points 
as an option for fighting rebellion in Iraq. However, as Douglas has shown, despite several 
erroneous claims in the literature that the British did use chemical weapons, this never actually 
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came to pass. Though the use of tear gas and other gas shells was seriously considered, and 
the idea had many supporters in military circles, notably Winston Churchill, circumstances, 
from availability to timing to official sanction for any such action, never fully aligned to enable 
their use in quelling the rebellion in Iraq.99 
     Other criticism centred on the purported advantages of air power, among them the 
argument that bombing was supposedly a particularly precise method. John Hay, Labour MP 
for Glasgow Cathcart, agreed with Lansbury in registering his protest against using aeroplanes 
“against unarmed people” in Iraq. He insisted that bombs dropped from planes were “not 
instruments of precision” and that the geography of Iraq, “where the features are not well 
marked”, made accuracy an even more elusive goal to obtain. The fact that the airmen could 
not “guarantee that they can strike the thing they wish to strike” was “the inhuman part of all 
this bombing.”100 As the Air Force fell under the rivalling Air Ministry and Secretary of State for 
Air, Laming Worthington-Evans, Churchill’s successor as War Secretary, also showed himself 
decidedly sceptical whether air power would prove to be the promised ‘magic bullet’ to solve 
the problem of the costly administration of Iraq. He criticised the policy of punitive air strikes 
and argued that “[i]f the Arab population realize that the peaceful control of Mesopotamia 
depends on our intention of bombing women and children, I am very doubtful if we shall gain 
that acquiescence of the fathers and husbands of Mesopotamia as a whole to which the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies [Churchill] looks forward.”101 
     While Worthington-Evans’ comments above were motivated primarily by inter-branch 
rivalry, with the intention of casting doubt on the RAF’s value to the nation’s armed forces, 
other arguments revolved around British values and the notion of civilisation, echoing themes 
which have already played a central role in Chapter 2. Reminding Members of the House of 
Commons that Iraqis were “not our subjects, but our allies”, Labour MP Josiah Wedgewood 
condemned the use of aerial bombing “for the illegitimate purpose of cowing a civilian 
population”, and warned that such a policy would result in a “loss of honour.”102 Lansbury 
asked the government “whatever […] those unhappy people in Mesopotamia [could] be 
thinking of you?” He, almost reverentially, invoked the region’s ancient history and significance 
as the cradle of Babylonian civilisation when he questioned the wisdom of taking the “blessings 
of our civilisation […] with bomb and aeroplane” to a land which “represented a civilisation 
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which existed long before the civilisation for which we stand had ever been dreamt of.” Indeed, 
he concluded with striking frankness, “the British people ought to be ashamed of any 
Government or any Department” that acted in such a way.103 Hay bluntly stated that, as a 
result of its Middle Eastern policy, “the moral prestige of Britain [had] fallen.”104 During the First 
World War, British, French, and German ‘flying aces’ had been considered ‘knights of the air’, 
the last bastion of fighters engaged in a form of chivalric man versus man combat, which stood 
in stark contrast to the industrialised and anonymised dying in the trenches.105 Within the 
colonial sphere, however, where the development of flight and aerial bombing strategies 
unbalanced the relationship between ‘combatants’ and allowed for a significant physical as 
well as emotional distance between the bomber and the unseen victims, who were often not 
combatants at all, but women and children uninvolved in active fighting, there was no more 
trace of the ‘chivalric’ tradition of the World War ‘flying aces’. Hay pointed out that there was 
not even any more of the “real give-and-take”, which had characterised aerial bombing during 
the war. While “at least the German was a man, that, if he hammered us, he himself stood up 
to the hammering he got from us”, the practically defenceless villagers subjected to aerial 
bombing in Iraq had no way of striking back at the British planes flying overhead.106 Hay was 
especially horrified at the thought of what effect dropping bombs from aeroplanes would have 
on the morals and attitudes of the young British men piloting those planes. Whether their 
bombs struck “a cow, a baby, or a man who has refused to pay taxes”, the airmen had no way 
of knowing. Giving voice to more widespread fears of brutalisation, once again, he asked, 
“what kind of men must they turn into, after they have played fast at striking helpless things 
without any chance of being struck back?” He answered his question himself: “They are taught 
to be cowards.” With some prescience, he also asserted that “after all, murder is murder, and 
[…] whether those things are paid back to us or not, they will certainly be remembered against 
our children.”107 
     The use of punitive air strikes to aid tax collection in Iraq from around 1921/1922 onwards 
became a particularly big point of controversy. Very soon after rebellion had broken out in Iraq, 
The Manchester Guardian voiced concern that “aeroplanes and tanks” were being used “for 
punishing the refusal to pay taxes” rather than for strictly military purposes, and admonished 
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that this method was “more brutal than any of the means to which the Turks had resort.”108 A 
particularly gruesome incident took place in 1921. On that occasion eight aeroplanes attacked 
an encampment, causing a stampede among the tribe’s animals which led the tribespeople to 
“[run] into the lake making a good target for the machine guns.” This report shocked and 
angered the Colonial Secretary, Winston Churchill, who wrote to the Chief of the Air Staff, 
Trenchard, that to “fire wilfully on women and children taking refuge in a lake is a disgraceful 
act.” He then made a point of explicitly reminding the High Commissioner in Mesopotamia, Sir 
Percy Cox, that “aerial action is a legitimate means of quelling disturbances or enforcing 
maintenance of order, but it should in no circumstances be employed in support of purely 
administrative measures such as collection of revenue.”109 Nevertheless, the practice appears 
to have continued. The Daily Mail’s Percival Philips published a multi-part series in 1922 which 
focused on this particular practice. He described the “Government by Bomb” which he said 
had made “tax-collection by bomb […] almost a matter of routine for the Royal Air Force in 
Mesopotamia.” As the Iraqi population was unwilling to submit to the authority of the British-
backed government of King Feisal, “British aeroplanes [had] been used to extract over due 
[sic!] revenue.” In his reports, Phillips fully recognised that “of course, innocent people have 
been killed. That cannot be helped.” Phillips’ criticism, however, lay not so much in the 
apparently inevitable deaths of what he conceded were likely “innocent people”, but in the fact 
that, two years after the first aeroplanes were used for bombing in the region, the effect, and 
efficacy, was beginning to wear off. The local population had “become used to bombing, and 
the throb of the engine overhead does not create the panic it did two years ago.”110 The issue 
was debated in the House of Commons, too, where Liberal MP Reginald Berkeley questioned 
the government as to whether the RAF was or had ever been engaged in any way, including 
by the use of bombs, in enforcing the payment of taxes. The Under-Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, William Ormsby-Gore, responded, denying all suggestions of the RAF being used 
to enforce payment of taxes, or punish non-payment, by bombing or other means. He 
emphasised that, except for cases of “open and armed defiance” or “attacks upon the native 
police forces”, the RAF was tasked only with “patrol and communication.” In any case, he 
continued, whenever air action had been taken, “at the request of the Arab Government”, 
warnings had been issued, and as the “mere threat of air action” was often enough to bring 
about the desired result, “casualties have been few.” In fact, he concluded, harking back to 
the ‘noble’ goals of the Mandate idea, “air action amongst the Euphrates tribes [had] saved far 
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more human lives than it [had] destroyed by restoring order and preventing inter-tribal 
fighting.”111 
     As Paris has argued with reference to the British “warrior  nation”, over the course of the 
interwar period airmen became not only “heroes of modern warfare” and “ultimate 
technological warriors”, but also “the guardians of empire and international order.”112 But 
bombing the native inhabitants of colonial spaces from the air also became a pan-European 
method of suppressing insurrection in this period. Spain and France employed it in Morocco 
and Syria in 1925.113 Italy later infamously bombed Ethiopia using first tear gas and then 
mustard gas in 1935-36.114 However, only when the Germans bombed a target within Europe, 
namely the northern Spanish town of Guernica, in 1937, did the international outcry lead to 
the immortalisation of the town and the victims in global collective memory. Meanwhile, none 
of the Libyan, Moroccan, Syrian, Indian, East African, or Arab victims of Italian, Spanish, 
French, or British aerial bombardment were or are remembered in a similar way within the 
metropole.115 The victims of aerial bombardment in peripheral, colonial or mandated, spaces, 
rather than being truly visible or experienceable, remained part of the imaginary. This made 
them easier to bomb; the consequences of air power on the ground, on the other hand, were 
not imaginary, but very real. However, within public discourse back in the metropole, what was 
imaginary could, because it was imaginary, be moulded and changed to fit particular beliefs, 
founded on colonial racial hierarchies, and purposes, especially the internal rivalries between 
the branches of the armed forces. The preceding section has reconstructed the often-
passionate debates within British public language over the legitimacy of aerial bombing. 
Though particularly the opposition strove to somewhat reinsert the victims into the discourse, 
out of a mixture of genuine humanitarian concern and as a way to delegitimise government 
policy, the human costs of the policy of air power in the end were made secondary to the 
financial costs of maintaining control of the area by traditional means. 
 
3.1.2 German Colonial Revisionism. 
In her 2006 book on German colonial masculinities, Weiße Helden, schwarze Krieger, Sandra 
Maß uses the triumphant return of German colonial general Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck and the 
remainder of his German and African troops (known as askaris) to Berlin on 2 March 1919 as 
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a moment in which interwar Germany’s relationship to its colonial past and to its former 
colonial possessions and subjects was epitomised. As the general and his troops, who had, 
as the narrative went, heroically defended German East Africa until ordered to surrender by 
Berlin, marched through the Brandenburg Gate, they were celebrated by the assembled 
spectators as living symbols of Germany’s status as a world power. The ‘war hero’ Lettow-
Vorbeck and the steadfast loyalty of his askari troops were supposed to represent the success 
of German colonial policy and to refute the Allies’ claims that Germany had been negligent in 
its colonial responsibilities and treated its colonial subjects badly. This carefully 
choreographed moment thus set the tone for German colonial revisionism throughout the 
interwar period.116 
     Above all, Germany’s expulsion from the circle of civilised, and civilising, European colonial 
powers was felt to be a grave humiliation, which came in addition to the already humiliating 
position of having lost the war and having to submit to the other terms of the Treaty of 
Versailles, which of course included the payment of reparations, the loss of territories in the 
east and the west of Germany, a strict limit on the size of German armed forces, and a ban 
on pursuing a German air force, besides having to formally accept full responsibility for the 
war. This position of inferiority stood in stark contrast to the superiority of British imperialism 
at the same time when, as laid out above, the Empire had reached its formal apogee and, via 
the RAF, Britain could even control and administer large swathes of land increasingly cheaply 
from the air, in addition to its naval domination. Despite the unequivocal loss of Germany’s 
possessions, the former colonies and German colonial ambition thus continued to play a 
noticeable role in public discourse. German dreams of their lost colonies manifested 
themselves in remarkably concrete plans for administering an imagined empire. The new 
German government still encompassed a dedicated colonial ministry, headed by the Catholic 
Centre Party’s Johannes Bell. Though it was officially tasked with the winding-up and 
liquidation of the affairs of the no longer existent German colonies, when it was dissolved in 
1920 and its tasks transferred to the Ministry for Reconstruction, they explicitly included the 
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“continued development of the ceded protectorates, the progression of the colonial question 
in general, and the possibility of reacquisition of colonial possessions.”117 Furthermore, a host 
of pro-colonial organisations sprang up, among them the Reichsbund der Kolonialdeutschen 
[‘league of colonial Germans’], the Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft [‘German colonial 
association’], and the Deutscher Kolonialverein [‘German colonial society’], which, in 1922, 
banded together under the umbrella organisation Koloniale Reichsarbeitsgemeinschaft 
(KORAG) [‘Reichs-colonial working group’].118 In the first half of 1919, all of these groups’ main 
aim was to lobby against paragraph 119 of the Treaty of Versailles, which stated that 
“Germany relinquishes all its rights and claims to overseas possessions in favour of the allied 
and associated main powers.”119 
     The voices of colonial revisionism often framed the claim that it was unjust to take away 
Germany’s colonies in language explicitly concerned with violence. To dispel accusations of 
maltreatment of colonial subjects and misadministration of the German colonies, all political 
voices right of the Independent Social Democrats insisted that British colonialism had been, 
and continued to be, just as bad as, if not significantly worse than German colonial rule had 
been, and that stripping Germany of its colonies was an act of cruel hypocrisy from the victors. 
In the National Assembly, DNVP representative Posadowsky-Wehner insisted that Germany 
had acquired its colonies “lawfully”, and bristled at the audacity with which “England” dared to 
accuse Germany of not having been able to govern its colonial subjects properly; “this 
England, which, for centuries, has subjugated India, which extracts immense riches from India, 
while the Indian population lives in terrible misery.” If all the world was currently speaking of 
the right to national self-determination, why then was Britain not introducing this right in India, 
or indeed in Ireland, he asked.120 Similar transnationally informed arguments were put forward 
across the political spectrum in the press. The right-wing Deutsche Tageszeitung 
unsurprisingly took the same stance, listing “the Indians, the Egyptians and the Irish” as the 
first among the oppressed peoples of the world, who, the paper stated with sarcastic relish, 
stood as “blatant examples” of “British worthiness” and Britain’s “moral adequacy.”121 The 
more liberal Frankfurter Zeitung and Vossische Zeitung made similar arguments, pointing, in 
particular, to General Dyer’s excesses in Amritsar in April 1919 in order to discredit the British 
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colonial administration in India.122 The Vossische Zeitung also highlighted the American-Irish 
joint report on conditions in Ireland, published in the summer of 1919, which alleged a British 
“reign of terror”, including violence against civilians, women and children, and injustices 
endured by prisoners in Mountjoy prison.123 The paper also directly accused the British of 
treating the native population in formerly German colonies, for example in the diamond-rich 
Lüderitz Bay area in South-West Africa, much worse than the Germans ever had, cheating 
them out of their wages and squeezing every bit of labour out of them.124 Germany, on the 
other hand, had never treated ‘its’ native populations any worse than any other colonial 
power,125 and in fact, the East African askari troops, who had just returned with Lettow-
Vorbeck, were living proof of the good German colonial administration.126 On 3 March 1919, 
the national assembly officially welcomed and thanked Lettow-Vorbeck and his German and 
African troops, emphasising “the rich blessing, which the civilising activity had spread” and the 
askaris’ thankfulness and loyalty towards the Germans.127 The accusations of German colonial 
ineptitude were therefore, it was argued by the German government, a mere pretext for Britain 
to preserve its self-interests and gain South-West Africa for its own Empire.128 The Allies, 
demanded German colonial minister Johannes Bell indignantly, should at least admit as much, 
rather than pretending to be guided by considerations of morality and law in their exclusion of 
Germany from the ranks of the “civilised peoples” [Kulturvölker] of the world.129 
     A whole series of other recurring themes of the discourse of German colonial revisionism 
was summarised in a newspaper advertisement from the ‘Reichs-association of Colonial 
Germans’ (Reichsverband der Kolonialdeutschen), an organisation which succeeded, in the 
first half of 1919, in collecting almost four million signatures in support of their demands for 
colonial possessions.130 In their advertisement they not only emphasised the “right” to colonial 
activity, but also the “duty” to participate in the “spread of civilisation and culture, truth and 
justice, and in the exploitation of the earth’s resources.” The advertisement rather ominously 
continued that “the violent exclusion of one people from exercising this right [would] endanger 
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world peace.”131 The Vossische Zeitung declared “the fate of Africa […] a pan-European affair”, 
and indeed characterised the whole continent as a “natural tropical extension of Europe”, 
where the circle of “highly cultured peoples”, among which the paper firmly placed Germany, 
faced “immense tasks” in fulfilling their “duty of colonial activity.”132 Rather than in the “capitalist 
exploitation of a less gifted human race”, the nature of colonial activity thus lay in helping them 
achieve a “higher culture”, from which the VZ confidently derived the “natural right” 
(naturrechtlicher Anspruch) of culturally and civilisatorily advanced powers to participate in 
colonial activity.133 The paper therefore insisted that the German government could not expect 
the German people to recognise a peace treaty which declared it “unworthy” and “unable” to 
participate in the “cultural work of the white race.” To demand its colonies back, the paper 
argued, was Germany’s prerogative and an existential requirement, as colonies served not 
only as space for surplus populations to settle, but also were economically valuable to 
Germany.134 The supposed economic relevance of colonies to Germany was a prominent 
argument in the debate and the ‘Reichsverband der Kolonialdeutschen’ also included this 
point in its advertisement, arguing that only colonial possessions would guarantee sufficient 
employment and could provide all social strata with food and clothing, as well as ensuring 
Germany’s ability to influence the price of colonial goods on the international market.135 
Colonial minister Bell also cited the “vital necessity” of colonial possessions for Germany, not 
only because the “insufferable moral degradation of Germany” constituted an “inexpiable” 
injustice which may yet prove fatal for world peace, but also because he considered colonial 
imports and exports indispensable for the recovery of the war-ravaged German economy.136 
The Independent Social Democrats and the Communists were alone in upholding their 
opposition to all colonial activity, which they viewed as exploitative and oppressive.137 
However, as Dirk van Laak has noted, it did not matter that in reality the loss of its colonies 
did not markedly affect the German economy; popular and political approval of German 
colonial activity had never been as strong and universal as it was at the very moment when 
Germans were stripped of this option by the Allies.138 The so-called ‘colonial guilt lie’, in 
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analogy to the ‘war guilt lie’, which alleged German colonial excesses and ineptitude, worked 
to “unite Germans more effectively than real existing colonialism had ever done.”139 
     Though the real-existing German empire ceased in 1918, the imagination of and about it 
certainly did not. Flying, which, as this chapter has demonstrated above, was becoming an 
increasingly important and popular means of transport and of warfare and in no small part 
supported the global pre-eminence of the British Empire, was in fact a pan-European 
obsession of the times.140 The rapid technological advances in aviation in the years before 
and during the First World War had been a great point of pride and source of confidence for 
the young German empire.141 Therefore, being banned from further developing an air force 
under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles constituted yet another element of humiliation at 
the hands of the Allies for Germans. As a result, large parts of the German population 
developed great enthusiasm for gliding, as an alternative to motorised aviation.142 Once the 
ban and later the restrictions on the manufacture of German airplanes were eased, and finally 
lifted in 1925/1926, Germany’s first semi-public airline, Luft Hansa, was established.143 
Importantly, civilian and commercial aviation thus “allowed Germany to ‘think in terms of 
continents’ once again”, despite the irreversible loss of its formal empire.144 Just like the 
thinking and imagination of Germany in global terms did not disappear after November 1918, 
the people who had been involved in colonial activity did not disappear the moment the 
German government relinquished its possessions; their energies, ambitions, and experiences 
were not simply ‘switched off’. The afterglow of German colonialism manifested itself in the 
life trajectories of many individuals, who often had learned the practice of extreme violence in 
colonial settings, and who, once returned to Germany, joined various Freikorps, and later 
could in many cases be found in the ranks of the NSDAP. High-profile examples included 
Lettow-Vorbeck, the ‘hero of East Africa’, himself; as well as Franz Ritter von Epp, who first 
participated in suppressing the Boxer Rebellion in China in 1900-1901, before commanding a 
company in German South-West Africa during the 1904 genocide of the Herero. After fighting 
in the First World War, he founded his eponymous Freikorps, which, as laid out in Chapter 1, 
was heavily involved in the brutal suppression of the Munich Councils’ Republic in late April 
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and early May 1919. He joined the NSDAP in 1928, became Reichsstatthalter (‘Imperial 
governor’) for the Nazis in Bavaria, and was director of the Nazi Colonial Office until its 
dissolution in 1943.145 
     The fact that these personal continuities exist and can be observed has been a much-
debated aspect of the ‘valve’ theory of violence discussed in the Introduction. Such a view 
might suggest that following the First World War, personal violent potentials had to be 
discharged somewhere, and thus, in the absence of colonial spaces which could ‘absorb’ this 
violent potential, postwar Germany saw high levels of internal violence while Britain was 
spared this experience because violence could be displaced into the colonies. Much like 
Mosse’s ‘brutalization theory’, the ‘valve’ theory remains an open and controversial area of 
inquiry in the history and theory of violence. It remains questionable particularly as the 
suggestion of a necessity for violent potential to be discharged somewhere runs the risk of 
evoking a sense of historical inevitability. Furthermore, it can hardly be proved or disproved 
empirically.146 Instead, more fruitful debates have recently developed around the continuities, 
including but by no means limited to personal ones, between German colonial history and the 
history of the Holocaust.147 
     Added to the perceived German national humiliation of having been stripped of its colonies 
and thus denied its membership among western civilised nations and a place as a colonial 
power among equals, was France’s use of colonial troops in their occupation of the Rhineland, 
discussed below. Both together created an even stronger feeling of humiliation, indignation 
and anger in Germany, as the “diktat of Versailles” had seemingly turned the Germans into a 
colonised people themselves, who were now being ruled over by a supposedly inferior race, 
and thus practically expelled from the circle of white races.148 In the next section, this chapter 
will turn to examining this particular episode, and the postwar interactions of race and violence 
in Germany and in Britain more generally, in more detail. 
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3.2 DARKNESS COMES TO THE HEART OF THE METROPOLE. 
The presence of soldiers and seamen of colour, who carried ‘darkness’ from the colonial 
peripheries into the heart of the German and British metropole in the early interwar era, caused 
intense anxieties among, and conflict with, the white populations of both countries.149 This 
chapter section will examine two case studies; firstly, the campaign launched against the use 
of colonial soldiers in the French occupation of the Rhineland between circa 1919-1923, and 
secondly the riots against coloured seamen taking place in several British port cities in 1919. 
What can be described as lying at the heart of both case studies is the highly charged 
interaction between race, on the one hand, and sex and gender on the other. “Miscegenation 
fears”, as Lucy Bland has termed them, played not only a prominent role in the British ‘race 
riots’ of 1919, but almost wholly dominated the German propaganda campaign against French 
colonial occupation troops.150 Women’s bodies, and in particular their reproductive capacities, 
were crucial and functioned as the screen (Projektionsfläche) on to which these fears were 
projected and the stage on which these conflicts were carried out. While the first section of 
this chapter, on aerial bombing, examined a form of violence the novelty of which lay in the 
physical, and ensuing emotional, disconnect between perpetrator and victim, the current two 
case studies are strongly characterised by their physicality, often literal, though sometimes 
more abstract. The violent act of postwar French occupation of the Rhineland may be regarded 
as a symbolic ‘rape’; this symbolic domination and penetration of the white European 
‘Volkskörper’151 by the ‘darkness’ of the French colonial soldiers, however, was actualised in 
actual (and alleged) cases of rape perpetrated by the soldiers against German women. In the 
UK, the physicality consisted, on the one hand, in the – largely voluntary – interactions 
between white women and men of colour, which were viewed as outrageous provocations of 
decency; and, on the other hand, the physical violence which men of colour experienced as a 
result at the hands of white British civilians, (demobilised) servicemen, and police. Women 
were thus victimised in two different ways in the two different contexts. In the Rhineland, under 
French occupation, they were often the victims of literal physical violence perpetrated by 
occupying troops; in postwar Britain, they were victimised rhetorically for their association with 
black men which was seen as the root of the rising racial tensions. As the below analyses will 
 
149 Though primarily concerned with the post-1945 era, see Waters on the equation of whiteness and 
Britishness and the anxieties created in British society specifically by the presence of “dark strangers”, 
i.e. black migrants in Britain. Chris Waters, “’Dark Strangers’ in Our Midst: Discourses of Race and 
Nation in Britain, 1947-1963″, Journal of British Studies, 36/2 (1997), pp. 207-238, my emphasis. 
150 Lucy Bland, “White Women and Men of Colour: Miscegenation Fears in Britain after the Great War”, 
Gender & History, 17/1 (2005), pp. 29-61. 
151 This might be translated as ‘national body’, or literally ‘people’s body’; the term contains a particular 
emphasis on biological qualities. Later, under the Nazis, it is fundamentally defined in racial terms. 
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elucidate, in both cases women were instrumentalised as was politically opportune, to 
advance either a strong anti-French narrative, in the German case, or anti-black narratives in 
a strained postwar economic situation in Britain. At the same time, the men of colour were 
equally politically instrumentalised in both contexts to also advance specific interpretations 
within race and labour conflicts. 
 
3.2.1 The French occupation of the Rhineland. 
Following the conclusion of the First World War, French troops occupied the German 
Rhineland. Of the circa 85,000 troops, it is estimated that during the summer months of 1920 
and 1921 between 25,000 and 40,000 were French colonial troops, mainly from Northern 
Africa, especially Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco, French West Africa, mainly Senegal, as well 
as Madagascar; some were also from French Indochina.152 In the spring of 1920, when 
German troops entered the demilitarised zone on the right bank of the river Rhine, the French 
retaliated by extending their occupation eastwards and occupying several German cities in 
the Rhine-Main area, such as Frankfurt, Darmstadt, Hanau and Homburg. On 7 April, when 
French troops, among them colonial soldiers, had just taken up their posts on the square 
outside the Hauptwache building in the centre of Frankfurt, they clashed with a group of local 
onlookers; some of the Moroccan soldiers fired their machine-gun into the crowd, killing 
several civilians and injuring several more. Following this incident, a vicious propaganda 
campaign against the colonial soldiers, launched by almost all political sides under the banner 
‘Schwarze Schmach’ [‘black shame’], reached its height, and continued throughout the years 
1920-1923.153  
   The German outrage at France’s use of colonial soldiers in their occupation had multiple 
facets. It focused on a plethora of (alleged) crimes. Under often graphic headlines such as 
“The black atrocities in the Saar region”, “The black regiment of horror”, “Bayonet attacks on 
pupils”, “The war on women and children. Orphans under the bayonet”, “From the French 
torture chambers”, “Girl shot ‘by mistake’”, “From the French slave colony on the Rhine”, 
“French soldiers as thieves and robbers”, “The punches of arbitrariness. Germans under the 
 
152 On the varying numbers of colonial troops given in the literature, see Christian Koller, "Von Wilden 
aller Rassen niedergemetzelt": die Diskussion um die Verwendung von Kolonialtruppen in Europa 
zwischen Rassismus, Kolonial- und Militärpolitik (1914-1930) (Stuttgart, 2001), p. 202. Koller notes that 
during the winter months many African troops were moved to Southern France. On the colonial troops‘ 
origins, see Maß, Weiße Helden, schwarze Krieger, p. 80. 
153 Koller, "Von Wilden aller Rassen niedergemetzelt", pp. 207-108; Julia Roos, “Nationalism, Racism 
and Propaganda in Early Weimar Germany: Contradictions in the Campaign against the ‘Black Horror 
on the Rhine’”, German History, 30/1 (2012), p. 49. Initial reports spoke of six killed and 35 wounded, 
see for example “Zusammenstösse in Frankfurt”, DAZ, 08.04.1920, MA, p. 1. 
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nigger whip”, or “New bloody deed by a Moroccan”, there were numerous reports of attacks, 
committed by both colonial and white French soldiers, such as armed robberies, violent stop-
and-search incidents, apparently arbitrary chicanery, fines, kidnappings, or violent drunken 
altercations.154 However, the most prominent aspect of the propaganda campaign unleashed 
after the Frankfurt incident focused on real and alleged acts of sexual violence against German 
civilians, in the vast majority women; though some reports concerned attacks against men, or 
children of either sex. As one of the most comprehensive works on the subject by Christian 
Koller has shown, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain how much truth there was 
to the allegations. As the German propaganda was countered by French, American, and 
occasionally the German opposition’s counterpropaganda, there is little possibility of 
retrospectively arriving at reliable numbers of crimes committed. Koller therefore concludes 
that attacks by French colonial soldiers were most likely largely isolated cases, rather than a 
systematic strategy of ‘quasi-biological warfare’ waged against the German people, as was 
alleged; however, Koller emphasises that a high number of unreported cases should also be 
assumed.155 Sandra Maß seconds this view, stressing the scarcity of reliable source material 
on which to base estimations of crimes committed by French occupying troops (colonial and 
white), and by which to judge the rigour with which the French authorities actually investigated 
such accusations.156 Members of the Reichstag repeatedly demanded information on specific 
reported cases,157 and eventually, in 1921, 1922 and 1923, long lists and tables of several 
hundred officially confirmed cases of, variously, murder, manslaughter, rape, attempted rape, 
“pederasty” and “attempted pederasty”, robbery, assault, and abuse by both white and colonial 
French soldiers in the occupied territories were published as appendices to the Reichstags’ 
debate transcripts.158 Maß, however, prudently concludes that analyses of contemporary 
witness accounts must take into account the tensions between taboos surrounding sexual 
 
154 Examples: “Französischer Mord an einem deutschen Offizier“ and “Die französische 
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violence, on the one hand, and racist hysteria and exaggeration, on the other.159 Therefore, 
while establishing accurate facts about crimes committed by French (colonial) soldiers against 
German civilians must remain a difficult endeavour, the analysis here is concerned with the 
German propaganda in reaction to the occupation, in particular the presence of colonial 
soldiers among the French troops, and the tropes, images and discourses which emerged 
from it. 
     Women were at the very centre of the storm of outrage against the colonial soldiers. The 
female body stood for the national body, and its rape for the violation of the German nation at 
large. As Chris Waters, citing Parker et al., has noted, “the trope of nation-as-woman ‘depends 
for its representational efficacy on a particular image of woman as chaste, dutiful, daughterly, 
or maternal.’”160 The term “Schwarze Schmach” itself, which, over the course of the year 1920, 
became quasi ubiquitous in reports on the French occupation, speaks to the way in which 
what was (actually and allegedly) done to German women by men of colour brought shame 
not only to the individual victims of attacks, but to the German nation as a whole. The political 
implications of this dimension of shame and humiliation will be discussed in more depth below, 
highlighting how the victimisation of German women, as well as the presence of the colonial 
soldiers themselves, were instrumentalised in public discourse in politically opportune ways. 
While the campaign against the French colonial soldiers was supported by a broad political 
spectrum, spanning from the Majority Social Democrats on the left to the extreme right in the 
Nationalversammlung, it was noticeably the more conservative, and especially German-
nationalist to völkisch newspapers which reported the most on conditions under the French 
occupation in general, and the ‘black shame’ in particular. Women in this context were 
constructed almost exclusively as victims, whose innocence was brutalised by the men of 
colour, who waylaid and assaulted them, sometimes robbed them, beat up or drove off any 
male companion, then raped them, and in the worst cases murdered them afterwards, 
sometimes reportedly discarding their bodies under dunghills. The widely-reported case of 19-
year old Frieda Guckes who was raped and strangled by two Moroccans in Idstein, who were 
soon apprehended, admitted the crime, and one of whom was convicted and executed as a 
result, was one of the clearly provable cases, which served to underpin the wider propaganda 
campaign.161 Social Democratic member of the national assembly Elisabeth Röhl explicitly 
 
159 Maß, Weiße Helden, schwarze Krieger, p. 107. 
160 Andrew Parker et al. (eds.), Nationalisms and Sexuality (New York, 1992), cited in Waters, “’Dark 
Strangers’″, p. 229. 
161 On Frieda Guckes see: FZ, 14.06.1922, ZMB, p. 2; FZ, 15.06.1922, AB, p. 2; FZ, 19.06.1922, AB, 
p. 2; “Die schwarze Pest in Idstein”, DZ, 17.06.1922, AA, p. 5; “Die schwarzen Bestien”, DZ, 23.06.1922, 
AA, p. 2; “Die Sühne für die Idsteiner Mordtat”, DZ, 07.02.1923, MA, p. 2; “Marokkanische Soldaten als 
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claimed to speak for “us women, who for the most part are mothers,” when condemning the 
constant danger to women’s and girls’ honour under the occupation, thus reemphasizing adult 
women’s primary role as mothers in protecting young women’s innocence and purity from 
French, and black, attack.162 Notably, the discourse had no space whatsoever for the 
instances in which German women chose to enter a relationship with, or marry, a French 
colonial soldier of their own free will. This capacity for agency was completely denied to the 
women, whose construction as pure and innocent victims was politically necessary to discredit 
the colonial soldiers and the French government in general. The women who nevertheless 
associated with the French colonial soldiers were victimised by their own communities, being 
regarded as symbols of shame, “traitors”, and excluded from the national and racial 
collective.163 As John Boonstra has argued, “anxiety over female sexuality” in general was 
strong, especially among conservatives, in early Weimar society, as women were gradually 
gaining more mobility and autonomy.164 Maß has further emphasised that it was especially 
bourgeois women who became involved in the campaign against the ‘black shame’, 
capitalising on the “’weakness’” of German masculinity following the First World War, which 
stood in stark contrast to the threatening image of the “potent, African soldier.” The women 
thereby further strengthened the connection between the concept of bourgeois femininity and 
the representation of the nation.165 
     Another preoccupation of the reports on the presence of French colonial soldiers in the 
Rhineland were notions of health and disease. The presence of French colonial soldiers in the 
heart of European society itself was portrayed as an epidemic and a danger to the health of 
the German national body (‘Volkskörper’), as is obvious from the use of the term “Schwarze 
Pest” (‘black plague/pestilence/scourge’) which, along with ‘black shame’ and ‘black horror’,  
was frequently applied to the colonial soldiers.166 In a more literal sense, venereal disease 
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was central to this theme. It allegedly reached epidemic dimensions in the occupied areas, 
not only due to the prevalence of rape by colonial soldiers, but also as a result of the upsurge 
in prostitution, therefore raising the threat of the “syphilitisation of the white race.”167 Notably, 
however, women were not generally given the blame for engaging in prostitution; as will 
emerge below, this was a significant aspect in how British women were apportioned blame for 
provoking tensions between white men and black men in British port cities. Instead, the 
practice of prostitution in the German occupied territories was blamed on either the economic 
destitution and widespread hunger caused by the harsh terms of the Treaty of Versailles and 
by the occupation itself, or on allegations that the French authorities had demanded that 
special brothels be established where white German women were to be made available 
specifically to colonial soldiers.168 The violation of children was another significant aspect of 
the reporting which served to further heighten the outrage. Vulnerable young people, in 
particular, were said to become “polluted” (‘verseucht’), in both their bodies and their souls, 
with venereal disease, as a result dramatically exceeding the capacities of local hospitals.169 
More concretely, the 600-800 mixed-race offspring of German women and colonial soldiers, 
who became known by the derogatory epithet “Rhineland bastards”, were a living, breathing 
symbol of the ‘pollution’ of the pure (i.e. white) German Volkskörper. Their fate was 
symptomatic, as, in 1937, under the Nazi eugenics programme, they were subjected to forced 
sterilizations in a völkisch effort to undo the ‘black shame.’170 
     Though the present thesis is focused on a specific type of public language, found in 
newspaper articles and parliamentary debates, the propaganda campaign more generally 
made heavy use of other forms of media, including caricatures, films, songs, poems, stamps, 
posters and plays.171 In these materials, an extremely racialised image of the colonial soldiers 
emerged, and quasi-pornographic acts of violence against women were imagined by the 
propagandists. Especially the African men were generally presented as barely human 
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“primitive savages”172 and “black beasts,”173 with grossly exaggerated ape-like features, 
protruding lips, long hairy arms, and seemingly superhuman strength. In particular, the colonial 
soldiers were attributed a dangerously uncontrollable, animal-like sex drive. Many images 
showed them dragging off helpless German women, while a particularly graphic medal from 
1920 depicted the caricatured face of an African soldier on one side, and an enormous phallus 
wearing a French soldier’s helmet, with the figure of a limp German woman shackled to it, on 
the other.174 Though the newspaper articles analysed here were generally less explicit, they 
occasionally alluded, in a titillating manner, to the “horrifying details” and the “abominable 
manner” of the reported sex crimes, without actually revealing them.175 They also strongly 
perpetuated, in words, the image of the colonial soldiers created by the visual materials, 
especially the trope of black men as sexually uncontrollable; they made sure to remind readers 
that “the African race [was] the sexually most developed one of all,”176 yet stood, culturally, on 
the “lowest rung”, being “governed by bestial instincts.”177 Iris Wigger has argued that the 
obsessively imagined violence against women far exceeded the real cases, in both number 
and in brutality, concluding that the highly racialised and sexualised imagery of the campaign 
reflected back on the propagandists, who were in fact the ones symbolically sacrificing women 
in their “rape scenarios.”178  
     It was not only Germans, however, who were outraged by the presence of men of colour 
in the midst of a European country. The discourse over the ‘black shame’ exhibited significant 
transnational influences. The violent incident at the Frankfurt Hauptwache in early April 1920 
was accompanied by the publication of a piece by Labour Party member Edmund Dene Morel 
in the Daily Herald on 10 April, in which he denounced the “Black scourge in Europe” in the 
strongest terms and accused the French of letting loose a “sexual horror” on the Rhine.179 The 
piece was immediately picked up and extensive excerpts re-printed in translation by several 
German newspapers. Especially the German-nationalist press pounced on it, as it powerfully 
gave voice to their own outrage at “the installation of black barbarians.” Morel based his 
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allegations on a number of statements, supposedly in his possession, from victims, family 
members, doctors and lawyers regarding numerous rape cases, “some of them of a horrifying 
nature.” He accused the colonial soldiers of “spreading syphilis” and “murdering harmless 
citizens,” and, repeating the trope of the Africans’ excessive sex drive, claimed that “due to 
well-known physiological reasons the rape of a white woman by a negro is almost always 
accompanied by serious damage to her health and often has the worst consequences.”180 
Later that year, Morel’s piece was published as a pamphlet entitled “The Horror on the Rhine”, 
translated into several languages, selling over 10,000 copies in under a month, and going on 
to appear in eight editions by April 1921.181 Notably, it was Morel who first used the term 
“scourge” prominently, and the phrase “Schwarze Schmach” really only began appearing 
frequently in German newspapers following the publication of his condemnatory article. In the 
pages of the Frankfurter Zeitung, in early June 1920, the term “Schwarze Schmach” began 
appearing without quotation marks around it for the first time, indicating the gradual 
consolidation of not only the term itself but also of its assumed factuality in public language, 
and with it perhaps in the collective German psyche.182 Spring 1920 was also when numerous 
other transnational actors weighed in on the issue. Various British groups, especially women’s 
groups, protested in London.183 Groups from other countries, for example the Peace League 
of Swedish Women, also voiced their condemnation of France’s use of colonial soldiers.184 
There were reports of protests in the United States of America, outrage being especially 
prevalent among the German-American community, as well as a much-publicised appeal by 
the American industrialist John de Kay.185 As these various groups made the campaign against 
the ‘black shame’ their cause célèbre, it further fuelled the propaganda campaign within 
Germany. A motion was filed, reportedly by all female representatives in the 
Nationalversammlung, in protest against the use of colonial soldiers in the Rhineland.186 The 
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Protestant Church of Germany, again with women’s church groups at the helm, also joined in 
the chorus of outrage and condemnation; as did German university students.187 
     The sociologist Iris Wigger, who has conducted one of the most thorough investigations of 
the ‘black shame’, has analysed the propaganda campaign as the powerful nexus of the four 
central themes of race, nation, gender, and class. Referring to Ann McClintock’s work, 
demonstrating how women and their bodies have been constructed as “’boundary markers’ to 
mark different social boundaries”, Wigger has argued that German women and their bodies 
functioned as “’gatekeepers’ of the nation”, marking the racial boundaries between ‘black’ and 
‘white’ which came under threat with the arrival of colonial soldiers in the heart of the European 
metropole.188 As Lora Wildenthal has stressed, the rape of German women by soldiers of 
colour “symbolized not only defeat at the hands of the uncivilized, but also the weakness of 
German men, especially those who were in charge of the new Weimar Republic.” While 
“interracial desire […] had been admitted and sometimes even praised before the First World 
War”, Wildenthal argues that in the new, postwar situation of German defeat, humiliation, and 
powerlessness, it was “denied and reinterpreted as rape.”189 The second major theme to 
emerge from the public language around the ‘black shame’ was therefore heavily concerned 
with notions of civilisation, culture, and the humiliation associated with being occupied by 
France’s colonial soldiers. Morel’s piece characterised the presence of the African and Asian 
men in Germany as nothing less than the “barbarian embodiment of a barbarian policy.”190 
Those writing in the national press, as well as those speaking in the German parliament, 
generally agreed that the French administration had very consciously made its decision to 
deploy troops of colour in their occupation of the German Rhineland, knowing full well the 
shocking and humiliating impact this would have on the population. As has already been 
discussed, the colonial soldiers were, even where they were not dehumanised completely, 
considered as lacking any meaningful culture and to exist on a very low level of civilisation. As 
Interior Minister Koch emphasised, no one could hold it against a German man if he resented 
any atrocity committed against him “doubly, if it was committed by a member of a people who 
culturally stand far below us.” This was a “Schmach (‘dishonour’) greater than any other” for a 
highly cultured people.191 Even in more ‘charitable’ perspectives, for example that of German 
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Democratic Party (DDP) representative Adolf Korell, the “poor humans” from Asia and Africa 
were by no means “animals”, but they were “people of a lesser civilisation, which ought to be 
gradually developed further through the influences of Christianity and European culture.”192 
The idea that such people could be put in charge of a white European population, especially 
a Kulturnation (‘cultural nation’/‘nation of culture’) like Germany, was anathema to this view. 
When French troops occupied Frankfurt in April 1920, what attracted particular ire, all the way 
down from German Chancellor Hermann Müller, was the fact that “Senegal-negroes” were 
now (allegedly) quartered in the city’s university and were “guarding the Goethe-house.”193 
The nineteenth-century writer Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, a Frankfurt native, epitomised 
(and still epitomises) like perhaps no other, German culture and the nation’s self-image as the 
‘nation of poets and thinkers’; Müller therefore considered this deliberate action by the French 
particularly loathsome. 
     The shame brought on German women who were raped by colonial soldiers was 
transferred, as elucidated above, and thus brought onto the entire German nation as it was 
being dominated by a supposedly racially inferior enemy army. Yet, “the military rape of 
Germany” was not just an act of humiliation against Germany, but was seen by many as a “sin 
against Europe”, or variously a “crime against Europe,” as well as both an “outrage against 
the German and the French people.”194 The use of colonial troops, which, according to Foreign 
Minister Köster, had already been “a dangerous experiment” during the war, in peacetime was 
an “offence against all of Europe”, a “spiritual crime”, a “danger for national hygiene”, and in 
fact constituted the “ruthless continuation of war by any means, in the middle of peacetime.”195 
Outraged German representatives therefore actively called for France to be excluded from the 
circle of civilised European nations henceforth. The Catholic Centre Party’s Johannes Bell 
appealed “to the world’s conscience, […] the entire civilised world” to no longer tolerate that 
such a state of affairs should be allowed to pertain in a “cultured country” (‘Kulturlande’) like 
Germany. By sending troops of colour to occupy a “thousand year old nation of culture” and 
thereby disregarding any sense of shared European (meaning white) solidarity and culture, 
France had “forfeited” any right to accuse other countries.196 The German-nationalist Deutsche 
Tageszeitung chose to appeal especially to the United States, with its strict segregation laws 
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and established practice of swiftly punishing, often by lynching, any black person who 
overstepped their mark, to join in the German condemnation of France, and to not allow the 
alleged “unspeakable black mass atrocities” to continue.197 Bell’s Centre Party colleague 
Georg Schreiber noted that “the menace” which the “uncultured illiteracy [and] uncurbed 
instincts” of the colonial troops posed to the “highly-cultured people on the Rhine” ought to be 
understandable not only to London and Washington, but also to Robert Cecil in South Africa.198 
By 1923, with France’s renewed occupation of the Ruhr area, German protest and outrage 
was no longer predominantly directed at the presence of colonial soldiers in this industrial 
heartland, but all French soldiers in general had become “beasts.”199 Though the 
dehumanising and racialised language persisted, it was now used to characterise white men 
and their behaviour as occupiers, as well as black men. Especially the National Socialist press 
made use of this trope, denouncing French soldiers as “white niggers” and casting their 
occupation as “white negro rule.”200 Shifting the focus away from exclusively colonial soldiers, 
the alleged rapes and sexual assaults against German women and girls associated with the 
‘black shame’ were now transferred and re-cast, by the more extreme Right at least, as a 
“white shame.”201 The French had thus apparently stooped to the level of barbarism usually 
associated with colonised peoples and were hardly worthy of inclusion in the circle of civilised 
European nations any more.  
     The power differential between the armed soldiers of occupation now put in charge of the 
German civilians only added to the feelings of powerlessness, defeat and humiliation; it 
appears that German civilians hardly ever dared to respond with violence against the French 
troops. However, bound up with the indignation and humiliation experienced as a result of the 
occupation were various, more or less veiled, threats. One was a general concern, though it 
was sometimes articulated almost with a hint of Schadenfreude in Germany, that the 
experience of acting as an occupying force within Europe and of exerting power over white 
European civilians, especially over women, would lead the colonial subjects to “lose faith in 
white superiority and the associated respect for white rule.”202 The German student body, 
writing in protest against the colonial soldiers, predicted that “the half-wild negro peoples, used 
as police dogs against highly cultured European peoples, will one day rebel against their 
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current tamers with the contempt for the white race now acquired.”203 The Frankfurter Zeitung, 
apparently sensing the future conflicts of decolonisation, speculated that this loss of “respect 
for the white skin,” brought about by the “short-sighted English and French hatred of the 
German people”, might have “terrible consequences” in Africa and Asia, as the French 
government would have to face up to the fact that its actions had undermined “Europe’s 
prestige” and France’s own “predominance in the world.”204 A second veiled threat, articulated 
by the Chancellor Hermann Müller, as he spoke under the impression of the recent putsch 
attempt by Kapp and Lüttwitz in March 1920, was that France’s newest expansion of its 
occupation into the Rhine-Main area and its overtly antagonising use of colonial soldiers would 
lead to a resurgence of German nationalism and possibly further coup attempts, which would 
endanger not only the stability of the new German republic, but also peace in Europe.205 
     As the previous chapters of this thesis have stressed already, the German administration 
in the early interwar years had to make it one of its priorities to project an image of Germany 
to the world which would undo the image created during wartime and present the young 
republic as a reliable and committed partner in a democratic, and civilised, world. In this 
context, the focus, especially of the “official” propaganda campaign, on internationally 
discrediting France’s policy of occupation and the Treaty of Versailles, and encouraging other 
nations to join in the German protest, therefore made political sense.206 Christian Koller has 
distinguished between an “official” propaganda campaign, run or at least supported, though 
often clandestinely, by the German Interior and Foreign Ministries, and an “unofficial” 
propaganda campaign, organised privately by non-governmental organisations, such as 
women’s groups, churches, students or similar. While it was especially the unofficial campaign 
which perpetuated the strongest and most graphic racist tropes and fully dehumanised the 
colonial soldiers, the official propaganda campaign was focused more on the political aspect 
of turning the world against France.207 The presence of French colonial soldiers in the 
occupied areas was a circumstance which could be richly exploited to this end; while the plight 
of the German women under the occupation, both real and imagined, could also be used for 
political gain by the propaganda campaign. As late as 1924, the Deutscher Notbund gegen 
die schwarze Schmach und die Bedrückung der besetzten Gebiete (‘German emergency 
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league against the Black Shame and the suppression in the occupied areas’) denounced the 
circumstance that even though France had withdrawn the “full-blood negroes” from the 
Rhineland, thousands of other “coloureds of equal nature” remained in Germany, continually 
endangering the honour of German women and the German nation. The league also took 
pride in advertising the fact that, sparing neither effort nor money, it had, since 1920, 
“enlightened” large parts of the world about the “humiliation” of Germany at the hands of the 
French, which “the world must tolerate no longer.”208 This is not to say that the use of dark-
skinned colonial soldiers to occupy a nation in the heart of Europe was not genuinely shocking 
and humiliating to contemporaries. However, alternative reactions to the situation were, 
though much rarer, also in evidence. Rather than lashing out via violent and extremely 
racialised language and imagery, more left-leaning papers, such as the Social Democratic 
Vorwärts, focused somewhat more on the general humiliation and violent act of French 
occupation itself, and reported less specifically on the presence, or (alleged) crimes, of colonial 
soldiers.209 The Communist Rote Fahne condemned the “agitating” propaganda campaign 
other papers ran against the ‘black shame’, and saw the colonial soldiers as “unfortunate 
victims of imperialism.”210 Similarly, Independent Social Democratic representative Luise Zietz 
condemned the racial hatred which the campaign against the ‘black shame’ was stoking, 
blaming militarism more widely for its brutalising effects everywhere. She provoked the 
assembly by reminding its members of the less than honourable actions of German soldiers, 
for example towards Chinese women before the First World War, as well as in France and 
Belgium during the war. She also gave expression to the hypocrisy of European civilising 
missions, by pointing out that it had of course been Europeans who had carried all the 
‘benefits’ of their civilisation, from “firewater, [to] syphilis and capitalist exploitation” into the 
wider world over the past centuries.211 However, with such voices much in the minority, the 
discourse was heavily dominated by the racist propaganda campaign against the colonial 
soldiers, which aimed at discrediting France internationally and projecting Germany as a 
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3.2.2 The ‘race riots’ in British port cities in 1919. 
After the end of the First World War, a number of British colonial seamen found themselves in 
British port cities across the country, where they became the victims of violence at the hands 
of white British rioters on multiple occasions during the year 1919. Riots took place in Glasgow 
in January, in South Shields in February, in Salford and London in April; London experienced 
rioting in May, June and August. The month of June saw the peak of the clashes, with riots 
taking place in Hull, Liverpool, Cardiff, Newport and Barry.212 Aside from the considerable 
damage done to property, dozens of people were injured, and at least 250 arrested. In total, 
five men died as a result of the rioting, one in Liverpool, three in Cardiff, and one in Barry; of 
the victims, three were white men and two were men of colour. Despite what this ratio of white 
to non-white fatalities might suggest, it was specifically the men of colour who were targeted 
by white violence, while the white victims died in a more accidental manner or as a result of 
the victimised men of colour defending themselves against their attackers.213 In referring to 
the men of colour involved in the unrest, newspapers variously used the words ‘coloured’ and 
‘black’; these covered a broad spectrum of individuals, as, though it was often men from the 
West Indies who were targeted in the riots, the “coloured men” living in British port cities and 
caught up in the unrest also included West Africans, Egyptians, other ‘Arabs’, Somalis, 
“Hindoos”, and Chinese immigrants.214 It is worth noting here that different people of colour 
were ‘ranked’ along a racial hierarchy by contemporaries, implying levels of ‘culture’ and 
‘civilisation’, with Asians and Arabs generally considered higher up the hierarchy than the 
“barbaric” tribes of Black Africa.215 This was the case in Germany, too, where, when a brigade 
of Senegalese soldiers was removed from the Rhineland and transferred to quell rebellion in 
Syria, the Frankfurter Zeitung commented on how the French were seemingly making a habit 
out of using a “lower” standing people to fight a “higher standing culture.” The paper, however, 
also was deeply indignant that the Senegalese soldiers were being replaced by North Africans 
in the Rhineland; though it acknowledged that “the North Africans stand on a slightly higher 
 
212 Jacqueline Jenkinson, “The 1919 riots”, in Panikos Panayi (ed.), Racial Violence in Britain in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries (revised ed., London and New York, 1996), p. 94. 
213 Numbers of victims summarised from Jenkinson, “The 1919 riots”, pp. 92-111, and Jenkinson, Black 
1919, p. 1. 
214 Most of these listed in Report by Cardiff Police Chief Constable David Williams to Director of 
Intelligence, 09.10.1919, TNA (Kew), CO 318/352, [digitised: 
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.movinghere.org.uk/search/catalogue.asp?seq
uence=14&resourcetypeID=2&recordID=64162 [accessed 30.05.2020]]. On racist perceptions of 
Chinese immigrants, specifically, as a culturally incompatible threat to interwar Britain, see Sascha 
Auberbach, Race, law, and 'the Chinese puzzle' in imperial Britain (New York and Basingstoke, 2009). 
215 Quote by Gold Coast lawyer Joseph Renner Maxwell in Paul Rich, Race and Empire in British Politics 
(Cambridge, 1990), p. 30. 
173 
 
level than the negroes,” its ultimate assessment was: “from the frying pan into the fire.”216 On 
the other hand, not everyone agreed on the specific hierarchy of races. The writer and traveller 
Mary Kingsley considered “the true negro […] by far the better man than the Asiatic”, mainly 
due to his ascribed sense for logic, practicality, and property, rather than being much 
concerned with religion and spirituality.217 Paul Rich therefore has emphasised the “lack of 
clarity and consistency in the thinking at this time over race […] in Britain.”218 Because the 
terms ‘black’ and ‘coloured’ described people from many different ethnic and cultural 
backgrounds, Laura Tabili has noted that “‘Black’ was a political label rather than a physical 
description: the boundary between Black and white was not drawn on the basis of physical 
appearance, but on relations of power.”219 She therefore opts to use the capitalised ‘Black’ to 
refer to all of the various groups of people of colour then living in Britain and involved in the 
unrest of 1919. Henceforth, this chapter will follow this convention. 
     The public language under investigation here exhibited two major themes in relation to the 
conflicts between white Britons and people of colour in Britain in 1919; both themes also 
constitute the major directions of the relevant historiography. They are race and class, or, 
more precisely, a discourse over miscegenation fears, on the one hand, and a discourse 
embedded in the labour conflicts of the economically strained postwar period, on the other. 
The latter theme has been the focus especially of Jacqueline Jenkinson’s work on the riots, in 
which she emphasised above all the impact of economic concerns, more so than race, as a 
factor in the riots. Several factors combined. Firstly the competition in the merchant shipping 
industry; secondly the mass demobilisation of (mostly white) servicemen following the end of 
the First World War, who were now demanding jobs back in the cities; and thirdly the presence 
of large numbers of Black workers and sailors, who had been hired during the war for 
munitions and other industries, to serve in the army and navy, and to sail in the merchant 
navy, to make up for the shortage of domestic British workers and sailors called up to serve 
in the war. Together, these factors created a situation in many British port cities in which Black 
and white men were competing for jobs, with employers hiring Black sailors to undercut white 
British sailors’ rates of pay.220 Jenkinson has also embedded this argument in the environment 
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of the labour conflict on ‘Red Clydeside’, specifically, where a riot involving Black sailors 
occurred a mere week before the wider unrest of the ‘Battle of George Square’, as discussed 
in Chapter 1. In this case, the origin of the riot at the Mercantile Marine Offices appeared 
particularly directly related to hiring practices. However, contemporary reports contradicted 
each other. Some alleged that Black men were being given preference over white men in 
signing on to the crew of a ship in Glasgow harbour, sparking resentment among the white 
men and triggering conflict between the two groups.221 Elsewhere, the opposite was reported, 
alleging that “preference [was] being given to British [i.e. white, A.K.] seamen over coloured 
seamen”, locating the source of resentment and aggression among the Black sailors rather 
than the white men.222 The Clyde Workers’ Committee’s 40-hour week campaign was driven 
specifically by fears over white unemployment in the wake of demobilisation and seamen’s 
unions thus specifically sought to limit the use of Black and Chinese sailors, Emmanuel 
Shinwell having made a “hostile speech” on the morning of the riot, further underlining the 
significance of economic concerns in the conflict.223 The argument that Black men were taking 
jobs which white men thought should have been theirs upon their return from the war, was 
repeated time and again over the course of the year’s riots.224 In Liverpool, where especially 
sugar refineries and oil cake mills became flash points of conflict, one such firm was reported 
to have “discharged all coloured men, as the white men refused to work with them.”225 
     It is important to note that the Black men, with some exceptions such as Chinese 
immigrants, were to a large extent British subjects, drawn to the opportunities of the metropole 
from various corners of the Empire.226 Though these men were a “section of Britain’s global 
workforce”, they were actively “kept structurally separate to ensure their enhanced 
exploitability” on the postwar job market.227 As Bill Schwarz has argued for the post-Second 
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World War period, the Black subjects coming to the UK were located “in British civilization, 
[but] found themselves simultaneously dislocated from its privileges.”228 Therefore, the Black 
workers’ struggle for equal treatment as citizens took on a deeper significance, transcending 
purely economic aspects and entering the realm of individual and collective identities. As Tabili 
has put it, their “demand for British justice embodied a claim to British nationality.”229 Thus 
more differentiated arguments have to be made, in addition to the economic motivation, in 
order to analyse the violence faced by Black inhabitants of British port cities in the postwar 
period. In her more recent monograph, Jenkinson has accordingly examined not only the 
explanatory potential of the pressured postwar economic situation, but also considered 
aspects of port city life more generally, theories of crowd behaviour, “contested 
understandings of national identity and ‘Britishness’”, and the “influence of racist thought within 
sections of British society.”230 It is the latter two aspects on which the chapter will primarily 
focus in the following. 
     Parliament remained noticeably silent on the events. Besides comments from Independent 
Labour MP for Govan (Glasgow) Neil Maclean, remarking how the lower wages paid by 
shipping companies to Asian sailors as compared to white British sailors were causing 
understandable resentment on the Clyde, the riots of the spring and summer of 1919 were not 
discussed by parliamentarians.231 This has led Michael Rowe to speculatively conclude that 
“elected politicians do not seem to have been particularly exercised by the disorders.”232 In 
stark contrast to this attitude, the contemporary press reported on the riots often and 
extensively. It was most concerned with the race of the colonial sailors and reporting was 
characterised to a large extent by, more or less explicitly articulated, fears of miscegenation. 
The Black men themselves were often characterised in dehumanising and racialised terms. 
One newspaper quoted a detective as saying that the “coloured men [were] becoming 
pests.”233 Another police officer, however, employed the wide-spread racist trope of 
infantilization, saying that “most of [the Black men] are only big children who when they get 
money like to make a show.”234 The Glasgow Evening Times’ “Hal o’ the Wynd” opinion column 
used racist language too, with the added feature of a crude phonetic rendering of a West 
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Indian, or West African or possibly Indian, accent. It referred to the Black men in Britain as 
“Sambo”, a stereotypical name for African-Americans and a slur used for people of mixed 
African, Native American, and/or Indian descent, who, prior to the current unrest, had generally 
been regarded as a harmless “amoosin’ cuss’” by the white British population.235 More hostile 
racist language was used in a piece which the Evening Times reproduced from The 
Manchester Guardian, in which it characterised the usually “quiet, apparently inoffensive 
nigger” as “a demon when armed with a revolver or razor.”236 
     The language used by the newspapers can give an indication of the perceived severity of 
the situation and the power dynamics involved. As Rowe has pointed out, the ubiquitous term 
“race riot” was in reality a misnomer, as “racist riots” would have been more accurate. 
However, Rowe rightly observes that the term “race riot” removed any attachment of blame 
which the term “racist” might have carried, even if this choice was less a deliberate one by 
newspaper editors than arising out of a real contemporary understanding of the differences 
and potentials for conflict between the races.237 While the vast majority of reports spoke of 
“rioting” or “riots”, there was also some use of “disturbances”, “trouble”, and “street fight”, the 
latter terms perhaps implying a little less severity than the former.238 The Daily Mail, however, 
in one instance spoke of “guerrilla warfare” when reporting on events in Cardiff in June, raising 
a far more menacing spectre than a more ordinary-sounding “street fight” might conjure up.239 
On the other hand, when the Black sailor Charles Wotten (or Wootton) drowned in a Liverpool 
dock after being chased by a white mob, one headline ran: “Negro Lynched in Liverpool Riot.” 
It thus placed this death in a row with the kind of racial violence familiar from the United States, 
clearly aware of the power dynamics of the situation and thus rhetorically distributing the roles 
of victim and perpetrators accordingly.240 Reports actually remained unclear on whether 
Wotten had jumped into the water in a desperate attempt to save himself, or whether he had 
been thrown in and left to die, to calls from the crowd to “let him drown.” Based on the lack of 
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clear evidence as to how exactly Wotten had ended up in the water at the Queen’s Dock, no 
verdict of murder was returned.241  
     The types of attacks and weapons employed by the Black and white rioters, and by the 
police, also allow some estimation of the perceived level of threat and seriousness of the 
unrest. The police, in some cases with the aid of mounted police, had at its disposal only their 
batons to disperse the angry crowds and restore order, which appeared to be largely 
successful, though sometimes only after a significant time.242 The white rioters were most 
often reported to be using their feet and fists, occasionally bricks, bottles, chair legs, stones, 
sticks, and in one case a frying pan, as weapons to get out their aggressions in face-to-face 
confrontations.243 But their superiority in numbers meant that situations of white mobs chasing 
and beating up Black men, white crowds attacking boarding-houses for Black men, wrecking 
them, throwing out furniture, and setting fire to them, were the more frequent forms which the 
white violence took.244 The Black men involved in the rioting, however, were reported to be 
remarkably well armed, and not in the least hesitant to defend themselves. One report claimed 
that the “Negroes are nearly all armed and fire on the slightest provocation”, while another one 
listed the Black men’s weapons of choice as “revolvers, pokers, and sticks.”245 References to 
knives, and in particular razors and slashing were particularly frequent. In Cardiff, a young 
white man named Harold Smart had his throat slashed, apparently by a Black man, and died 
in hospital, while numerous reports contained reference to the use of razors as weapons and 
cuts being inflicted on white rioters and police officers. By way of an explanation for the 
prevalence of the weaponization of razors by the Black men, the Daily Express quoted one 
“Ali”, once again crudely rendering his accent phonetically: “no barber’ll shave dis cullud man!” 
Thanks to racial prejudice, therefore, Ali and men like him had to carry their own razors, which, 
the paper however implied, only made for a convenient excuse to be in possession of “so 
deadly a weapon.”246 
 
241 “The Racial Riots in Liverpool. A Menacing Situation.”, Manchester Guardian, 11.06.1919, p. 7; 
shouts from the crowd were reported in, for example, “Liverpool ‘Colour’ Riots”, Morning Post, 
11.06.1919, p. 4. 
242 Example: “The Colour Trouble at Cardiff. Baton Charge by the Police.”, Manchester Guardian, 
16.06.1919, p. 9;  
243 Examples: “Black Men and White Girls.”, Daily Mail, 13.06.1919, p. 3; “Race Rioting at Cardiff. Wild 
Early Morning Scenes.”, Times, 13.06.1919, p. 9. 
244 Examples: “Serious Disturbance in Glasgow”, The Scotsman, 24.01.1919, p. 4; “The Racial Riots in 
Liverpool. A Menacing Situation.”, Manchester Guardian, 11.06.1919, p. 7; “The Liverpool Riots”, 
Manchester Guardian, 12.06.1919, p. 4; “Race Rioting at Cardiff. Wild Early Morning Scenes.”, Times, 
13.06.1919, p. 9; “Black Men and White Girls.”, Daily Mail, 13.06.1919, p. 3. 
245 “Ostentatious Negroes. Causes of Cardiff Riots.”, Daily Mail, 14.06.1919, p. 3; “Rioting at Newport”, 
Morning Post, 09.06.1919, p. 7. 
246 Examples: “Serious Racial Riots at Cardiff. Three Whites Killed. Negroes Attack with Razors.”, 
Manchester Guardian, 13.06.1919, p. 7; “Black and White at Liverpool. Sunday Night Outbreak”, Times, 
178 
 
     The menacing aspect of the presence of Black men in British cities, however, apparently 
lay not necessarily just in their capacity for physical violence, but first and foremost in their 
interest in white women and the resultant interracial sexual relations. As former colonial 
governor Ralph Williams laid out in stark terms in a letter to the editor of The Times, “intimate 
associations between black or coloured men and white women” were, to contemporaries, “a 
thing of horror.” The emphasis lay on what was implied to be a natural aversion against racial 
mixing: “It is an instinctive certainty that sexual relations between white women and coloured 
men revolt our very nature.”247 It is notable that this apparently ‘natural’ aversion only seemed 
to apply to relations between Black men and white women, while relations between white men 
and women of colour, which occurred in colonial settings as well as occasionally in the 
metropole, were not subject to the same scrutiny or condemnation.248 As Tabili has stressed, 
with the arrival of large numbers of British colonial subjects (and other people of colour) in the 
metropole, “imperial racial categories and racial subordination were reconstituted on British 
soil.”249 “Imperial manhood”, which relied on the successful subordination of women, children, 
the natural world, and colonised people, was a constituting part of British imperial power and 
identity, which was threatened by the transgressive interracial relationships between Black 
men and white women.250 Noticeably, in contrast to the situation in the Rhineland described 
above, the press discourse was not primarily characterised by allegations of rape or sexual 
assaults by Black men against white women, in which women were solely constructed as 
victims. Instead, white women were apportioned a large amount of the blame for the rising 
tensions, which they were seen to be provoking by associating with Black men. This was true 
both in cases of mutual relationships, as well as with regards to prostitution. Thus, The Times, 
for example, commented that “the intermarriage of black men and white women, not to 
mention other relationships, has excited much feeling.”251 Insinuating prostitution, and with 
clear class-based judgement, many reports blamed the unrest on the association with Black 
men of women who they characterised as being “of a low type.”252 “Ostentatious negroes” who 
had “grown more arrogant of late”, as they were enjoying spending the money they made on 
their jobs (which, in many people’s opinions, as laid out above, they should not have had in 
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the first place), were attracting the “class of women who infest seaports.”253 These “loose 
women” who had been given license to “solicit the black men,” thus sparking resentment 
among white men, were seen as a main cause of the unrest.254 
     The victimisation of women extended far beyond those engaged in prostitution, however, 
and featured in all the centres of rioting. In Liverpool, which saw some of the largest-scale 
rioting in June, violence first broke out when a number of Black men apparently attacked some 
Scandinavian sailors; the Black men, being British subjects, resented that shipping companies 
were hiring (white) foreigners in their stead. However, newspapers immediately drew on the 
theme of interracial relationships as they explained that “the strife is the outcome of the 
negroes’ familiarity with white women, which in some cases has been legalised by marriage”, 
as well as pointing to the employment issue, positing that white men felt Black men were taking 
their jobs.255 In Cardiff, which also experienced severe rioting in June, it was reported that “the 
white population was inflamed” because a “negro was seen walking down the Bute-street arm-
in-arm with a white girl.” An apparently “prominent citizen”, speaking to the newspaper 
reporter, was confident as to who was responsible, explaining that “‘some of the white women 
are not free of blame. They fraternise with the negroes, and give them encouragement.’”256 
Not only did this “prominent citizen” lay at least a significant portion of the blame for the unrest 
at the feet of white women, he also employed language from a war context, identifying the 
Black men – British subjects in many cases, who had just fought for the Empire in the First 
World War – as an enemy with whom the women were “fraternis[ing]”; an image and a choice 
of language familiar to contemporaries from the recent context of the First World War, when, 
particularly in France and Belgium, women who had associated with enemy soldiers were 
severely stigmatised and punished as traitors, for example by having their heads shaved, after 
the end of the war.257 In what appeared as almost a strange show of masculine solidarity, one 
piece first blamed the Black men, saying that the “negroes would not have been touched but 
for their relations with white women. This has caused the entire trouble,” only to then go on to 
contend that “of course, the white woman is equally to blame, but somehow it is the black man 
that suffers.”258 Another piece also showed a sort of sympathy for the male victims at the 
expense of the white women leading them into trouble; the piece recognised the injustice of 
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“these insane riots – in which men whom we brought over to fight for us are killed for a race 
prejudice excited by the folly of certain women” and, echoing Williams’ vocabulary, suggested 
that “a campaign of education should reveal to white women the well-founded horror in which 
their intimacy with blacks is held.”259 It was not only men, however, who participated in the 
victimisation of the women who associated with Black men. In Cardiff, when a house where 
Black men were living was set fire to, a “young white woman was rescued from the premises, 
and the police, who escorted her away, had some difficulty in protecting her from other white 
women.”260 While the report made no comment as to why the “young white woman” was at the 
attacked premises, it is clear that her fellow white women, sure of their own moral 
righteousness, did not need confirmation and jumped to the conclusion that the woman was 
in fact “fraternising” with the Black men, bringing shame on white British womanhood, 
outraging contemporary morals and provoking the anger of white men. At a court session 
dealing with charges arising from the riots in Newport, one of the accused, a white woman, 
was reported to have shouted at one of the victims, a white wife of a Black man, the extremely 
violent threat of “You ought to be burnt, because you are a black man’s wife.”261  
     Much of the activities of white women to which their fellow white Britons objected so much 
may have in fact been based in rumour. When unrest broke out at an Arab-run coffee shop on 
Cable Street in London’s East End in June of the year, it was reported that the riot had arisen 
“on a report being spread that some white girls had been seen to enter the house.” No 
indication was provided in the report as to whether any white girls had actually been at the 
scene at all, however the rumour had proved potent enough so that “soon a crowd of 3,000 
people assembled, and the place was attacked.”262 Even when a riot was said to have 
occurred because of “a black man accosting a white girl”, the headline redistributed the blame 
and ran: “Girl causes a riot.”263 The agency, opinions, or feelings of the women who associated 
with the Black men were generally not taken into account. The East End riots in April also took 
their origin at a café, or restaurant, “frequented by coloured seamen,” where “a couple of 
English girls were employed.” Though it was reported that “these girls were often the subject 
of insulting remarks”, the “girls’” own views of these remarks, and whether insulting remarks 
from “coloured seamen” were any more objectionable to them than receiving them from white 
customers, never featured in the reporting. Instead, the riot was said to have occurred because 
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“white men resent[ed] the attention paid by coloured men to waitresses.”264 Thus white men’s 
sensibilities stood at the centre of the discourse, while the opinions and feelings of the white 
women themselves were relegated to the discursive side-lines. As Jenkinson has noted, only 
a small number of women chose to speak up and defend their choices against the critics, such 
as one who wrote a letter to the Glasgow Evening Times in response to the ‘Hal o’ the Wynd’ 
column, commenting that she was very happy with her decision to marry a Black sailor.265 The 
previously mentioned Ralph Williams, who had served as the governor of the Windward 
Islands and for several years administered the Government of Bechuanaland (modern-day 
Botswana), also sought the cause of the riots among “white women of a certain temperament” 
who were “encouraging [the Black men’s] attentions, and allowing themselves to be taken as 
paramours, or sometimes wives.” Tellingly he concluded, “what blame to the coloured men if 
they take advantage of it? And what blame, too, to those white men who, seeing these 
conditions and loathing them, resort to violence?”266 The only party left to blame, then, were 
women, their actions evidently proving so outrageous, unacceptable and threatening to 
“imperial manhood” that they justified violent retaliation in order to restore imperial power and 
colonial race and gender norms which were in danger of becoming unbalanced in the 
multiracial milieux of postwar British port cities. 
     Intimately linked with conceptions of the imperial self were contestations over Britishness 
more broadly, as well as more specific rights associated with this identity, to which the Black 
men arriving in the metropole, as far as they came from within the British empire, lay their own 
claim. In opposition to the situation in the Rhineland discussed above, where the French 
colonial soldiers were part of a foreign army of occupation and wielded power over the German 
civilian population who dared not lash out against them, the Black men in Britain were not in 
a position of power in relation to the white British population around them. Despite many of 
the Black men being British subjects, they were a disadvantaged minority, the victims of 
prejudice, and of verbal and physical abuse at the hands of the white majority. The “Society 
of People of African Origin” therefore held a protest meeting in Hyde Park following the height 
of the riots in June 1919. In a resolution moved by the society’s president, Eldred Taylor, 
members condemned recent events, which had seen “manifestations of race hatred, […] 
resulting in the ill-treatment, punishment, and death of negroes.” The resolution demanded 
that “adequate protection should be granted us as British subjects.” The Society’s general 
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secretary, F.E.M. Hercules, further emphasised the society members’ claim to a British identity 
by insisting that branding all Black Britons as morally dubious on the basis of the actions of 
only a few was “unfair and un-English.”267 The ultra-patriotic John Bull was in fact willing to 
lend support to the Black men’s argument and published a letter from a “group representing 
more than 130 black sailors” in which the men protested the ‘colour bar’ on British ships in 
Glasgow. The letter repeated that the “coloured seamen” were “Britishborn subjects” who had 
“defied the Hun and his devilries for the sake of Britain.” The fact that many of them were now 
unemployed and destitute was an outrage to them. Yet, in a turn of argument which no doubt 
pleased the editors and readers of John Bull, the letter also emphasised that the Black men 
were “modest enough to say – ‘first place for white Britishers; after that coloured Britishers’”, 
identifying as the real villains in the story the “Norwegians, Swedes and Spaniards” who the 
Black men had to watch the shipping companies hire instead of them.268 Thus some Black 
men in Liverpool reportedly actively claimed and exhibited their British identity by wearing their 
war medals, demonstrating their loyalty and service to Britain.269 This observation stood in 
stark contrast to the involvement of dissatisfied demobilised white soldiers in the riots, as for 
example in Newport, where one of the white men charged with rioting and assaults on the 
police was reported to have been “wearing the Mons ribbon.”270 
     Voices from the Dominions weighed in on the tensions in the “Mother Country”, too, with 
one Australian correspondent in the Morning Post expressing hope that the “one benefit in the 
troubles which the Mother Country has at present with a small negro population” would be that 
Britain would now better understand the “’White Australia’” policy and “Canada’s objection to 
unrestricted Asiatic immigration.” The correspondent considered it “a fact – an unfortunate 
fact, perhaps, but still a fact – that the coloured races and our white race cannot live together 
on terms of equal freedom.” At the centre of the issue he unequivocally placed “the sex 
question.” If “full privileges as ‘as man and a brother’” were to be extended to “other racial 
types” then interracial relationships would have to be accepted as the logical outcome; “that 
path”, however, “leads to racial degradation” and “all the instincts of our white race refuse 
that.” Therefore, a “negro problem in [the British man’s] home will convince him, far more 
quickly than any abstract argument” of the need for segregationist, or apartheid-style policies 
which would keep “race equality” at bay.271 The United States’ approach to race relations was 
also put into contrast with the ongoing conflicts in Britain and the prominence of interracial 
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relationships. The Times thus reported that “American naval officers stationed at the American 
naval base at Cardiff have often expressed their disgust at the laxity of the British law in this 
connexion.”272 
     It had been a political choice by the British government to increase the “importation of black 
labour” as a “war emergency” measure, and political solutions to the arising tensions had to 
be sought.273 In Liverpool, in the immediate term, between 700 and 1,000 Black inhabitants of 
the city, including families, were, “at their own request”, offered protection from the angry white 
mob by being housed in the Bridewell, the city’s central prison, for a few days.274 This was 
evidently not a permanent solution, however. To account for the slightly longer term, to avoid 
further rioting, one option being considered was removing the Black men to an internment 
camp, especially as the military was seen as having some responsibility for the large number 
of British colonial subjects now finding themselves in British port cities, having recruited them 
during the war.275 This approach made clear the perception that the ‘problem’ were the Black 
men and the solution was their removal from where their presence would provoke white 
Britons. The next policy solution to be devised by the government made this attitude and belief 
in the separation of the races even more obvious. It was a proposed repatriation scheme, 
encouraging Black men to return to their ‘home’ countries, or indeed anywhere in the “colonial 
periphery, regardless of whence they came,” further underlining that the British government’s 
priority was to remove these men from the metropole.276 The repatriation scheme did not prove 
particularly successful. Although apparently some five hundred Black men had initially 
expressed a willingness to return to their home countries, or another colonial destination, the 
steamer Batanga left Liverpool on 18 June 1919 with only forty-three West Africans on board. 
Everyone else had decided against the journey, citing a variety of reasons, from too short a 
notice, to outstanding payments for their war service, to a lack of guarantees from the 
government to provide them with a sum of money upon arrival at their destination to ensure 
that they would not be left destitute.277 
     As the repatriation scheme already begins to illustrate, the riots of 1919 had reverberations 
not only within Britain, but also in its colonies, metropole and periphery being intimately linked 
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in what Tabili has termed a “continuing dialectic” between their societies and cultures.278 The 
fact that events in the metropole would be noticed and judged throughout the Empire was an 
important concern for contemporaries, who were continuously aware of how important colonial 
perceptions of the ‘Mother Country’ were for the maintenance of British imperial prestige and 
power. Exuding the paternalism of Kipling’s ‘White Man’s Burden’, the Reverend George 
Mitchell, Chaplain to Seamen, wrote in a letter to the Daily Express that “for good or bad, these 
dark sons of the West Indies are members of the British Empire, and to foster an antipathy 
towards them will not tend to cement the bonds of Empire.”279 Similar concerns were voiced 
by Williams, who wrote a letter to the editor of The Times in which he expressed his worry that 
“every ‘coloured newspaper’ in the West Indies, on the west coast of Africa, and in every land 
where colour predominates, [was] seething with journalistic indignation at what they deem to 
be the ill-treatment of their brethren who have come over to aid us in the war.”280 With an 
awareness of nascent and potentially growing anti-colonial movements in the periphery, the 
Liverpool Daily Post warned of “infinite possibilities of mischief if any idea gained ground in 
India and Africa that the isolated conduct of riotous mobs represented the prevailing British 
attitude towards the black members of the Empire who are in our midst.”281 Given that a large 
number of the Black men involved in the unrest were of Caribbean origin, news of the riots 
echoed the most round the West Indies. As a letter from the Director of Intelligence 
emphasised, “the alleged stories of negro atrocities in South Wales [were] a matter which was 
agitating the Government of Trinidad.”282 In an effort to alleviate this agitation, a staff member 
in the Colonial Office received reports from the Hull and South Shields Police Chief Constables 
with the comment that the Colonial Office ought to “now consider the question of sending 
T’dad [Trinidad] & leewards suitable extracts from the reports, by way of refutation of the 
alleged illtreatment [sic!] of coloured men in this country.”283 The police reports thus generally 
emphasised that there was no evidence “of West Indians either collectively or individually 
being outrageously attacked.” They also reiterated that it was the Black men who made use 
of the more dangerous weapons, such as firearms, knives and razors, as discussed above, 
while the white rioters only used their fists or threw stones. The Cardiff Chief Constable’s 
report also took particular care to expose as false an especially gruesome and distressing 
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rumour that one Black man had been killed in the rioting and his head subsequently been 
abused as a football by the white aggressors; this evidently was not true, proving once again 
the agitating potential of rumours in volatile violent situations.284 The Chief Constable of 
Newport sent the Director of Intelligence a letter to the same effect, in order to dispel the 
concerns of a Barbadian newspaper that the riots constituted “colour feuds.” The police chief 
argued that “racial feeling” never played an overly important part in the unrest; instead, he 
considered the rioting to have been “an opportunity for sheer hooliganism and disorder on the 
part of an undesirable section of the residents of this town.” He also quickly provided further 
details on who he considered to make up this “undesirable section”, adding that “it is noticeable 
that the majority of white persons charged in connection with the disturbances is Irish.”285 The 
convenient argument, which deflected the need to actually address the underlying social and 
economic grievances motivating many rioters, that “hooligan elements” or “roughs” had simply 
exploited an already charged atmosphere was also made in Liverpool and London, and the 
Liverpool Assistant Head Constable reported to the Director of Intelligence that “the attacks 
on the negroes were only made by the irresponsible element of the population many of whom 
were arrested, and have been sentenced to various terms of imprisonment.”286 Jenkinson has 
analysed the treatment in the courts of the Black and white people who were arrested and has 
concluded that the judiciary’s approach was inconsistent. While some Black and Arab 
defendants were released or found not guilty on lack of evidence, others received heavier 
sentences than white defendants did for comparable offences, and occasionally magistrates 
appeared to show a degree of sympathy for the actions of the white rioters.287 
     Analyses of the 1919 ‘race’ riots have largely revolved around resolving whether they were 
in fact primarily motivated by racial prejudice, or whether broader social and economic 
concerns played the more important role. As Jenkinson has put it, the “sex issue [i.e. the 
rejection of interracial relationships] was simply the leading manifestation of a more general 
white dissatisfaction.”288 She has maintained, also in her later, more comprehensive work, that 
viewing the riots primarily through the prism of ‘race relations’ is a fallacy and that they need 
to be considered within broader postwar circumstances, making a class analysis more 
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compelling than an analysis centring race as an explanatory factor.289 This may be convincing 
in order to explain the riots themselves, but given this thesis’ approach and its interest in 
analysing the public language which accompanied the rioting of 1919, it is undeniable that 
race and in particular the unease about racial mixing were central to contemporaries. As has 
been shown above, the presence of Black seamen in British port cities was exploited within 
the context of ongoing labour conflicts, by blaming the men of colour for perpetual 
unemployment among white sailors and workers. However, an emotionally even more highly 
charged matter was the association of white women with Black men. The white women were 
thus also intrumentalised in this conflict, by being apportioned a significant amount of blame 
for outraging contemporary morals, provoking white men, and inciting conflict. Interracial 
relationships threatened the hegemony of “imperial manhood” (Tabili) which relied on 
dominating women, children, the natural world, and colonised peoples. In this way, especially, 
the conflicts between white Britons and Black inhabitants of British cities raised complicated 
questions about who had a right to lay claim to a British identity. As Bill Schwarz has pointed 
out, “arguably the culture of insular England was formed as much by its overseas possessions 
as by the island territory; and […] white English ethnicity is, despite all protestations to the 
contrary, a hybrid.”290 The Government’s efforts to implement a ‘repatriation’ scheme, 
however, were proof of the perception of the Black men as the ‘problem’ and the desire to 
keep the races physically separate, despite the fact that many of the Black men affected were 
British subjects with the right to move freely within the Empire. Rhetorical efforts to downplay 
the aggression of white rioters and blame a small “hooligan element” further aimed at 
preserving the prestige and power of Britain and its Empire, assuaging fears and discontent 
in the colonial periphery and pre-empting growing anti-colonial sentiments. The presence of 
thousands of people of colour in the metropole therefore unsettled what were considered basic 
tenets of British colonialism and the ‘success’ of the British Empire. Who could belong within 
the ‘inner circle’ was a contested issue, and it was contested violently in the case of the 1919 
riots. 
 
     While in Conrad’s novel ‘darkness’ outwardly referred to the unknown, mysterious, 
potentially dangerous, unexplored regions of central Africa, in a metaphorical way it comes to 
refer to the darkness which takes hold of European hearts as they become capable of 
unleashing extreme violence in spaces where racial hierarchies govern actions and the rules 
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of civilised conduct cease to apply. If one is to consider once again Frederick Harrison’s quote 
from 1867, which appeared at the beginning of this chapter, his concern that measures of 
extraordinary violence employed in the colonial sphere might find their way back, via Ireland, 
onto (specifically) English soil, with incalculable consequences for domestic peace and the 
rule of law in Britain, appears prescient. It seemingly anticipates arguments made in the early- 
to mid-twentieth century, first by decolonisation activists and writers such as W.E.B. DuBois, 
Aimé Césaire, and Frantz Fanon, and later by Hannah Arendt in her magisterial Origins of 
Totalitarianism (1951) regarding certain “boomerang effects” by which the experiences and 
norms established in colonial settings had palpable effects on the “behavior of European 
peoples.”291 Among those experiences, the most significant, according to Arendt, was the 
profound realisation that “peoples could be converted into races and [that] simply by taking 
the initiative in this process, one might push one’s own people into the position of the master 
race.”292 As Gerwarth and Malinowski emphasise, it still remains an open question “where the 
boomerang originated and where it landed.” In particular, the relationship, an indirect one as 
Arendt stated, between the colour-based racism of colonialism and the Nazis’ anti-Semitism 
directed against a fully assimilated, white European ‘inner enemy’, who was nevertheless 
constructed in racial terms by the regime, remains to be examined further.293  
     Language, no doubt one of the constituent parts of the ‘boomerang’, transcended the 
various geographic circles in which political violence manifested itself in the postwar era, 
reverberating dialectically between metropole and periphery. The race riots of 1919, for 
example, have so far largely been analysed by writers in black and immigration history.294 
Despite the much more wide-spread prevalence of unrest during that year, including but by 
no means limited to dissatisfied demobilised soldiers burning down Luton town hall in July, it 
has been less common to incorporate such events into broader histories of postwar political 
violence, within Britain itself, within the Empire, as well as in a comparative European context, 
as this thesis does.295 In examining events of political violence across geographic theatres, as 
well as from within two different national contexts side-by-side, certain commonalities emerge, 
while acute differences equally come into focus. 
 
291 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York, 1976 [1951]), p. 206. On the pre-Arendtian 
history of the ‘boomerang argument’, see summary in Gerwarth and Malinowski, “Hannah Arendt’s 
Ghosts”, pp. 280-281. 
292 Arendt, Origins, p. 206. 
293 Gerwarth and Malinowski, “Hannah Arendt’s Ghosts”, p. 296. 
294 Jenkinson, “Black Sailors on Red Clydeside”, p. 31. 
295 Evans, “Across the universe”, pp. 62, 69. Evans is one of the few to list unrest in India (Amritsar), 
Egypt, Iraq, and Ireland when setting the imperial context to the race riots in British port cities in 1919. 
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     With the first case study of this chapter, British air control in Mandatory Iraq, the categories 
of space, time, and visuality take an especially important place, as does the emerging 
industrialisation, or rationalisation, of killing. The highly modern method of air control, with its 
anonymous, quasi invisible, victims on the ground and the apparent omnipotence of the pilots 
overhead, stood in stark contrast to previous methods of combat, in which killing had had to 
be done largely by hand, face-to-face, and physical and emotional contact between 
combatants, who were more evenly matched, had been unavoidable. In terms of topography, 
too, air control increased the distance, not only between victim and perpetrator, but also 
between the scene of combat – in a faraway Iraqi desert – and the reading public back in the 
metropole. The distance was both physical as well as psychological, allowing for a very 
particular discourse to take hold, driven, in the case of air control in Iraq, by primarily financial 
considerations, making fighting, indeed wounding and killing, a more rationalised, 
industrialised process. The term ‘control’ itself, despite consisting, by the government’s own 
admission, basically of institutionalised terror, suggested a basically administrative process, 
with little emotional investment. This was significantly not the case in the German case studies 
considered here. The discourses over ‘lost’ colonial possessions, and, even more so, over the 
perceived injustice of a French occupation which involved colonial soldiers were highly 
emotionally charged, making use of profoundly emotional language and images, laden with 
pathos, ideology and arousing the passions of Germans in opposition to the occupation.  
     This heated discourse stood in marked contrast to the ‘cold’ administrative and economic 
considerations driving the move towards air control in Iraq. The air control method, with the 
distance and the imbalance it created between victims and perpetrators, came with profound 
implications, too, for both the identities of the victims and those of the perpetrators. Targeting 
defenceless people from the air was seen by some as a cowardly tactic, with concerns raised 
for how it would affect the morals of those doing the bombing. The victims, on the other hand, 
experienced an anonymisation in this process, as their number, let alone their individual 
identities, were obliterated alongside their bodies and not recorded by the bombers. The 
opposite process could be observed with regards to the German victims of attacks by French 
colonial soldiers in the Rhineland. The perpetrators were highly visible, standing out not only 
as foreign soldiers, but especially due to the colour of their skin; the propaganda materials 
against them were often highly visual, purposely drawing on stark and explicit imagery to vilify 
the men. The German women, and men, who were assaulted, beaten, and raped were 
identified and given names, wherever possible, as is evident from the long lists and tables 
published in the Reichstag’s appendices enumerating case after case of such alleged crimes. 
It is notable, however, that the identities of the victims provided often featured only the first 
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name and the initial of the last name, an indication of the shame and stigma associated with, 
in particular, sexual violence. Nevertheless, unlike the Arab victims of British aerial bombing, 
the German civilians victimised by French soldiers were named and counted, as this served 
an express political purpose. The long lists of names and, more or less detailed, accounts of 
the attacks were used in the public arena to further protest and discredit the French 
occupation, the Treaty of Versailles more generally, and the old enemy France as a whole. 
     Physicality has been another aspect which ties the analyses of this chapter’s case studies 
together. Where the method of aerial bombing physically decoupled the violence inflicted from 
its perpetrators, and thus rendered it more abstract, the two case studies of section 3.2 have 
been characterised by an extreme physicality and corporality. The occupation of the 
Rhineland, a violent penetration of national autonomy by enemy forces, was actualised in 
literal rape, women’s bodies standing in, discursively, for the nation as a whole, their bodily 
autonomy being violated by force. While the experience of war on its own territory, occupation 
and violence inside its borders was not unfamiliar in the German context, such experiences 
had been largely absent from British history for many centuries. Violence was something that 
was exported, via British imperialism, into other people’s homes, on the colonial periphery, 
rather than being experienced to the same extent in the metropole. However, with the arrival 
of several thousand people of colour form the ‘dark’ periphery in the beating heart of the 
Empire, an acute anxiety set in over the prospect, and the reality, of interracial physical 
relationships which would unbalance in particular masculine imperial power structures. The 
fact that the physical violence which several British port cities experienced in 1919 was 
perhaps driven more by social and economic dissatisfaction than simply by racial prejudice 
cannot hide the fact that when frustrations surfaced and manifested themselves physically, 
they did so along racial lines. 
     Where public language in Britain was largely in agreement over the dangers, undesirability 
and provocative nature of interracial relationships, the discourse over aerial bombing and the 
implementation of air control was characterised by much more controversial debate, 
ambivalence, diverging opinion, and criticism. Criticism intensified in particular once the 
Labour government took office in 1924, when air policing methods came under somewhat 
more scrutiny.296 The fact that air control continued nevertheless and the voices of those 
criticising it on moral grounds were not successful in effecting a policy change is perhaps 
testament to the primacy of the economic argument, underpinned by strong perceptions of 
racial differences between white European culture and civilisation, and the ‘half-civilised’ 
 
296 Omissi, Air Power, p. 174. 
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worlds of the ‘Arabs’ or ‘Orientals’. This case study is important to the present thesis as a 
means of rebuffing arguments that political violence was absent in interwar Britain; while most 
of it may have taken place in the colonial sphere, it still held significant implications for the 
domestic sphere. As with the case study of Ireland examined in Chapter 2, it once again 
sparked debates over notions of ‘civilised’ uses of violence and particularly ‘British’ values, 
from economic efficiency, to technological invention, to medieval notions of chivalry. 
Importantly, as this chapter has shown, critical voices within those debates can be 
reconstructed from the record; this was less true in German public discourse, the increasingly 
extreme divisions of which this thesis explores further in its next chapter.  
     Tabili has suggested that what was in evidence in interwar debates over the place of people 
of colour in British society, and, by implication, the value of their lives, were “the contradictions 
in twentieth-century imperialism itself: the intensified tension between maintaining the 
subordination and stratification that made imperialism profitable and the political necessity of 
a liberal and progressive public face.”297 The necessity of maintaining a certain public face 
applied to Germany at this point in time, too, as this thesis has continued to argue throughout. 
As a priority, the government of the young German republic had to seek to present the country 
as having been chastened after the excesses of the war, ready to be a reliable, democratic 
member of the civilised family of nations. However, debate, ambivalence, and criticism of the 
dominant public discourse with regards to both colonial revisionism as well as the role of 
French colonial soldiers in the Rhineland was much less in evidence in Germany than the 
debates examined in the British contexts above. With the notable exception of the Independent 
Social Democrats and the Communists, all political voices in parliament and in the press were 
vehemently in favour of demanding the revision of the removal of Germany’s colonies. Those 
voices also vilified, even more virulently, the colonial soldiers of the French occupation. In 
reaction to real acts of violence committed by some of the soldiers of occupation, both white 
and of other ethnicities, the public discourse experienced a rhetorical backlash of extremely 
racialised language, tropes and images created to dehumanise in particular the men of colour 
and therewith delegitimise French policy more generally. The discourses established at that 
point subsequently became increasingly radicalised, taking on enormous momentum with the 
emergence of National Socialism. As the case of the forcibly sterilised ‘Rhineland bastards’ 
shows symptomatically, extreme violence was preceded by extreme propaganda. 
 
 
297 Laura Tabili, “The Construction of Racial Difference in Twentieth-Century Britain: The Special 
Restriction (Coloured Alien Seamen) Order, 1925”, Journal of British Studies, 33/1 (1994), p. 96. 
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In the final chapter, the thesis will move forward some ten years, zooming in on the ‘inner 
circle’ once again, where it will examine reactions to fascist violence in both early 1930s 
German and mid-1930s British public language.
 192 
CHAPTER 4 
REACTING TO FASCIST VIOLENCE IN GERMANY AND BRITAIN IN THE EARLY/MID-
1930s. 
This chapter examines perceptions of Fascist violence in German and British public discourse 
in the early/mid-1930s. Thus, the chapter returns to the inner geographic circle, but moves 
forward circa ten years. For Germany, two case studies prior to the Nazi takeover of power 
have been chosen, as neither the press nor the political and public sphere more generally 
could be considered to be free after January 1933. The first case study examines anti-Semitic 
rioting accompanied by assaults on the general public by the Nazi stormtroopers on Berlin’s 
Kurfürstendamm boulevard in September 1931, while the second one concerns the brutal 
murder of Konrad Pietrzuch, a Polish Communist sympathiser and unemployed labourer, by 
SA men in the small Upper Silesian village of Potempa in August 1932. The case study chosen 
for Britain occurred in June 1934, at the highpoint of popularity for Oswald Mosley’s British 
Union of Fascists (BUF), when Blackshirt stewards at a riotous public meeting at London’s 
Olympia hall ejected interrupters by considerable force, causing many injuries and prompting 
public outrage. 
     In examining the public language exhibited in reaction to these specific instances of Fascist 
violence, this chapter will, even more so than the preceding ones, throw into sharp relief the 
differences between German and British experiences and receptions of this kind of violence 
in the early/mid-1930s. It is worth emphasising at the very outset the stark discrepancies in 
the scale of violence experienced in early-1930s Germany and mid-1930s Britain as a result 
of Fascist and anti-Fascist clashes. As Thurlow has observed, “there was not one proven 
fatality from political violence, neither fascist nor anti-fascist, in Britain in the 1930s; there was 
no British Horst Wessel nor any anti-fascist martyr.”1 This chapter will thus highlight the chasm 
between different European experiences of violence in interwar Europe, which became most 
acutely evident as Fascism reared its head across the continent. However unsuited to 
comparison the scale of Nazi violence and British Fascist violence might seem, the 
comparison is undertaken in this chapter as a way of casting a satellite ten years into the 
future from where the other three chapters have been situated, and to thus give an impression 
of the stark drift apart in what was considered appropriate or defensible conduct in British and 
German public discourse by this later point in time. Where the thesis’ earlier chapters found 
common themes between both countries’ response to political violence, such as concern over 
 
1 Richard C. Thurlow, “The Straw that Broke the Camel's Back: Public Order, Civil Liberties and the 
Battle of Cable Street”, Jewish Culture and History, 1/2 (1998), p. 76. More on Wessel’s significance 
further below. 
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international reputation, fears of ‘foreign’ ideologies, and a commitment (in public language, 
at least) to democratic values and common standards of civilised conduct, this final, ‘satellite’ 
chapter demonstrates how these discourses had shifted apart in significant ways by the 1930s. 
While British public discourse held onto many of the tropes developed in the early interwar 
years about British peaceableness and aversion to ‘continental-style’ violent politics, German 
public discourse failed to roundly condemn Nazi conduct, with the Right publicly defending 
and praising it without fear of consequences.  
     Furthermore, by examining reactions to BUF violence side-by-side with Nazi violence, the 
pronounced difference in relative threat potential these two movements held for Britain and 
Germany, respectively, becomes particularly obvious. While Mosley’s Blackshirt movement 
asked some significant questions of the established political system in Britain, it never actually 
posed a significant threat. National Socialism, however, will be shown to already have reached 
a level of ‘success’ and relative acceptance within public discourse that threatened societal 
cohesion and the democratic foundation which the republic was supposed to stand on. It 
quickly brought down the shaky republican government in Germany, in no small part due to 
the growing public justification, toleration and even acceptance of Nazi violence by the 
established powers and old elites. The stormstroopers’ use of violence to demonstrate power 
and underscore their commitment to the movement, in both public spaces and marginal areas 
of the country, will be shown to have elicited mixed responses. Though the open anti-Semitism 
of the Kurfürstendamm riots, and especially the brutality of Pietrzuch’s murder, drew severe 
criticism from a lot of commentators from the political centre and of course the Left, it was 
significant that the perpetrators received support from members of the old elites, such as the 
nobility, and the leaders of the Nazi movement felt secure enough in their position to openly 
declare their solidarity with the perpetrators, indicating a critical shift in what could be publicly 
defended by the leaders of a growing political movement without endangering their electoral 
following. Mosley, too, of course attempted to defend his men’s actions and deflect blame onto 
the Communists, but the British Fascists came under strong criticism from the centre, the Left, 
and even most Conservative voices. While anti-Semitism was not yet high on the BUF’s 
agenda, this chapter will argue that the BUF’s display of violent behaviour at Olympia did more 
to prompt debates about British ways of conducting politics, the nature of free speech, and 
notions of British ‘immunity’ to the wave of authoritarianism sweeping the continent, than 




4.1 VIOLENCE AS THE STURMABTEILUNG’S POWER PROPAGANDA. 
The Sturmabteilung (SA, ‘stormtroopers’) began as a stewarding body for the newly founded 
NSDAP (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, ‘National Socialist German Workers’ 
Party’) in the early 1920s, with many early recruits coming out of the postwar Freikorps. It 
functioned as the party’s paramilitary organisation and a “violent social movement”, fighting 
out its battles, mostly against Communists, on the streets or during political brawls, through 
the 1920s and early 1930s.2 Sven Reichardt, taking a praxeological approach to comparing 
the SA and its Italian forerunners, the Squadristi, has extensively analysed and highlighted 
the social and political role of violence for the SA. He has illustrated how the SA used violence 
effectively as a language, one of action rather than of words, to intimidate and demonstrate 
their power and superiority over political rivals as well as over the political establishment. In 
this sense, violence was central to the Nazi propaganda of power.3 This section will be 
examining two rather different incidents of violence committed by the SA in the years 
preceding the Nazi takeover of power in January 1933. One incident took place in a 
deliberately public setting, on Berlin’s Kurfürstendamm boulevard, when an estimated 500 SA 
men began assembling there and engaged in violent anti-Semitic rioting on the evening of 12 
September 1931, the day of Rosh Hashanah, the Jewish New Year. The rioting SA men 
chanted offensive slogans and, though no fatalities occurred, they assaulted many members 
of the public, in some cases inflicting injuries serious enough to warrant hospitalisation, and 
caused significant material damage to local businesses.4 The rioting and the subsequent trials 
attracted much press attention. This incident will be considered here alongside another 
instance of SA violence which also attracted much public attention, but one which, in contrast 
to the Kurfürstendamm riots, took place in a much more covert manner, in a peripheral space, 
targeting one specific individual. In the early hours of 10 August 1932, in the small Upper 
Silesian village of Potempa, the 35-year old agricultural labourer Konrad Pietrzuch was brutally 
murdered by local members of the SA. Pietrzuch, a Communist Party (KPD) sympathiser of 
Polish ethnicity, was ordered out of his bed by six SA men who had forced their way into his 
home. They severely beat and trampled on him, causing fatal injuries, before finally firing a 
shot at him, all in front of his brother and elderly mother. Nine members of the SA were quickly 
 
2 On the SA see: older works such as Conan Fischer, Stormtroopers: a social, economic and ideological 
analysis, 1929-35 (London, 1983); Peter Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone. Geschichte der SA 
(München, 1989); and more recently Daniel Siemens, Stormtroopers. A New History of Hitler’s 
Brownshirts (New Haven and London, 2017), quote on e-book p. 22. 
3 Sven Reichardt, Faschistische Kampfbünde. Gewalt und Gemeinschaft im italienischen Squadrismus 
und in der deutschen SA (Köln, 2002), pp. 93-140. 
4 Dirk Walter, Antisemitische Kriminalität und Gewalt: Judenfeindschaft in der Weimarer Republik 
(Bonn, 1999), pp. 211-221. 
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arrested and put before a special court in the nearby town of Beuthen, where they were tried 
under new anti-terrorism legislation. A verdict of five death penalties, one prison sentence of 
two years, and three acquittals was returned after three days.5 
     These two events have been selected for examination in this chapter because though they 
were both atypical in some ways, they were also significant landmarks and indicative of future 
events. The Potempa murder is often considered a turning point in the history of Nazi violence 
in the late Weimar Republic. Daniel Siemens, for example, uses the incident to open his recent 
study of the Stormtroopers, framing it as a particularly heinous example of the escalating 
violence which, despite government attempts to regain control, soon led to the collapse of the 
republican state.6 Significantly, following the announcement of the court sentence, the leader 
of the National Socialists, Adolf Hitler, sent a telegram expressing solidarity with the convicted 
men. The murder was an early example of the Nazi capacity for exercising extreme physical 
violence against their political opponents. Given the shocking brutality of the crime, readily 
acknowledged and condemned in the democratic press, Hitler’s public expression of solidarity 
represented the crossing of a new line, where the public defence of convicted murderers no 
longer posed a risk to the public image of the movement, but rather counted as a shrewd move 
to garner and sustain support from its base. The convicted men were promptly set free in 
March 1933, when the Nazis had gained power.7  
     Most SA violence prior to the Nazi takeover of power was directed against the ‘class 
enemy’, taking the shape of violent street clashes between the SA and Communists and/or 
members of the Social Democratic Reichsbanner; in Richard Bessel’s words, the violence was 
primarily directed “against the organisations of the working class.”8 Therefore, the 
Kurfürstendamm riots can be considered unusual for the time, in that they were explicitly anti-
Semitic rather than embedded in the virulent Left-Right conflict of the late Weimar years. As 
will be examined below, the riots, which received wide coverage in the press, were indeed 
understood as anti-Semitic by contemporaries, making it particularly relevant to examine their 
reception and treatment in public discourse, as the riots were symptomatic of the 
institutionalised anti-Semitism which was to follow under the Nazi regime. Furthermore, the 
section will examine how the particularly public location of the rioting on Kurfürstendamm was 
 
5 Richard Bessel, “The Potempa Murder”, Central European History, 10/3 (1977), pp. 241-254. 
6 Siemens, Stormtroopers, e-book pp. 11-15. 
7 Bessel, “Potempa Murder”, p. 252. 
8 Richard Bessel, Political violence and the rise of Nazism: the storm troopers in Eastern Germany, 
1925-1934 (New Haven, 1984), p. 76. 
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of special concern to the democratic press, who, continuing a theme found throughout this 
thesis, expressed worry over Germany’s reputation abroad. 
     This chapter section will draw primarily on material from the contemporary press. This is 
mainly due to the lack of normal parliamentary proceedings in Germany at the time. By the 
early 1930s, representative democracy had already ceased to function effectively. The country 
had been governed by ‘presidential cabinets’ (Präsidialkabinette) since March 1930, as 
identifying majorities capable of forming a government became increasingly difficult, if not 
impossible, and presidential rule by emergency decree increased. This circumstance 
contributed to the hollowing out of Weimar democracy, removing opportunity for conflicts to 
be carried out verbally in a parliamentary setting, and instead pushing more political conflict 
out of parliament and onto the streets. The volatile nature of successive presidential cabinets 
meant several elections were held in the years between 1930 and 1933, and parliament was 
out of session for much of the time period considered here. There were no sessions between 
26 March 1931 and 13 October 1931, the time covering the Kurfürstendamm riots, and when 
parliament reconvened in October, the riots evidently did not prove significant enough to enter 
debate. The agenda was dominated by economic concerns, dictated by the devastating 
economic and financial crisis which had the country in its grip. When violent political action did 
become a topic of debate, as stressed earlier, the main area of attention were conflicts 
between Left and Right, not anti-Semitic violence. Similarly, parliament was out of session 
when Konrad Pietrzuch was murdered in Potempa, and of the three sessions held in the latter 
part of 1932, the trial of Pietrzuch’s murderers was alluded to just once, following yet another 
election, in the context of heated debates over whether the new emergency anti-terrorism 
legislation was being applied fairly or unfairly to left- and right-wing perpetrators of political 
violence.9 
 
It has been noted that since about 1923 Nazi Party strategy and propaganda, particularly in 
the later Weimar years, did not, until their actual takeover of power, focus very heavily or 
explicitly on anti-Semitism. Instead, the party focused its propaganda efforts on anti-Marxist 
messages, resulting in much violence between Nazis and Communists. At the same time, 
however, the party emphasised its own ‘socialism’ by employing anti-materialist rhetoric, 
which was bound up with the anti-Semitic stereotype of ‘the Jewish capitalist’.10 In this context, 
the location as well as the date of the riot on 12 September 1931, the Jewish New Year, was 
 
9 Verhandlungen, 3. Sitzung, 09.12.1932, pp. 97-106. 
10 Reichardt, Faschistische Kampfbünde, pp. 631-643. 
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particularly significant. The Kurfürstendamm, situated at the heart of Berlin’s bourgeois 
Charlottenburg district, stood for everything which the Nazis purported to oppose. The 
boulevard represented the obscene flaunting of wealth amid the plight wrought on ordinary 
people by the world economic crisis. The avenue was lined with shops, cafés, theatres and 
cinemas, representing both the fast-paced, superficial amusement culture of Weimar as well 
as its intellectual, left-leaning, cosmopolitan intelligentsia. It was furthermore seen as a centre 
of vice, populated by ‘degenerate’ political, artistic, and sexual subcultures. The smashing of 
the shop windows, demolition of the interior (including the firing of two shots which fortunately 
hit nothing more serious than the cake stand), and the general assault on the patrons of the 
café Reimann on Kurfürstendamm was thus not only a random act of wanton destruction, but 
a highly symbolic act.11 This was because the café, a popular meeting place for Berlin’s artists 
and intellectuals, among whom were many Jews, was particularly representative of the area 
and its inhabitants. The neighbourhood around Kurfürstendamm was indeed home to a 
comparatively large percentage of Jewish inhabitants, an estimated 25 %, most of whom were 
well-to-do doctors, lawyers, or of similar highly-educated professions.12 Many members of the 
community were just leaving the synagogue on adjacent Fasanenstraße after the Rosh 
Hashanah evening service, when the increasingly large numbers of SA units who had been 
congregating on Kurfürstendamm began insulting and physically assaulting them, chasing 
them down the street in groups and beating up them as well as other passers-by as they went 
along. The boulevard, a place of “imagined Jewish omnipotence”, therefore did not 
coincidentally become the scene of an SA demonstration of power.13 Berlin itself was central 
to the NSDAP’s strategy to gain control; the party’s Gauleiter (‘district leader’) for Berlin, 
Joseph Goebbels, had written that the “the decision in this battle [for power, A.K.] will not 
happen somewhere in the Reich, neither in Munich nor in central Germany or in the Ruhr area, 
but solely in Berlin.”14 Controlling symbolically important spaces in the capital, like the 
Kurfürstendamm, was a crucial tactic in this endeavour and, as Dirk Walter has emphasised, 
the purpose of the riot in September 1931 was to demonstrate to Berlin’s Jewish citizens that 
their presence in this public space was unwanted and would from now on be accompanied by 
risks to their personal safety.15 
 
11 Destruction summarised for example in “Brutale Ausschreitungen in Berlin”, FZ, 14.09.1931, MB, p. 
2; „Ausschreitungen am Kurfürstendamm“, VZ, 13.09.1931, R1501/126181, BArch. 
12 Reichardt, Faschistische Kampfbünde, pp. 639-640. 
13 Walter, Antisemitische Kriminalität und Gewalt, p. 219. 
14 Cited in Bernhard Sauer, “Goebbels „Rabauken“. Zur Geschichte der SA in Berlin-Brandenburg“ in 
Uwe Schaper (ed.), Berlin in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Jahrbuch des Landesarchivs Berlin (Berlin, 
2006), p. 107. 
15 Walter, Antisemitische Kriminalität und Gewalt, p. 221. 
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     The anti-Semitic nature of the rioting was acknowledged with indignation by media of all 
political leanings, except of course the Nazi press. While all other media tended to refer to the 
events in geographical terms, as Kurfürstendamm-Krawall or “riots at the Kurfürstendamm”, 
the Nazi Party’s Völkischer Beobachter conspicuously used the term “Judenkrawall” (‘Jew 
riot’).16 The Nazis themselves therefore consciously and explicitly made the unrest about 
Jews, but semantically shifted the blame onto the Jewish victims; the term ‘Jew riots’ seemed 
to linguistically imply that Jews were somehow active in, and thereby responsible for, the 
unrest and destruction. More liberal and left-wing publications, on the other hand, consciously 
described the events as a “Nazi riot”, a “pogrom” or “pogrom-like” (pogromartig), leaving no 
doubt as to who they saw as the instigators of the unrest and who the intended victims were.17 
Carl von Ossietzky, then the editor-in-chief of the left-wing weekly Die Weltbühne, referred to 
the rioters with disdain as “pack” (Rotte), “groups of rowdies”, and “national hooligans”; other 
papers, too, called them “national-socialist rowdies” or “swastika rowdies”.18 The Berliner 
Tageblatt even called them “terrorists”, while elsewhere the scenes of destruction were, 
somewhat hyperbolically, described as a “war zone” (Kriegsschauplatz).19 In light of reports 
and witness statements that the rioting by the groups of SA men had been accompanied by 
shouts of “Judah, die!” (Juda verrecke!) and “Germany, awake!” (Deutschland erwache!), the 
thrust of the violence seemed clear.20 Nevertheless, the Nazi press insisted on their version 
of events, portraying what had taken place on Kurfürstendamm as a demonstration by ordinary 
unemployed Germans, some of whom had begun physically taking out their frustration on the 
“dolled-up Kurfürstendamm holiday audience” (das feiertäglich aufgeputzte Kurfürstendamm-
Publikum). The paper did not know what all the fuss was about, given that, as far as they 
knew, no person was hurt very badly, let alone killed.21 The Nazi tactic was to play down the 
scale of events. Roland Freisler, later Hitler’s Justice Minister and President of the Nazi 
‘People’s Court’, represented the defendants in court at the second trial, later in the year, and 
on that occasion dismissively conceded that there had certainly been “a few slaps in the face”, 
 
16 For example “Kurfürstendamm-Krawalle vor Gericht”, VZ, 18.09.1931, R1501/126181, BArch; „Der 
‚Judenkrawall‘ am Kurfürstendamm“, VB, 24.09.1931, ibid.; the term also appears in VB, 25.09.1931 
and 29.09.1931, ibid. 
17 “Nazi-Krawalle im Westen”, Vorwärts, 13.09.1931, R1501/126181, BArch; “Der Judenpogrom war 
organisiert“, Vorwärts, 19.09.1931, ibid.; “Goebbels kommandierte den Pogrom”, Die Welt am Montag, 
14.09.1931, ibid.  
18 Carl v. Ossietzky, “Pogrom und Polizei”, Die Weltbühne, 27, 2nd vol. (1931), p. 453; “Brutale 
Ausschreitungen in Berlin”, FZ, 14.09.1931, MB, p. 2; “Nazi-Krawalle im Westen”, Vorwärts, 
13.09.1931, R1501/126181, BArch. 
19 “Die Terroristen vom Kurfürstendamm”, Berliner Tageblatt, 20.09.1931, R1501/126181, BArch; 
“Goebbels kommandierte den Pogrom”, Die Welt am Montag, 14.09.1931, ibid. 
20 “Nazi-Krawalle im Westen”, Vorwärts, 13.09.1931, R1501/126181, BArch. 
21 [No title], Der Angriff, 14.09.1931, R1501/126181, BArch. 
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but, he argued, “it was quite justified if one or two Semites had received slaps on 
Kurfürstendamm: When the working man sees the satisfied ones (die Satten) there it may well 
happen that he confronts them with a fist to show them: there is still hunger in Germany.”22 
Through the use of the passive voice, the Nazi press also consciously obscured agency, 
speaking only of the fact that “certainly, there was unrest at the Kurfürstendamm, a number of 
people were injured and a coffee house took a toll in the process.”23 Who was responsible for 
those slaps and the wrecking of businesses was left unsaid in this instance. Instead, the Nazi 
tactic was to shift the blame and draw attention to acts of left-wing violence and, while 
exaggerating their scale, complain about unequal treatment: 
 
When, a few days ago, as a result of Jewish provocation, a few hundred National 
Socialists were demonstrating on Berlin’s Kurfürstendamm and a few Jews were 
beaten up, three days later 70 National Socialists stood before the summary court and 
were given prison sentences of several months. Of the 5,000 red sub-humans who 
cowardly and treacherously beat up, and in some cases permanently crippled, a total 
of 800 National Socialists, not one has been convicted to this day.24 
 
     Notwithstanding the general recognition across the political spectrum, save for the extreme 
right, that the riots had been directed against Jews, there was also a peculiar outrage or 
unease in the reports of the events and in the witness statements at the fact that non-Jewish 
passers-by had been victimised in the course of the rioting. The reporting always spoke of 
Jewish or “Jewish-looking” people being attacked, and often made a point of informing readers 
whether a given victim or witness giving evidence in court actually was Jewish or not. The 
Frankfurter Zeitung reported the case of a “young man, who is not a Jew and only became 
caught up in the storming of the patisserie Reimann by coincidence”, as if any of the Jewish 
patrons of the café had been there not by coincidence, and who “because of his slightly Jewish 
appearance was beaten so heavily by the National Socialists that he had to be taken to a 
doctor with bleeding headwounds and a nervous shock.”25 The Social Democratic Vorwärts, 
especially active in reporting the events, in particular stressed that the roll-call of witnesses at 
the trial held shortly following the riots contained “surprisingly few Jewish names” and that 
 
22 “Verteidigungsplädoyers im Helldorf-Prozeß”, DAZ, 07.11.1931, R1501/126181, BArch; “6 Monate 
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23 “Drakonische Strafen“, DTZ, quoted in “Die Schreckensurteile im Kurfürstendamm-Prozeß“, VB, 
25.09.1931, R1501/126181, BArch. 
24 [No title], VB, 20./21.09.1931, R1501/126181, BArch. The paper here refers to the (exaggerated) 
numbers of victims of clashes between Communists and Nazis which had been taking place in many 
places throughout Germany with growing intensity since 1929. 
25 “Brutale Ausschreitungen in Berlin”, FZ, 14.09.1931, MB, p. 2. 
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“one did not even need to be a Jew to come away with a beating and most severe injuries.”26 
The Nazis’ inability to ‘correctly’ identify their intended Jewish victims appeared to add to the 
perceived despicability of their actions. Some non-Jewish passers-by initially felt unthreatened 
by the arising trouble, suggesting a pronounced divide in the way Jewish and non-Jewish 
inhabitants of the city generally experienced anti-Semitism. The Vorwärts reported the 
statement of the tradesman Nickels, who, clearly aware of who the intended victims of the 
rioting were, felt himself to be “out of any danger. He [was] not a Jew after all.” However, while 
he was still contemplating this circumstance, he “already had received a blow to the face.”27 
Another victim, however, testified that “I knew what was going on and that there would be 
beatings. Though I am not a Jew, I may be taken for one from my appearance. Therefore, I 
preferred to keep quiet.”28 
     In addition, what appeared to exacerbate the objectionable character of the SA’s rioting to 
contemporaries, was that among the victims there were not only “many non-Jews, who are 
German citizens, but also foreigners, such as Romanians, Armenians, etc.”29 The Vorwärts 
deplored one case in particular in which an Egyptian student called “Ramann” had been 
punched in the face as he was leaving a vegetarian restaurant on Kurfürstendamm; the 
German passer-by who rushed to help the student was then also beaten. “That was how the 
man from Egypt was taught the culture of the swastika,” the paper concluded with 
consternation.30 Implicit in this incident, and made explicit in many other reactions to the riots, 
was a concern for Germany’s international reputation and that of its capital, Berlin, in 
particular. This was for example evident in the title the Vorwärts chose for its article containing 
the story of the unfortunate Egyptian student, Die deutsche Kulturschande, ‘the German 
cultural disgrace’. The words of the prosecutor’s closing statement also gave voice to this 
concern for Germany’s status as a member of the civilised world which the SA’s open display 
of violence was seen to be threatening; the prosecutor condemned the accused as cowards, 
for ganging up on old men, and emphasised that Germany’s reputation as a “cultured state” 
(Kulturstaat) had been severely damaged by the rioting.31  
     Ossietzky in fact criticised Germany’s newspapers for holding back initially on reporting the 
full scale and true nature of the anti-Semitic ‘pogrom’ out of an overprotective concern for 
 
26 “Die Opfer der Meute”, Vorwärts, 19.09.1931, R1501/126181, BArch. 
27 “Die deutsche Kulturschande”, Vorwärts, 20.09.1931, R1501/126181, BArch. 
28 “Die Opfer der Meute”, Vorwärts, 19.09.1931, R1501/126181, BArch. 
29 Ibid. 
30 “Die deutsche Kulturschande”, Vorwärts, 20.09.1931, R1501/126181, BArch. 
31 Quotation from „Staatsanwalt beantragt Zuchthaus“, VZ, 23.09.1931; see also “Zuchthaus-Anträge 
im Kurfürstendamm-Prozeß“, Berliner Tageblatt, 23.09.1931, R1501/126181, BArch. 
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Berlin’s reputation.32 He also questioned the efficiency of the police, accusing them of having 
ignored prior warnings, not responding quickly enough, and not being nearly as well organised 
as the SA rioters. Whenever left-wing unrest occurred, he observed, the police were much 
quicker to act and more forceful in their actions. Though the police eventually succeeded in 
dispersing the crowds and quickly arrested several dozens of suspects, Ossietzky was not 
alone in doubting that the police force had done all it could to contain the riot and protect 
Berlin’s citizens, thus further endangering the city’s international prestige. The Welt am 
Montag thought that the police had “intervened much too late”, while the Vossische Zeitung 
prominently asked: “Where was the police?”33 In a piece also concerned with the riot’s 
reputational damage, the Vorwärts noted that while several other violent clashes in recent 
news had perhaps somewhat obscured the Kurfürstendamm riots in domestic reporting, the 
unrest in the German capital had – “unfortunately!” – not escaped international attention. The 
paper especially pointed out the bitter irony which they saw between the Nazis’ purported fight 
for the “interests of the German people”, and how their actions, namely engaging in pogroms 
and “Jew baiting” (Judenhetze), actually did most severe damage to those interests. In fact, 
taking the argument further, and exposing its own anti-Semitic tendencies, the article argued 
that, more than “Jewry” itself, the real victim of the Nazi pogroms was the reputation of the 
German people. The reason was that there was “no sympathy anywhere in the civilised world” 
for this kind of anti-Semitism, which, the paper added, only reminded the world of czarist 
Russia and its ignoble history of pogroms. Worse still, the article continued, was the anti-
Semites’ tendency to not even distinguish between actual Jews and non-Jews, and to treat 
anyone who looked somewhat foreign as if they were a Jew.34 This had even led to foreign 
diplomats inquiring whether Germany would be safe for them. The piece concluded that no 
reasonable person could be made to believe that it would do the country any good if “sympathy 
for Germany was beaten out of those people.” Thus, if the Nazis actually cared about Germany 
as much they professed, they should be the ones putting a stop to anti-Semitic pogroms, “not 
for the Jews’ sake, but for Germany’s sake!”35 The clear priority which, for the paper, 
Germany’s international reputation held over the victimisation of Jewish members of the public 
 
32 Carl v. Ossietzky, “Pogrom und Polizei”, Die Weltbühne, 27, 2nd vol. (1931), p. 453. 
33 Ibid.; “Goebbels kommandierte den Pogrom”, Die Welt am Montag, 14.09.1931, R1501/126181, 
BArch; “Wo war die Polizei?“, VZ, 14.09.1931, ibid. 
34 While of course the literature on the Nazi use of racist pseudo-science to justify their anti-Semitic 
agenda is numerous, Cohen gives an illuminating account of how racial differences were purposely 
ascribed to assimilated British Jews precisely to be able to distinguish them from other Britons when 
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can be viewed either as a symptom of negligent ignorance towards the real suffering 
experienced by Jewish citizens, or as a more sinister anti-Semitic tendency to victim-blame 
and view Jews as separate from the ‘German people’. 
     It seems very plausible that the riots drew comparatively much attention in the press due 
to their prominent location on the famed bohemian entertainment strip of one of the cultural 
centres of interwar Europe. About forty people were arrested immediately after the riot, and 
thirty-three, almost all of them members of various Berlin SA units, were tried in a summary 
court (Schnellgericht). While numerous defendants claimed to have been at the scene of the 
riot by pure coincidence, for “a stroll” (Bummel) amid the hustle and bustle of the big city, 
others testified that they had been ordered by their SA leaders to come to Kurfürstendamm.36 
The nationalist-conservative Kreuz-Zeitung sought to make it out as if it had merely been 
misguided youths, who, “out of an immature appetite for a racket” (unreife Radaulust), had 
protested against the inequalities of the times, which were particularly stark in Berlin’s 
bourgeois west. While the paper stressed that “we in no way approve of these means”, it was 
clear that it considered the economic plight a mitigating circumstance.37 After only a week and 
a half, the court returned its verdicts. While six people were acquitted, the remaining 
defendants were handed comparatively harsh prison sentences of at least one year, ranging 
up to a year and nine months, for breaches of the public peace, of varying degrees of severity, 
sometimes in conjunction with incitement to class hatred.38 In the opinion of the right-wing 
press, the sentences were entirely disproportionate, but the prominent nature of the riots might 
again serve to explain to some extent the judiciary’s initial resolve to be seen to be handling 
such events forcefully. However, the legal aftermath of the riot continued to draw sustained 
interest in the press, perhaps not least out of a sensationalist interest in one of the other main 
defendants, the nobleman and local SA leader, Count (Graf) Wolf-Heinrich von Helldorf.39 To 
him, as to many other members of the German nobility who had lost their status and in many 
cases their wealth, too, following the end of the First World War, joining the SA constituted a 
useful career move to claim a position of power and status once again.40 Following the riot on 
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38 Walter, Antisemitische Kriminalität und Gewalt, pp. 212-213. 
39 On the somewhat puzzling biography of Count Helldorf, who, although initially an enthusiastic Nazi, 
came to be part of the conspiracy to assassinate Hitler in July 1944, see Ted Harrison, “’Alter Kämpfer’ 
im Widerstand. Graf Helldorf, die NS-Bewegung und die Opposition gegen Hitler“, Vierteljahreshefte für 
Zeitgeschichte, 45 (1997), pp. 385-423. 
40 For an analysis of the nobility’s reasons for joining the SA, see Stephan Malinowski and Sven 
Reichardt, “Die Reihen fest geschlossen? Adelige im Führungskorps der SA bis 1934“, in Eckart Conze 
and Monika Wienfort (eds.), Adel und Moderne. Deutschland im europäischen Vergleich im 19. Und 20. 
 203 
Kurfürstendamm, Helldorf had initially made a clandestine escape to Munich, only to return 
and hand himself over to the Berlin prosecutors on 21 September. Helldorf and his SA adjutant 
Karl Ernst were then tried as instigators of the unrest in a separate trial in October, alongside 
several further rioters who had been arrested in the meantime. Witnesses judged the riot to 
have been well organised in advance and reported having seen Helldorf and Ernst driving 
slowly up and down Kurfürstendamm in an open-top car while the riot was taking place, giving 
directions and encouragement to the rioting men as they passed them. During this second 
trial, the Nazi defence changed tack, arguing that there had been Communist and Social 
Democratic agents provocateurs on Kurfürstendamm who had provoked the SA men to react, 
and who had in fact been the ones shouting anti-Semitic slogans in order to tarnish the SA.41 
Helldorf and his lawyers argued that the SA leader had been there in order to calm down the 
men and encourage them to disperse. The court, however, was not convinced and sentenced 
the count and his adjutant to six months prison and a 100 Reichsmark fine for breach of the 
public peace and using insulting language. Appeal proceedings began in January 1932, with 
Joseph Goebbels himself appearing as a witness for the defence and Roland Freisler as one 
of Helldorf’s lawyers. With such high-profile involvement from the Nazi Party, the defence 
succeeded in getting the sentences reduced significantly, so that in February 1932 Helldorf 
and Ernst were acquitted of instigating the unrest and causing a breach of the public peace, 
and instead walked away with only the 100 Reichsmark fine for using insulting language, 
having called a man either “Bankjude” or “Bandjude”.42 
     The involvement in the riot of Count Helldorf, and his fate in its aftermath, were important 
as an indication of shifting allegiances. It was significant that a prominent member of the 
country’s old aristocratic elite not only condoned, but actively encouraged and even 
participated in National Socialist anti-Semitic violence. Such behaviour on the count’s part lent 
the Nazis credibility as well as some of the nobleman’s ‘glamour’. Helldorf was a useful man 
for the Nazi movement to have on their side. Influential conservative politicians during the final 
years of the Weimar Republic, such as Alfred Hugenberg and Kurt von Schleicher, took 
Helldorf seriously because of his aristocratic background. At the same time, he was not above 
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‘getting his hands dirty’ by being an active member of the Stormtroopers. For his efforts, having 
proved himself to the leadership, Helldorf was in fact promoted just three days after the riot 
from his previous position as leader of the Standarte 2 of the SA and was made chief of the 
Berlin SA by Röhm.43 This, as well as the fact that he managed to come away from his 
involvement in the Kurfürstendamm riots almost unscathed, with a very minor punishment 
compared to many of the other defendants, was no doubt a sign of the changing times in which 
members of the old elite recognised the opportunities to be gained from lending their prestige 
to the new regime looming on the horizon. 
     By contemporary standards, the violence perpetrated on the Kurfürstendamm that evening 
was relatively tame. It was not the typical anti-left SA violence of the day, which was usually 
more brutal and made use of weapons, including firearms. Though the police confiscated 
some knives, knuckle-dusters, and even a few guns from the arrested, no weapons were used 
in the riot; the SA men mainly used their fists, or threw objects, and injuries were comparatively 
minor as a result.44 This approach may have been indicative of the presence of certain lines 
that were yet to be crossed: using weapons against Jewish members of the public (or those 
perceived as such) out in the open, in a purposely public space in which brutal violence was 
not expected to take place, would not yet be widely condoned. Using weapons in street battles 
with the Left, however, was much more common at the same point in time. As Reichardt has 
observed, anti-Semitism did not yet make for an attractive theme for the Nazis’ election 
campaigns between 1930 and 1932.45 In this sense, however, the Kurfürstendamm riot was a 
sign of things to come, with its ‘pogrom-like’ targeting of specifically Jewish people, which at 
the same time was gaining active support from members of the old elites, like Count Helldorf. 
 
The brutal murder of Konrad Pietrzuch46  in his house in the Upper Silesian village of Potempa 
in August 1932 came during a time which has been noted as a peak period in SA violence. 
The lifting of a ban on the storm trooper organization in June of the same year led to a rapid 
increase in the number of victims of Nazi violence. While the first three months of 1932 saw 
thirty-one people killed in political clashes, that number grew to 155 deaths by the end of 
August. Violence spiked in particular just before the Reichstags elections on 31 July. With 
eighty-six people killed in July alone and 1,125 people injured between mid-June and mid-
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July, it was the bloodiest period of the Weimar Republic.47 While the Communists’ preferred 
tactic was to interrupt meetings, the Nazis primarily engaged in street battles.48 Konrad 
Pietrzuch’s murder, however, was a different kind of violent act. It was part of a wave of 
“terroristic” violence which, under the notoriously brutal SA leader Edmund Heines, swept 
through all of Silesia in early August. The SA torched Jewish businesses, bombed Communist 
meeting places, shot policemen, and beat Communists and Social Democrats to death.49 The 
unemployed 35-year old agricultural labourer Pietrzuch personified an ‘ideal’ enemy for the 
local SA in several ways. He was Polish and had supported Polish insurgents in the area in 
the aftermath of the First World War, he was a known sympathiser with the Communist Party, 
and one of the men accused of instigating his murder, Paul Lachmann, bore a personal grudge 
against him, because Pietrzuch knew that Lachmann had been illegally poaching. The two 
men had previously come to blows in Lachmann’s tavern.50 On the evening of 9 August 1932, 
six SA men made their way to Potempa and, after drinking heavily in Paul Lachmann’s tavern 
and being outfitted with some extra guns, undertook to attack local Communists. They first 
tried the house of another known Communist sympathiser, but when his wife grew suspicious 
of the men demanding to see her husband, the group left and instead decided on the Pietrzuch 
cottage, where Konrad shared just one room with his brother Alfons and their elderly mother. 
When they arrived a short while after midnight on 10 August, the intruders ordered Konrad out 
of the bed and severely beat and kicked him. His brother was also knocked unconscious, while 
their mother looked on. When the heavily bleeding Konrad took refuge in a small adjacent 
closet, one of the SA men fired a shot into the dark closet which hit Pietrzuch’s arm. Pietrzuch, 
however, was already dying of his previous injuries. Once the shot had been fired, the SA men 
left. 
     As the summer of 1932 was, as mentioned above, one marked by a spike in political 
violence in Germany more generally, Pietrzuch’s murder in a provincial village initially only 
warranted a small note in the national press. Between 19 and 22 August, however, the trial of 
the nine men involved took place before a special court in the nearby town of Beuthen. It 
brought to light the details of the murder and attracted a significant amount of national 
attention, particularly because it was the first case tried before one of the special courts 
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established as part of new anti-terrorism legislation, prompted by the escalating levels of 
violence, which had come into effect on 10 August. When the court, making use of the harsher 
penalties which the new anti-terrorism measures allowed for, sentenced five of the defendants 
to death, gave out a two-year prison sentence to another one of the defendants, and acquitted 
the remaining three, the ruling caused immediate outrage inside the courtroom, where local 
SA leaders were present and immediately started shouting slogans, and outside. The unrest 
quickly spilled out into the streets of Beuthen, where it continued for several days, as SA men 
wrecked Jewish-owned businesses as well as the headquarters of the Social Democratic 
Volksblatt and other papers.51 The Nazi leadership made a point of publicly displaying its 
solidarity with the accused. The SA leader Röhm, as well as Roland Freisler, travelled to 
Beuthen to visit the condemned men in prison and to express solidarity with them. Hitler 
himself sent a telegram of solidarity with the condemned murderers, in which he assured his 
“comrades” that he felt united with them in “boundless loyalty” and that their liberty was now a 
“question of our honour” while the “fight against a government under which such a thing is 
possible [was] our duty.”52 Hermann Göring considered the sentence “the most egregious 
blood verdict that had ever been passed since the days of darkest tyranny” and also sent his 
expression of solidarity by telegram, assuring the convicted men of his full support and that of 
all “14 million National Socialist voters.”53 
     In reporting the trial in Beuthen, liberal and left-wing newspapers stressed the sheer 
brutality of the murder with noticeable abhorrence. The evidence given by the coroner at the 
trial was widely reported, as it contained the details of how Pietrzuch had been killed. Overall, 
the victim’s bruised and bloodied body bore twenty-nine separate wounds. The shot through 
his right arm had not been fatal; instead, the injuries already inflicted on Pietrzuch by beating 
and kicking would have been enough to kill him. His neck showed marks of strangulation as 
well as being trampled on, his larynx was squashed, and his carotid artery was completely 
ruptured, leading the coroner to conclude that the cause of death was suffocation due to blood 
filling his windpipe.54 The papers also emphasised the ignominy of the attack by recounting 
the evidence given in court by Konrad’s brother Alfons, who had survived, and their mother, 
Marie Pietrzuch, who was only able to testify “under great agitation.”55 The Communist press 
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predictably pounced on the murder of Pietrzuch, whom the Rote Fahne consciously claimed 
as one of “our comrades.” They emphasised in even more extreme language the brutality of 
the crime in order to stoke anti-Nazi sentiments, also citing the coroner’s findings and Alfons’ 
and Mrs Pietrzuch’s testimonies at length, and using animalistic language to describe the 
accused and their crime. They called the SA men “beasts”, “butchers” (Schlächter), a “brutish 
gang” (vertierte Bande), “assassins” (Meuchelmörder), and described their deed as “cold-
blooded murder”, having “butchered” Pietrzuch in a “bestial manner” (bestialische Weise) and 
with “beastly brutality” (viehische Brutalität). Referring to Hitler’s declaration of solidarity with 
the murderers, the paper judged that with “this greeting address to the brutish murderers of 
workers [vertierte Arbeitermörder] of Potempa, Hitler had ripped off his and his party’s mask.” 
One piece, in which the paper envisioned how things would be different if the Communists 
were in power, ended with the unmistakable threat that the “brown plague spot will be 
cauterised in a Germany of the councils.”56 The violence inflicted on Konrad may be described 
as “autotelic” violence, as opposed to “locative” and “raptive” violence. While the latter violence 
is used in order to own another body, and locative violence is employed to (re-)move another 
body, with the “autotelic” kind, which strikes us as particularly despicable and “senseless”, 
violence is not a means to an end, but the end itself; it has as its very point the purposeful 
destruction of the body, such as happens in cases of torture, mutilation, or excessive 
brutality.57 Pietrzuch’s murder bears resemblance to such an act. While his Communist and 
insurgent ties might have characterised him as an ‘enemy’ in the sense of an equal opponent, 
with at least some power, who the SA might seek to defeat in a fight, the “autotelic” nature of 
his violent death, outnumbered, ambushed, and fatally maltreated in the middle of the night in 
his own bedroom, marked him as a defenceless victim who had posed no danger whatsoever 
to his attackers in the moment of the attack. The purposeful and malicious destruction of his 
defenceless body through excessive violence was therefore all the more disturbing to 
observers. 
     Right-wing, nationalist papers, like the Deutsche Tageszeitung and the Deutsche Zeitung, 
did not cite the coroner’s report or Alfons’ or Mrs Pietrzuch’s evidence, not wanting to draw 
attention to the gruesome details of the crime. Unlike with the Kurfürstendamm riots, there 
was no scope for the violent acts to be played down, so keeping silent about them was the 
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better option. Instead, the Nazis put out their own view, according to which the perpetrators 
had acted in “latent self-defence” (latente Notwehr) against rampant left-wing aggression in 
the area. The SA men’s defence lawyer argued that the local SA units were feeling threatened 
and had repeatedly been the victims of violent Communist attacks, because of which “latent 
self-defence”, which had been applied in a recent trial against National Socialists in nearby 
Gleiwitz, should also apply in the Potempa case to lessen the sentences.58 At the same time, 
the right-wing press did its best to generally tarnish the character of the victim, describing him 
as a drunkard and aggressive troublemaker, whom Lachmann had had to throw out of his 
tavern on multiple occasions, and as a dangerous and unpatriotic traitor who was far from 
innocent. They emphasised his being Polish, as well as, allegedly, a former insurgent, and 
implied he might be a Communist and/or Polish agent.59 The liberal Vossische Zeitung 
poignantly commented on the anti-Polish rhetoric of the Right and observed that two of the SA 
defendants bore the distinctly Polish-sounding names “Kottisch” and “Wolnitza”. Thus, to try 
and distinguish between “noble Germanic humans” (germanische Edelmenschen) and “Polish 
Untermenschen” was particularly nonsensical in an area like Upper Silesia, where “German 
and Polish blood were inextricably mixed.”60 On the other hand, the Völkischer Beobachter 
wrote up special ‘human interest’ stories about the plight of the wives and children of the 
condemned men in order to elicit sympathy and garner support for their cause. A first-hand 
report from Potempa, including interviews with locals, about how generally well-liked the 
convicted Paul Lachmann was, was also printed in the paper.61 Several conservative 
organisations voiced their public support for the convicted men, calling for a re-trial or their 
amnesty; among them were the Stahlhelm (the right-wing paramilitary ‘League of Front 
Soldiers’), the Bund-Königin-Luise (the Stahlhelm’s sister organisation for conservative, 
monarchist women, whose patron was Crown Prince Wilhelm’s wife, Cecilie), the 
Reichsverband der Baltikumskämpfer (the Reich’s league of Baltic fighters (cf. Chapter 2)), 
the Arbeitsgemeinschaft katholischer Deutscher (the ‘working group of Catholic Germans’), 
and the Deutschbanner Schwarz-weiß-rot (a league of Kaiser-supporting monarchists).62 
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     The horror with which left-wing and liberal papers reported the gruesome attack clearly 
highlighted the lines which, within a large part of public discourse, were not yet crossable. The 
SA, however, had already crossed them, indicating the climate of escalating political violence 
towards the end of the Weimar Republic. Left-wing and liberal discourse, therefore, was even 
more shocked at the open support and show of solidarity which the convicted men received 
from the Nazi Party leadership, who evidently considered it politically acceptable or even 
opportune to defend them despite, or perhaps because of, the indisputable crime they had 
committed. By consciously re-printing the coroner’s report of the injuries Pietrzuch had 
sustained side-by-side with Hitler’s telegram of solidarity with the convicted SA men, the 
Frankfurter Zeitung emphasised the significance of the display of solidarity from the Nazi 
leadership. “Who”, the paper questioned, 
 
among the entire German public will understand that the leader of a large political 
movement would dare, unhesitatingly, to declare the killers honourable? Who could 
understand that a movement which makes claims to shape the future of Germany, 
would put itself on one level with creatures who must have renounced all human dignity 
in such a terrible manner?63 
 
Likewise, the Vossische Zeitung perceptively commented on a piece written by Goebbels, 
entitled “It is the Jews’ fault”, in which he railed against the Beuthen verdict and placed the 
blame for this supposed miscarriage of justice at the feet of “intellectual Jews, […] pimps and 
[…] red murderers”, ending on what the VZ  considered an unmistakable call to murder. As 
long as such language from the “dangerous demagogue” Goebbels could go unpunished, 
argued the liberal paper, Germany would never see peace, as no anti-terrorism laws would 
be able to prevent some “faithful reader” from one day putting into action what Goebbels had 
“diabolically” insinuated.64 By their open display of solidarity with the murderers, the Nazi 
Party, until then trying to convince the public of their “legal intentions”, had definitively shown 
their true colours and Hitler had made abundantly clear what he stood for and what means he 
was willing to employ and condone in his relentless pursuit of power.65 
     Aside from displays of shock at the sheer brutality of the act, the press discourse was 
dominated by the question whether the men should be tried, and punished, under the new 
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anti-terrorism laws. In an attempt to stop the wave of escalating political violence during the 
summer of 1932, the German government had introduced new, so-called anti-terrorism laws, 
which provided for special courts (such as the one in Beuthen) and allowed for harsher 
penalties, including the death penalty, to be applied. The new laws came into effect at midnight 
on 10 August, just an hour and a half before the SA men in Potempa fatally maltreated Konrad 
Pietrzuch. This coincidence of timing gave rise to much debate in the press as to whether it 
was appropriate to apply the new laws, given that the crime had only been committed so 
shortly after they had come into effect, with the liberal Vossische Zeitung wondering when the 
government intended to intervene “if not in this case?”66 Defending itself in this debate, the 
German government made a declaration, to be published by all newspapers, in which it 
insisted that “from the moment in which this decree came into effect, it has to be applied 
equally to anyone who violates law and justice, regardless of party or person.” The government 
showed confidence, threatening that “if necessary, the Reich government will employ all of the 
state’s means of power to ensure impartially the application of the laws, and it will not tolerate 
any party revolting against its rulings.” The public’s passions, it continued, would be better 
directed against “the originators of the bloody events” rather than against the government 
which “had to resort to such harsh measures in the collective interest.”67 Coincidentally, 
another trial was taking place simultaneously in the Silesian town of Brieg. On trial were a 
number of Social Democratic Reichsbanner members for the killing of two SA men in the 
course of clashes between Reichsbanner and SA men in the town of Ohlau on 10 July 1932. 
Compared to the men on trial in Beuthen, the Reichsbanner men received much lower 
sentences, prison sentences of varying length and no death sentences. Significantly, the 
crimes on trial in Brieg had taken place prior to the introduction of the anti-terrorism laws which 
had been in effect, if only for a couple of hours, when the SA men beat Konrad Pietrzuch to 
death in Potempa. Therefore, the divergent degrees of the penalties were lawful, particularly 
when taking into account, too, that in Ohlau the clashes between Left and Right had involved 
hundreds of people and no individuals could be proved to have killed the two SA men, while 
what had taken place in Potempa was clearly a targeted, premeditated attack.68 However, the 
simultaneity of both trials and their divergent verdicts intensified the debates as to whether it 
was fair to apply the new, harsher laws to the SA men, and the circumstance offered the right-
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wing press an ideal juxtaposition to highlight left-wing political violence and rail against the 
alleged bias of the courts against the National Socialists.69 
     Despite the gruesome nature of the crime and the far-right affiliation of its perpetrators, the 
Social Democratic Vorwärts and the outspokenly liberal Frankfurter Zeitung maintained their 
opposition to the death penalty on principle. The Frankfurter Zeitung argued that the 
government would not lose any authority if it decided to take into account the close temporal 
proximity of the murder to when the anti-terrorism laws had come into effect, thus preventing 
the executions from actually going ahead. However, the paper insisted that instead, the 
government had to force the Nazi press to acknowledge and report accurately the nature of 
the murder and what their readers’ comrades had done; naively, it seems, the liberal paper 
hoped that being confronted with the truth would have an effect on the faithful readers of the 
Völkischer Beobachter or Angriff.70 The Vorwärts insisted that if mercy was shown to the 
convicted men now, it would practically render useless the emergency anti-terrorism laws that 
had just come into effect. Out of overt self-interest, the paper stressed that what must under 
no circumstances happen, was that the laws be followed against left-wing aggressors, while 
their right-wing counterpart might get away with lesser punishment. So while they remained 
opposed to the death penalty on principle, they demanded, in retrospect also naively, that 
perpetrators of violence from the Left and the Right be treated equally in the execution of the 
law.71 The paper also commented on the glaring disrespect which the accused men flaunted 
inside the courtroom, laughing and chatting to each other and other SA men in the audience, 
demonstrating intentional indifference to their crime. It was as if, the Vorwärts ominously 
speculated, “the accused had received the assurances of their leaders that with the Nazi 
takeover of power, they would soon be given back their freedom.”72 This was exactly what 
happened. The National Socialist campaign proved successful first when their sentences were 
commuted to lifelong prison in September 1932, indicating the government’s inability (or 
unwillingness) to withstand Nazi pressure. However, the men remained in prison for a total of 
only about seven months and on 18 March 1933 were promptly released by Prussian Reich-
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commissar von Papen, who declared them the “’innocent sentenced victims of Potempa’ 
(“unschuldig verurteilten Opfer von Potempa”).”73  
     Von Papen’s remarkable reversal of the roles of victim and perpetrator in the Potempa case 
was indicative of a development which had already begun in the Beuthen courtroom. In his 
final speech for the defence, the SA lawyer Walter Luetgebrune made reference to the SA 
leader Horst Wessel, who had been shot on his doorstep in Berlin by a Communist on 14 
January 1930 and died of his injuries on 23 February. He had immediately been elevated to 
the position of national hero and Christ-like martyr for the Nazi cause by Goebbels.74 In an 
apparent attempt to relativize the severity of Pietrzuch’s murder, Luetgebrune said he did not 
wish it upon the prosecutor to have had to witness “how Horst Wessel had been tortured to 
death.” The events of the night of 10 August, he continued, were merely a defensive reaction 
to Communist threats.75 By bringing up Wessel, Luetgebrune therefore not only tried to justify 
his defendants’ actions, but also insinuated that, should the maximum sentence under the new 
anti-terrorism laws be carried out, the convicted men would join Wessel as martyrs for the 
National Socialist cause. Hitler, in an appeal published in the party newspaper, indicated the 
same when he referred to the “over three hundred party members massacred, often literally 
butchered, [whom] we count as dead martyrs.” He exhorted his comrades to make it their 
prime cause to fight for the freedom of the five men sentenced to death in Beuthen, lest they 
join the ranks of Wessel and the alleged 300 other martyrs.76 Some among the more moderate 
press picked up on the Nazi efforts to instrumentalise the condemned men in this way. The 
Vossische Zeitung commented that “perhaps tomorrow we shall see the five killers turned into 
national martyrs, and that the death penalty will instead be demanded for the judges who 
dispensed justice in accordance with the law.” The paper harshly condemned the defence’s 
attempts at framing the crime as an act of “national self-defence” (Staatsnotwehr) against a 
dangerous Polish insurgent, and instead reminded readers that personal motives, and a large 
amount of alcohol, had been instrumental in this unleashing of “brute instincts” which had “run 
riot in a bestial manner against a defenceless man.” The fact that the Nazi press was now 
trying to turn this act into a “national martyrdom” was a blatantly political tactic, rather than in 
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any way a question of the law, the paper concluded.77 The warnings, however, did not prevent 
the men, who were released shortly after the Nazi takeover of power, from somehow 
succeeding in becoming quasi ‘living martyrs’ for the movement. 
     As with the rioting on Kurfürstendamm the previous September, the murder of Konrad 
Pietrzuch and the trial of the SA men accused of it caused some anxiety within German public 
discourse over how the country would be viewed abroad. Though the crime had taken place 
far away from the very public spectacle on Berlin’s main boulevard, its nature and the added 
arguments concerning the trial made it come under extra scrutiny. The concern was palpable 
that the wave of violence spreading through Germany, of which the murder in Potempa was 
just one particularly gruesome ‘highlight’, would reflect badly on the country and its 
international standing. In its withering comments on Hitler’s public declaration of solidarity with 
the murderers, the Frankfurter Zeitung stated plainly that “a declaration of honour for these 
murderers is a punch in Germany’s face”, meaning that Hitler was doing a great disservice to 
the country as a whole by suggesting there was anything honourable about the crime or the 
perpetrators.78 Elsewhere, excerpts from the foreign press were reprinted as proof of the way 
in which the Potempa case was making waves abroad. The Vossische Zeitung cited both the 
Morning Post and The Times of London. The former called the “murder committed in cold 
blood” a “violation of the basic tenets of human propriety and civilisation”, which any candidate 
for political power ought to have renounced vehemently. The fact that Hitler had instead 
“celebrated this murder as an act of virtue and patriotism”, the Morning Post was cited further, 
was enough to “show the level to which political life in Germany had sunk.” The Times 
acknowledged that the German government had handled the “hysterical outbreaks of the 
National Socialists with dignity”, but also added that “nothing since the war had done as much 
damage to Germany’s name as the frightening prevalence of the most brutal political crimes.” 
It added that neither the harsh terms of the Versailles Treaty nor the desperate economic 
situation in Germany could excuse this.79 On the Right, the Deutsche Tageszeitung, referring 
to the British press in general, noted that “the dramatic aggravation of the situation within 
German domestic politics is being followed in England [sic!] with the greatest eagerness.” It 
was assumed that what was on the line was nothing less than the “existence of the Papen 
government”, and that, should the death sentences be carried out, it was expected that Hitler 
would succumb to pressure from the Stormtroopers and, following Mussolini’s example, would 
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initiate a “march on Berlin.” The Evening Standard was therefore cited as suggesting that 
Papen, short of pardoning the men, commute the death penalties into prison sentences, if he 
was going to preserve his government and its ability to keep order and guarantee justice. The 
DTZ consciously pointed out that the Evening Standard considered part of the reason for the 
especially fierce political fight in Silesia to be the region’s rendering apart under the Treaty of 
Versailles. The French Paris midi thought that “decapitating” the five SA men would be a 
demonstration of strength from the German government, but it doubted that it would come to 
that, anticipating instead the success of the Nazis’ intimidation tactics. The case was noted 
even beyond Europe, as the DTZ also reported that the leader of “the German-American 
National Socialists” had sent a telegram to Reichs-President Hindenburg, in which some 5,000 
American party members protested against the Beuthen verdict.80 It was thus not only clear 
that the murder of an unemployed worker in a Silesian village carried a significance far beyond 
the region, and even the country, but also that the sceptical views from abroad, doubting the 
assertiveness of the German government in the face of the growing Nazi movement and 
judging the German political climate harshly, reverberated back into German public discourse, 
sparking worry about the country’s international role and reputation. 
 
Both the rioting at Kurfürstendamm in September 1931 and the murder of Konrad Pietrzuch 
in August 1932, though very different in their nature, serve to exemplify the continual 
escalation of violence by the National Socialists during the final years of the Weimar Republic. 
At the same time, while both acts were instructive of the methods which the SA were now 
willing to employ, and which the Nazi leadership was willing to publicly defend, the reactions 
to both events indicated certain boundaries which were still in existence and which could not 
yet be crossed according to more mainstream public discourse. Excessive brutality, “autotelic” 
violence which seemingly relished the excess, against an unsuspecting, unarmed common 
worker remained indefensible in public discourse away from the extreme Right, as did attacks 
on unsuspecting members of the public on Berlin’s prime boulevard. In the latter case, in 
particular, location played an important role. As with the geographic circles which form the 
basic structure of this thesis, violence taking place at the centre of a society made a particular 
impact on public discourse, while the geographic periphery constituted a different kind of 
space. That which took place hidden away, at the margins, far from the centres of power, for 
example in a small Silesian village in a long-disputed border region, in the middle of the night, 
was shocking in its brutality, but not surprising in the fact that it was happening at all. Silesia 
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had been experiencing a high level of violence throughout the summer of 1932, violence had 
come to be expected there. While street clashes between the SA and Communists were also 
common in areas like Berlin, Hamburg, and the industrial centres to the East and West of the 
country in the later Weimar years, the attacks on Kurfürstendamm constituted an unexpected 
form of violence. As emphasised above, the openly anti-Semitic nature of the violence 
indicated a new level of confidence within the SA to carry their ideology forcefully into the 
streets. People out to worship, to celebrate the Jewish New Year, or to enjoy themselves 
among the entertainment options on offer on the busiest and most famous boulevard of 
Germany’s capital city, did not expect to be suddenly assaulted in broad daylight. They were 
not political fighters; nor did non-Jewish passers-by, once they realised the nature of the 
attacks, expect to be victimised despite not being Jewish; when they were attacked anyway, 
it only added to the public outrage. The riots therefore shocked those who became caught up 
in them, as well as those observing the very public spectacle domestically and from abroad. 
In this way, both examples of Nazi violence examined here highlight a shift that had taken 
place, in both actions and language, which resulted in a stark discrepancy between the more 
moderate mainstream public discourse in the late Weimar Republic, and the radically different 
discourse already embraced by the National Socialists, whose leadership had no problem 
publicly defending these acts. 
     With the SA, the Nazis had developed a radically new relationship with and use of violence. 
Reichardt has analysed violence as a central concept of the Nazi movement, according to 
which participating in violent acts was part of the culture and worked as a social glue among 
the SA. Committing violent acts together as a group, whether just nine, as in Potempa, or 
several hundred, as on Kurfürstendamm, united its members, as no individual bore the full 
responsibility for the group’s actions, yet every member of the group was implicated, creating 
a powerful bond.81 A willingness to use violence functioned as an “internal factor of prestige” 
among the members of the SA, earning those men the most prestige from their peers who 
were willing to commit the most and/or the most egregious acts of violence.82 In addition to 
being a tool of propaganda to demonstrate their power, violence allowed the Nazis to create 
a positive self-image. With violence as their raison d’etre, and the attractive manly 
camaraderie of the SA offering an alternative cause and home to restless young men, the 
movement appeared new, dynamic and actually willing to take action, while established 
organisations of the Right, such as the Stahlhelm, were dominated by an older generation and 
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seemed old-fashioned and sluggish with their traditional marches, uniforms and flags, shying 
away from the final commitment to bringing down the republican system through actions.83 
The triumph of the Nazi cult of violence was finally achieved in June 1934, with the ‘Night of 
the Long Knives’, when the SA itself became its victim and its leader, Ernst Röhm, and several 
dozen others were murdered on Hitler’s orders. The purge also counted noblemen, like former 
chancellor Kurt von Schleicher, and ‘apolitical’ women, such as Schleicher’s wife, among its 
victims. However, even this extraordinary circumstance did not deter members of the old elites 
sympathetic to the movement from continuing to lend public support to the Nazis and thus 
continue the discursive erosion of the boundaries of violence. 
 
4.2 “A PLAGUE ON BOTH YOUR BLOUSES!”84: DEBATING BRITISH FASCIST 
VIOLENCE IN 1934. 
Former Conservative, independent, and Labour Party MP Oswald Mosley, disillusioned with 
his old parties and having failed to make a success of his short-lived ‘New Party’, founded the 
British Union of Fascists (BUF) in October 1932.85 Like their Italian counterparts, from which 
the BUF took inspiration and with whom it had close links,86 Mosley’s men and women adopted 
a uniform of black shirts, earning them the descriptive moniker ‘Blackshirts’. As has been 
noted, anti-Semitism was not initially a prominent part of the BUF’s agenda. Instead, Mosley 
had taken inspiration from Mussolini’s fasci and strove for a “’fascist revolution’” in Britain, 
which would result in the establishment of a Corporate State which would manage industry; 
thereby the party especially sought to attract those disillusioned by the National Government.87 
By Martin Pugh’s estimation, the BUF enjoyed the apex of its popularity between January and 
June 1934, largely thanks to its public endorsement by the Rothermere press, who most 
famously owned the Daily Mail.88 In the evening of 7 June 1934, the BUF held a very large 
meeting at London’s Olympia exhibition hall, which was attended by up to 15,000 people.89 It 
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had been well-publicised beforehand, and the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) and 
other left-wing opponents of the Fascists were also in attendance with the aim of disrupting 
Mosley’s speech. Interrupters and hecklers began doing just that as soon as Mosley started 
speaking. Despite being amplified through twenty-four loudspeakers, Mosley chose to stop 
speaking at every interruption and had the hall spotlights trained on the hecklers. Shouting 
matches, brawls, and struggles between pro- and anti-Fascist attendees broke out in several 
parts of the large hall and Fascist stewards proceeded to forcibly remove the interrupters, 
handling them roughly enough to inflict numerous injuries in the process. Outside the venue, 
fighting continued and police, who did not intervene inside the hall, tried to restore order, which 
they only achieved near midnight. No fatalities occurred, but many injuries were sustained, 
and over a dozen people had to be taken to receive hospital treatment.90 The Liberal MP Isaac 
Foot, who brought up the Olympia meeting as the topic of a lengthy debate in the House of 
Commons, described the violence-stained events of 7 June as having “very much stirred the 
public mind.”91 This was certainly the case and as a result the Olympia meeting has been 
regarded as pivotal to the question of how or whether the violence accompanying the meeting 
changed public perception and attitudes towards the Fascists. This is precisely why this case 
study has been chosen for this chapter, even though anti-Semitism, which only emerged as a 
main focus of the BUF later in 1934, did not yet play a significant role in the discourse.92 It is 
not the purpose of this chapter section to explore the history of British Fascism more generally; 
rather, it uses this specific instance of political violence connected to the Fascist movement 
as a case study, embedded in the broader context of Fascism in Britain in the 1930s, to 
investigate attitudes within British public language towards political violence and highlight how 
the Fascists’ use of violence proved a divisive feature. 
     The main, and most recent, historiographical debate between Martin Pugh and Jon 
Lawrence regarding the events at Olympia already points towards its particular significance 
within the history of British Fascism, as the incident touched on deeply rooted facets of British 
society and politics. The historiographical debate has revolved around whether or not Fascist 
violence, especially as displayed at the Olympia meeting in June 1934, had a positive, 
negative, or any effect at all on how Mosley and the BUF were viewed, and whether it 
contributed to the movement’s eventual failure. While orthodox accounts considered Olympia 
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as a “watershed”, in the aftermath of which the BUF began losing the propaganda war,93 
Pugh’s revisionist account has argued that the effect of Fascist violence, as displayed at the 
Olympia meeting, on popular perceptions of the BUF had been overstated in the past and that 
in reality there was more widespread sympathy for the Fascists, especially among Tory 
politicians and conservative newspaper editors, than had hitherto been realised, or admitted.94 
Jon Lawrence’s post-revisionist response to Pugh has argued that the violence which occurred 
at the Olympia meeting did in fact have a negative effect on the BUF’s popularity and 
respectability, amounting to a “propaganda disaster of the first order” for the Fascists, and 
counting significantly towards the movement’s eventual failure. Indeed, the party never won a 
parliamentary seat. Lawrence’s argument, however, is that the real issue which the debate 
over the Olympia meeting brought forward, went further. The public debate, he argues, was 
less concerned with the nature of Fascism as such, and more generally explored what 
constituted “’legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ behaviour within democratic politics.”95  
     Though Pugh has written a response to Lawrence’s criticism, doubling down on his own 
argument that Fascism continued to enjoy more widespread popularity post-Olympia than is 
generally recognised in the historiography,96 Janet Dack, who has undertaken an extensive 
analysis of the reception in the national press of Mosley and his Fascists, finds Lawrence’s 
reading of the sources, in particular of the conservative press, more convincing than Pugh’s.97 
The existing recent literature on this topic, from Pugh to Lawrence to Dack, has made wide 
use of the available source materials, including press and parliamentary discourses, which 
this thesis focuses on. The designated literature has naturally used these materials more 
extensively than could be achieved in this limited chapter section. Therefore, while going back 
into the original source material directly relating to the Olympia meeting, the chapter section 
will also be making use of the already available analyses and materials regarding the BUF 
and its popularity more generally. The riotous meeting at Olympia captured significant 
attention in parliament. On 11 June questions were put to the Home Secretary demanding the 
clarification of rumours and the confirmation of the known facts regarding the Olympia 
meeting. Then, with rumours of new legislation already on the way, on 14 June a long debate 
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took place in the Commons in which MPs’ varying views of the meeting and interpretations of 
the gravity of the disturbances emerged. In particular, MPs’ speeches revolved around issues 
of law and order, the role of the police, the importance of free speech in democratic societies, 
and whether or how much of a danger Fascism posed to it, as well as the widespread 
perception of the Fascist movement and ideology as ‘foreign’, with developments on the 
European continent serving as a warning to Britain. The national press found itself debating 
similar issues, and the newspaper-reading public clearly felt strongly on these matters, as was 
evidenced by the “very large correspondence on the subject” which The Times, among others, 
reported receiving.98 
     An issue which has been recurrent throughout this thesis and which greatly exercised 
Members of Parliament was the central problem of maintaining law and order and whose role 
this was. As Home Secretary John Gilmour informed the House, it was not the duty of the 
Metropolitan Police, though 760 men were primed and ready outside the Olympia venue on 7 
June, to enter the hall to restore order or act as stewards unless called on by the organisers 
of the meeting to do so. He continued to explain to the House that “the British Union of Fascists 
informed the Commissioner that the Fascists did not require the assistance of the police inside 
the building and at no stage was any request made for police to enter the building.”99 Thus, 
he argued, the police were not to blame for the escalation inside the hall. However, he stressed 
that “the function of the Government is to preserve law and order” and “the duty of the police 
is to keep order.” Therefore, he suggested that “it may be necessary to arm the executive 
authorities with further powers for the purpose of preserving public order.”100 For procedural 
reasons, MPs were not allowed to explicitly discuss possible new legislation during the 14 
June debate, however, it was frequently alluded to. Isaac Foot posed the question whether 
the stewarding at political meetings ought not to be done by the police, rather than leaving this 
important duty to the organisers of the event, especially where “disorder may be 
apprehended.”101 Conservative MP Terence O’Connor was also of the opinion that the existing 
laws regarding the orderly conduct of political meetings “should be strengthened, the penalties 
increased.” Notably, however, his proposal was in particular referring to those who organised 
interruptions at meetings, interfering with the speakers’ right to free speech, a fundamental 
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right, the importance of which reappeared throughout the debate.102 Conservative MP Arthur 
Dixey also urged that “it would be in the interest of the Government to bring forward some 
legislation which would give some sort of adequate protection,” but added that new legislation 
was needed “not merely to deal with this Fascist question, but to deal with the whole question 
of keeping decent order at public meetings.”103 His assertion that he supported “fair play for 
every party” was read by his colleagues as tacit support for Mosley.104 David Logan, a Labour 
Party MP, on the other hand, did not think new legislation was necessary, as he insisted that 
both the Fascists and the Communists could, and should, be legislated against by the 
government under existing sedition laws.105 Foot, too, thought that new legislation was not 
quite necessary, especially if it were to be introduced “in the way of panic or under the 
influence of fear.” He did, however, think that it was in a way fortunate that the events at 
Olympia had “revealed our danger”, “like a flash of lightning that has lit up the political 
landscape.”106 
     The crucial argument which speakers returned to time and again was the assertion that the 
state must not tolerate any other person or body taking the law into their own hands. Mosley’s 
movement and its actions at Olympia thus further fuelled existing concerns over the 
emergence of ‘private armies’ in the country which might endanger the state’s monopoly on 
power. Liberal Clement Attlee pointed to various pieces of evidence from which he discerned 
that Mosley was in the process of establishing a form of armed force for himself, which was 
“something quite new.” Among the evidence he listed “the use of resounding military titles, the 
drilling, the organisation, the barracks, the uniform, the gangs who live in barracks under Sir 
Oswald Mosley’s control and are sent from meeting to meeting at Sir Oswald Mosley’s 
expense”, as well as “the use of armoured cars” and “talk of forming aeroplane squadrons.”107 
Attlee considered raising such a “semi-militarist force” “a very dangerous thing”, identifying the 
“central danger in the present situation” to be “the claim of a man like Mosley that he is entitled 
to keep order himself.” Attlee stated categorically that “that is not his prerogative.”108 The 
Independent Labour Party’s James Maxton agreed, arguing that Mosley’s “desire at the 
moment is to show that he can maintain law and order better, more effectively, more efficiently, 
and do the strong man better than the people who have been publicly appointed to do that 
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job.”109 This had been the strategy of Fascist ascension in Italy and Germany, where the 
state’s monopoly on power, and its capacity to maintain public order, had been deliberately 
undermined. William Thorne (Lab) therefore urged that the “Government should not allow any 
military force to be formed outside the forces of the Crown.”110 Foot pointed out that Olympia 
was not an isolated event. Drawing attention to other, though much smaller-scale, recent 
interruptions of Communist meetings and clashes between the attendees and Fascists, he 
lamented a “return to violent ways of thinking”, which was causing some “public 
apprehension.” He especially warned against the emergence of private armies in this climate, 
which, with reference to experiences on the European continent, he considered “a menace to 
liberty”, functioning as “the bodyguards of dictatorship.”111 He also drew on very recent Anglo-
Irish history to caution his contemporaries to not let violence breed more violence, reminding 
them that “if we look to Ireland we see what was the inter-connection between reprisal and 
reprisal only a few years ago.”112 
     The wearing of uniforms presented a particular point of contention in this discussion of 
‘private armies’. In reference to a previous meeting, in Bristol, which had also got rowdy, Foot 
cited the Home Secretary who had at the time admitted that “this disorder was largely due to 
the adoption of semi-military evolutions by the Fascists, their marching in formation and their 
general behaviour, which was regarded by the crowd as provocative.”113 Conservative MP 
Vyvyan Adams voiced a similar notion when he, trying very hard to not break the ban on 
explicitly discussing possible new legislation, emphasised that “I feel in my own heart that the 
real centre of this problem, and its real solution, lies in dealing with political uniforms.”114 The 
Scottish Unionist William Anstruther-Gray even went so far as to blame those choosing to 
wear uniforms for their own misfortune. Citing the case of one Fascist who had written to The 
Times recounting how, after the meeting at Olympia, he “was pursued by a mob and violently 
assaulted,” Anstruther-Gray simply stated “that it was his own fault. He was to blame for 
wearing a provocative uniform.” He added that “I think that that sort of thing is inevitable if 
people will persist in the wearing of black shirts.”115 As has been pointed out in the existing 
literature, even though the Metropolitan Police Commissioner himself, Hugh Trenchard (who 
had previously founded the RAF, as discussed in Chapter 3), was especially keen on 
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outlawing paramilitary organisations and banning the wearing of uniforms,116 new legislation 
to address the rising levels of public unrest specifically involving Mosley’s Fascists was not in 
fact passed in the aftermath of the Olympia meeting. It was not until two years later, when the 
‘Battle of Cable Street’ in London’s East End on 4 October 1936, involving at least 1,900 
Fascist marchers, some 100,000 counter-demonstrators, and the Metropolitan Police, had 
endangered public peace on a whole different scale, that the Public Order Act was passed. In 
it, among other things, the wearing of political uniforms was banned, indicating the central 
importance of the issue in the effort to render extremist political movements less compelling 
and effective, and instead cement the state’s monopoly on power as well as displaying the 
symbols thereof.117 Pugh, however, has pointed out that despite the debates following 
Olympia, and even though a ban on political uniforms had been discussed as early as April 
1934, the Public Order Act was only passed two years later, in 1936. This to him indicates a 
“lack of urgency on the part of the government”, which Pugh in turn takes as further evidence 
for his argument that the BUF enjoyed much more tacit support among Tories than 
historiography has generally been prepared to admit.118 
     The concern for maintaining law and order was closely bound up with even more 
fundamental questions about the situation of free speech, the nature of British democracy, 
and the public’s right to participate in the democratic process. From its formation in late 1932, 
the BUF’s efforts at disrupting Communist Party meetings and processions, as well as their 
attacks on rival Fascist groups, had led to a marked increase in political violence across 
Britain, but especially in London’s East End. On the other hand, the Communist Party 
organised anti-Fascist campaigns, again especially among the Jewish community in the East 
End, which proved equally, if not more, disruptive.119 The escalation of the Olympia meeting 
brought to the fore pre-existing anxieties about the state of free speech in Britain in many 
contemporaries, though they had diametrically opposed opinions about who was endangering 
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it and who was upholding it. The Fascists themselves, as well as their supporters and 
sympathisers in the press and in parliament, argued that the BUF was valiantly upholding the 
fundamental right to free speech against the Communists whose tactic of interrupting political 
meetings was endangering free speech in Britain. Mosley took the (alleged) provocations and 
violence from Communist interrupters at Olympia as proof for the necessity of a “Blackshirt 
Defence Force to secure the right of free speech in this country.”120 Both the Daily Mail and 
the Morning Post made reference to the quintessentially British notion of ‘fair play’ in their 
arguments that Communist interruptions were destroying political culture and discourse in 
Britain, indeed wrecking “this country and every Institution in it,” while Mosley stood for “’law, 
order, free speech, and English methods’.” According to the Mail, at Olympia the “right to free 
speech [had been] at stake” and thanks to the intervention by the Fascist stewards it had been 
“firmly upheld.”121 The Morning Post, too, invoked fair play. It complained of the fact that “for 
some years in many constituencies Socialist or Communist gangs have made free speech 
and public meeting almost impossible.” Therefore, if what the paper presented as the facts of 
the Olympia meeting, which it based on Mosley’s own account, were correct, “we suggest that, 
in this case at least, the Fascists are the defenders rather than the assailants of these rights 
of free speech and public meeting on which democracy rests.” The Post emphasised that it 
had no sympathy for dictatorships, but preferred “our traditional Government of King, Lords 
and Commons.” For this reason, it hoped that the “English liking for fair play” would prevail in 
the government consultations about what ought to be done to keep public order, rather than 
resulting in the, in the paper’s eyes unfair, suppression of only the Fascists.122 In the 
Commons, Conservative MP Tom Howard put forward the argument that it was because “we”, 
meaning Conservatives, but presumably also Liberals and Labour politicians, had not opposed 
and handled Communist interruptions at their meetings as forcefully as the Blackshirts were 
dealing with them, that the Fascist movement had gained popular support. “People are going 
into it because they resent the methods adopted by the other side,” he reasoned, adding that 
people were “following him [Mosley, A.K.] because he is appealing to their sense of fair play 
and the right of free speech” by (literally) cracking down on Communist interrupters.123 Fellow 
Conservative MP Michael Beaumont, who openly called himself an “anti-Democrat”, also 
argued that it was because of the Communists attempting to break up meetings all over the 
country that the Fascists were gaining support; however, he opposed any government moves 
to proscribe the Fascist movement as he thought it would only drive up recruitment into the 
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BUF.124 Earl Winterton (Con) saw a “menace to free speech”, but argued that it had “existed 
for a long time” and was a result of the fact that “we tolerate things – interruptions, abuse, 
insults and physical threats in a way that they are not tolerated, for instance, in the United 
States of America or Canada.” Nevertheless, he thought that the threat of Fascism was being 
“altogether exaggerated.”125 
     On the other hand, there were those contemporary voices who argued that it was Mosley’s 
Fascist movement which was endangering free speech in Britain. Clement Attlee disdainfully 
remarked about Mosley that “he preserves free speech just as long as it suits him.”126  The 
Daily Herald reminded readers that “turbulence” and interruptions had occurred at political 
meetings of any party, and in principle there was nothing wrong with this, as “generally British 
people concede to others the liberty of utterance which they claim for themselves.” This 
equilibrium, however, rested on the basis that stewards at political meetings usually used only 
“the minimum force in silencing or ejecting brawlers.” The fact that Mosley’s Blackshirt 
stewards had failed to do so would, argued the paper, eventually harm their own cause. 
Conservative Terence O’Connor identified free speech as “an essential bulwark of democracy” 
and insisted that “we cannot permit any self-appointed protector of free speech.”127 He had 
attended the meeting at Olympia, which he likened to a “Russian pogrom”, and was left in no 
doubt that “the object of the meeting was to demonstrate the value of the Fascist defence 
force in securing free speech.”128 He held up the example of democracies which were “going 
down like nine-pins all over Europe, largely because the right of free expression of opinion 
has been denied to democracy.” “If we are to see democracy survive” in Britain, he insisted 
that the House ought to consider all options, “by administration and by legislation”, to “preserve 
that right.”129 By O’Connor’s own admission, this emphatic attitude towards the dangers posed 
by Mosley and Fascist movements in general had earned him the characterisation as a 
“Conservative softy and sentimentalist” by the Rothermere press.130  
     A large number of contemporary observers, certainly not sympathetic to the Fascists, 
however, took the Olympia events as an opportunity to condemn both Communist and Fascist 
violence and interruptions as impermissible dangers to free speech and liberty. The Guardian 
piece which gives this chapter section its title did so humorously by wishing “a plague on both 
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your blouses!” It insisted that liberty was the “essence of our British life” and “Englishmen 
[would] not be bludgeoned or kicked out of it,” neither by men in red shirts nor by ones in black 
shirts. An infringement of this fundamental liberty would put the country on the “slippery slope 
that leads downwards to civil war and faction tyranny.”131 Liberal MP Kingsley Griffith took a 
similarly admonitory stance towards the interplay between Communists and Fascists in British 
political culture. He argued that “two rather unconstitutional bodies in the political field are a 
great deal more than twice as bad as one such body. One unconstitutional body may succeed 
in making a riot. Two can make something much more like a civil war.”132 Conservative 
Geoffrey Lloyd thought that Olympia had been “the culmination of these two movements,” 
meaning the disruptive involvement of both the Communists as well as the Fascists in British 
politics. He appealed to his colleagues that “we all agree that we want to maintain the rule of 
law. […] We all agree that we want to maintain free speech.” Therefore, he put forward the 
suggestion of having police present from the start at any meeting where disorder was 
anticipated; this, he argued, “would have the effect of restraining both the Communists and 
the Fascists.”133 Fellow Conservative Maurice Petherick stressed that, in his opinion, “every 
political party, however subversive they may be, have a perfect right to express their views, 
impartially, as long as they do not preach actual sedition; they should have as far as possible 
complete freedom of speech.” He was unimpressed with the fact that there were “in the House 
of Commons at the present time hon. Members who are defending the Fascists on the ground 
that they are the only people who care to promote freedom of speech.” The reason, in his 
analysis, was not so much that “they are so very keen on freedom of speech, but because 
they really and thoroughly dislike the Communists.” He himself, he insisted, disliked “both 
extremes” and considered it appropriate, when disorder was provoked and broke out, that the 
police should “deal with them as they would with two rival gangs of racecourse rowdies.”134 
What these debates came down to, as Lawrence has pointed out, was a basic concern over 
the appropriate form of public participation in the democratic process and the place of force in 
it. As Lawrence has argued, the division between contemporary commentators on the events 
at Olympia was less about their pro- or anti-Fascist convictions; as the Guardian observed at 
the time, “it was a relief to many who were watching closely the Tory reactions to the Olympia 
affair to find that so few showed Fascist sympathies.”135 Instead, Lawrence has identified the 
issue at the heart of the Olympia debate as the controversial attempt to determine where to 
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“draw the line between legitimate and illegitimate forms of opposition at public meetings.” In 
other words, Olympia prompted questions, recurrent throughout the modern period, about 
whether the right to free speech should be regarded as “absolute,” or whether the public had 
a “right to voice reasoned objections without being subject to violent ejection” and what the 
role of the state’s executive forces was in guaranteeing either.136 
     In a reversal of the worry identifiable in German public discourse over how the country 
would be viewed abroad and how its rising tide of political violence was endangering its 
international reputation, British public discourse was consumed with fear of ‘continental’ 
conditions developing in the UK. Proving the worries of the German press correct, Germany, 
but also Italy, were held up as warning examples of places where “terrorism [was] running 
from one end of the country to another.”137 Foot did not mince his words when he warned that 
developments “abroad” had shown just “how soon barbarism can break down the dykes of 
civilisation” and that the way Hitler had “taken over Hindenburg” had resulted in a “state of 
affairs in Germany which most people would regard as an affront to the spirit of man.”138 In the 
Observer’s estimation what had occurred on 7 June corresponded to “Hitlerism at Olympia”, 
as witnesses were reporting “a Nazi brutality of physical violence.”139 The CPGB’s Daily 
Worker thought Mosley’s spectacle at Olympia to have been “in true Goebbels’ style”, while 
the Guardian attested that Mosley had “nothing of theatricalism to learn from either Hitler or 
Mussolini.”140 The Observer’s German correspondent noted the much more sinister fact that 
“misgivings which Nazis have hitherto expressed as to Sir Oswald’s apparently open attitude 
to the Jewish question seem now to have been set at rest, and increased interest is being 
taken in his movement here.”141 Attlee shared Foot’s concerns, arguing that Mosley’s methods 
were “utterly foreign to this country”, identifying them as “really the Italian method. It is the 
method of the gang.” The prospect of the state potentially losing its monopoly on power to the 
“method of the gang”, going down the path of “many countries abroad” where “democracy 
[had] failed […] simply because they [had] forgotten their common citizenship in their extreme 
partisanship”, was perceived as profoundly un-British.142 William Thorne (Lab) reminded the 
House that a “potential dictator” was in need of a “private army”, and that that was “just what 
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happened in Italy.”143 Mosley had indeed apparently visited Mussolini in Rome in 1932 to learn 
more about the “’forms and methods of organisation adopted in Italy’.”144 Britain, therefore, 
would be well advised to stay vigilant, as both Labour and Conservative Members warned: 
Harold Hales (Con) “fear[ed] for the future of this country” if “we are to have a repetition of 
what is happening on the Continent to-day”; while David Logan (Lab) urged the government 
to act decisively against both the “Fascist and Communist movements”, because he worried 
that “if we do not govern them, we shall be governed.”145 
     Continuing his warning of both extreme left and right-wing movements, Logan exhorted his 
colleagues that “we must see that there is no further contamination.”146 His choice of words 
contained a telling notion that Fascism (and Communism) could spread from the continent to 
Britain like a disease or epidemic. Many, however, had a curious sense that there was 
something inherently British which would make the inhabitants of the country immune to this 
disease. The above-cited “Nazi brutality”, the Observer continued, was something “the British 
people abhor.” The paper confidently asserted that “Britain is not Germany or Italy. There is 
something in the stomach of this people which he [Mosley, A.K.] and his know nothing of.”147 
Citing one of the most stereotypical national attributes, Colonial Secretary Philip Cunliffe-Lister 
thought it impossible for a dictatorship to ever take hold in “England” because “the whole idea 
of such a movement is so alien to our character and our common sense.”148 With some 
condescension, as well as confidence, Maurice Petherick (Con) showed himself certain that 
“if this faction is handled in a proper way, as the Communists have been handled, the good 
sense of the British public will lead them to realise that there is really nothing in these 
Continental and new-fangled notions.”149 Not without considerable pathos, several speakers 
invoked Britain’s democratic tradition as both legacy and as mandate, while eying 
developments on the European continent with great concern. Terence O’Connor called the 
country “one of the essential bulwarks of democracy” and urged his fellow lawmakers to “be 
vigilant” and “take in time the steps necessary to maintain our position as the greatest 
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democratic country in the world.”150 Vyvyan Adams (Con) took his cue from “the last line of the 
chorus of ‘Rule Britannia’”, arguing that “freedom” was the “quality which we in this country 
find justifies us more than any other in loving our country”, because it “in fact, in deed and in 
sentiment really exists here.” But, he asked, could this freedom exist “under any 
dictatorship?”151 William Ormsby-Gore (Con) invoked even older history, when he warned of 
the “foreign fashions of Blackshirts and Redshirts”, calling them “dangerous nonsense”, and 
asserted that neither “Sir Stafford Cripps or Mosley, or any other ballyhoo who comes along” 
should be permitted to undo “what it took all our people, all the fighting of Magna Charta and 
the Bill of Rights and the abolition of slavery, centuries to win.”152 Attlee took a similar line and 
called the country “the oldest child of liberty in the world” which must not “succumb to the 
forces which have prevailed among some of her younger sisters on the Continent.” Instead, 
Britain was the country which “sets an example to the rest of the world in the way it conducts 
its political controversies” and, revealing a sense that extremist ideologies had muddled the 
international order, Attlee asserted that Britain’s role should be to “lead the world back to 
sanity.”153  
     It is worth noting that, though it occurred a few weeks later, at the end of the month, June 
1934 of course saw the purges of the ‘Night of the Long Knives’ in Germany, exposing beyond 
any doubt the ruthlessness and brutality of the Nazi regime. In the heated public debate in the 
aftermath of Olympia, the transnational awareness of this climate of political violence 
dominating much of continental Europe could only serve to further enforce the link between 
Fascism and violence in British perception.154 The place of violence, therefore, both in British 
Fascism as well as in British politics more generally, emerged as another central topic of the 
debate prompted by the events at Olympia. The violence displayed by the Fascist stewards at 
the meeting was generally condemned in the House and in the press as disproportionate by 
all but the most partisan, right-wing and Fascist voices. The Conservative and Scottish 
Unionist MPs Terence O’Connor, William Anstruther-Gray, and Henry Scrymgeour-
Wedderburn wrote to the editor of The Times, calling what they had witnessed from the 
Blackshirts at the Olympia meeting “wholly unnecessary violence.” They highlighted the fact 
that “men and women were knocked down, and, after they had been knocked down, were still 
assaulted and kicked on the floor.” Apparently, the display of violence was severe enough that 
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the three writers of the letter said they would be surprised “if there were no fatal injuries.”155 
Another eyewitness, Conservative MP Geoffrey Lloyd, characterised the behaviour of the 
Fascists as “calculated to exaggerate the effect of the most trivial interruptions and to provide 
an apparent excuse for the violence of the Blackshirts.”156 Another indignant author of a letter 
to the editor called the Fascists’ behaviour “deliberately provocative” and “the most 
unnecessarily violent and disgusting thing I have ever witnessed.”157  
     It was generally agreed that a certain amount of interruptions and heckling at political 
meetings was commonplace. Attlee, who called the behaviour of the Fascists at Olympia 
“unjustifiable brutality”, reminded the House that “in times past there has been political 
violence” and he was certainly not going to suggest that “this country has always been free 
from political violence.” However, he emphasised that “until very recently political violence was 
a thing of the past” and he evidently hoped it would stay that way.158 Terence O’Connor called 
the “ordinary straightforward heckler” the “salt of every political meeting” without whom “politics 
would not be worth while”, and Lieutenant-Colonel Evelyn Powell (Con) even claimed that “we 
welcome the heckler and are friendly with him. He makes our meetings more interesting.”159 
Geoffrey Lloyd agreed that “in English politics a certain amount of good-humoured heckling 
and rough interruptions are traditional,” the general consensus being that such incidents ought 
to be handled by the speaker with equally good-humoured aplomb.160 What had occurred at 
Olympia, however, was perceived to have been excessive. Lloyd had been “appalled by the 
brutal conduct of the Fascists last night,” who he thought had “behaved like cads and 
bullies.”161 Lawrence, tracing the role of violence in British politics back through the Victorian 
and Edwardian periods, has argued that while in those earlier eras there had been a 
“widespread acceptance of force within popular politics,” attitudes towards political violence 
had “changed decisively in the aftermath of the First World War.” Under the impression of the 
mass violence of the war years, and many of the developments examined in this thesis, 
including postwar riots in Britain, the conflict in Ireland, colonial violence, and the violent 
revolutionary upheaval on the European continent, Lawrence has argued that Britain 
experienced a fear of brutalisation, which caused “politicians of all parties” to want to 
“reconstruct Britain as a ‘peaceable kingdom’.” He emphasises, however, that while attitudes 
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changed, behaviour did not, causing the tensions as traced in the discourses analysed here.162 
Pugh has criticised this argument, arguing that Lawrence overlooked the fact that there were 
many on the political Right who took the Fascist movement seriously as early as the 1920s as 
a force which might be able to stop Bolshevism on the continent and confidently oppose the 
Left in Britain, which the incumbent Tory government was failing to do in their opinion, and 
who were therefore prepared to defend the BUF’s use of violence by reference to pre-war 
practices of force within politics.163  
     Whether or not a fundamental shift in attitudes towards the place of violence within British 
politics had occurred as a result of the First World War is certainly debatable. It seems 
accurate, however, to argue that, whether in response to the War or more in an effort at 
delineation towards other countries, in interwar Britain violence as a political means came 
generally to be regarded as a ‘continental’ defect and fundamentally ‘un-British’. The 
Guardian’s London correspondent thought that some of the “blind and insatiate brutality” of 
“the fascists and Nazi mentality and methods” had been “allowed to be seen on Thursday, and 
it has seriously shocked public opinion.”164 Geoffrey Lloyd expressed the perceived 
foreignness of political violence in Britain when he stated that it had been “a deeply shocking 
scene for an Englishman to see in London,” adding in the House that what he had witnessed 
at Olympia had “made my blood boil as an Englishman and a Tory.”165 Fellow Conservative 
MP John Davidson called the “brute force” displayed at Olympia “quite foreign to the British 
character” and asserted that it had “made every one of my friends – men and women – 
ashamed that the people who perpetrated these deeds were Britons.” The fact that “they were 
only copying other countries, where liberty is dead” was not an excuse for him; “we are not 
going to stand for that in this country.”166 The Chicago Tribune’s London correspondent 
deemed the entire Olympia meeting a “fiasco”, seeing as “the papers are filled with protests 
against the brutality with which the interrupters were manhandled.” Significantly, he added, 
“the fact that most of the interrupters were Communists had not made a bit of difference to the 
conservative Englishman’s love of fairplay. He supports the Communists’ right to interrupt a 
speaker as much as that of anyone of any other political faith.”167 Lloyd condemned the 
“disgraceful brutality” of the BUF stewards, but in the same breath highlighted that 
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Communists had also been engaged in “a substantial amount of outrage.”168 Foot urged his 
colleagues that “if we are going to put an end to this growing violence, we must be prepared 
to condemn the violence of our friends as well as the violence of our enemies.”169 Therefore, 
while on this occasion Fascists had been the ones to overstep the line and were attracting 
public criticism as a result, both Liberal and Conservative MPs acknowledged that violence in 
politics was generally not acceptable in British political culture, lending credence to at least 
part of Lawrence’s argument. 
     The Fascists of course justified their violence by reference to provocations from the 
Communists, whom they accused of organised interruptions (with some justification, seeing 
as the Daily Worker published a map with instructions of how to get to London’s Olympia in 
their 7 June edition).170 With considerable exaggeration, however, particularly considering the 
deadly violence between Left and Right which had taken place in Germany just a few years 
prior, the Blackshirt spoke of the “Red Terror” of the British Communists, which had 
supposedly been successfully “smashed” at Olympia.171 Several letters written to the editor of 
the conservative Morning Post agreed with the view that Communists had provoked the 
escalation of violence, one reader calling their behaviour “unsporting and thoroughly un-
British;” another one was certain that the Communists had been “out for hooliganism and 
rioting, and it is on them that the vitriol of public opinion should be poured. They were the 
originators of the trouble, and were asking for all they got.”172 The BUF’s supporters at the 
Daily Mail evidently took considerable pride in the efficiency of the Fascist stewards and 
openly described the injuries inflicted when the stewards “would be upon them [the 
interrupters, A.K.] in an instant, punching, pulling and pushing with such vigour that after a 
very few moments of interruption the struggling rowdies would find themselves outside with 
black eyes and bruised bodies.”173 The paper, however, also claimed that “Blackshirts suffered 
three times as many casualties as the Reds”, which they took as proof that the “Reds were 
the aggressors, and that they were handled with all possible restraint.”174 This claim, however, 
is contradicted by the evidence presented in the House of Commons by Home Secretary John 
Gilmour who had figures collated of victims who had received treatment at various London 
hospitals in the aftermath of the Olympia meeting. According to these, 14 people had been 
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injured severely enough to require hospital treatment. Only one of them, a woman, was 
reported to have been wearing a Fascist Blackshirt uniform, though Gilmour admitted that in 
collecting these figures he had not been interested in whether the injured were Communists 
or Fascists. None of the injuries recorded was found to be consistent with the use of razors as 
weapons; the numerous head injuries, black eyes, bruises, cuts, abdominal injuries and 
suspected fractures were largely attributed to fist blows and kicks, though it was thought 
“possible that some of the injuries treated might have been caused by the use of 
knuckledusters.”175  
     As far as the use of weapons inside Olympia was concerned, contradictory claims were 
made. While most reports agreed that chairs had been smashed in the fight, and some claimed 
that shoes, and in one case a fire-extinguisher, had been used as weapons, the more partisan 
publications of both political camps accused the other of using more serious weapons.176 The 
Communists claimed that Fascists had slashed interrupters and had been fitted out with 
knuckledusters;177 Mosley not only claimed to have seen “that favourite weapon of Red 
hooligans, the razor” in action at Olympia, but also “knuckle-dusters covered with spikes, 
stockings filled with broken glass […], iron spikes and bludgeons.”178 Given such a potent list 
of alleged weapons, the recorded injuries of Fascists should have been much more numerous 
and severe than the available figures suggested. If the Communist allegations were correct 
though, it ought to have been the other way round, an aspect Mosley himself addressed in a 
speech at the English Review Luncheon Club, when he provocatively asked “Where are the 
bodies?”179 There was some evidence that more people were treated for injuries than the 
number presented by Gilmour in the House, as various papers published eyewitness reports 
from doctors who had been in attendance at Olympia and recalled treating a number of injuries 
on the spot, rather than referring the victims to hospital. One reported that doctors doing 
voluntary work had treated circa 70 patients for bleeding head wounds, lacerations, and a 
“number of more or less serious injuries.” “None of the people treated”, however, had been 
“wearing the Fascist uniform.”180 Another medical volunteer manning a First Aid post, on the 
other hand, claimed to have treated a young man in Blackshirt uniform who he even doubted 
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would survive the night due to his abdominal injuries.181 Nevertheless, Mosley’s claim that 
eleven Blackshirts had had to be hospitalised with stomach injuries and razor slashes, to which 
the Morning Post purposely added “injuries below the belt”, while their opponents had 
“produced only one man in hospital” was evidently untrue, going by all available evidence.182 
     The fact that Mosley made such an effort to deflect blame for inflicting serious injuries away 
from his organisation was indicative of the BUF’s approach to violence. Even though the Daily 
Worker claimed that “Mosley’s fascist thugs are in every respect of the same brand as Hitler’s 
Storm Troops”, this assertion does not hold true when their differing ethos of violence is 
considered.183 Though Lawrence has emphasised that violence did have an important role to 
play in the “ethos of the movement”, he has also stressed that for the British Fascists violence 
was a means to an end, rather than an end in itself. It was considered a “necessary evil”, 
needed to ensure the Fascists could hold their meetings without interruptions, rather than 
being the movement’s raison d’être.184 To this end, the BUF’s director of propaganda, Bill 
Risdon, for example published advice on stewarding “with a view to the maintenance of good 
order”, which meant avoiding a “scrap.”185 In a radio speech broadcast on the BBC a few days 
after Olympia, Mosley also put forward the narrative of defensive violence, claiming that in 
“not one single case have Blackshirts ever attacked their opponents’ meetings”, and assuring 
listeners that “I can promise you that we, at least, will continue to preserve law and order.”186 
Contemporary observers sympathetic to the Fascists concurred that at Olympia the 
“Blackshirts acted purely in self-defence” and that they had been “simply defending the 
established British right of free speech.”187 However, making it unmistakably clear that violence 
had its place in the Fascist movement, Mosley ominously added that “when we are attacked, 
we hit back and we hit hard: and so would any Briton worthy of the name.”188 This framing by 
Mosley of violence as a defensive, if regrettably necessary, means contrasted starkly with the 
gratuitous use of violence in the Nazi movement, for whose members, as discussed above, 
violence was fundamental to their collective and individual, especially masculine, identity 
formation. Reichardt has identified three main purposes of violence in the German and Italian 
Fascist movements. They were the paralysation of the political enemy, the strengthening of 
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the inner cohesion of the Fascist units thanks to the collective experience of the fight, and the 
public demonstration of Fascist power and order.189 These do not easily map onto the British 
Fascists. Though Mosley had emphasised that “this age is dynamic” while “the pre-war age 
was static,”190 for the British Fascists this dynamism of the new age, of which Fascism, with 
its prioritisation of action, was a representative ideology, did not necessarily include 
‘purification’ through the perpetration of violence.191 If the purposeful glorification of the fight 
and of violent self-expression and action is considered a central tenet of continental Fascist 
movements, then, British Fascism was almost oxymoronic, due to Mosley’s outward insistence 
on violence as primarily a defensive recourse and the BUF’s purported aversion to gratuitous 
violence. Even at the famed ‘Battle of Cable Street’ on 4 October 1936, when the BUF’s 
intention of marching through London’s East End constituted a clear and deliberate 
provocation of the working-class and Jewish neighbourhood, the vast majority of the fighting 
actually took place between the police and the large numbers of anti-Fascist demonstrators.192 
Evidently, at this point in time, especially against the backdrop of violent Fascist regimes on 
the continent, a British Fascist movement had to carefully toe the line of publicly expressing 
regret at and reluctance to use violence, even if its actions contradicted its words. 
     The discussions of the violence which occurred at Olympia also carried noticeable 
gendered dimensions. The presence of both men and women among the general audience at 
Olympia, as well as among the Blackshirts, including their stewards, and also among the 
number of injured and arrested as a result of the riotous meeting, was generally noted in the 
press.193 Some reports seemed to suggest that the women’s presence almost worked to 
heighten the confusion and chaotic atmosphere in the hall, as the Daily Telegraph for example 
asserted that “one of the most effective interrupters was a woman who screamed shrilly at the 
top of her voice.”194 As the meeting grew more riotous and fighting broke out, it was reported 
that a “number of elderly women became frightened and left.”195 However, other female 
members of the audience, “of bold spirit”, seemed to view the scenes unfolding before them 
as more of an amusing spectacle, deciding to stand “on their chairs watching the fighting 
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through opera glasses and laughing with excitement.”196 Of central importance in the public 
discussions over the violence that had occurred at Olympia was the treatment of women in 
this context. In an effort to discredit their political opponents, the partisan press of both the 
Left and the Right respectively accused the other side of violently attacking women. The BUF’s 
Blackshirt printed an account according to which Blackshirt men and women had been brutally 
kicked in the stomach and slashed with razors by Communist interrupters; an eyewitness 
quoted in the CPGB’s Daily Worker recounted largely identical assaults, with the roles of victim 
and perpetrators reversed.197 One assault reported in the left-wing Daily Herald, by all 
accounts exaggerated, as the incident was referenced nowhere else, had overt sexual 
connotations, with a woman as the victim, but women also as stereotyped fury-like 
perpetrators of the attack. The paper recounted how the woman, who had screamed at the 
sight of a man being kicked and beaten while lying on the floor, was “thrown to the women 
Black-shirts, who hit her and clawed at her as she sagged limply on the ground. They picked 
her up and, with her clothes apparently torn from her, naked from the hips, they carried her 
screaming through the audience.”198 Self-righteous outrage at the gendered violence 
occasionally became bound up with racism, too, as in one eye-witness’ account, who wrote to 
the Daily Herald emphatically stating that “if the way I saw some women being handled means 
being British, then I would sooner be a Negro.”199 This element, unsurprisingly, was strong 
among the Fascists, too, who, as Julie Gottlieb has shown, on the one hand strove to harness 
women’s racist and anti-Semitic “fanaticism” to further the movement and, on the other, used 
women as a “veneer of decency” for an ideology which “promised to protect female virtue from 
alien interference.”200 
     Far from being only presented as victims of violence, however, the female Blackshirt 
stewards, in particular, appeared empowered by their use of martial arts in the execution of 
their stewarding duties. The woman who the Daily Telegraph had called “one of the most 
effective interrupters” due to her piercing shrieks, was promptly “dealt with by a member of 
Fascist ‘ju-jitsu’ [sic!] girls who have been specially trained for throwing out women 
interrupters.”201 The ancient Japanese technique which the female Blackshirts used to eject 
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female interrupters had become popular among British women early in the century as a means 
of self-defence, but gained special notoriety as the suffragettes’ adopted method of defending 
themselves against police assaults.202 The fact that the Blackshirts had specifically seconded 
female stewards to deal with female interrupters at Olympia was noted in a letter to the editor 
of The Times, co-signed by senior British Army officer and hero of the 1920 Mesopotamian 
campaign Aylmer Haldane, as being a particularly noteworthy “action of thoughtful courtesy 
on the part of the Blackshirts.”203 This apparent expression of confidence in the Fascists’ moral 
decency and gentlemanliness contrasted with other, less generous assessments. 
Conservative MP Oliver Locker-Lampson told the House that he had “often dealt with 
Communists at meetings” of his and that he had always “got rid of them in what is called a 
gentlemanly fashion.” One of the Communists had apparently even written to him “applauding 
me for the delicate manner in which he was conducted out of one of my meetings.”204 The 
implication was clear; Locker-Lampson did not think the Fascists’ method of dealing with 
interrupters at Olympia had been particularly “gentlemanly.” While the BUF-supporting Daily 
Mail expressed satisfaction at the efficient manliness of the Blackshirt stewards, likening the 
“sturdy squad of blackshirted figures” to a “first-class Rugby football team”, the Guardian was 
much more biting when characterising the Fascist cult of masculinity as “silly showmanship, 
lime-lit powwows and posturings.”205 The ultimate blow, however, was dealt to Fascist 
masculinity by insinuating cowardice. The non-Fascist press showed itself very unimpressed 
by the fact that Fascists outnumbered neutral and hostile audience members by a large 
number and that, in ejecting them, the stewards were always reported to ‘gang up’ on 
individual interrupters. One eyewitness described how an interrupter was “being chased down 
the corridor by a horde of Blackshirts” while Geoffrey Lloyd claimed that he had seen “case 
after case of single interrupters being attacked by ten or twenty Fascists. Again and again as 
five or six Fascists carried out an interrupter by arms and legs several other Blackshirts were 
engaged in hitting and kicking his helpless body.”206 A different report spoke of “eight girl 
Blackshirts” who “pounced on” a young woman who had shouted something and, “screaming 
as much as the girl they were ejecting, whirled out of the building.”207 Fascist cowardice was 
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thus not necessarily only a masculine shortcoming. Interestingly, one particularly ‘cowardly’ 
accusation was, once again, flung both ways. The Daily Worker had claimed that Mosley had 
opened his speech at Olympia with a conscious provocation, saying that Communist men 
“were hiding behind women’s skirts.”208 Four days later, however, the same paper turned the 
story on its head and claimed that at another Fascist meeting, this one in Southampton, the 
“male brand of Fascist thug kept away, preferring to hide behind the skirts of the women.”209 
Evidently, the mere suggestion of such cowardice in Mosley’s speech had been egregious 
enough to require the Communists to reassert their manliness by denigrating Fascist 
masculinity. 
     While Olympia thus undeniably prompted serious debate over the danger of escalating 
violence creeping into political culture, at the same time, the chaotic events that had taken 
place only caused some contemporaries to take Fascism less seriously. An eyewitness who 
had attended the meeting out of curiosity to find out “what Fascism [had] to offer” was left 
deeply unimpressed by the “display of un-English theatricalism” and “schoolboy hooliganism.” 
He disparagingly compared the atmosphere to the “concerted shouting such as one has 
become accustomed to associate with American University football matches” and concluded 
that this display had “finally killed our readiness to believe in Fascism as a force worthy of 
serious consideration.”210 Conservative MP Frederick Macquisten also voiced his disdain for 
not so much the events themselves, as for the fact that the House spent several hours 
debating their significance. Dismissing some of the evidence, and downplaying the level of 
violence meted out at Olympia, he declared “all this talk about weapons is bosh. Nobody has 
any weapons, neither the Communists or anybody else. I do not believe there has been any 
serious use of weapons.” Instead, he argued the people outraged at what had happened just 
did “not know what it is to be in a real scrap.” He admitted that “being hit in the face and that 
sort of thing” was “no doubt […] very painful”, but the lack of “broken bones” as a result of the 
altercations led him to consider it to have been no more than “a kind of juvenile scuffle” that 
had “been given a preposterous amount of importance.” He wondered aloud: “What is the 
good of treating that gentleman [Mosley, A.K.] so very seriously?”211 
     This dichotomy seemed to be characteristic of the discourse sparked by the events at 
Olympia, which is reflected in the historiographical debate sketched out above, as well as its 
shortcomings. Pugh and Lawrence have extensively argued about whether or not the violence 
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displayed by the Fascists at Olympia turned public opinion, politicians and the press against 
Mosley and his movement, or whether, as Pugh has insisted, there remained more public 
opinion, especially among Conservative politicians, sympathetic to Fascism. While the violent 
nature of the Olympia meeting certainly proved a divisive issue, the split may not just have 
occurred along pro- or anti-Fascist lines, but, as has been discussed in this chapter, along the 
line of whether or not observers took Fascism in Britain seriously as a threat to free speech, 
democracy and political culture, or whether they chose to downplay its significance, opting 
instead to trust the ‘inherent’ British ‘immunity’ to extremist ideologies from the continent. 
Fundamentally, then, this was an argument over British exceptionalism and, as this thesis as 
a whole seeks to explore, the public discourse over Fascist violence at Olympia proved a 
potent point of crystallisation for the differing opinions as to whether, or to what extent, Britain’s 
experience of political violence in the interwar period differed significantly from that of its 
continental neighbours. 
     Though perhaps initially seemingly unrelated, or even inappropriate, a theme which 
appeared surprisingly frequently in public debate about British Fascism was that of humour. 
Humour has been described by Martina Kessel as “an important means to negotiate identity 
and belonging” and a “cultural practice that both organized social order and revealed shared 
assumptions about society and politics.”212 Thus, humour actually fits well with the debates 
over an inherent British immunity to Fascism. Humour was invoked in two related ways: on 
the one hand, the BUF were perceived to be lacking a sense of humour, while on the other 
hand, it has been argued that Fascism was an “irresistible target for the British sense of 
humour” which was thus in part responsible for the failure of the movement in Britain. Gottlieb 
has explored this theme and confirms that “BUF propaganda was strikingly lacking of self-
irony or the ability to laugh at itself”; no doubt a fatal shortcoming for any political movement 
hoping to achieve popularity with the British people. The overly serious staging of Fascist 
meetings and marches, complete with Fascist regalia, national symbols, and an attempted 
imitation of the Italian and German cults of the leader, as well as the violent “aestheticization 
of male brutality”, “failed to sell in the British political marketplace.” At the same time, precisely 
due to this pronounced lack of self-irony, Gottlieb asserts that “the movement was easily 
undermined by humour.” Lady Astor, speaking in 1936, gave voice to this notion when she 
described Fascism as “farcical” and asserted that, should it ever come to power in Britain, “we 
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should all die laughing.”213 As these examples show, not everyone shared the concerns, laid 
out above, about the Fascist threat and what consequences an increasingly disorderly and 
violent culture of political meetings would have on free speech and democracy in Britain. 
     In the Commons debate of 14 June, MPs too made reference to humour and whether or 
how it related to Fascism in Britain. O’Connor argued that a certain amount of heckling was 
normal and healthy at a political meeting, and it was proof of the quality of a speaker if he (it 
usually was a ‘he’) showed himself able to handle the interruption when faced with such a test 
of his “wit and humour.” These qualities, by implication, Mosley was thought to be lacking; 
instead of demonstrating his “wit and humour” in dealing with interrupters at Olympia, Mosley 
had immediately stopped speaking every time he was interrupted, powerful electric 
amplification notwithstanding, and had his stewards deal with the interrupters with what many 
perceived to have been excessive force.214 Macquisten (Con) echoed this sentiment. By 
recounting how he himself used to deal with Communist interrupters at his own meetings, 
namely by making a joke at the interrupters’ expense, he claimed that “Mosley […] was born 
without any sense of humour; otherwise he would be able to laugh at himself and not take 
himself so seriously.”215 However, the Fascist leader was not the only victim of this harsh 
judgement of Macquisten’s. Foot, the Liberal MP who had brought the debate before the 
House, and Vyvyan Adams, who seconded Foot’s concerns about the conduct of the Fascists 
at Olympia, came in for the same criticism, being accused by Macquisten of “not being 
endowed with a proper sense of humour.” “If they were,” he continued, evidently not sharing 
in the outrage stirred in many contemporaries by the events, “they would laugh at the whole 
business; it is ridiculous.”216  
     Whether one actually believes that the British Fascists’ alleged lack of a sense of humour 
and their resulting susceptibility to ridicule actually brought about, or at least contributed to, 
the movement’s demise, it is clear that there existed among contemporaries a strong feeling 
that there was something about Fascism – that continental ideology – which was antithetical 
to ‘Britishness’, of which a good sense of humour was, and is, considered such a 
quintessential trait. Prior to their ascension to power, the Nazis were of course also subjected 
to ridicule at the hands of left-wing Weimar intellectuals and writers, for examples in Kurt 
Tuckolsky’s weekly magazine Die Weltbühne. However, it has been argued that on the whole, 
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Germans in the later Weimar years exhibited a pronounced preference for “seemingly 
unpolitical, cheerful entertainment”, pushing liberal and democratic voices to the margins in 
favour of “humorous presentations that were at best paternalistic, at worst outright anti-
democratic.”217 Thus, the National Socialists gained enough support from people who took 
them seriously to reap political success.218 Liberal MP Kingsley Griffith reminded the House of 
this circumstance, urging a little less complacency and a little less proud confidence in British 
immunity to Fascism on his colleagues’ part. “It is not so long ago”, he warned, “since Hitler 
was almost a figure of fun in Germany, and his party an unconsidered party.”219 With the 
benefit of hindsight, and especially as compared to their contemporaries in Italy and Germany, 
the British Fascists are relatively easily dismissed as a comical attempt at imitating the 
continental original, never standing much chance of success. On the other hand, a debate 
about whether, if only Germans had developed a sense of humour in time, the crimes of the 
Nazi regime might have been prevented, seems wholly inappropriate. As the discourses 
analysed in the above section have illuminated, however, British Fascism was not so easily 
dismissed by all contemporaries in the public discourse, and certainly not by members of the 
Jewish community, whom the BUF targeted increasingly openly after 1934. Many took the 
threats to democracy, to the rule of law, and to public order and safety seriously enough to 
protest the BUF’s behaviour, to passionately debate the issues, propose new laws, and to 
organise mass counterdemonstrations, most famously in London’s East End in October 1936. 
     It is noteworthy that, though the shockingly violent character of the Olympia meeting was 
what prompted the intensive public debates in its aftermath, the violence itself was but one of 
many aspects which emerged during those debates. A salient factor in this was that 
contemporary political priorities significantly informed attitudes to the British Union of Fascists. 
The National Government of the time, consisting of members of all major political parties, 
came in for criticism from their backbenches, who blamed some of the success of Mosley’s 
Fascists on the failures of the current government, which had left the electorate disappointed 
and searching for alternatives. Macquisten voiced this criticism most directly, arguing that 
Mosley was “stealing a great deal of the thunder of the Conservative party by declaring that 
he is going to do all the things they said they would do but have not done yet. That is very 
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awkward for the Conservative party.”220 Pugh furthermore has argued that Conservatives, in 
particular, feared the electoral threat of the BUF, if it decided to run candidates against them 
and split the anti-Labour vote.221 It was thus in the interest of the government to vehemently 
oppose the BUF regardless of whether or not they actually agreed or disagreed with what the 
movement stood for and how it pursued its goals. 
     The public debate provoked by the Olympia meeting went deeper than the concerns of 
everyday politics, however. It in fact served as a gateway to discussions of the very essence 
of values such as liberty and democracy, which were consciously constructed as British and 
explicitly in opposition to the failure of free and democratic societies on the European 
continent. At the very bottom of these debates lay the question of free speech, which the 
violent escalation of the Olympia meeting, as the culmination of the contemporary climate of 
political conflict between the extremes and the established parties, posed with increasing 
urgency. As has been explored above, public discourse was spilt between those who regarded 
the right to free speech as absolute, including Fascists’ right to say whatever they wished, 
short of sedition, without any limitations; while on the other hand, those more worried by the 
violent side of Fascist politics argued for new and stronger legislation which would empower 
the executive to prevent such escalations in future and reinforce the state’s monopoly on 
power. Nevertheless, all but the most openly partisan right-wing supporters condemned the 
degree of violence employed by the Fascist stewards at Olympia. The debates of democratic 
values and how to preserve them when Fascists were attempting to unsettle the political status 
quo, were set in motion by the basic fact that an escalation of this scale and a display of this 
level of force, in an extremely public setting in the heart of London, attended by a number of 
Members of Parliament, was highly unusual for Britain at the time and carried enormous 
potential to shock contemporary British public discourse. The arguments over how to deal with 
such an escalation were often tied to appeals to the typical ‘British’ ways of dealing with 
interrupters, by wit rather than violence, as well as being infused with a strong confidence that 
British political culture was inherently ‘immune’ to the authoritarian tendencies witnessed on 
the continent. From this strong sense of British exceptionalism, which, it has been argued 
here, stood at the heart of the Olympia debate, derived a sense that Britain’s role in the world 
was as a beacon of liberty and democracy, guiding the aberrant continental dictatorships back 
to the light. 
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This chapter has examined reactions to instances of Fascist violence in Germany and in 
Britain in the early/mid-1930s. As indicated at the outset, it highlights, more than previous 
chapters of the thesis, the divergent trajectories of British and German experiences of and 
reactions to political violence by this point in time. Though perhaps a relatively minor aspect, 
the dimension of humour, discussed above, in reactions to the BUF is, in itself, an indicator of 
a clear and significant difference. The fact that humorous treatment of a Fascist movement 
was at all conceivable in Britain certainly distinguished how serious of a threat the BUF’s 
violence was perceived to be by contemporaries compared to how much of a challenge to the 
foundations of German democratic republicanism Nazism’s politics of violence posed. The 
SA’s violent power propaganda was too widespread and too brutal to ‘laugh off’. Regarded 
purely in terms of severity, the violence inflicted at Olympia might be considered comparable 
to the injuries inflicted on the Kurfürstendamm. It is surely telling, however, that, in their 
respective domestic contexts, the former prompted a very different kind of debate than the 
latter. What attracted most attention about the Kurfürstendamm rioting was the trial that 
followed, perhaps not least out of a sensationalist interest in well-known defendants like Count 
Helldorf. The kind of violence used by the SA, in itself, was not notable; rioting resulting in 
relatively minor injuries and no fatalities at all was far from the most pressing escalation of 
violence facing the German state in the early 1930s. Parliament was not in session at the time 
of the riot, but once the Reichstag reconvened, the event did not warrant any debate. However, 
while the severity of the attacks itself was not novel in the contemporary German context, their 
location and who they were directed against, in ideological as well as in real terms, did cause 
outrage within media discourse away from the right-wing fringe. As has been emphasised, the 
prominent location on Berlin’s famed bourgeois-bohemian Kurfürstendamm boulevard was 
surprising and unsettling; contemporaries were far more used to clashes between Nazis and 
Communists, which would often deliberately take place in working-class neighbourhoods. 
Given the unexpected location, the riot therefore carried potential to shock and outrage the 
German public. The riot’s openly anti-Semitic nature was undeniable, to an extent even by the 
SA’s legal defence, but, though it was a sign of things to come, in this instance it worked to 
further outrage and shock mainstream opinion, as anti-Semitism was not yet as powerful and 
attractive a theme for the NSDAP to campaign on as it was to become. The fact that non-
Jewish passers-by, both Germans and foreigners, were also attacked by the rioting SA men 
further reinforced the condemnation, especially with concerns over how such acts would 
endanger Germany’s international reputation. 
     At the BUF’s Olympia meeting, the level of injuries sustained was largely comparable to 
those inflicted on the Kurfürstendamm: fists were the main weapons, and headwounds, cuts 
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and bruises were the main results; no deaths occurred. However, an outbreak of violence on 
this scale proved much more unsettling in the contemporary British context, where no political 
movement(s) were engaged in a sustained politics of violence the way the National Socialists, 
and, until their defeat, the Communists, had been in Germany a few years prior. As the above 
chapter has examined, the violent nature of the BUF’s stewarding at the meeting led to 
fundamental questions about the nature of British democracy being asked. While the 
historiography has focused on whether or not the display of violence in June 1934 caused a 
widespread loss of support for the British Fascists, the present analysis has been more 
interested in the kinds of debates which were prompted by the Olympia incident. These 
revolved around foundational elements of a democratic society, such as the nature and 
potential limits of free speech, as well as the role and responsibilities of the state executive in 
maintaining public order; as well as what differentiated British politics and society from the 
increasing number of authoritarian regimes on the European continent. In 1934 the question 
whether the public’s right to unlimited free speech or its right to safety at political meetings 
were more important was still left somewhat unresolved. Only with the passing of the Public 
Order Act in 1936, following the mass public disorder at the ‘Battle of Cable Street’, did the 
executive gain significantly increased powers. Throughout this period, the regimes of Hitler 
and Mussolini were held up in public discourse as warnings of the dangers of Fascism, tying 
the argument closely to supposedly inherently and uniquely British characteristics like 
common sense and a dislike for fascistic methods, which were hoped to inoculate the country 
against those foreign ideologies. 
     At Potempa, a significant line was crossed as to what violence the SA were not only willing 
to use, but, more significantly, what kinds of violence the Nazi leadership was willing to publicly 
defend and associate itself with. The autotelic brutality of Konrad Pietrzuch’s murder was 
shocking to contemporaries, as this kind of violence directed against one defenceless 
individual differed notably from the more familiar street battles or brawls at political meetings 
which the SA was frequently engaged in with Communists. The fact that the National Socialist 
leadership, all the way up to Hitler himself, publicly and emphatically expressed their solidarity 
with the murderers, found ways to defend their actions, and even turned the narrative upside 
down and eventually succeeded at turning the convicted men into (living) martyrs, was an 
unmistakable sign of the toleration and indeed celebration of the politics of violence espoused 
by the Nazi regime. Importantly, this growing toleration of the SA’s highly violent methods also 
increasingly applied to the old elites and the nobility. The case of Count Helldorf’s active 
participation in organising the Kurfürstendamm riots has already been highlighted as an 
important example of old elites’ involvement with and support for the movement and its 
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stormtroopers. Hitler’s declaration of solidarity with the Potempa murderers, furthermore, put 
no dent in Crown Prince Wilhelm’s well-documented public support of the Nazi movement, 
further indicating the shift of old elites’ sympathies towards the National Socialists.222  
     Such a kind of violent politics, and much less its public espousal, was not conceivable in a 
contemporary British context. Examining the reaction within British public discourse to the 
violence surrounding British Fascism side-by-side with the reactions to Nazi violence in 
Germany in the early 1930s is perhaps the most challenging of the case studies chosen for 
this comparative thesis project, as by this point both countries’ experiences with political 
violence were perceived as utterly divergent, with an openly brutal Fascist regime grasping for 
power in Germany while British public discourse espoused a strong sense of exceptionalism 
and held steadfastly on to the image of a ‘peaceable kingdom’. Nevertheless, however 
unintuitive, a comparison between the two countries yields insights into both contexts. Where 
the previous chapters have pointed towards unexpected shared aspects of both countries’ 
experiences with political violence in the interwar period, such as racial dimensions, 
controversial paramilitary bodies, anxieties over preserving order, the state monopoly on 
power, and international prestige, this fourth chapter does more to contrast the two, 
emphasising the differing trajectories taken. The growing public toleration and even 
justification of the SA’s violent power propaganda by not only the National Socialists 
themselves, but by established powers and old elites led to violent methods such as examined 
in this chapter becoming both more commonplace and more defensible in public discourse. A 
critical shift was occurring in both the kind of violence that was employed as part of Nazi 
politics, as well as what was becoming publicly defensible without endangering the Nazi 
party’s chances in the political arena. In Britain, mechanisms of discursively and symbolically 
containing violence and delegitimising the BUF’s use of force remained intact; significantly, 
unlike in Germany, elite voices, including conservative ones, in their vast majority participated 
in this containment. The fact that at this point in time an event of, relatively speaking, minor 
political violence such as the Olympia meeting served to alienate a large part of the British 
public from the Fascist cause (as Lawrence has argued somewhat more convincingly than 
Pugh has argued against it) and prompted earnest debates over fundamental aspects of 
British democracy and freedom, must be regarded as an obvious difference between the two 
countries whose reactions to political violence have been examined over the course of this 
thesis. 
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The First World War, in the words of Jürgen Osterhammel, “disenchanted the West and placed 
a question mark over its claim to rule over, or at least to act as a civilizing guardian for, the 
rest of humanity.”1 Nevertheless, after the end of the war, countries of the ‘West’ continued, 
in both domestic and colonial contexts, to forcefully lay claim to the values of civilisation which, 
on the one hand, had to be defended against acts of ‘uncivilised’ violence, while on the other, 
they occasionally had to be defended by violent means which had to be constructed as 
legitimate. This thesis has investigated the discursive efforts in Britain and Germany to inhabit 
the idea of civilisation, in which violence has been shown to have acted as a key demarcator 
between ‘civilised’ and ‘uncivilised’, between ‘us’ and ‘them’. The rhetorical construction of 
British identity as ‘peaceable’, of Britain as a people and a nation opposed to violence as a 
means of politics, became ‘real’ in interwar Britain, not in actual fact, as is obvious when 
examining peripheral and colonial spaces in particular, but by being repeated often enough in 
public discourse to become a powerful narrative which convinced at least the elite participants 
in those discourses enough to delegitimise violence and talk it, especially domestically, largely 
out of existence. This was not the case in Weimar Germany, where from its inception in defeat 
and revolutionary violence, public discourse was too harshly divided politically for a strong, 
convincing narrative of ‘peaceable’ politics to be successful. This was despite the best efforts 
of many dedicated defenders of the democratic values of the Republic who spoke passionately 
against political violence. Thus, eventually an opposite discourse which actively embraced 
and praised violence as a means of politics, led by the anti-republican Right in parliament and 
in the press and extending to Freikorps, underground organisations, large parts of the 
Reichswehr, and later of course the NSDAP and the SA, proved too strong in the discursive 
fight over the legitimacy of political violence. 
     This thesis has examined these processes via a series of case studies. As much as 
violence as a phenomenon transcended the geographic circles which this thesis is constructed 
around, as much did language do the same, too. Fundamentally, public speech about political 
violence played an important role in both country’s efforts at identity construction. Germany 
emerged from the First World War with what has been described as a “culture of defeat,”2 
everything the German people had known and held dear was broken down or discredited by 
the outcome of the war, causing a catastrophic defeat and destruction of its pre-war identity. 
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Therefore, this thesis has argued, the government of the new German republic and those 
within public discourse supportive of the new state put great rhetorical efforts into establishing 
postwar Germany as a reliable partner of the international community of democratic, ‘civilised’, 
European nations. The fractured political identities in post-/interwar Germany, however, never 
truly allowed this intended narrative to succeed and become a strong point of national 
identification in Weimar Germany. Britain, on the other hand, had experienced a stabilisation 
of its values and a confirmation of its system and identity by emerging from the First World 
War victorious. With reference to France, in particular, Horne has suggested that, in analogy 
to the German ‘culture of defeat’, the Allied victors of the war developed a “’culture of victory’” 
which was characterised by efforts at “reconciling a positive outcome to the war with the 
human price paid.”3 As part of this ‘culture of victory’ this thesis has emphasised how postwar 
British public discourse was governed by a “fear of brutalisation,”4 especially under the 
impression of the violent realities witnessed on the European continent and the menace of 
Bolshevism. As a result, those reacting to political violence in British public discourse took 
great care to characterise it as an ‘un-British’ method, emphasising the importance of values 
which were instead constructed as British, such as justice, law, order, and high international 
prestige as the prime proponent of civilised humanity. This notion of civilisation was, however, 
to be defended against racial, or politically extremist, Others who might upset those values 
and the carefully observed class and gender hierarchies which went along with them. 
     In its first chapter, the thesis has examined political violence taking place in the domestic 
spheres of Britain and Germany respectively. The chapter crucially highlighted the early 
breaking of taboos of violence in the German domestic context. In its effort to establish its 
undisputed authority, the new German government sponsored brutal, and ideologically often 
undemocratic, Freikorps and gave them license to shoot at German civilians to fight off the 
challenge from the extreme Left. In Britain, on the other hand, a fear, even if disproportionate 
to the actual danger, of a ‘continental’ Bolshevik threat caused a strong symbolic reaction 
against left-wing challenges to ‘law and order’. The dimension of political violence in interwar 
Britain and Germany, especially in the domestic spheres, differed vastly; while hundreds, and 
even thousands of civilians were killed in German urban contexts,5 Britain had no comparable 
numbers of deaths, or even of serious injuries. However, significantly, this thesis has 
examined how even much fewer dead or injured bodies could spark a much greater reaction 
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in a British domestic context, while in Weimar Germany the ‘threshold’ for outrage at violence 
grew higher and higher, right from the republic’s conception in the revolutionary period of 
1918-1919. The thesis has furthermore contended that this ‘threshold’ for condemning acts of 
violence changed across the thesis’ geographic circles. Most, and the most severe, of the 
violence examined with regards to Britain occurred not at the centre, like in Germany, but in 
peripheral and colonial spaces. It undoubtedly made a difference to the perceptions and 
constructions of legitimacy of such violence whether one witnessed one’s own neighbour 
sustain injuries from a police baton, or whether one read in the paper of the aerial bombing of 
unfamiliar, unknown, and unseen Iraqi tribes, with no reliable casualty numbers accompanying 
the report either. On the other hand, the thesis has also explored how violence done to just 
one ‘special’ body at the centre of the metropolis, a prominent body representative of the state, 
such as that of Henry Wilson or Walther Rathenau, could take on enormous significance and 
spark strong reactions. 
     The effort at constructing national identities and the role which reactions to political violence 
played in this was a particularly prevalent feature explored in Chapter 2. The violence 
unleashed by state-sponsored paramilitary bodies in the peripheral spaces of Ireland and the 
Baltic eventually threatened the self-images of Britain and Germany in powerful ways. In an 
exhibition of the transnational use of language, the accusation that the Black and Tans were 
behaving like, or worse than, the German ‘Huns’ had during the war, became the ultimate 
means of delegitimising their use in Ireland and attacking the government who increasingly 
lost control over the paramilitary body. The Freikorps’ refusal to return from their anti-Bolshevik 
campaign in the Baltic caused more upset to the German government than did their extreme 
violence; the defiance of orders risked the health and wellbeing of the entire population, as a 
renewed blockade was at stake. Thus, dissociating itself from the rogue paramilitaries was a 
priority for the young German state in order to demonstrate its role as a reliable partner to the 
Allied nations, who shared in their values and understandings of civilised conduct. 
     While Germans had become synonymous with barbarism as a result of the war, German 
politicians and journalists were quick, in turn, to accuse Britain of hypocrisy over its violent 
actions in various colonial settings. Chapter 3 has examined perceptions of political violence 
through the prism of race within the outermost circle, the colonial sphere, as well as in 
situations when colonial bodies came back into the metropolis. The geographic removedness 
of areas like Iraq and Orientalist constructions of civilisation allowed certain kinds of violence 
to be perpetrated and constructed as legitimate, and even as highly civilised, like aerial 
bombing, which would have been unthinkable to commit in the domestic sphere against a 
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‘civilised’, white population. Nevertheless, the fact that there remained contestation within 
public discourse over the policy of aerial bombing was testament to the fundamental difference 
between Britain and Germany, where politics and discourse suffered from much more 
extreme, end eventually unbridgeable, divisions. When ‘darkness’ came to the centre, in the 
shape of colonial soldiers and sailors in British port cities, and French colonial troops of 
occupation in the Rhineland, it was met with hostility and violence by a threatened white 
identity. The chapter has explored the collective racial anxiety for the national body, for which 
white women in particular stood in and whose violation became symbolic of the violation of 
white European nations, culture, and indeed civilisation, by those constructed as lesser. In 
Germany, the extremely racialised language used to vilify French colonial soldiers fed into 
later National Socialist imagery and policy. 
     The thesis ends with an examination of receptions of Fascist violence in Britain and 
Germany, respectively. Extending its view as far as the early/mid-1930s has allowed the thesis 
to chart how public discourses on political violence had changed over the course of the 
interwar period. The chapter demonstrated how narratives established in 1919 and the early 
1920s had become strengthened by this later point. Public discourse itself had continued to 
drift apart and become more fragmented and extreme in Germany, while in the UK there 
remained a stronger consensus that political violence was not part of Britain’s ‘peaceable’ 
identity and instead emphasis was placed once again on law and order. The fact that the 
Fascist challenge led to open and heated debate over the principles and limits of free speech 
suggested, on the one hand, that the phenomenon of British Fascism was not entirely 
laughable, but, on the other hand, only served to exhibit that the established mechanisms of 
democratic debate remained intact in Britain to an extent that was long gone in Germany’s 
public discourse. Targeted anti-Semitic violence came to the fore in this chapter, but as a 
theme in framing violent attacks it had been prominent, too, in the assassination of Walther 
Rathenau and in how the leaders of the Munich Councils’ Republic were delegitimised. 
Crucially, following the breaking of taboos of violence early on in the Weimar Republic, by the 
early 1930s elites began aligning themselves with the Nazis’ brand of violence, lending it 
credibility and shifting significantly what was regarded as permissible. 
     Some of the personal continuities which have weaved their way through a number of the 
case studies examined in this thesis are worth pointing out again in these concluding 
reflections. In Germany, there were many men among them, trained in violence as their trade, 
for whom the cataclysm of the First World War left a void of meaning which they chose to fill 
by continuing their ‘careers of violence’, searching for redemption. Franz Ritter von Epp’s 
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‘career of violence’, already sketched out in Chapter 3, stretched from directing pre-war 
colonial genocide in modern-day Namibia, via the battlefields of the First World War, to 
commanding his eponymous Freikorps in 1919, and ended as director of the Nazi Colonial 
Office. Josef Bischoff, introduced in Chapter 2, had also participated in the genocidal fighting 
in ‘German South West Africa’, achieved the rank of major during the First World War, and 
after the war commanded the Eiserne Division in the Baltic, staunchly refusing to return to 
Germany.6 Chapter 2 also introduced Ernst von Salomon, who was only sixteen years old at 
the end of the war and thus too young to have actively participated in the fighting. However, 
like many of his generation, he enthusiastically threw himself into the Freikorps’ Baltic 
campaign and his writings on his and his comrades’ experiences became highly successful in 
Weimar Germany. He continued to be published until the 1970s. Following his Baltic 
‘adventure’, Salomon joined the right-wing extremist underground Organisation Consul and in 
1922 received a five-year prison sentence for aiding and abetting the murder of Foreign 
Minister Walther Rathenau (cf. Chapter 1).7 Wilhelm Reinhard, a veteran of the First World 
War and subsequently commander of an eponymous Freikorps, was asked by the German 
government to assist in quelling the Spartacus uprising in January and to take part in the 
‘March fighting’ in Berlin in 1919. In response to the request for troops he replied simply, “the 
best assistance is the bullet. You should shoot.”8 As early as 1919, he clearly expressed no 
qualms about shooting German civilians in the German capital, indicating that critical taboos 
of violence were already being broken. His ‘career of violence’ continued in the NSDAP and 
eventually led him to the rank of SS-Obergruppenführer.  
     British ‘careers of violence’ have also threaded their way through the preceding chapters. 
From common fighters, like Douglas Duff who, as a “free-companion”, chose to hire out his 
“sword” to the highest bidder,9 to men who rose up to be organisers of violence at a higher 
level, like Henry Wilson, Winston Churchill, H.H. Tudor, who created the ADRIC (Chapter 2) 
before commanding the British Gendarmerie in Palestine, or Hugh Trenchard, who founded 
the RAF and later became Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police. Their use of violence 
was officially condoned and organised. Against the redemptive backdrop of victory in the war, 
and under the influence of a postwar fear of brutalisation, violence was done in the name of 
preserving law and order, to defend justice, civilisation and ‘British values’. On the one hand, 
British violence often took place away from the metropole, on its periphery, and against people 
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9 Cf. Duff, Sword for Hire 
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who were constructed as ‘other’, making it more easily defensible in public discourse. On the 
other hand, it was also continually subject to critical debate within that domestic public 
discourse. Both circumstances, the rhetorical construction of violence as a sensible, if 
regrettable, means for ensuring stability, whether in Glasgow, Dublin, or Baghdad, as well as 
its continued critical examination within public discourse, were important in explaining Britain’s 
lack of the extreme escalations of violence witnessed in Germany. However, significantly, this 
kind of British violence did not experience the caesura of 1945. It carried on in the conflicts of 
decolonisation. 
     It is necessary to openly acknowledge this thesis’ ‘vanishing point’. The historical reality, 
which is not part of the thesis as such, but which informs its research interest, is of course the 
failure of Germany’s first republic, the rise of National Socialism, the collapse of civilisation 
under the ‘Third Reich’ and the genocide of Europe’s Jews. This thesis also considers itself to 
be contributing in its own way to the manifold attempts at explaining this. By its comparative 
approach, it can help show how disparate experiences of/with political violence could be in 
interwar Europe. Research with a close focus on just German history might lead, and of course 
has led in the past, to conclusions of a German ‘Sonderweg’, making this amount of political 
violence and its normalisation appear inevitable. Exclusive study of British, especially 
domestic British history, on the other hand, might lead to assertions that interwar Britain was 
indeed a ‘peaceable kingdom’ in which political violence was a “striking absence.”10 In 
comparing the two, diverse experiences can be discerned, which highlight the varied 
possibilities, opportunities, imaginations, and choices faced by contemporaries. Yet, having 
acknowledged both, the ways in which this comparative approach works to highlight the 
specificities of each country’s path, as well as reminding us that those paths were not 
inevitable, this thesis also shows the fundamentally common European experience of political 
violence in the interwar period. Even if the dimensions differed significantly, the experience 
and perpetration of political violence can be regarded as a trait or process integrative to 
European identity in the interwar era.11 It was especially recurrent as a means of demarcating 
civilisation and defining varying notions of civilised conduct and identity in the face of 
‘barbarous’, ‘uncivilised’, often colonial, Others, but also to strive towards defining national 
identities and values domestically. This thesis has shown that this process of negotiating the 
boundaries of legitimacy took place differently in British and German public discourse, even if 
 
10 Gregory, “Peculiarities”, p. 54. 
11 This notion is here inspired by Robert Gerwarth and Stephan Malinowski, “Europeanization through 
Violence? War Experiences and the Making of Modern Europe”, in Martin Conway and Kiran Klaus 
Patel (eds.), Europeanization in the Twentieth Century. Historical Approaches (Basingstoke, 2010), pp. 
189-209. 
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often similar themes occurred, as political violence played different roles in the rhetorical 
identity construction in either country. In Britain, the continuous, unresolved tension between 
self-constructions as a ‘peaceable kingdom’ and the violent reality, especially in peripheral 
and colonial spaces, was expressed vividly in public discourse where the efforts at 
constructing Britishness were carried out and debated. In Germany, if one follows Jones’ 
argumentation, a postwar brutalisation had taken place when the state had used extraordinary 
violence to found its authority, permitting German soldiers to kill German civilians, women and 
children, in an inner-German urban context. Therefore, this tension, which in Britain was 
negotiated in public discourse with a certain consensus on boundaries remaining intact, was 
heightened in German public discourse, which was much more harshly divided into extremes, 
with consensus increasingly slipping away. Where British public language successfully if 
robustly debated the legitimate and illegitimate uses of political violence, in Germany both the 
sphere of public discourse as well as the people perpetrating or experiencing it, soon began 
to get used to violence as a means of politics, the state consistently failing to control it, with 
the challenge to those committing acts of political violence less unified. 
     The urge to not become used to political violence as something ‘normal’ continues in the 
present. As was acknowledged early on, this thesis has been shaped conceptually by its 
contemporary context. The past several years have seen a proliferation of opinions, put 
forward by journalists and historians alike, about whether we are currently ‘re-living’ the 1930s, 
whether fascism is making a global return, about the dangers of twenty-first century populism 
and illiberalism, and what the similarities and the crucial differences are between then and 
now.12 The (short-lived) election of a new liberal minister-president in the German state of 
Thuringia, elected with the help of votes from the right-wing Alternative für Deutschland party 
in early 2020, caused an uproar, forcing the resignation of the 1-day minister-president, and 
led to much debate as to whether Germany was witnessing the re-emergence of ‘Weimar 
conditions’, which would threaten its foundations and give way to völkisch ideologies. 
Commentators have been undecided on these questions, some emphasising similarities, 
danger, and the worries of especially Germany’s Jewish community, others emphasising 
 
12 Paul Mason, “Are we living through another 1930s?”, Guardian, 01.08.2016, 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/aug/01/are-we-living-through-another-1930s-paul-
mason; Andrew Gawthorpe, “Is this fascism? No. Could it become fascism? Yes”, Guardian, 
31.07.2019, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/jul/31/is-this-fascism-no-could-it-
become-fascism-yes; Francis Beckett, “Britain can be as prone to fascism as any other nation”, 
Spectator, 11.04.2020, https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/britain-can-be-as-prone-to-fascism-as-any-
other-nation; Mark Mazower, “Fascism revisited? A warning about the rise of populism”, Financial 
Times, 11.04.2018, https://www.ft.com/content/6d57a338-3be9-11e8-bcc8-cebcb81f1f90; Christopher 
R. Browning, “The Suffocation of Democracy”, The New York Review of Books, 25.08.2018, 
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2018/10/25/suffocation-of-democracy/ [all accessed 11.05.2020]. 
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differences between then and now and arguing in favour of confronting current threats to 
democracy in their own right rather than as a re-hashing of interwar history.13 Regardless of 
their differences in opinion, these debates highlight the continued, or rather renewed, interest 
in political violence as a phenomenon not exclusive to a bygone era, its danger in the 
contemporary political context, as well as the centrality of language, especially public 
language, in its propagation, in its justification, in trying to “push the boundaries,”14 as well as 
in the efforts to confront and fight these trends.15 In this area there lie obvious opportunities 
for further research into the role and power of language in promoting, and in opposing, political 
violence, bound unreservedly to concerns of the present and with potential applications in 
education, media practices, or informed policy making. 
     This thesis has worked to integrate a variety of historiographies which are often kept 
separate and thus wishes to contribute to more multi-faceted study of interwar histories of 
political violence, more in line with the complex realities of how violence and public language 
actually interacted and transcended geography. The thesis has examined British and Irish 
history in a more cohesive manner in Chapter 2, it has contributed to studying domestic British 
and imperial histories more holistically in Chapter 3, and it has especially sought to integrate 
British and wider European history, which are most often treated separately due to the 
divergent dimensions of political violence experienced in Britain and on the continent. The 
thesis is neither solely a study of interwar Britain, nor of interwar Germany. Instead, it has 
successfully demonstrated that comparative histories of Britain and Germany in the interwar 
period, even with a focus on political violence, are both possible and can contribute to a better 
understanding of both. Especially the interest in perception and language, rather than analysis 
of the acts of violence themselves, has enabled this kind of comparative work. While many of 
the case studies chosen for this thesis are well-studied individually, the unique manner in 
which they have been brought together here, across traditional historiographic boundaries and 
in a bi-national comparison, has worked to highlight some common themes in the discourses 
examined (not only between Germany and Britain, but also between different case studies 
from the same country). By examining these disparate case studies in one thesis, the study 
 
13 “Historiker: Völkische Inhalte heute nicht mehrheitsfähig. Wolfram Pyta im Gespräch mit Bettina 
Köster”, Deutschlandfunk, 06.02.2020, https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/vergleiche-mit-weimarer-
republik-historiker-voelkische.1148.de.html?dram:article_id=469734; “‘Das erinnert verdächtig an 
Weimarer Verhältnisse‘”, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 06.02.2020, 
https://www.sueddeutsche.de/kultur/michael-brenner-thueringen-afd-fdp-antisemitismus-1.4787085 
[all accessed 11.05.2020]. 
14 As quoted and discussed in Introduction, Alexander Gauland, then leader of Germany’s right-wing 
Alternative für Deutschland party, cited in Séville, “Vom Sagbaren zum Machbaren?”. 
15 Yuliya Komska, “In search of an anti-fascist language”, Boston Review, 17.05.2019, 
http://bostonreview.net/politics/yuliya-komska-search-anti-fascist-language [accessed 11.05.2020]. 
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counteracts historiographic exceptionalism, most deliberately through the Europeanisation of 
British historiography. The myth of the “peaceable kingdom” has been clearly identified as just 
that, a myth which does not stand up when the broader imperial context is considered, as this 
thesis argues it should. Nevertheless, differences in the nature of the discourses examined 
have been highlighted and acknowledged throughout as pivotal to explaining the familiar 
divergences in political violence and political culture which ultimately characterised interwar 
Britain and Germany. The foil of British public language served to underscore the extreme 
divisions which characterised German reception of political violence. 
     By choosing to reject traditional historiographical boundaries between studying political 
violence in these two countries, this work has pointed towards the direction which much 
research in future will no doubt take and which this thesis is most closely related to: conducting 
more comparative, and transnational, studies, integrating diverse European, and even global, 
experiences into more complex stories of political violence in the aftermath of the First World 
War, consciously including imperial dimensions, and acknowledging the interactions and 
reverberations between centre and periphery which applied not only to the practice of political 
violence but also, crucially, to the language used to speak about it. Of course, this research 
could in future be expanded to include different kinds of sources which will help reconstruct 
different voices, experiences, and opinions, to examine perceptions of and attitudes towards 
political violence in other forums, such as in more private spheres, in cultural spheres, or to 
examine political language which was explicitly not public, but rather kept secret. With a view 
to the later, post-1945 era, this thesis’ approach may be adapted to the history of 
decolonisation. These often very violent processes could be examined with similar methods 
to study how attitudes towards political violence changed after the Second World War and/or 
during various conflicts of decolonisation and how those conducting public discourses dealt 
rhetorically with violence as part of (post-)colonial identity construction. Changed international 
and legal frameworks post-1945 could make for particularly interesting contexts in which the 
role of violence and its rhetorical justifications had to exist and be re-examined.16 More 
generally, the area of language and conflict studies, which straddles the disciplines of history, 
linguistics, and other social sciences, constitutes a promising emergent field for future 
interdisciplinary research to which this thesis considers itself related.17 
 
16 One example of research in this area is Dirk Moses, “The Language of Transgression before and 
after the Holocaust”, lecture delivered at the Institute of European Studies, University of California, 
Berkeley, 18.04.2017, https://ies.berkeley.edu/blog/language-transgression-and-after-holocaust 
[accessed 13.05.2020]. 
17 See for example Michael Kelly, Hilary Footitt, Myriam Salama-Carr (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook 
of Languages and Conflict (London, 2019). 
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     One epitomising image on which this thesis might end would be the year 1938, when violent 
politics had long carried the day in Germany but were still met by, in retrospect naïve, efforts 
at appeasement by a British government which continued to believe in negotiation and 
consensus-building. The developments charted in this thesis point towards this moment. The 
thesis could, however, also, and perhaps more strikingly, end on the image of SS leader 
Heinrich Himmler’s speech at Posen (Poznań) on 4 October 1943. In the speech, Himmler 
chose to address his audience of SS group leaders “in all openness” about the “extermination 
of the Jews.” Yet, he was quick to qualify this by stressing that his openness in speaking of 
the ongoing extermination was only “in private” (unter uns) and that in fact, “we will never 
speak about it in public.” He described the genocide as a “glorious chapter [Ruhmesblatt] 
never written and never to be written.”18 This thesis has explored how boundaries of the ‘say-
able’ were negotiated and pushed, and how language was used to condemn or justify certain 
acts of political violence in public. These processes went further in the extremely divided public 
discourse of interwar Germany than they did in Britain, where mechanisms, crucially including 
conservative voices, for the rhetorical and symbolic containment of violence remained much 
more intact. Nevertheless, even in 1943, amid a war of extermination of unprecedented 
brutality, there remained among the perpetrators a sense that some things were not, and 
would never be, ‘say-able’ in public. The dissolution of the boundaries of violence and of how 
violence could be spoken of publicly, which this thesis has examined over the interwar period, 
undoubtedly contributed to the fact that the acts Himmler referred to could be committed at 
all. Yet the observation that some discursive boundaries remained in place even at the 
moment of the twentieth century’s most radical perpetration of violence, serves as a stark 
reminder that though discourse can influence reality, “it does not determine it.”19 Though 
publicly the discursive veneer of civilisation may be left intact, actions often have transgressed 
it. 
 
18 “Rede des Reichsführers SS bei der SS-Gruppenführertagung in Posen am 4. Oktober 1943”, online 
at https://www.1000dokumente.de/pdf/dok_0008_pos_de.pdf, p. 25 [accessed 13.05.2020]. 
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